"Null and Void" Plea Clauses and the Mandatory Right to Withdraw:
Commentary on State v. McGarvey, Idaho Supreme Court (2025)

I. Introduction

The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. McGarvey, Docket No. 52843 (Nov. 19, 2025), is a significant plea-bargaining case that clarifies two closely related issues:

1. The legal effect of a “null and void” clause in a plea agreement when the defendant breaches the agreement; and
2. The district court’s obligations under Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f) when it declines to sentence in accordance with a plea agreement.

The Court vacated Dillon Brumbaugh McGarvey’s felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance because the district court:

• Misconstrued a “null and void” clause as freeing only the State and the court while keeping the defendant’s guilty plea binding; and
• Failed to afford McGarvey an opportunity to withdraw his plea after effectively rejecting the plea agreement, contrary to Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(4).

The case sits at the intersection of contract law and criminal procedure. The Court treats plea agreements as contracts, gives controlling weight to the settled legal meaning of “null and void,” and insists that Rule 11’s procedural safeguards are mandatory even when a defendant breaches a plea bargain. It also reinforces Idaho’s recent clarification of what it means to “preserve” an issue for appeal.

In doing so, McGarvey establishes an important precedent: under Idaho law, a plea agreement made “null and void” by its own terms upon a defendant’s breach is unenforceable by either party, and when a court declines to follow such an agreement at sentencing, Rule 11(f)(4) requires that the defendant be allowed to withdraw the plea. The decision also serves as a pointed warning to prosecutors and defense counsel about the precision needed in drafting plea agreements.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

McGarvey was charged in Nez Perce County with:

• Felony possession of a controlled substance;
• Misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia; and
• Misdemeanor possession of burglary tools.

He entered into a written plea agreement under Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f). The key terms were:

• McGarvey would plead guilty to the felony drug charge.
• The State would dismiss the two misdemeanor charges.
• Sentencing “cap” and structure:
  • A determinate term of up to 2 years plus up to 2 years indeterminate,
  • With the understanding that this sentence would be suspended, and
  • McGarvey would be placed on 4 years of probation.
• The agreement stated that if the court rejected the plea agreement, McGarvey would be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial on the original charges.

Crucially, Paragraph 16 contained a breach clause providing that the agreement would become “null and void” if McGarvey, without good cause, failed to:

• Appear for the presentence investigation (PSI) appointment;
• Appear for sentencing; or
• Keep other promises, including not committing new crimes.

The clause stated (emphasis added in the Opinion):

“The above Agreement is null and void if the Defendant fails to keep any promise made in this Agreement, including but not limited to: make an appearance at the presentence appointment, sentencing, if the failure to appear is without good cause, or commits a new crime.”

It then listed several rights McGarvey waived if he breached—e.g., double jeopardy protections, speedy trial rights, and statute-of-limitations protections for new charges arising from the breach.

At the change-of-plea hearing:

• The district court confirmed that McGarvey had read, understood, and signed the agreement.
• The court accepted his guilty plea after finding it was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
• However, the court did not yet accept the plea agreement itself; instead, it told McGarvey:

  “The way it works is, I would take your plea today; and then at sentencing, the sentencing judge would either sentence you in accordance with that agreement or give you the chance to take back your plea.”

• The court ordered a PSI.

McGarvey then:

• Failed to appear for the PSI appointment; and
• Failed to appear for sentencing.

The court issued a bench warrant. After McGarvey was arrested, he appeared at a status conference and later at sentencing. At sentencing:

• The State argued that McGarvey’s failure to appear—without good cause—triggered Paragraph 16, making the agreement “null and void” and freeing the State from its obligations (including the agreed sentencing structure).
• Defense counsel argued the State should still be bound, emphasizing there had been no pre-sentencing notice that the State would abandon the deal.
• The district court:
  • Found that McGarvey had no good cause for his failure to appear;
  • Read the “null and void” provision into the record; and
  • Concluded that the agreement was “null and void” and that the court was “not bound by this agreement.”
• McGarvey personally objected, stating:

  “I pled guilty for the Rule 11, and it was my understanding that if that wasn’t the case, that I’d be able to get my plea back.”

The court responded that by failing to appear, McGarvey had “relieved everybody from the obligation under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement to have this binding recommendation” and refused to allow withdrawal of the plea. It proceeded to sentence him to:

• 2 years determinate; plus
• Up to 2 years indeterminate,

with no suspended sentence and no probation in place of imprisonment—i.e., a sentence inconsistent with the plea agreement’s core promise.

