Not Complete on Mailing: Venue Lies Where False Instruments Are Delivered Under NRS 205.110 and NRS 239.330

Not Complete on Mailing: Venue Lies Where False Instruments Are Delivered Under NRS 205.110 and NRS 239.330

Introduction

In State v. DeGraffenreid, III (James) (Criminal), No. 89064 (Nev. Nov. 13, 2025) (en banc), the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed a district court’s dismissal of an indictment on venue grounds and clarified a critical question of where crimes predicated on “offering” or “uttering” forged or false instruments occur. The decision holds that for charges under NRS 205.110 (uttering or offering a forged instrument) and NRS 239.330 (offering a false or forged instrument to be filed in a public office), the offenses are not complete when a defendant deposits documents in the mail. Rather, because the statutory verbs “offer” and “utter” inherently contemplate presentation to and action by a recipient, venue properly lies in the county where the documents are delivered and presented for acceptance.

The ruling arises from Nevada’s 2020 “alternate electors” matter. After the November 2020 general election and unsuccessful challenges to the certified results, respondents executed certificates purporting to cast Nevada’s electoral votes for a different slate and mailed those documents to various officials, including the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada at the federal courthouse in Las Vegas (Clark County). A Clark County grand jury indicted respondents for violations of NRS 205.110 and NRS 239.330. The district court dismissed, reasoning the offenses were complete upon mailing from Douglas County. The Supreme Court disagreed, reinstating the indictment and providing a venue roadmap for prosecutions involving false documents transmitted to public offices.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The Court holds that under NRS 205.110 and NRS 239.330, the crimes of uttering or offering forged/false instruments require presentation to a recipient and therefore are not complete upon mailing.
  • Venue is proper in Clark County because the documents were addressed to, delivered at, and time-stamped by the federal courthouse in Las Vegas, thereby “offering” the instruments there.
  • NRS 171.030 permits prosecution where an offense is committed in whole or in part, or where acts or effects requisite to consummation occur; the receipt and presentation in Clark County satisfy this statute.
  • Subsequent forwarding of the delivered package to a judge’s chambers in Washoe County does not defeat Clark County venue and, in any event, Nevada law allows multiple proper venues.
  • Respondents’ argument that federal false-statement law (18 U.S.C. § 1001) preempts state law was waived and, even on the merits, unpersuasive given Nevada’s strong interest in regulating false statements in its elections.

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondents were nominated by the Nevada Republican Party as potential presidential electors for 2020. After Nevada’s certified results favored Joseph Biden and Kamala Harris, respondents challenged the outcome in state court; their challenge was denied and the denial was affirmed on appeal (Law v. Whitmer, No. 82178, 2020 WL 7240299 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020)).

Thereafter, respondents conducted a ceremony in Carson City and signed documents asserting they were “the duly elected and qualified Electors” and purported to cast Nevada’s electoral votes. Respondent DeGraffenreid mailed packages containing these documents from Minden (Douglas County) to, among others, the Archivist of the United States, the President of the Senate, the Nevada Secretary of State, and Chief Judge Miranda M. Du at the Lloyd D. George Courthouse in Las Vegas (Clark County).

Before a Clark County grand jury, a postal inspector testified that the package to Judge Du was sent certified and delivered in Las Vegas; a state investigator testified the federal court time-stamped its receipt. The grand jury returned a true bill. Respondents acknowledged delivery in Las Vegas but argued venue was improper because the offenses were complete upon mailing; they also contended the Las Vegas address was a mere “pit stop” en route to Washoe County, where the package was ultimately opened. The district court agreed and dismissed. The State appealed.

Analysis

Statutory Framework and Legal Reasoning

Nevada’s venue statute provides that prosecution may be brought in the county where a crime is committed or, if committed in multiple counties, where “the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur.” (NRS 171.030; see also Martinez Guzman v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. 599, 496 P.3d 572 (2021)). Determining venue requires identifying where the elements of the crime occurred, a question of law (Ibarra v. State, 134 Nev. 582, 426 P.3d 16 (2018)).

The Court focused on the operative verbs in the charged statutes, following the interpretive approach endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 280 (1999) (examining the verbs to discern the nature of the substantive offense):

  • NRS 205.110 makes it forgery to, “knowing [an instrument] to be forged or altered, and with intent to defraud, … utter, offer, dispose of or put off as true” a forged writing.
  • NRS 239.330(1) makes it a crime to “knowingly procure or offer any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered or recorded in any public office.”

Using contemporary definitions, the Court explained:

  • Offer means “presenting something for acceptance.”
  • Utter means “to put or send [a document] into circulation; especially, to circulate [a forged note] as if genuine.” (Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)).

