Nuisance Injunctions, Poultry Odors, and Regulatory Deference: Narrowly Tailored Equitable Relief Under Texas Law

I. Introduction

The dispute in Steve Huynh, et al. v. Blanchard, et al. arises from the clash between large-scale poultry operations and neighboring landowners in rural Texas. The neighbors complained that odors from the chicken “grow-out” facilities—operated by growers under contract with Sanderson Farms—created a private nuisance that substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of their properties.

A jury agreed, finding that each grower had negligently and intentionally caused a private nuisance to each neighboring landowner. Crucially, however, the jury also classified the nuisance as “temporary”: the interference would recur only “occasionally, irregularly, [and] intermittently,” and its recurrence was “not reasonably predictable.” Despite that finding, the trial court entered a permanent injunction that, in practical effect, shut down the entire chicken-growing operation.

The Supreme Court of Texas held that the shutdown injunction was an abuse of discretion and remanded for the trial court to craft narrower injunctive relief. Justice Huddle wrote a separate concurring opinion (joined by Chief Justice Hecht and Justice Bland, and by Justice Young as to Part I), agreeing with the judgment but criticizing the majority’s reasoning. Her concurrence provides an especially clear and structured articulation of the governing principles for nuisance injunctions, particularly in the context of heavily regulated activities like poultry farming.

This commentary analyzes Justice Huddle’s concurring opinion as a window into the Court’s evolving doctrines on:

• When a permanent injunction may issue even where a jury finds a “temporary” nuisance;
• How courts must respect jury fact findings while addressing legal prerequisites for injunctive relief;
• Why damages may be an inadequate remedy for recurring nuisance harms;
• The requirement that injunctions be narrowly tailored and not operate as de facto penalties; and
• The obligation of Texas courts to align nuisance injunctions with legislative and regulatory frameworks, particularly the Texas Clean Air Act and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) rules governing poultry-facility odors.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural and Factual Background

Neighbors living near poultry grow-out houses associated with Sanderson Farms sued the contract growers and Sanderson Farms itself, alleging that extremely offensive odors from the facilities created a private nuisance. At trial:

• The jury found that each grower both negligently and intentionally caused a private nuisance as to each neighboring plaintiff.
• In answering a “type of injury” question (Question 4), the jury expressly chose the second of two alternatives, finding that the injuries were “of such a character that any anticipated recurrence would be only occasional, irregular, intermittent, and not reasonably predictable.”
• No party challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings.

Relying on these findings, the trial court nonetheless entered a sweeping permanent injunction that effectively shut down the entire chicken-growing operation. This was the court’s very first attempt at equitable relief; it skipped over any narrower, incremental remedies.

B. Core Holdings as Reflected in the Concurrence

Justice Huddle agrees with the Court’s bottom line: the shutdown injunction was an abuse of discretion. She further agrees that:

1. Injunctions are doctrinally available in this case. The Court correctly rejected three defenses by the growers, namely:
   • that a permanent injunction cannot issue to abate a nuisance that the jury has characterized as “temporary”;
   • that a finding of a temporary nuisance precludes a legal finding of “imminent harm,” a prerequisite for injunctive relief; and
   • that the availability of monetary damages supplies an adequate remedy at law, barring an injunction.
2. The trial court nonetheless exceeded its discretion in scope. The injunction was overbroad because it:
   • was a first-step remedy that effectively shut down an otherwise lawful business;
   • enjoined lawful activity along with unlawful, nuisance-causing conduct;
   • failed to tailor relief to the specific nuisance (odor) and to the degree of odor deemed unlawful; and
   • disregarded the detailed legislative and regulatory framework (notably Texas Health and Safety Code § 382.068 and TCEQ’s odor-control regime) that defines and manages acceptable poultry-farm odor levels.

On remand, Justice Huddle emphasizes, the trial court must:

• Respect the jury’s finding that the nuisance was “temporary” in the sense defined by the jury charge;
• Nonetheless recognize its equitable authority to issue a permanent injunction to abate ongoing or recurring odor-based nuisances;
• Align the terms of the injunction with Texas’s statutory and regulatory scheme for poultry-farm odor—including TCEQ’s Strategic Odor Control Plan—so that the order prohibits only conduct that exceeds lawful odor thresholds; and
• Consider shutdown of the business only as a last resort, after narrower injunctions and regulatory measures have proved ineffective.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

Justice Huddle grounds her analysis in a robust set of Texas and federal precedents. Understanding these cases is key to understanding the framework she applies.

