Novel Constitutional Claims Will Not Be Resolved at the Preliminary‑Injunction Stage: Arkansas Supreme Court Reaffirms Status Quo and Deferential Review in Short‑Term Rental Zoning

Introduction

In Shelley Hause and Stephen Hause v. City of Fayetteville, Arkansas; The Fayetteville Planning Commission; and the Fayetteville City Council, 2025 Ark. 156 (Oct. 16, 2025), the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed two intertwined questions arising from a challenge to Fayetteville’s short‑term rental (STR) regulatory framework:

Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction that would have halted the City’s STR ordinance pending a final merits ruling.
Whether the Court had appellate jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Rule 9 administrative appeal where a previously issued Rule 54(b) certification had been vacated.

The majority affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction, emphasizing the status‑quo function of interim relief, the requirement of irreparable harm, and a highly deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard that avoids resolving unsettled constitutional questions at the interlocutory stage. The Court dismissed without prejudice the separate appeal of the Rule 9 administrative matter for lack of appellate jurisdiction following the circuit court’s vacatur of Rule 54(b) certification.

In dissent, three justices would have reached the constitutional merits of a vagueness challenge to Fayetteville’s STR regime, held the ordinance likely unconstitutional, and found an abuse of discretion in denying interim relief.

Background

Fayetteville’s 2021 Ordinance 6427 (the “STR Ordinance”) regulates residential properties rented for fewer than 30 days. The ordinance distinguishes between two types of STRs; both require a license, but Type 2 STRs in residential districts also require a conditional‑use permit (CUP) from the Fayetteville Planning Commission. The City capped Type 2 STRs at 2% of housing stock (later reduced to a fixed number of 475).

The Hauses own a Fayetteville home used intermittently. To help cover carrying costs, they sought a Type 2 STR CUP. Although the citywide cap had not been reached, the Planning Commission denied the CUP in October 2023, finding the proposed STR “incompatible with the neighborhood” given the number of other Type 2 STRs nearby.

The Fayetteville Code requires three City Council members to sponsor an appeal of a CUP decision to the Council. No member agreed to sponsor the appeal. The Hauses then filed in circuit court: (1) a Rule 9 administrative appeal and (2) claims for declaratory relief and for deprivation of rights under Arkansas law and the Arkansas Constitution. They also moved for a preliminary injunction to suspend the STR Ordinance. The City moved for summary judgment, asserting the Rule 9 administrative appeal was untimely.

After a combined hearing, the circuit court denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the Rule 9 administrative appeal as untimely (thus concluding it lacked jurisdiction over that portion), while expressly leaving the constitutional challenges for further briefing. The plaintiffs appealed the injunction denial and, via a briefly issued (then vacated) Rule 54(b) certificate, attempted to appeal the Rule 9 dismissal, too.

Summary of the Opinion

Preliminary injunction affirmed. The Court held the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying interim relief. The requested injunction would have altered, not preserved, the status quo; the plaintiffs’ alleged harms were monetary and thus reparable; and, on the limited interlocutory review appropriate here, the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success, particularly given the City’s statutory zoning authority and the presumption of constitutionality.
Rule 9 administrative appeal dismissed without prejudice for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The circuit court’s summary‑judgment order dismissing the Rule 9 appeal was not final because other constitutional claims remained. A short‑lived Rule 54(b) certification was vacated under Rule 60; because the plaintiffs did not file a notice of appeal from that vacatur (or the deemed denial of reconsideration), the Supreme Court could not review that issue.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Extraordinary nature of preliminary injunctions. The Court reaffirmed that a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy” reserved for “extraordinary circumstances.” See Muntaqim v. Lay, 2019 Ark. 203, 575 S.W.3d 542; Drummond Citizens Ins. Co. v. Sergeant, 266 Ark. 611, 588 S.W.2d 419 (1979).
Two‑part test for interim relief. The movant must show (1) irreparable harm absent an injunction and (2) likelihood of success on the merits. Gulley v. State ex rel. Jegley, 2023 Ark. 70, 664 S.W.3d 421.
Deferential standard of review. Denials of preliminary injunctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion—i.e., whether the decision was “improvident, thoughtless, and without due consideration.” De la Garza v. State, 2025 Ark. 10, 704 S.W.3d 627; Muntaqim, 2019 Ark. 203.
Status quo principle. Preliminary injunctions preserve the status quo, not change it. Am. Invs. Life Ins. Co. v. TCP Transp., Inc., 312 Ark. 343, 849 S.W.2d 509 (1993) (citing Citizens’ Pipeline v. Twin City Pipeline, 183 Ark. 1006, 39 S.W.2d 1017 (1931)).
Irreparable harm and adequacy of money damages. “Irreparable harm is the touchstone of injunctive relief,” typically not satisfied where monetary damages can remedy the injury. Bentonville Sch. Dist. v. Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, 643 S.W.3d 763; Thurston v. Safe Surgery Ark., 2021 Ark. 55, 619 S.W.3d 1.
Interlocutory scope—no final merits determination. On a preliminary‑injunction appeal, the Court reiterated its narrow inquiry into abuse of discretion and cautioned against “final merits” resolutions at the interlocutory stage. Ark. Dep’t of Ed. v. Jackson, 2023 Ark. 105, 669 S.W.3d 1; Gulley, 2023 Ark. 70; Bentonville Sch. Dist., 2022 Ark. 80; Thurston, 2021 Ark. 55; Muntaqim, 2019 Ark. 203.
Municipal zoning authority. Arkansas Code Annotated § 14‑56‑402 (liberally construed by § 14‑56‑401) authorizes municipalities to adopt and enforce coordinated development plans. Conditional‑use permitting within zoning has been upheld. See Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179.
Presumption of constitutionality. Ordinances are presumed constitutional; challengers bear the burden. Convent Corp. v. City of N. Little Rock, 2021 Ark. 7, 615 S.W.3d 706.
Finality and Rule 54(b). Without a valid Rule 54(b) certification, orders resolving fewer than all claims are not appealable. Heffner v. Harrod, 278 Ark. 188, 644 S.W.2d 579 (1983); Macklin v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. 151, 624 S.W.3d 869. Vacatur of certification restored nonfinal status, and without a notice of appeal from that vacatur, the issue was not before the Court. Bayer CropScience LP v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, 385 S.W.3d 822.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds through the classic injunction framework and careful attention to appellate posture.