These verbs inherently presuppose receipt by, and potential action from, a recipient. For NRS 239.330, this is explicit: a document must be presented “to be filed, registered or recorded” in a public office, which necessarily implicates receipt by that office. For NRS 205.110, “offering” and “uttering” envisage a recipient who can accept, file, or otherwise act upon the document. Therefore, the offenses are not consummated merely by depositing materials in the mail; they involve presentation and delivery to the destination.

Applying those principles, the State established by a preponderance of the evidence that the package was addressed to and delivered at the federal courthouse in Las Vegas, where it was time-stamped. Because the defendants directed their false instruments to that public office for action, they “offered” and “uttered” the instruments in Clark County, making venue there proper under NRS 171.030.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Martinez Guzman v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. 599, 496 P.3d 572 (2021): Reiterates that venue lies where acts or effects constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur and must be proven by a preponderance. The Court used this framework to assess whether delivery in Clark County was an act/effect requisite to the consummation of the charged crimes.
  • Ibarra v. State, 134 Nev. 582, 426 P.3d 16 (2018): Clarifies that determining where elements are committed is a question of law. The Court relied on this to conduct a de novo analysis of where “offering” and “uttering” occur.
  • United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999): Supports interpreting the “verbs” of a statute to determine the locus of criminal conduct. This method anchored the Court’s focus on “offer” and “utter.”
  • In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257 (1890): Establishes that where an offense is perpetrated by mail, venue may lie where the letter is received, especially where the letter may influence the addressee. The Court analogized this reasoning to the receipt of purported electoral certificates at the Clark County courthouse.
  • State court analogs supporting venue at the place of receipt:
    • Lee v. Bates, 130 P.3d 226 (Okla. 2005) (false representation completes when received and relied upon).
    • State v. Hudson, 32 P. 413 (Mont. 1893) (uttering via mail completes upon receipt in destination county).
    • State v. Swank, 195 P. 168 (Or. 1921) (venue for uttering is proper where the forged instrument is received).
    • Harrell v. State, 83 So. 922 (Fla. 1920) (looks to the county to which a forged instrument is mailed).
    • People v. Gould, 246 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Cnty. Ct. 1964) (venue in county of the office receiving a perjured application).
    • Soliz v. State, 97 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (perjury venue lies both where uttered and where intended to be used in court).
  • Federal circuit guidance (noting the broader federal venue statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), but aligning on principle):
    • United States v. Elbaz, 52 F.4th 593 (4th Cir. 2022) (wire fraud venue proper where transmission sent and received).
    • United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996) (venue proper either where false statement is prepared/mailed or where received).

The composite of these authorities supports the Nevada Supreme Court’s conclusion: when an offense’s elements include offering/uttering, a receiving jurisdiction where the document is presented is a proper venue.

Forwarding and Multiple Venues

Respondents argued that because the package was forwarded from Las Vegas to chambers in Reno (Washoe County) and opened there, Clark County venue was improper. The Court rejected this argument:

  • Respondents addressed their package to the federal court in Las Vegas; it was delivered and time-stamped there. That delivery itself constitutes the requisite “offering/presenting.”
  • Nevada law permits multiple proper venues when offenses occur in part in multiple counties (NRS 171.030). The Court did not need to decide whether Washoe County would also be proper because Clark County clearly was.
  • Any alleged “mistake” in using the Las Vegas address rather than a Reno address did not undermine venue where the package was in fact addressed to and received at the Las Vegas courthouse; respondents cited no authority that such a “mistake” negates venue.

Preemption Argument (18 U.S.C. § 1001)

Respondents raised a late-breaking contention that federal false-statement law (18 U.S.C. § 1001) preempts state prosecutions under NRS 205.110 and NRS 239.330. The Court held the argument was waived because it was not raised below. It also signaled that, even if reached, it would fail: Section 1001 contains no clear, manifest congressional intent to displace state law; Nevada has a strong sovereign interest in protecting the integrity of its elections. The Court invoked the presumption against preemption (see Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 123 Nev. 362, 168 P.3d 73 (2007); Las Vegas Convention & Visitors Auth. v. Miller, 124 Nev. 669, 191 P.3d 1138 (2008)).