1. Jury Fact-Finding and Appellate Restraint

• Crosstex North Texas Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2016)

  Crosstex is a leading Texas nuisance decision clarifying the definition of nuisance as a “condition that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land” by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. It also emphasizes the division between:

  • the jury’s role in resolving disputed facts; and
  • the court’s role in applying law to those facts and determining equitable relief.

  Justice Huddle cites Crosstex to reinforce that the Supreme Court is bound by the jury’s factual determinations (here, that the nuisance’s recurrence would be irregular and not reasonably predictable) unless those findings are attacked as legally or factually insufficient—which they were not. The injunction must be built out of those “building blocks.”

• Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2003)

  This case underscores that courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the jury on fact issues, and that the jury is the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence. Justice Huddle invokes it to criticize any suggestion that the trial court or Supreme Court could discard or “relabel” the jury’s finding on the type of injury (temporary vs. permanent) merely for convenience in framing an injunction.

• Benoit v. Wilson, 239 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. 1951)

  Benoit reiterates that the jury, not the court, is the fact finder. Justice Huddle leans on this to argue that once the jury chose the “occasional, irregular, intermittent” injury characterization, appellate courts must accept that factual resolution rather than treat the nuisance as if it were proven to recur “repeatedly, continually, and regularly.”

2. Temporary vs. Permanent Nuisance and Property Injury

• Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines (East Texas), L.P., 449 S.W.3d 474 (Tex. 2014)

  Gilbert Wheeler clarifies that the ultimate legal classification of an injury to real property as “temporary” or “permanent” is a question of law, but the factual underpinnings (e.g., whether recurrence is predictable, whether the condition is abatable) are for the jury upon proper request.

  Justice Huddle uses this to make a nuanced point: while courts decide the legal label “permanent vs. temporary,” they cannot ignore jury findings that bear directly on that classification. The majority’s suggestion that the neighbors “could have argued for a presumption of permanent interference” despite the jury’s contrary selection, in her view, risks undermining Gilbert Wheeler’s division of roles.

• Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004)

  Schneider is central to Texas nuisance law, particularly on:

  • characterizing temporary versus permanent nuisance;
  • clarifying that the temporary/permanent label is not dispositive of the availability of injunctive relief; and
  • emphasizing that courts may, in their discretion, choose to abate a nuisance whether categorized as temporary or permanent.

  Justice Huddle quotes Schneider to support two propositions:

  1. The “temporary vs. permanent” label does not dictate whether a nuisance can be abated by injunction. A court may enjoin a nuisance regardless of how it is classified if the equitable requirements are satisfied.
  2. A temporary nuisance can recur, and injunctions may be appropriate precisely to prevent repeated litigation over unpredictable future episodes.

3. Standards for Injunctive Relief

• Pike v. Texas EMC Management, LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. 2020)

  Pike restates the four elements a party must show to obtain a permanent injunction in Texas:

  1. a wrongful act;
  2. imminent harm;
  3. irreparable injury; and
  4. the absence of an adequate remedy at law.

  Justice Huddle applies this framework to rebut the growers’ arguments, explaining that:

  • the jury’s nuisance findings establish a wrongful act;
  • “imminent harm” is a legal question for the court, not an ultimate fact issue for the jury;
  • recurring nuisance harms may constitute irreparable injury; and
  • the prospect of repeated lawsuits renders damages an inadequate remedy at law.
• Operation Rescue–National v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Southeast Texas, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998)

  This case confirms that “imminent harm” is a legal question for courts, resolved based on underlying facts that may be found by a jury. It also illustrates progressive use of injunctions: a more narrow injunction that proves ineffective can justify a broader one.

  Justice Huddle relies on Operation Rescue to support two aspects of her reasoning:

  • that the jury’s “temporary nuisance” finding does not prevent the court from legally concluding that there is imminent harm justifying injunctive relief; and
  • that a full shutdown injunction might be appropriate only after a narrower prior injunction has failed to curb violations.
• Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002)

  Butnaru is frequently cited for the rule that equity will not issue an injunction when an adequate remedy at law exists. Justice Huddle cites it as the starting point for the “last resort” nature of injunctive relief.

• Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. 2016) and Repka v. American National Insurance Co., 186 S.W.2d 977 (Tex. 1945)

  These cases highlight that if reliance on damages would lead to a “multiplicity of suits,” that very fact undermines the adequacy of a legal remedy and supports equitable relief. Justice Huddle uses them to explain why forcing neighbors to repeatedly sue each time odor levels spike is not an adequate remedy.

