OADA Exclusivity Preempts IIED Claims Arising from the Same Operative Facts as Employment Discrimination

Case: BAUGHMAN v. WORLD ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION (2025 OK 57)  |  Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma  |  Date: 2025-09-16

I. Introduction

Dionne Baughman sued her former employer, World Acceptance Corporation of Oklahoma, Inc., and its parent, World Acceptance Corporation (collectively “WAC”), alleging she was terminated while dealing with significant physical and mental health issues, including cancer history and an asserted “mental breakdown” while on leave. Notably, Baughman pleaded only a single cause of action: intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), expressly disclaiming reliance on other state or federal remedies.

WAC moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds, including that the IIED claim was preempted by the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (OADA). The original trial judge granted summary judgment; after reassignment, the new judge vacated that ruling. WAC appealed the order vacating summary judgment as an appealable interlocutory order. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the appeal and reversed.

The case presented two interlocking issues: (1) whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to review an order vacating summary judgment, and (2) whether an IIED claim rooted in alleged disability discrimination may proceed outside the OADA’s exclusive remedial scheme.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the order vacating summary judgment was immediately appealable by right because it vacated a final judgment disposing of the only claim. On the merits, the Court held Baughman’s IIED claim was preempted by the OADA because it was not independent of the alleged discriminatory employment practice; it arose from the same core facts that would support a statutory disability discrimination claim (termination and alleged mistreatment related to disability and leave).

The Court rejected Baughman’s attempt to avoid OADA exclusivity by characterizing the tort as “highly personal,” concluding her allegations remained “firmly rooted” in employment actions rather than extreme personal invasions (e.g., sexual assault cases) that can constitute distinct torts.

The Court reversed the order vacating summary judgment and remanded with instructions to reinstate the original summary judgment for WAC.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Appellate jurisdiction and characterization of post-judgment motions

• Matter of K.S. (2017 OK 16): Provided the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing an order vacating a judgment, including the principle that legal error constitutes an abuse.
• Bank of Oklahoma, N.A. v. Red Arrow Marina Sales & Service (2009 OK 77): Used to justify de novo review of the underlying summary-judgment correctness when assessing whether vacatur was an abuse of discretion.
• H2K Tech, Inc. v. WSP USA, Inc. (2021 OK 59) and Tiger v. Verdigris Valley Elec. Coop. (2016 OK 74): Reinforced summary-judgment principles—legal determinations reviewed de novo and inferences viewed for the nonmovant.
• Lincoln Farm, L.L.C. v. Oplinger (2013 OK 85): Confirmed that a denial of summary judgment is not an interlocutory order appealable by right, which framed the jurisdictional dispute.
• Smith v. City of Stillwater (2014 OK 42) and Schepp v. Hess (1989 OK 28): Supported the Court’s treatment of a timely “motion to reconsider” as a motion for new trial/vacate that affects appeal timing.
• Reeds v. Walker (2006 OK 43): Explained that a “new trial” motion is statutorily authorized even after summary judgment, despite the phrase’s semantic awkwardness.
• LCR, Inc. v. Linwood Properties (1996 OK 73): Distinguished; there the “summary judgment” was only partial and non-final, so vacating it was not appealable by right. Here, summary judgment disposed of the entire case.
• Moore v. Haley (2021 OK 37): Cited for the requirement that a summary order must comply with final-judgment formalities (contextual support for recognizing the later journal entry as final).

2. OADA exclusivity and legislative displacement of common law remedies

• Burk v. K-Mart Corp. (1989 OK 22): Originated the public-policy wrongful discharge tort (“Burk tort”) as an exception to at-will employment, setting the historical stage.
• Tate v. Browning-Ferris Indus. (1992 OK 72): Extended Burk tort concepts to OADA violations and articulated the key interpretive rule that statutory remedies are cumulative unless the statute declares exclusivity.
• MacDonald v. Corp. Integris Health (2014 OK 10): Recognized that the 2011 OADA amendments clearly abolished common-law remedies for employment discrimination, validating the Legislature’s “exclusive remedies” policy choice.
• Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co. (1917 OK 47) and Knox v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. (2024 OK 37): Cited for the Legislature’s power to modify/abolish common-law causes of action by providing an exclusive statutory remedy, while requiring clear expression.

3. Federal persuasive authority and “same operative facts” framework

• Jones v. Needham (10th Cir. 2017): The Court found persuasive the “dispositive question” approach—whether the tort arises from the same operative facts as a discrimination claim; if yes, it is barred regardless of label.
• Patterson v. Rural Water Dist. 2 (W.D. Okla. 2020): Illustrated preemption where common-law claims are predicated on the same facts as OADA discrimination theories.
• Cunningham v. Skilled Trade Services, Inc. (W.D. Okla. 2015), Branum v. Orscheln Farm & Home, L.L.C. (E.D. Okla. 2019), and Brock v. United States (9th Cir. 1995): Discussed in addressing the claimed “highly personal tort” exception; the Court distinguished the sexual-assault line of cases as involving conduct beyond ordinary employment actions.