Impact and Implications

This decision has wide-ranging procedural and practical consequences for Nevada criminal law and beyond:

  • Clarifies the locus of “offer” and “utter” crimes: For statutes that require presentation to a public office or recipient, the place of delivery and receipt is a proper venue. Mailing alone is not enough to complete the offense.
  • Confirms multi-county venue flexibility: Prosecutors may lay venue in any county where an act or effect required to consummate the offense occurred. Defendants cannot defeat venue by initiating conduct in one county but directing fraudulent instruments to a public office in another.
  • Guidance for document-based offenses in the digital age: Although this case involves physical mail, the reasoning readily extends to emailed filings or electronic submissions: venue will lie where the receiving office is located and the document is presented for acceptance or filing.
  • Election-related enforcement: Nevada retains authority to prosecute state-law offenses involving false statements in its election processes even if federal officials or offices are recipients. The state interest in election integrity mitigates preemption concerns and supports venue where submissions are directed.
  • Evidence to establish venue: The State prevailed on a preponderance standard with straightforward proof: certified mail records, delivery confirmation, and a receiving office’s time-stamp. This sets an evidentiary template for future venue contests.
  • Forum-selection concerns balanced by statutory text: While the availability of multiple venues may raise “forum shopping” concerns, NRS 171.030 expressly authorizes venue where acts or effects requisite to consummation occur, and the Court’s textual analysis anchors the choice to objective facts of delivery and presentation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Venue vs. Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear a case; venue is the specific location (county) where the case may be tried. This case is about venue—choosing the correct county under Nevada statutes—not jurisdiction.
  • “Offer” and “Utter” (criminal context): To “offer” is to present a document for acceptance; to “utter” is to put a document into circulation as genuine. Both imply the involvement of a recipient who can act on the document.
  • “Acts or Effects … requisite to the consummation” (NRS 171.030): Venue can be set where parts of the crime happen or where the intended effects that complete the crime occur—here, the receipt by the public office.
  • Continuing offense (federal concept) vs. Nevada’s test: The federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)) allows prosecution where a continuing offense moves through or into a district. Nevada instead focuses on where the crime’s elements or their requisites occur. Even without the “continuing offense” label, delivery and receipt can satisfy Nevada’s venue statute.
  • Preemption: Federal law displaces state law only when Congress clearly intends it. Absent explicit preemption, states may enforce their own criminal statutes—especially in areas of core state interest, like election integrity.
  • Standard of proof for venue: Venue is not an element of the crime; it must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.

Practice Pointers

  • For prosecutors:
    • Identify the recipient’s county and secure proof of receipt (postal certifications, logs, time-stamps, clerk testimony).
    • For “offer” or “utter” offenses, emphasize that the statutory verbs require presentation to and potential action by the receiving office.
    • Consider multi-venue strategies where different acts/effects occurred in different counties, but tie venue to objective delivery facts to forestall forum-shopping challenges.
  • For defense counsel:
    • Scrutinize whether the State can actually prove receipt in the chosen county and whether the receiving location is the relevant public office.
    • Where documents were misaddressed or diverted, argue lack of “offer/presentation” in the chosen venue—though DeGraffenreid makes clear that mere forwarding will not defeat venue if delivery occurred there.
    • Preserve preemption and other statutory arguments in the trial court to avoid waiver on appeal.
  • For public offices:
    • Maintain reliable receipt and time-stamp procedures; such records can be decisive in venue disputes.
    • Where internal forwarding occurs, document the chain of custody to clarify the sequence of receipt and any subsequent handling.

Key Takeaways

  • Mailing alone does not complete the crimes of “offering” or “uttering” under NRS 205.110 and NRS 239.330; receipt and presentation to the recipient are essential.
  • Venue is proper where the false/forged instruments are delivered and presented—here, the federal courthouse in Las Vegas (Clark County).
  • Forwarding to another county does not negate venue where delivery occurred, and multiple venues may be proper if the offense spans counties.
  • State prosecutions for false statements related to elections are not preempted by 18 U.S.C. § 1001 absent a clear congressional directive.

Conclusion

State v. DeGraffenreid cements an important principle in Nevada criminal procedure: for offenses defined by “offering” or “uttering” forged or false instruments, the crime is not complete upon deposit in the mail. Venue may be laid where the instruments are delivered and presented to the intended public office. By anchoring its analysis to the verbs that define the substantive offenses and to NRS 171.030’s “acts or effects” language, the Court harmonized Nevada practice with longstanding state and federal authorities that look to the place of receipt for mail-transmitted crimes. The decision streamlines venue analysis for document-based offenses, strengthens the enforceability of Nevada’s election-integrity laws, and provides clear, administrable guidance for trial courts, prosecutors, defense counsel, and public offices handling official filings.


Opinion by Justice Stiglich; en banc; Justice Pickering recused. Reversed and remanded to the Eighth Judicial District Court (Clark County) for further proceedings.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

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