4. Narrow Tailoring and Overbreadth in Injunctions

• Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2003) and Holubec v. Brandenburger, 214 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.)

  Holubec (Texas Supreme Court) holds that injunctions must be “narrowly drawn and precise,” and that nuisance injunctions must focus on abating the nuisance rather than shutting down lawful operations categorically. The later Austin Court of Appeals decision reiterates that courts grant injunctions to restrain existing nuisances, not hypotheticals that might become nuisances.

  Justice Huddle cites these authorities to condemn the trial court’s “sledgehammer” approach: rather than narrowly targeting the odor-producing practices, the court imposed an across-the-board business shutdown.

• TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v. Inhance Technologies, LLC, 540 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) and Fairfield Estates, L.P. v. Griffin, 986 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.)

  These cases articulate the basic principle that an injunction must not prohibit lawful conduct; overbroad injunctions that enjoin a defendant from acting within its legal rights constitute an abuse of discretion.

  Justice Huddle uses them to underscore that “there is nothing innately improper about operating a chicken farm,” and that the trial court’s job is to separate lawful from unlawful odor-emitting activities—not to shutter the entire lawful business as a first remedy.

• Wiese v. Heathlake Community Ass’n, 384 S.W.3d 395 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.)

  Wiese stresses that injunctions must be specific and clear in the conduct they prohibit, and broad enough to prevent recurrence of violations without straying into restraint of lawful activity. Justice Huddle invokes this requirement for specificity in urging a more precise, odor-focused injunction rather than a blanket shutdown.

• Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1958)

  Hyde Corp. cautions that injunctions should act as correctives, not punishments. Justice Huddle relies on this to criticize the lower court’s apparent attempt to penalize the growers for broader “sins” (such as alleged abuses of federal subsidy programs) rather than focusing solely on abating the nuisance.

• Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) (U.S. Supreme Court)

  Califano states that the “scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established.” Justice Huddle imports this federal equity principle to argue that a court may not grant more expansive injunctive relief than is necessary to redress the proven nuisance—here, excessive odors—not the mere existence of poultry operations.

5. Regulatory Context: Texas Clean Air Act and TCEQ

• Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975)
• BCCA Appeal Group, Inc. v. City of Houston, 496 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016)
• Brazoria County v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 128 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.)
• Slay v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 351 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. denied)

These cases collectively underscore:

• State primacy in administering federal air-quality programs (Train);
• TCEQ’s central role in regulating air quality in Texas and enforcing the Texas Clean Air Act (BCCA, Brazoria County, Slay); and
• Legislative entrustment of odor and emission standards to TCEQ, particularly in specialized contexts like poultry operations.

Justice Huddle uses this line of precedent to argue that Texas courts must not ignore the regulatory scheme when fashioning nuisance injunctions. Instead, they must:

• Identify where the line is between lawful and unlawful odor emissions as defined by statute and agency rules;
• Look to TCEQ’s notices of violation (NOVs) and compliance mechanisms; and
• Consider TCEQ’s Strategic Odor Control Plan as a benchmark for lawful operation, even if the growers or agency have been lax in implementation or enforcement.

She also cites an out-of-state example, In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products Liability Litigation, 476 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), to emphasize the importance of coordinating judicial equitable relief with ongoing regulatory oversight.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning as Clarified by the Concurrence

1. Permanent Injunctions May Abate “Temporary” Nuisances

One of the central doctrinal clarifications in Justice Huddle’s concurrence is that a finding of a “temporary” nuisance does not bar a permanent injunction.

The jury here found that the nuisance was of a type whose recurrence would be “occasional, irregular, intermittent, and not reasonably predictable.” That finding implies:

• the interference is not constant or continuous;
• there may be periods where odors subside; but
• odor episodes will still recur in the future, albeit unpredictably.

Justice Huddle analogizes this to a chronic disease: the condition is permanent though symptoms flare and recede. In legal terms:

• “Temporary vs. permanent nuisance” concerns the character and predictability of the injury to property over time, not the availability of equitable remedies.
• Courts have repeatedly held that they may abate a nuisance—by permanent injunction—regardless of its classification as temporary or permanent (Schneider, Crosstex).

Thus, even accepting the jury’s temporary-nuisance finding, the trial court retained authority to issue a permanent injunction if the other equitable criteria were met. The concurring opinion stresses that this conclusion flows from existing precedent and does not require courts to relabel the jury’s factual characterization.

