NYCHRL “Marital Status” Limited to General Condition, Not Specific Spousal Relationships

Introduction

Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC (2d Cir. Apr. 8, 2025) addressed whether the New York City Human Rights Law’s prohibition on “marital status” discrimination extends to adverse employment actions taken because an employee is married to, or divorcing, a specific individual. Kelvin Hunter, long-time executive producer of The Wendy Williams Show, alleged he was fired by the show’s producer, Debmar-Mercury LLC, immediately after his divorce filing from Wendy Williams. Hunter sued under the NYCHRL, claiming that his termination was “solely because of his marital status” in relation to Williams. The district court denied the producer’s motion to dismiss, certified the question for interlocutory appeal, and the Second Circuit panel granted review.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, reversing the district court, held that “marital status” under the NYCHRL refers only to the general legal condition of being single, married, separated, divorced or widowed, and does not encompass discrimination based on one’s marriage or divorce relative to a particular person. Applying its de novo review standard, the panel concluded that the New York Court of Appeals’ recent decision in McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. confirmed that the term is uniform across both employment and housing provisions and cannot be stretched to cover “specific-person relationships.” The Court therefore vacated the dismissal denial and remanded for further proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1. Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board (1980): The New York Court of Appeals rejected a marital-status discrimination claim under the state law when an employee was fired “because she was married to her manager,” holding that “marital status” protects only the condition of being married or not, not the identity of the spouse.

2. Hudson View Properties v. Weiss (1983): Extended the Manhattan Pizza Hut construction to the NYCHRL’s housing discrimination provisions, reaffirming that “marital status” means the objective condition, not the personal relationship.

3. Levin v. Yeshiva University (2001): Reiterated the distinction under both city and state human rights laws between the abstract status of marriage and the existence of a particular marriage relationship.

4. Morse v. Fidessa Corporation (App. Div. 2018): An intermediate appellate court held that post-2005 and 2016 amendments rendered “marital status” broad enough to include specific-person discrimination, but left room for the New York Court of Appeals to clarify.

5. McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. (N.Y. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2024): The New York Court of Appeals definitively construed “marital status” as the general legal condition of marriage, divorced, separated, or single, and rejected any context-specific expansions, explicitly overruling Morse.

Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit began by accepting all factual allegations in Hunter’s complaint as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. It then identified the narrow legal question: did “marital status” under the NYCHRL encompass an employee’s marriage to a specific individual? The panel surveyed state precedents, noted the district court’s doubts about Morse, and observed that the New York Court of Appeals had since resolved the conflict in McCabe.

Drawing on McCabe’s clear statutory interpretation—“marital status reflects the legal condition of being single, married, legally separated, divorced, or widowed”—the panel applied the familiar canon against varying statutory definitions in different contexts. It emphasized that the term must bear a uniform meaning in employment and housing provisions and that Hunter’s claim rested on his relationship to Wendy Williams, not on his general status. The panel thus held the complaint failed to state a NYCHRL claim.

Impact

This decision clarifies and cements the scope of marital-status protections under the NYCHRL. Employers, landlords, and courts now have definitive guidance that adverse actions based on marriage or divorce with a particular person do not violate “marital status” discrimination provisions. Future litigants must allege discrimination because an individual is married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed—not because of the identity or status of the spouse. The ruling also limits attempts to expand NYCHRL protections through creative interpretations of “status” terms.

Complex Concepts Simplified

NYCHRL: The New York City Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination by employers, landlords and others on various protected characteristics, including “marital status.”
Marital-Status Discrimination: Under the NYCHRL, an employer cannot treat an employee unfavorably because they are married, single, divorced, separated or widowed—but does not extend to whom they are or have been married to.
Summary Order: A non-precedential appellate decision resolving a case without full panel briefing; this order, however, cites precedential authority and garners binding effect on remand.
Interlocutory Appeal: An appeal of a trial court’s non-final order—here permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)—to resolve important questions before final judgment.
De Novo Review: The standard under which an appellate court reviews a lower court’s legal conclusions without deference to the district court’s interpretation.

Conclusion

Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC delivers a clear and uniform definition of “marital status” under the NYCHRL: it is confined to the abstract legal condition of marriage, not to relationships with specific individuals. In doing so, the Second Circuit aligns with the New York Court of Appeals’ authoritative guidance in McCabe, resolves conflicting lower-court interpretations, and sets a predictable framework for employers, housing providers, and litigants. The decision underscores the principle that statutory terms should bear a consistent meaning across all applications, ensuring that legislative text—rather than shifting judicial readings—bounds the reach of anti-discrimination protections.