OCGA § 15-11-32 Precludes Setting Aside Juvenile Termination Orders for Post-Judgment Counsel Mistakes

Introduction

This case arises from the Court of Appeals of Georgia’s review of a juvenile court’s denial of a mother’s post-judgment motions following the termination of her parental rights to her eight-year-old child, M.R.S. After the juvenile court terminated her parental rights, her trial counsel filed a notice of appeal but failed to comply with the discretionary review procedures under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(12). New counsel subsequently filed three remedies—an out-of-time appeal, a motion to set aside under OCGA § 15-11-32 and a motion for new trial—each of which was denied. On appeal, the mother challenged (1) the denial of her motion to set aside the termination order and (2) the merits of the termination itself. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals held that:

OCGA § 15-11-32(a) authorizes setting aside a juvenile court order only if it was obtained by fraud, mistake sufficient therefor in the underlying judgment, lack of jurisdiction or newly discovered evidence. An error by counsel in filing an appeal post-judgment does not satisfy subsection (a)(1). The “mistake” must relate to how the judgment itself was obtained, not to subsequent appellate procedures.
The mother’s motion to set aside based on trial counsel’s post-judgment appellate error was properly denied as an abuse of process. No Georgia authority compels resetting a juvenile termination timeline for a parent’s counselial mistake after entry of the order.
The mother’s enumeration of errors did not encompass her separately filed motion for an out-of-time appeal, so that ruling is not before the court.
Because an appeal from denial of a motion to set aside under the juvenile code permits review only of the order denying that motion, not the merits of the termination itself, the Court of Appeals could not reach the mother’s challenge to the termination order.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

OCGA § 15-11-32(a) – The juvenile code’s analogue to OCGA § 9-11-60(d)(1), permitting a court to set aside orders obtained by fraud, mistake sufficient therefor, lack of jurisdiction, or newly discovered evidence.
Cheuvront v. Carter, 263 Ga. App. 837 (589 SE2d 609, 2003) – Emphasizes the requirement that the mistake must relate to the entry of the judgment.
In the Interest of H.A.M., 201 Ga. App. 49 (410 SE2d 319, 1991) – Treats OCGA § 15-11-32 motions as akin to OCGA § 9-11-60(d) motions in civil cases.
Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 (870 SE2d 758, 2022) – Holds that criminal defendants cannot use a trial-court out-of-time appeal procedure to bypass habeas corpus.
Wallace v. State, 303 Ga. 34 (810 SE2d 93, 2018) & Tyson v. Scottsdale Indem. Co., 343 Ga. App. 370 (805 SE2d 138, 2017) – Bar expanding an enumeration of errors to include rulings not explicitly raised.
Felix v. State, 271 Ga. 534 (523 SE2d 1, 1999) – Instructs liberal construction of appellate enumerations and the duty to decide on the merits when possible.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s central reasoning rests on the plain language of OCGA § 15-11-32(a). Subsection (1) allows setting aside a judgment “obtained by…mistake sufficient therefor in a civil action.” That phrase has consistently been interpreted to mean a mistake in obtaining the underlying judgment, not a subsequent procedural misstep by counsel. Citing Cheuvront and H.A.M., the court held that an appellate filing error is not cognizable under § 15-11-32(a)(1). For out-of-time appeals, the court noted that the mother did not enumerate denial of that motion as error; under Wallace and Tyson, the court could not consider it.

Impact

Juvenile practitioners must ensure that appeals from termination orders strictly comply with OCGA § 5-6-35 procedures; post-judgment counselial mistakes will not reopen the statutory timeframe.
Parents and counsel should explore other remedies (e.g., direct discretionary applications) but cannot rely on § 15-11-32 to reset an appellate clock.
The decision reiterates the strict separation between relief available under the juvenile code and habeas-type remedies, reaffirming procedural finality in termination cases.
The Court of Appeals’ refusal to consider issues not enumerated highlights the continuing importance of precise error listings, despite liberal construction principles in Felix.

Complex Concepts Simplified

OCGA § 15-11-32 Motion: A petition to vacate a juvenile court order for fraud, mistake in the judgment itself, lack of jurisdiction, or newly found evidence.
Out-of-Time Appeal: A request to extend or reopen the deadline for filing an appeal after the statutory period has lapsed.
Notice of Appeal vs. Discretionary Application: A notice invokes a right to appeal; a discretionary application asks the appellate court to choose whether to review.
Enumeration of Errors: A listing in the appellate brief of the trial court’s rulings the appellant wants reviewed. Courts will not consider rulings not listed.
Habeas Corpus Act: A statutory procedure (OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq.) allowing criminal defendants to challenge unconstitutional deprivations of liberty after conviction. Cook holds that this is the exclusive remedy for criminal appeals blocked by counsel error.

Conclusion

This decision cements the principle that post-judgment attorney errors in juvenile termination cases cannot, under OCGA § 15-11-32(a), form a basis to set aside a termination order. It underscores the critical need for strict procedural compliance in termination appeals and reinforces that relief under the juvenile code is limited to mistakes affecting the original judgment. Finally, it reminds practitioners to enumerate every desired ruling in their briefs, as courts will refuse to consider omitted issues even when they relate to fundamental appellate rights.