Status quo and equitable posture.
The Court first emphasized that interim relief should preserve the status quo. Because the Hauses were not operating a Type 2 STR before litigation, an injunction allowing operation would alter, not preserve, existing conditions. That counseled against injunctive relief. The circuit court’s conclusion on this point was reasoned and based on full briefing and a hearing; thus, not an abuse of discretion.
Irreparable harm.
The plaintiffs sought “just compensation in actual damages” measured by fair market value of their property—a quintessential monetary remedy. Arkansas law generally deems harms reparable, and thus not “irreparable,” if compensable with money. Bentonville Sch. Dist.; Thurston. Given the plaintiffs’ framing of their injury and relief, the circuit court reasonably concluded the irreparable‑harm prong was not met. The Supreme Court held that conclusion was not “improvident [or] thoughtless.”
Likelihood of success on the merits—interlocutory restraint amid unsettled law.
On the second prong, the Court underscored the tight lens of interlocutory review. It noted the City’s broad zoning authority (§§ 14‑56‑401, ‑402), the established use of CUPs for land‑use control (Brock), and the presumption of constitutionality (Convent Corp.). With both sides having fully briefed complex constitutional challenges, and the “novel” and “disputed” character of those issues evident, the Court declined to transform an abuse‑of‑discretion review into an early merits decision. It concluded the circuit court could reasonably find no present likelihood of success on this record and reserved final merits adjudication for appeal after a fully developed record and final judgment.

Notably, the Court stated that “the uncertainty does not justify reversing the denial of a preliminary injunction,” reinforcing that unsettled constitutional questions, without more, are insufficient to mandate interim relief.
Appellate jurisdiction and Rule 54(b).
The summary‑judgment ruling on the Rule 9 administrative appeal did not resolve all claims; without a valid Rule 54(b) certification, it was nonfinal and unappealable. The circuit court initially granted but then vacated certification under Rule 60. Because the plaintiffs did not notice an appeal from the vacatur (or the deemed denial of reconsideration), the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to review the Rule 9 dismissal and dismissed that portion without prejudice.

Impact and Implications

Preliminary‑injunction practice in Arkansas.
- Movants should expect a stringent application of the status‑quo principle. If the requested injunction would authorize new activity, courts may view that as altering, not preserving, the status quo.
- Irreparable harm remains the “touchstone.” Framing harms as compensable monetary losses (lost rents, diminution in value) will likely defeat interim relief. Parties alleging nonmonetary harms should develop concrete evidence of unique, noncompensable injuries tied to property use or constitutional rights, anticipating skeptical review.
- Unsettled or “novel” legal questions do not, by themselves, make preliminary relief appropriate. This opinion signals a pronounced reluctance to decide complex constitutional issues on an interlocutory record and an insistence on deferring such questions to final judgment absent clear abuse of discretion below.
Short‑term rental and land‑use regulation.
- Municipalities retain broad latitude under Arkansas’s zoning statutes to regulate STRs via CUPs and discretionary criteria. While the Court did not reach the ordinance’s constitutionality, its refusal to disturb enforcement at the preliminary stage may embolden continued local regulation pending final merits adjudication.
- That said, the dissent’s detailed vagueness critique—focused on undefined “frequency and concentration” criteria—puts cities on notice: open‑textured standards that lack measurable benchmarks risk future void‑for‑vagueness challenges on a full record.
Appellate procedure and finality traps.
- Parties seeking interlocutory review of partial dispositions must ensure a valid Rule 54(b) certificate and should be prepared for the trial court to revisit certification under Rule 60. If certification is vacated, a separate notice of appeal is required to obtain review of the vacatur itself.
- Where administrative appeals hinge on strict timeliness requirements (often governed in Arkansas by the mechanism associated with District Court Rule 9 for local land‑use decisions), practitioners must perfect the administrative record and comply meticulously with filing deadlines or risk jurisdictional dismissal.
Division on the Court and future litigation.
- The 3‑justice dissent advocates de novo review of legal conclusions embedded in preliminary‑injunction rulings and would have found a likelihood of success on a vagueness challenge to Fayetteville’s “frequency and concentration” factor. Future litigants can expect that argument to reappear, and municipalities would be prudent to refine and define discretionary standards with objective metrics.