The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. On petition for review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, vacated the judgment of conviction, and remanded.

III. Summary of the Opinion and Key Holdings

The Idaho Supreme Court (Bevan, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court) held:

1. Preservation of issues: Both of McGarvey’s appellate claims were preserved, despite limited argument below:
   • His claim that he had a right to withdraw his plea under Rule 11(f) was preserved because he expressly raised his understanding that he should be able to withdraw and the district court expressly rejected that view on the record.
   • His challenge to the interpretation of the “null and void” clause was preserved because the district court explicitly ruled that the agreement was “null and void” and that the court and State were no longer bound.
2. “Null and void” means void for everyone, not merely voidable for the State.
   • Plea agreements are contracts, reviewed under general contract principles.
   • The phrase “null and void” has a settled legal meaning: a contract that has no legal effect and is treated as if it never existed.
   • The district court erred by construing the clause to release only the State and the court from their obligations while keeping McGarvey bound by his guilty plea.
   • When the “null and void” condition occurred (failure to appear without good cause), the agreement became unenforceable by either party.
3. Rule 11(f) still governs, even after a defendant’s breach.
   • Only the court, not the parties, may reject or “void” a plea agreement for Rule 11 purposes.
   • The court accepted the guilty plea but deliberately deferred acceptance or rejection of the plea agreement under Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(2).
   • Once the court refused to sentence in accordance with the agreement, it effectively rejected the plea agreement.
4. Failure to allow plea withdrawal violated Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(4).
   • Under Rule 11(f)(4), if the court rejects a plea agreement of the type described in Rule 11(f)(1)(A), (C), or (D), it must afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea.
   • The court here rejected the agreement by refusing to honor its sentencing terms, so Rule 11(f)(4) mandated that McGarvey be allowed to withdraw the plea.
   • Because the court did not do so, it erred, requiring vacatur of the conviction and remand.

The decision thus:

• Establishes that “null and void” plea clauses, when triggered, render a plea agreement unenforceable by both sides;
• Reaffirms that trial courts must follow Rule 11(f)’s structure even where the defendant breaches the agreement; and
• Insists that defendants must be given the opportunity to withdraw their pleas whenever a court rejects the agreement’s sentencing terms.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Preservation of Issues for Appeal

The State argued that McGarvey had not preserved:

1. His claim that he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea; and
2. His challenge to the district court’s interpretation of the “null and void” clause.

The Court rejected both arguments, relying on its precedents:

• State v. Miramontes, 170 Idaho 920, 517 P.3d 849 (2022): An issue is preserved for appeal either when:
  • (1) the party raises it with argument and authority in the trial court, or
  • (2) the trial court issues an adverse ruling on it.
  Both are not required.
• State v. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903, 436 P.3d 1252 (2019): If the “bedrock” of the argument is present in the record and the court made a determination on it, the issue is preserved.

Applying these principles:

1. Preservation of the Rule 11(f) Withdrawal Issue

At sentencing, after the court announced it would not be bound by the Rule 11 agreement, McGarvey said:

“I pled guilty for the Rule 11, and it was my understanding that if that wasn’t the case, that I’d be able to get my plea back.”

The district court responded at length, explicitly rejecting McGarvey’s understanding and explaining its view that his failure to appear “relieved everybody from the obligation under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement.”

That exchange did three things:

• It put the issue of whether he could withdraw his plea squarely before the court;
• It elicited an express ruling from the court; and
• It created a clear record on the issue.

Therefore, even if counsel did not cite Rule 11(f)(4) by number or present it extensively, the issue was preserved under Miramontes and Godwin.

2. Preservation of the “Null and Void” Interpretation Issue

The court initiated discussion on whether the agreement was “null and void.” It:

• Read the pertinent paragraph of the plea agreement into the record;
• Found that McGarvey had no good cause for his failure to appear; and
• Concluded:

  “I am going to find that the express terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement indicate that absent good cause, a failure to appear at the sentencing hearing renders the agreement null and void, and certainly the court is not bound by this agreement.”

Although defense counsel did not fully articulate a separate, contract-law-based argument about the meaning of “null and void,” the Court held that the trial court’s express ruling on that very phrase constituted an “adverse ruling” sufficient to preserve the issue under Miramontes.