4. Elements comparisons (used to show factual overlap)

• Computer Publications, Inc. v. Welton (2002 OK 50): Provided the elements of IIED.
• Hawkins v. Schwan's Home Serv., Inc. (10th Cir. 2015): Provided the federal ADA prima facie framework (used comparatively to underscore that the same factual nucleus underlies both theories).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why the appeal was allowed (vacatur vs. denial)

The Court rejected Baughman’s jurisdictional argument that the appeal was really from a “denial of summary judgment.” It drew a sharp procedural distinction: a denial of summary judgment is not immediately appealable, but an order vacating a final judgment is expressly appealable by right. The characterization mattered because Judge Walkley’s summary judgment resolved the only claim, satisfying the finality definition of 12 O.S.2021 §§ 681 and 953, making Judge Virgin’s vacatur order appealable under §§ 952(b)(2) and 993(A)(8).

2. OADA exclusivity: statutory text + “same operative facts” test

The Court treated the 2011 OADA amendments as the decisive shift: by revising § 1101 and enacting § 1350, the Legislature declared the OADA the exclusive remedy under state law for discriminatory employment practices. Against that backdrop, the Court framed preemption around whether the plaintiff’s common-law tort is genuinely independent or merely a relabeled discrimination claim.

To operationalize exclusivity, the Court adopted (as persuasive) the federal approach: the “dispositive question” is whether the IIED claim arises from the same operative facts as a claim actionable under the OADA. If the harm flows from alleged discriminatory employment practices—termination, leave handling, accommodation failures, disability-related treatment—then the common-law claim is barred.

3. Application to Baughman’s pleaded facts

Baughman filed an OADA administrative charge alleging disability discrimination (physical and mental). Her later IIED petition, despite disclaiming statutory causes, relied on the same narrative: employer reactions to health disclosures, leave communications, supervisors’ inquiries about returning, exclusion from the workplace, and termination during the leave dispute. The Court deemed these “quintessential allegations of disability discrimination” within the OADA’s scope; the asserted emotional distress “flows directly” from the same employment actions that would form the statutory claim.

4. Rejection of the “highly personal tort” bypass

The Court acknowledged that some federal cases allow tort claims alongside discrimination claims when the conduct is independently tortious in a way that is qualitatively different from discrimination (e.g., sexual assault). But it refused to create (or apply) such an exception here, emphasizing:

• the OADA’s text contains no express “highly personal tort” carve-out;
• even if an exception could exist in theory, Baughman’s proof did not show conduct distinct from employment discrimination;
• the alleged wrong was fundamentally “the manner and circumstances of her termination,” not an extreme personal invasion outside ordinary workplace decision-making.

C. Impact

• Clarifies OADA’s reach beyond Burk: The decision reinforces that post-2011, plaintiffs cannot resurrect Burk-style or other common-law damages theories (including IIED) when the factual nucleus is discriminatory employment action covered by the OADA.
• Adopts a practical preemption metric: By embracing the “same operative facts” framework discussed in Jones v. Needham and applied in federal OADA cases, the Court gives litigants and trial courts a workable test focused on factual gravamen rather than pleading labels.
• Pleading strategy consequences: Plaintiffs who “plead around” the OADA by omitting statutory counts risk dismissal if the tort theory repackages discrimination. Conversely, defendants gain a clearer path to summary judgment on tort claims that mirror discrimination narratives.
• Procedural certainty: The opinion strengthens appellate access to review orders vacating final judgments, and underscores the importance of how post-judgment motions are treated when filed within ten days.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Preemption” (here): Not federal supremacy preemption, but state statutory displacement—the Legislature made the OADA the exclusive state-law remedy for workplace discrimination, so overlapping common-law claims are not allowed.
• “Same operative facts”: If the tort claim depends on proving the same workplace conduct that would prove discrimination (e.g., firing because of disability, mishandling accommodation/leave), then the statute controls and the tort is barred.
• “Motion to reconsider”: Oklahoma looks at what the motion does, not its label. If it seeks to reopen/vacate a final judgment within ten days, it functions like a new-trial/vacatur motion under the statutes.
• “Finality” vs. “appealability”: A judgment is “final” when it resolves all claims and parties; an order may still be “appealable” mid-case if a statute authorizes an immediate appeal (as with an order vacating a final judgment).

V. Conclusion

BAUGHMAN v. WORLD ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION tightens and operationalizes the OADA’s 2011 exclusivity mandate: when the alleged emotional distress is caused by discriminatory employment practices within the OADA’s coverage, IIED cannot be used as an end-run around the statute. The Court also confirms that an order vacating a final summary judgment is immediately appealable by right and reiterates that post-judgment “reconsideration” motions are governed by substance, not labels.

Disposition: Reversed; remanded with instructions to reinstate summary judgment for defendants.