The Dissent’s Counterpoint

Justice Brunni, joined by Justices Womack and Webb, rejected the majority’s reluctance to engage the merits of a constitutional claim at the preliminary‑injunction stage. The dissent stressed:

Standard of review. While the ultimate decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion, legal conclusions within that decision are reviewed de novo; the Court should resolve properly presented legal issues even if “novel.”
Void‑for‑vagueness. Drawing on Arkansas and federal precedent, the dissent argued that Fayetteville’s CUP criterion—“frequency and concentration of nearby” STRs—lacks any defined yardstick and invites arbitrary enforcement, making the ordinance facially vulnerable. Authorities cited include Abraham v. Beck, 2015 Ark. 80, 456 S.W.3d 744; Benton Cnty. Stone Co. v. Benton Cnty. Plan. Bd., 374 Ark. 519, 288 S.W.3d 653 (2008); Craft v. City of Fort Smith, 335 Ark. 417, 984 S.W.2d 22 (1998); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
Irreparable harm. Although monetary harms are typically reparable, the dissent pointed to nonmonetary harms tied to the plaintiffs’ intended use of their home and the special needs of a family member, contending the circuit court failed to engage these claims and the City did not meaningfully rebut them.

While not controlling, the dissent foreshadows robust scrutiny of undefined qualitative land‑use criteria in future, fully briefed merits appeals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Preliminary injunction. A temporary court order issued before a full trial that either prevents or compels action to preserve the status quo. To obtain one, the movant must show irreparable harm absent relief and a likelihood of success on the merits.
Status quo. The last peaceable, noncontested state of affairs before the dispute. Courts generally avoid using preliminary injunctions to create new rights or authorize new activity.
Irreparable harm. Injury that cannot be adequately repaired by money damages or other legal remedies (e.g., unique property interests, constitutional infringements with no adequate legal remedy). Routine economic loss usually does not qualify.
Abuse of discretion. A highly deferential standard. An appellate court will reverse only if the lower court’s decision was improvident or made without due consideration, not merely because the appellate court would have decided differently.
Likelihood of success on the merits. A forward‑looking assessment of whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail at trial. At the interlocutory stage, appellate courts often avoid definitive resolutions of complex or unsettled legal questions.
Conditional‑use permit (CUP). A discretionary zoning authorization that allows a land use not automatically permitted in a zoning district if specified conditions are met.
Void‑for‑vagueness. A due‑process doctrine invalidating laws that fail to provide people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is required or prohibited, and that invite arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
Rule 54(b) certification. A trial court’s express determination that there is no just reason for delay and direction for entry of final judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties, enabling immediate appeal.
Rule 60 (vacatur). A rule permitting trial courts, within limits, to correct errors or prevent injustice by modifying or vacating orders; if a Rule 54(b) certificate is vacated, an interlocutory order returns to nonfinal, nonappealable status.
Rule 9 administrative appeal (Arkansas practice). The procedural mechanism frequently used to obtain circuit‑court review of certain local administrative or quasi‑judicial decisions, often with strict timeliness and record‑perfecting requirements.

Conclusion

Hause v. City of Fayetteville reinforces several bedrock principles of Arkansas injunctive and appellate practice and signals a cautious approach to interlocutory adjudication of complex constitutional questions. On preliminary injunctions, the Court emphasized preservation of the status quo, demanded a clear showing of irreparable harm beyond monetary loss, and declined to resolve “novel” and “disputed” constitutional issues at an interlocutory stage where the trial court’s decision reflects reasoned consideration. On appellate procedure, the opinion stands as a practical reminder that absent a valid, extant Rule 54(b) certification—and a timely notice of appeal from any vacatur—partial dispositions remain unappealable.

For municipalities, the decision tacitly validates continued use of CUPs and discretionary factors to manage STRs pending final merits rulings, though the dissent’s vagueness critique highlights the litigation risk of undefined standards such as “frequency and concentration.” For property owners and public‑law litigants, the case underscores the importance of developing robust, nonmonetary irreparable‑harm showings and preserving appellate pathways with meticulous attention to finality and certification rules.

Ultimately, the Court’s holding prioritizes procedural regularity and deference at the interim stage, reserving constitutional line‑drawing for a fully developed record and final appeal. The dissent’s pointed analysis ensures that, when the merits return, the clarity and objectivity of municipal land‑use criteria—especially in the STR context—will be squarely in the spotlight.