2. Imminent Harm Is a Legal Question; Temporary Nuisance Does Not Negate It

“Imminent harm” is a required element for permanent injunctive relief. The growers argued that because the jury found a temporary nuisance—with only intermittent recurrence—there could be no “imminent harm.”

Justice Huddle, relying on Operation Rescue, rejects this:

• Imminent harm is a legal determination for the court, not an ultimate fact question for the jury.
• The jury’s findings provide the factual predicate (e.g., that nuisance-level odors will recur unpredictably), but the court decides whether those facts constitute imminent harm justifying equitable intervention.
• A nuisance that is ongoing in the sense that it will recur—albeit on an irregular schedule—can still present a legally imminent threat to the neighbors’ property rights and use and enjoyment of land.

Accordingly, the concurrence agrees that the trial court did not abuse its discretion merely by concluding that imminent harm existed; the error lies in the scope of the remedy, not in the recognition that equitable relief was available.

3. Damages Are Not an Adequate Remedy for Unpredictably Recurring Odor Nuisances

The growers further argued that because the neighbors could recover money damages for each episode, injunctive relief was foreclosed. Justice Huddle underscores why that is incorrect in this context:

• Past harms that are discrete and quantifiable can often be fully remedied by damages.
• Future harms that are intermittent, unpredictable, and recurring pose a different problem:
  • their severity and frequency cannot be forecast with precision;
  • neighbors would have to sue each time odors again become intolerable; and
  • this “perpetual litigation” is precisely what equity seeks to avoid.

Drawing on Campbell and Repka, Justice Huddle explains that when the supposed “legal remedy” of damages would result in a multiplicity of suits, it ceases to be “complete and adequate” and thus does not bar injunctive relief. She colorfully cites Schneider’s reference to Robert Frost: while “good fences make good neighbors,” repeated litigation does not.

On these points, Justice Huddle and the majority agree: there was no categorical doctrinal bar to injunctive relief arising from the jury’s “temporary nuisance” finding or the theoretical availability of damages.

4. The Real Error: A Shutdown Injunction as the First and Only Equitable Step

Where Justice Huddle diverges from the majority is in her sharper focus on the scope of the injunction. She characterizes the trial court’s order as “cracking a nut with a sledgehammer”:

• It effectively shut down all chicken-growing operations at the facility.
• It did so as the very first iteration of injunctive relief, without any prior narrower or incremental orders targeting particular odor-causing practices.
• It enjoined substantial amounts of lawful activity as well as the unlawful nuisance-producing conduct.
• It largely ignored the existing TCEQ regulatory scheme, which is designed to address exactly this sort of odor problem through NOVs and compliance agreements.

From a doctrinal standpoint, Justice Huddle identifies several problems with this approach:

1. Injunctions as Last Resort Under Butnaru and long-standing equity principles, injunctive relief is extraordinary and should be employed when no adequate legal remedy exists. Within that framework, a total business shutdown of a lawful enterprise should be a last, not first, resort—reserved for cases where:
   • narrower injunctions have failed; and/or
   • the defendant repeatedly and willfully violates court orders or regulatory standards.
2. Narrow Tailoring and Prohibition on Enjoining Lawful Conduct The injunction must:
   • be narrowly tailored to the offending conduct (here, unlawful levels of odor);
   • describe prohibited acts with clear, precise specificity; and
   • avoid sweeping in lawful activities that do not themselves constitute, or contribute to, the nuisance.

   By effectively banning any operation of the poultry facility, the trial court prohibited both nuisance-causing and nuisance-free levels of operation, violating the principles in Holubec, TMRJ Holdings, Fairfield Estates, and Wiese.

3. No Punitive Use of Injunctions Justice Huddle criticizes the majority for dwelling on the growers’ general “sins”—such as alleged misuse of subsidies—that do not necessarily bear on the existence or degree of nuisance-level odors. Under Hyde Corp., injunctions should correct specific wrongful conduct; they cannot be wielded as a generalized punishment for broader misbehavior unrelated to the nuisance itself.

5. Aligning the Injunction with Texas’s Poultry-Odor Regulatory Scheme

Perhaps the most significant forward-looking aspect of Justice Huddle’s concurrence is her insistence that trial courts must coordinate nuisance injunctions with the Texas Clean Air Act and TCEQ’s regulatory framework, particularly:

• Texas Health and Safety Code § 382.068 (“Poultry Facility Odor; Response to Complaints”)

Section 382.068 establishes a detailed scheme under which:

• Residents may submit odor complaints about poultry facilities to TCEQ.
• Upon investigation, TCEQ may issue Notices of Violation (NOVs) if it finds noncompliance with air-quality standards.
• If TCEQ issues three NOVs within a year, the operator and TCEQ enter a comprehensive compliance agreement that includes:
  • a Strategic Odor Control Plan; and
  • specific requirements for odor mitigation (e.g., ventilation, litter management, flock size or cycle adjustments).