However, the Court stressed this was a “close call” and “tests the outer boundary” of its preservation rules. The Court cautioned that:

• Preservation is rooted in the adversarial system—counsel must ordinarily raise and develop arguments expressly; and
• Litigants should not rely on sua sponte trial court rulings as a substitute for proper issue development.

This cautionary note will likely be cited in the future to prevent litigants from over-reading Miramontes as a broad safety net.

B. Interpretation of the “Null and Void” Clause in Plea Agreements

1. Plea Agreements as Contracts

The Court reiterates longstanding Idaho law that:

“Plea agreements are essentially bilateral contracts between the prosecutor and the defendant.”

(citing State v. Haws, 167 Idaho 471, 472 P.3d 576 (2020), which itself quotes McKinney v. State, 162 Idaho 286, 396 P.3d 1168 (2017)). Therefore:

• They are interpreted under general contract law principles (Haws; Cope);
• Whether a plea agreement has been breached is reviewed de novo (Gomez; Peterson); and
• The analysis begins with the plain language of the agreement (Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. v. Sorrells, 568 P.3d 820 (Idaho 2025); Litster; Caldwell Land & Cattle).

A contract term is ambiguous only if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation or is nonsensical (Litster).

2. The Legal Meaning of “Null and Void”

The Court relies on standard legal definitions:

• “Null” means “[h]aving no legal effect; without binding force.” (citing Black’s Law Dictionary).
• “Null and void” is a familiar redundancy that indicates total absence of legal effect.
• Under Idaho contract law:

  “A void contract is ‘a promise for breach of which the law neither gives a remedy nor otherwise recognizes a duty of performance by the promisor … such a promise is not a contract at all; it is the “promise” or “agreement” that is void of legal effect.’”

  (quoting Drug Testing Compliance Grp. v. DOT Compliance Serv., 161 Idaho 93, 383 P.3d 1263 (2016), which in turn quotes the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 7 cmt. a).

In short, a “void” contract is treated as if it never existed in the eyes of the law. It is not merely unenforceable by one party.

3. Competing Interpretations in McGarvey

Both parties agreed the “null and void” language controlled, but they disagreed on its effect:

• McGarvey’s view: Once he breached in the specified way (failure to appear without good cause), the entire agreement lost legal effect for both parties, returning the case to the pre-agreement posture. That would include unwinding the guilty plea or at least triggering his right to withdraw it.
• The State’s view: The clause made the agreement unenforceable by McGarvey, freeing the State from its sentencing and dismissal obligations, but left McGarvey’s guilty plea in place and binding.

The district court effectively adopted the State’s view, treating the plea agreement as:

• Binding upon McGarvey (his guilty plea stood); but
• Not binding upon the State and the court (they were no longer constrained by the sentencing terms).

The Supreme Court rejected this asymmetric interpretation as inconsistent with the plain, settled meaning of “null and void”:

• There was nothing in the plea agreement that limited the nullification effect to the State’s obligations.
• There was no contractual language preserving McGarvey’s guilty plea in the event of breach.
• Courts enforce the words the parties actually chose, not subjective or unstated intentions (Sunnyside Park Utilities).

Accordingly, the Court held that the plea agreement, by its own terms, became unenforceable by either party once the triggering condition (breach without good cause) occurred.

4. Supporting Federal Authority

The Court bolstered its interpretation with federal appellate decisions that had confronted similar clauses:

• United States v. Gardner, 5 F.4th 110 (1st Cir. 2021):
  • The First Circuit addressed a plea agreement that became “null and void” under certain conditions.
  • It held that when the defendant breached, the agreement became void, and the defendant retained the right to withdraw his guilty plea unless the agreement expressly provided otherwise.
  • The Idaho Supreme Court quoted Gardner’s caution that plea agreements “should [be] clearer … about the consequences of a defendant’s breach.”
• United States v. Fernandez, 960 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1992):
  • The Ninth Circuit held that a “null and void” clause required either:
    1. Allowing the defendant to withdraw the plea, or
    2. Sentencing within the agreed range.
  • In other words, the court could not both disregard the sentencing terms and refuse withdrawal.
• United States v. Rivera, 954 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1992):
  • The Second Circuit explained that if the government wants a breach to free it from its obligations but still hold the defendant to the guilty plea, the plea agreement must make that result “absolutely clear.”

The Idaho Supreme Court adopted the same approach: because the plea agreement spoke in absolute “null and void” terms, and did not spell out any asymmetrical consequence preserving the guilty plea alone, the agreement must be treated as wholly void upon breach.

