Notice and Scienter Under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act: Reckless Disregard Standard and Bar-Date Enforcement

Introduction

In Mario Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 11th Cir. No. 23-12966 (May 20, 2025), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed two core issues under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (the “Helms-Burton Act”): (1) the application of the March 12, 1996 “bar-date” for heirs asserting claims to property confiscated by the Cuban government, and (2) the scienter (knowledge or “reason to know”) required to hold third-party travel-booking websites liable for “trafficking” in that property. Plaintiffs-Appellants are U.S. nationals and heirs to Cuban properties taken by Castro’s regime; Defendants-Appellees operate online hotel-booking platforms. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, and this appeal followed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. First, it held that heirs who “acquir[ed] ownership of the claim” to confiscated property after March 12, 1996—here, Plaintiffs Falla and Pou, who inherited in 2004 and 2014—are categorically barred from bringing Title III suits. Second, it rejected Defendants’ challenge that Del Valle himself had insufficiently alleged an ownership interest in confiscated beachfront land he inherited in 1968. Third, the court held that neither President Clinton’s 1996 signing statement, Plaintiffs’ pre-suit demand letters, nor the complaint’s allegations alone gave Defendants “reason to know” they were “knowingly and intentionally” trafficking in confiscated American property. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend when Plaintiffs never requested it below.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 1265 (11th Cir. 2022)—reversed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.
• Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., 57 F.4th 916 (11th Cir. 2023)—heirs inheriting after March 12, 1996, are barred by the Title III “bar-date.”
• Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine LTD., 135 F.4th 939 (11th Cir. Apr. 2025)—same bar-date rule applied to post-cutoff heirs.
• Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)—standard for dismissal for failure to state a claim.
• Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2002)—plaintiff’s duty to move for leave to amend below.

Legal Reasoning

1. Bar-Date Enforcement: Under 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B), Title III claims on property confiscated before March 12, 1996, are barred unless the U.S. national “acquire[d] ownership of the claim” by that date. The Eleventh Circuit, bound by its own prior panels, reaffirmed that heirs who inherit post-cutoff have no Title III remedy (Garcia-Bengochea, Fernandez), despite arguments that “claim” might include contingent rights or that equitable tolling could excuse the date. Under the prior-panel-precedent rule, only an en banc court or the Supreme Court may revisit that construction.

2. Ownership Allegations: Del Valle’s complaint traced his grandfather’s 1940s beachfront purchase, its inheritance to his father, and then to Del Valle in 1968. At the 12(b)(6) stage, those allegations suffice to raise a “reasonable inference” of ownership. The court declined to require granular detail (e.g., wills or intestacy statutes) before discovery.

3. Scienter—“Knowingly and Intentionally Trafficking”: Title III liability attaches only if a defendant “knowingly and intentionally traffics” in confiscated property. “Knowingly” includes “having reason to know,” a term of art imported from tort and criminal law that denotes reckless disregard—i.e., awareness of a substantial or highly probable risk that the property belongs to a U.S. national. Neither a general presidential signing statement nor unspecific pre-suit letters nor bare assertions in a complaint impose on third-party booking platforms the duty to investigate ancestral deeds, wills, or Cuban government decrees. Unlike cases offering stock certificates or dividends plus a Cuban decree (Fernandez), Plaintiffs here provided no documentary proof or detailed testimony to render their claims “highly probable.”

4. Refusal to Grant Leave to Amend: Although Rule 15(a)(2) generally favors amendment, Wagner controls where represented plaintiffs never even moved to amend in district court. To prevent endless second bites at the apple, the court held that a failure to request leave below forecloses an appellate mandate to reopen.

Impact

This ruling sharpens the burden on Title III litigants in two respects:

1. Bar-Date Finality: Heirs inheriting claims post-1996 have no relief, period—prompting families to consolidate claims or file before cutoff dates.
2. Notice and Recklessness Standard: Website operators and other intermediaries will not face Title III exposure absent clear, individualized evidence—deeds, ownership decrees, wills—demonstrating that property listed on their platforms was confiscated from a U.S. national. Broad, generic warnings do not suffice.

Future litigants must therefore assemble documentary proof early or forgo suit, and defendants can generally rely on the absence of specific notice to plead scienter away at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Title III of the Helms-Burton Act: A U.S. law allowing American nationals to sue anyone “trafficking” in property confiscated by Cuba after 1959.
• Bar Date (March 12, 1996): If you inherited your claim after this date, your Title III claim is automatically barred.
• Trafficking: Under the Act, engaging in commercial transactions involving confiscated property.
• Scienter (“Knowingly and Intentionally”): Requires actual knowledge or “reason to know” (reckless disregard) that the property belonged to a U.S. national before confiscation.
• Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Rule 12(b)(6)): The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true but can dismiss if those facts cannot support a legal claim.
• Leave to Amend: Under Rule 15, courts usually allow amendments, but plaintiffs must request it in district court; failure to do so bars new amendment arguments on appeal.

Conclusion

Mario Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH crystallizes two key Helms-Burton principles. First, the March 12, 1996 bar-date for heirs is absolute and cannot be tolled or avoided except by Supreme Court or en banc reversal. Second, Title III’s “trafficking” requires a recklessness mens rea: third-party platforms face liability only when they possess or ignore compelling proof that a listed property was confiscated from a U.S. national. Generic statutory warnings or bare claims will not pierce the scienter requirement at the pleading stage. Together, these rulings will likely channel Title III litigation toward well-documented claims and discourage speculative suits against intermediaries lacking concrete notice.