In this case:

• TCEQ had issued multiple NOVs to the growers.
• The growers and TCEQ adopted a Strategic Odor Control Plan.
• Neighbors alleged that the growers failed to fully implement the plan and that TCEQ failed to enforce it vigorously.

Justice Huddle’s key points about this framework are:

1. The existence of a plan shows that lawful, compliant operation is possible. The mere fact that implementation and enforcement were allegedly deficient is not proof that no odor-control plan can work. Instead, it suggests that a properly implemented plan could reduce odors below nuisance levels while allowing business operations to continue.
2. The trial court must respect legislative judgments about acceptable odor levels. The Legislature, via the Clean Air Act and § 382.068, has defined—directly or via delegation to TCEQ—the outer bounds of lawful odor emissions. A trial court crafting an injunction must:
   • Identify where those regulatory lines are drawn;
   • Prohibit only that conduct which crosses those lines; and
   • Allow operations that remain within statutorily and regulatorily permissible levels.
3. The Strategic Odor Control Plan is a logical template for injunctive terms. While the court need not “regurgitate” the plan verbatim, it should consider adopting or adapting its requirements—such as limits on flock size, cycle frequency, clean-out practices, or ventilation standards—as enforceable injunction terms, with appropriate judicial oversight.
4. Court orders must complement, not supplant, regulatory enforcement. Justice Huddle underscores that courts are to “give effect to laws and regulations; we must not create our own.” This means:
   • Courts should not ignore TCEQ’s role because of perceived agency laxity.
   • They must instead ensure that private injunctive relief works in tandem with existing statutes and regulations, much like the coordination envisioned in In re MTBE.

Shutdown might become appropriate only if, after a properly tailored injunction aligned with regulatory standards is entered, the growers:

• persistently violate the order; or
• demonstrate that they cannot operate within lawful odor limits.

But such drastic relief cannot be the very first judicial reaction to nuisance findings in a regulated industry.

C. Likely Impact on Future Cases and on Texas Nuisance Law

1. Nuisance Cases Involving Regulated Industries

This opinion will likely be cited in future disputes involving:

• Confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs);
• Landfills, waste-treatment facilities, and other odor-generating activities; and
• Industrial plants and operations regulated by TCEQ or other specialized agencies.

The major lessons for trial courts are:

• Recognize that injunctions remain available even when:
  • juries find “temporary” nuisance; or
  • statutes and agencies also regulate the conduct.
• But ensure that injunctions:
  • closely track statutory and regulatory standards;
  • avoid stepping beyond or contradicting the regulatory scheme; and
  • stop short of a shutdown unless lesser measures have failed.

2. Clarifying the Role of Jury Findings in Equitable Relief

Justice Huddle’s opinion reinforces a nuanced but important distinction:

• Jury findings on nuisance existence and character (temporary vs. permanent) are binding factual determinations unless challenged on sufficiency grounds.
• Legal elements of injunctive relief—like imminent harm and adequacy of legal remedies—remain for the court, though the court must base those legal conclusions on the factual record and jury findings.

Future litigants can expect courts to scrutinize whether:

• jury charges and findings adequately resolve the factual predicates relevant to nuisance classification; and
• trial courts have properly treated those findings as constraints when framing equitable relief.

3. Reining in Overbroad Business-Shutdown Orders

The concurrence sends a strong signal that:

• Total shutdown of a lawful business, especially one operating within a comprehensive regulatory framework, is a disfavored first-step remedy.
• Such orders will be carefully scrutinized for:
  • whether they enjoin more conduct than is necessary to abate the proven nuisance;
  • whether they amount to punishment for generalized bad conduct; and
  • whether they conflict with legislative policy choices regarding what level of activity is permissible.

Trial courts may thus be more inclined to:

• Start with targeted injunctions (e.g., limiting flock size; mandating specific odor controls; restricting particular waste-handling practices);
• Condition continued operation on compliance with those narrower orders; and
• Reserve business-closure remedies for recalcitrant defendants who flout narrower injunctions or clearly cannot operate within legal limits.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Private Nuisance

A private nuisance in Texas is not a specific tort but a type of legal injury: a condition or activity that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Odors, noise, smoke, or vibrations can all be nuisances if they are sufficiently severe and unreasonable.