5. Contract-Drafting Lessons

The Court used this case to send a broader message about drafting plea agreements:

• Plea agreements are enforceable according to their plain language.
• If the State intends to free itself from a lenient sentencing recommendation upon a defendant’s breach, but still keep the guilty plea binding, the agreement must explicitly say so and avoid language such as “null and void” that implies total invalidation.
• Ambiguous or imprecise language invites litigation and may result in defendants being allowed to withdraw pleas they otherwise might not be permitted to withdraw.

The Court explicitly echoed Rivera:

If the State wishes to hold a defendant to a plea in the event of a breach, it should be “absolutely clear in a plea agreement that a breach by the defendant releases the government from its obligation to recommend leniency but does not release the defendant from the plea of guilty.”

Because the agreement with McGarvey failed to do this and instead used “null and void,” it did not accomplish the State’s apparent intent.

C. Interaction with Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)

1. Separate Acts: Accepting the Plea vs. Accepting the Plea Agreement

A central procedural point in McGarvey is the distinction between:

• Accepting the defendant’s guilty plea (Idaho Criminal Rule 11(c), (d)); and
• Accepting or rejecting the plea agreement (Rule 11(f)).

This distinction mirrors federal Rule 11 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670 (1997), which the Idaho Supreme Court cited by analogy:

“Guilty pleas can be accepted while plea agreements are deferred, and the acceptance of the two can be separated in time.”

Under Idaho Rule 11:

• Subdivisions 11(c) and (d) govern the court’s inquiry before accepting a guilty plea:
  • Voluntariness;
  • Understanding of rights and nature of the charge;
  • Awareness of consequences; and
  • Whether any promises or plea agreements exist, and importantly, that the court is not bound by such promises (Rule 11(c)(5)).
• Subdivision 11(f) governs the “plea agreement procedure.” Among other things:
  • Rule 11(f)(1) enumerates the types of plea agreements that can be made (dismissal of charges, nonbinding recommendations, specific sentences, or other dispositions).
  • Rule 11(f)(2) requires disclosure of the agreement when the plea is offered, and authorizes the court to:
    • Accept or reject the agreement; or
    • Defer the decision until after reviewing a PSI report.
  • Rule 11(f)(4) sets out what the court must do if it rejects the agreement, including the duty to allow withdrawal of the plea for all but nonbinding recommendation agreements under 11(f)(1)(B).

In McGarvey’s case:

• The court accepted the guilty plea at the change-of-plea hearing (Rule 11(c), (d)).
• The court explicitly deferred its decision on the plea agreement (Rule 11(f)(2)), explaining that the sentencing judge would later either:
  • Sentence McGarvey in accordance with the agreement, or
  • Give him a chance to withdraw his plea.

This separation is crucial: acceptance of the plea does not equal acceptance of the agreement, and vice versa. Only once the plea agreement is either accepted or rejected do certain procedural consequences flow.

2. What Happened After McGarvey Breached

After McGarvey failed to appear without good cause:

• The “null and void” clause (contractually) rendered the agreement unenforceable.
• But (procedurally) the court still had to operate within the Rule 11 framework.

The Idaho Supreme Court underscored a critical point, citing United States v. Cox, 985 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1993): only the court, not the parties, may declare a plea agreement void for purposes of the criminal proceedings. The prosecutor cannot unilaterally “void” the agreement and bypass Rule 11(f).

Accordingly, once the court determined that the agreement was “null and void” (in the contract sense) and refused to follow it, the court in substance rejected the plea agreement under Rule 11(f)(4), whether or not it explicitly labeled its action as “rejection.”

3. Rule 11(f)(4) and the Mandatory Right to Withdraw

Rule 11(f)(4) provides that if the court rejects a plea agreement of the types in 11(f)(1)(A), (C), or (D), the court must, on the record:

• Inform the parties that it rejects the agreement; and
• Afford the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the plea.

In practical terms, when the agreement is more than a mere nonbinding recommendation (11(f)(1)(B)), the defendant’s guilty plea is conditional on the court’s acceptance of the agreement. If the court turns down the agreed disposition, it must allow the defendant to restore the status quo ante by withdrawing the plea.

Here, the McGarvey agreement:

• Contained concrete sentencing commitments (a capped term, suspended, with probation), not simply a nonbinding recommendation;
• Expressly stated that if the court rejected the agreement, McGarvey would have the right to withdraw his plea.

Once the court decided it would not sentence according to the agreement—because it deemed the agreement “null and void”—it was, functionally, rejecting the plea agreement. Under Rule 11(f)(4), that rejection triggered a mandatory right for McGarvey to withdraw his plea.

The district court did the opposite: it held McGarvey to his plea, refused to honor the sentencing bargain, and expressly declined to allow withdrawal. The Supreme Court thus held:

• The district court “failed to comply with the mandatory procedures of Rule 11(f)(4)”; and
• This was reversible error requiring vacatur of the conviction and remand.

The Court also made a structural point: nothing in Rule 11 creates an exception to these withdrawal rights in cases of defendant breach. Parties may try to draft around this by structuring the agreement differently, but they must do so clearly, and courts still retain ultimate control over acceptance or rejection.

D. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Null and Void” vs. “Voidable”

• Null and void: A legal term meaning a contract has no effect whatsoever. It is as though the contract never existed. No one can enforce it.
• Voidable: A contract that is valid and enforceable unless and until one party with the power to avoid it chooses to do so.

The district court essentially treated the plea agreement as voidable by the State: the State could choose to walk away from its promises, but the defendant’s plea remained binding. The Supreme Court held that this contradicted the plain “null and void” language, which implies total invalidity, not unilateral avoidability.

2. Plea Agreement vs. Guilty Plea

It is crucial to distinguish:

• The plea agreement (the negotiated contract about sentencing, dismissed counts, etc.); and
• The guilty plea (the defendant’s formal admission of guilt in court).

Under Rule 11:

• The court may accept the guilty plea after a voluntariness and rights colloquy;
• The court can separately accept or reject the plea agreement; and
• When an agreement is rejected, the defendant is usually entitled to withdraw the plea (except for purely nonbinding sentencing recommendations).

In McGarvey, the guilty plea was accepted; the plea agreement was deferred and ultimately rejected (in substance, though not in name). Hence, the right to withdraw the plea arose at sentencing.

3. Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(1)(B) “Nonbinding” Recommendations

Rule 11(f)(1)(B) allows agreements where the prosecutor merely agrees to:

• Recommend, or
• Not oppose the defendant’s request for a particular sentence,

“with the understanding that the recommendation or request is not binding on the court.”

In such cases, Rule 11(f)(2) requires the court to tell the defendant that:

• Even if the court does not follow the recommendation, the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea.

That was not the type of agreement in McGarvey. His agreement contained a more structured, quasi-binding sentencing arrangement—and the written agreement itself explicitly gave him a right to withdraw if the court rejected it.

4. Presentence Investigation (PSI) and Failure to Appear

A Presentence Investigation is a report prepared (commonly by probation officers) to aid the court at sentencing. It gathers:

• Background on the defendant;
• Criminal history;
• Victim impact information; and
• Other factors relevant to sentencing (e.g., substance abuse treatment needs).

The PSI process usually requires the defendant to:

• Appear for an interview; and
• Complete a questionnaire.

McGarvey’s plea agreement made clear that failing to appear for PSI or sentencing without good cause would trigger the “null and void” clause. The district court found he lacked good cause for his non-appearance and validly concluded that, contractually, the clause was triggered. The error lay not in that factual finding, but in what the court did next with the plea agreement and the plea under Rule 11.

V. Impact and Implications

A. For Plea Agreement Drafting in Idaho

McGarvey will likely force prosecutors and defense counsel to revisit their standard plea forms. Key takeaways:

• Avoid using “null and void” casually. Under Idaho law, it now clearly means total invalidity of the agreement in the sense relevant here. If the State wants a breach to free it from its promises but still keep the plea in place, “null and void” is the wrong phrase.
• Be explicit about breach consequences. Agreements should clearly spell out:
  • What happens if the defendant fails to appear or otherwise breaches;
  • Whether the State retains the right to refile charges or reinstate dismissed counts;
  • Whether the guilty plea remains binding; and
  • Any waiver (if permitted) of the right to withdraw the plea upon breach, keeping in mind Rule 11’s constraints.
• Align contract terms with Rule 11’s structure. Agreements cannot override the court’s duty under Rule 11(f). Even if the parties purport to “void” the agreement upon breach, the court must still decide to accept or reject the agreement and comply with Rule 11(f) if it rejects.