Temporary vs. Permanent Nuisance

These labels focus on the duration and predictability of the interference:

• Permanent nuisance: Typically continuous, predictable, and likely to persist indefinitely unless the defendant fundamentally changes or ceases operations. Damages are often calculated as a one-time reduction in property value.
• Temporary nuisance: Intermittent or sporadic; may come and go, and future occurrences may be uncertain or irregular. Damages often relate to loss of use and enjoyment during specific periods and may require repeated suits if the condition recurs.

Importantly, whether a nuisance is temporary or permanent does not decide whether injunctive relief is available; courts can enjoin either, depending on the circumstances.

Permanent Injunction

A court order, issued after a full trial on the merits, that indefinitely requires a party to do or refrain from doing certain acts. To obtain one in Texas, a party generally must prove:

1. a wrongful act (such as creating a nuisance);
2. imminent harm if the conduct continues;
3. irreparable injury (harm that cannot be adequately fixed by money damages alone); and
4. no adequate remedy at law (e.g., damages would require endless lawsuits or be impossible to quantify).

Imminent Harm

Harm that is sufficiently likely and near enough in time that a court should act now to prevent it, rather than wait for it to happen and then award damages. It does not require showing that the harm is literally continuous or happening every moment; recurring or predictably recurring conduct can be “imminent” if the risk is ongoing.

Adequate Remedy at Law

A legal remedy (usually money damages) is “adequate” if it can fully and fairly compensate the injured party for the harm suffered and likely to be suffered. If damages:

• would be speculative or impossible to calculate; or
• would require lawsuit after lawsuit as the harm recurs;

the remedy is not considered adequate, opening the door to injunctive relief.

Overbroad Injunction

An injunction that goes further than necessary to stop the wrongful conduct. For example, if a court, to stop excessive odors, completely bans the operation of a lawful facility—even at levels that produce no nuisance—it has issued an overbroad injunction. Texas courts repeatedly hold that such injunctions are abuses of discretion.

Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)

TCEQ is the state agency charged with protecting Texas’s air, water, and environmental quality. Under the Texas Clean Air Act, TCEQ sets and enforces air-quality standards, including responding to odor complaints from facilities such as poultry farms.

Notice of Violation (NOV)

A formal notice issued by TCEQ when it finds that a facility has violated environmental laws or regulations. Multiple NOVs—especially within a specified time frame—trigger additional enforcement mechanisms, such as mandatory compliance agreements or odor-control plans.

Strategic Odor Control Plan

Under Texas Health and Safety Code § 382.068, when a poultry facility receives enough odor-related NOVs, it must enter into a comprehensive compliance agreement with TCEQ. A key component is a Strategic Odor Control Plan, which sets out specific measures designed to reduce odors to lawful levels (e.g., changes in housing design, ventilation, waste management, stocking densities).

V. Conclusion

Justice Huddle’s concurrence in Huynh v. Blanchard crystallizes several critical principles in Texas nuisance and equity law.

• A jury’s finding that a nuisance is “temporary” does not preclude a court from issuing a permanent injunction to abate it. Temporary nuisances can be persistent in the sense that they will recur, and equity exists partly to prevent repeated litigation over such recurrences.
• “Imminent harm” and the adequacy of legal remedies are legal questions for the court, which must respect—but not be handcuffed by—jury fact findings.
• Damages are not an adequate remedy when future nuisance harms are intermittent, unpredictable, and would require neighbors to return to court again and again.
• Injunctions must be narrowly tailored to the proven wrongful conduct and cannot serve as blunt instruments to shut down lawful businesses, especially as a first equitable measure. They are corrective, not punitive.
• When a nuisance arises from a regulated activity—such as poultry farming subject to TCEQ oversight—trial courts must harmonize their injunctions with the governing statutory and regulatory scheme. They must determine, often with the help of agency standards and plans, where lawful behavior ends and nuisance-level conduct begins, and draft injunctions that prohibit only the latter.

Taken together, these principles reinforce a model of equitable relief that is both rights-protective and regulation-aware. Neighbors retain meaningful recourse against serious, recurring odor nuisances. At the same time, lawful businesses—particularly those operating under detailed environmental regimes—are entitled to expect that courts will not shut them down wholesale when narrower, more precise remedies can abate the nuisance while respecting legislative and regulatory judgments.