B. For Trial Judges Applying Rule 11

Trial courts in Idaho must now be especially careful at three junctures:

1. Change-of-plea hearings:
   • Clearly distinguish for the record:
     • (a) Acceptance of the defendant’s plea, and
     • (b) Acceptance or rejection (or deferral) of the plea agreement.
   • Ensure that defendants understand the court is not automatically bound by agreements.
2. Post-PSI consideration of plea agreements:
   • After reviewing the PSI, the court must consciously decide whether:
     • To accept the agreement and sentence consistently with it; or
     • To reject it and then follow Rule 11(f)(4).
3. Dealing with defendant breaches:
   • Even if the agreement has a self-executing “null and void” or breach clause, the court:
     • Must still make a judicial decision under Rule 11(f) about acceptance or rejection;
     • Cannot treat the plea as irrevocably binding while discarding only the State’s obligations (unless the agreement clearly and validly provides for that, and even then must respect Rule 11); and
     • Must allow plea withdrawal if it rejects the agreement’s terms in a case falling under 11(f)(1)(A), (C), or (D).

C. For Defendants and Defense Counsel

From a defense perspective, McGarvey is both protective and instructive:

• Protective: It reaffirms that defendants cannot be held to one side of the bargain (the guilty plea) while losing the benefit of the bargain (the sentencing concessions), at least when the agreement uses “null and void” language and the court rejects the agreement at sentencing.
• Instructive:
  • Defendants must take conditions of the plea agreement seriously—such as appearing for PSI and sentencing—because a breach may unravel the agreement entirely.
  • Defense counsel should:
    • Explain clearly the consequences of breach to their clients;
    • Monitor carefully at sentencing whether the court is following the agreement; and
    • Promptly assert the right to withdraw if the court indicates it will not follow a structured plea deal.

D. For Appellate Practice and Issue Preservation

On a more procedural level, McGarvey refines Idaho’s preservation doctrine:

• It confirms that an issue can be preserved either by:
  • Argument and authority below; or
  • An adverse ruling from the trial court on the issue as framed in the record.
• However, the Court emphasizes this is not an invitation to minimal advocacy:
  • Counsel remain expected to raise and develop issues explicitly.
  • Relying solely on trial courts’ sua sponte rulings risks waiver in closer or differently framed cases.

Thus, while McGarvey helped this particular defendant clear the preservation hurdle, it simultaneously warns future litigants not to push the doctrine further.

VI. Conclusion

State v. McGarvey is a significant Idaho Supreme Court decision at the intersection of contract interpretation and criminal procedure. Its key contributions can be summarized as follows:

1. Meaning of “null and void” in plea agreements:
   • When a plea agreement states that it becomes “null and void” upon a defendant’s breach, that phrase is given its ordinary, well-established legal meaning: the agreement is treated as having no legal effect for either party.
   • Courts will not reinterpret “null and void” to mean “voidable at the State’s option.”
2. Integration with Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f):
   • Even when a defendant breaches, plea agreements remain subject to Rule 11(f).
   • Courts—not parties—control the acceptance or rejection of plea agreements.
   • When a court declines to sentence in accordance with a plea agreement (for whatever reason, including breach), it has effectively rejected the agreement within the meaning of Rule 11(f)(4), unless the agreement is of the purely nonbinding variety under Rule 11(f)(1)(B).
   • Upon such rejection, the court must give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea.
3. Fairness in plea bargaining:
   • The decision prevents the State and the court from enjoying the benefits of a defendant’s guilty plea while discarding the sentencing concessions that induced it.
   • It strengthens procedural safeguards for defendants whose pleas are tied to specific sentencing outcomes.
4. Drafting and practice guidance:
   • Prosecutors and defense attorneys must draft plea agreements with precision, especially concerning breach consequences.
   • Trial judges must carefully distinguish their acceptance of the guilty plea from their acceptance of the agreement and rigorously adhere to Rule 11(f) when an agreement is rejected or becomes unenforceable.

In practical effect, the Court’s remedy in McGarvey—vacating the conviction and remanding—restores the defendant to a position where he may again choose whether to plead guilty under a different arrangement or proceed to trial. The decision underscores the principle that plea bargaining, while ubiquitous, must remain anchored in clear language, contract law norms, and stringent adherence to procedural safeguards designed to protect the voluntariness and fairness of guilty pleas.

Going forward, McGarvey will stand as Idaho’s leading authority on the effect of “null and void” clauses in plea agreements and on a trial court’s duty to afford plea withdrawal under Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f) when such agreements are not honored at sentencing.