Nonreceipt of Alternative Service and the First Craddock Prong in Texas Default Judgments: Commentary on Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman, Supreme Court of Texas (Dec. 5, 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam decision in Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman, No. 24‑0919, a default divorce case that substantially clarifies how the Craddock test applies when a defendant is served by alternative service but credibly denies ever receiving the citation.

The central question before the Court was whether Jenna Tabakman, the defaulting spouse in a divorce proceeding, was entitled to a new trial under the three‑part equitable test announced in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1939, opinion adopted). The lower courts concluded that Jenna had failed to satisfy the first Craddock element—showing that her failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that on the record presented, Jenna’s nonappearance was excused under Craddock, and that she also satisfied the second and third elements. The case was remanded for a new trial.

The opinion is especially significant for three reasons:

It draws a sharp and emphatic distinction between (a) mere awareness that a lawsuit has been filed and (b) awareness that one has been served with a citation commanding an answer.
It holds that validly executed alternative service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b) is not, by itself, evidence of actual notice sufficient to controvert a sworn claim that the defendant never received the citation.
It reaffirms and strengthens the State’s strong policy disfavoring default judgments, particularly in family‑law contexts, and clarifies the low evidentiary threshold for the second and third Craddock elements.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Jenna and Gary Tabakman were married for thirteen years and had one child. After alleged mistreatment, Jenna left the marital residence and moved in with her parents. That same month, Gary filed for divorce and told Jenna that he had done so. Jenna testified that she was frightened, had no money for a lawyer, and expected—incorrectly but understandably in lay terms—that divorce papers would be served on her in person.

Multiple attempts at personal service failed. The trial court then authorized alternative service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b). The process server posted the citation, petition, and alternative‑service order on the front door of Jenna’s parents’ house, where she was staying. No answer was filed by the deadline, so Gary moved for a default judgment.

At the default hearing, the trial court orally rendered a default divorce judgment. Jenna was unaware of the hearing, of the posting, or of any document being left at the house. Around the same time, she contacted an attorney because Gary allegedly told her he was planning to leave with their child and the family dog. Within three weeks of the oral rendition, Jenna’s counsel filed an answer and a motion for new trial under Craddock. Despite this, the trial court signed the written default divorce decree a few days later.

After an evidentiary hearing on Jenna’s motion for new trial, the trial court:

Found that Jenna had established a meritorious defense (Craddock’s second prong);
Found that she had not negated conscious indifference in failing to answer (first prong); and
Found that she had failed to show that a new trial would not harm or injure Gary (third prong).

The court of appeals (Fourteenth Court, Houston) affirmed, addressing only the first Craddock element. It held that Jenna’s claim of being unaware of alternative service and her failure to take additional steps to avoid missing service did not negate conscious indifference, particularly because Gary had told her about the lawsuit and efforts at service.

The Supreme Court of Texas granted review, reversed, and ordered a new trial.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Default Judgments and the Craddock Framework

The Court begins by re‑emphasizing its long‑standing policy that default judgments are “greatly disfavored” under Texas law, citing In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024). It reiterates that cases should, whenever reasonably possible, be decided on the merits, and that any doubts regarding a default judgment must be resolved against the party who obtained it.

The Court applies the established three‑part Craddock test, under which a defendant seeking to set aside a no‑answer default judgment must show:

Her failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but due to accident or mistake.
She has a meritorious defense.
Granting a new trial will not delay the case or otherwise injure the plaintiff.

When these elements are satisfied, a new trial must be granted.

B. Holding on the First Craddock Element

The Court holds that Jenna’s factual assertions—if true—negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct and that Gary did not effectively controvert those assertions:

Jenna believed she would be served in person (a mistake of law that can qualify under Craddock).
She did not attempt to evade service and was unaware of any actual attempt to serve her personally or via posting.
She never saw or received the citation posted on the door and no one brought it to her.
Once she learned of the default, she moved quickly, retaining counsel and filing an answer and new‑trial motion before the written decree was signed.

The Court concludes that these facts, supported by her father’s corroborating testimony, are sufficient to negate conscious indifference under Craddock.

Crucially, the Court clarifies that:

A defendant’s knowledge of the existence of a lawsuit does not, by itself, create a duty to answer absent proper service, waiver, or citation.
Alternative service, properly executed, proves when and how service was attempted, but it is “no evidence” of when the defendant received actual notice of the suit papers.
Therefore, proof of valid alternative service does not controvert a sworn assertion that the citation was never actually received.

C. Holding on the Second and Third Craddock Elements

Proceeding in the interest of judicial economy, the Court also addresses the remaining Craddock elements:

Meritorious defense: Jenna “set up” a meritorious defense by asserting a reimbursement claim in favor of her separate estate for the down payment on the marital home, supported by testimony and documents. She does not have to prove her defense conclusively or overcome the clear‑and‑convincing community‑property presumption at this stage; prima facie proof suffices.
No undue delay or injury: Jenna alleged that a new trial would not injure Gary, stated that she was ready for trial, and offered to pay his reasonable costs associated with obtaining the default. This shifted the burden to Gary. His assertions of financial costs and strain on their child were deemed insufficient, because they did not show prejudice to his ability to present his case at a new trial.

The Court therefore holds that Jenna satisfied all three Craddock elements and was entitled to a new trial as a matter of law. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court.

IV. Precedents and Authorities: How They Shape the Decision

A. Craddock and Its Progeny

The core analytical framework is the equitable doctrine announced in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939), which still governs motions to set aside no‑answer default judgments. Subsequent cases have refined each of the three prongs.

1. First prong: Intentional or consciously indifferent failure to answer

The Court relies on several prior decisions to articulate and apply the first Craddock element:

In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006): Sets out the modern burden‑shifting structure. A defendant meets her burden on the first prong when her factual assertions, if true, negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct and those assertions are not controverted by the plaintiff.
Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., 913 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1995): Clarifies that conscious indifference is “more than mere negligence.” A failure to answer is not necessarily intentional or consciously indifferent simply because it was deliberate; there must be a showing that the defendant knew of the suit and did not care.
Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006): Provides the oft‑quoted test—intent and conscious indifference in this context mean that “the defendant knew it was sued but did not care.” The Court also explains in that case that “I didn’t get the suit papers” is generally enough to satisfy the first prong, provided the explanation is plausible and corroborated where possible.
Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2012); Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2012): Both cases uphold new trials where the excuse was misplacing or forgetting the suit papers. The Court’s focus is on the “absence of an intentional failure to answer rather than a real excuse for not answering”; “some excuse, although not necessarily a good one,” suffices.
Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992): Confirms that a mistake of law can satisfy the first Craddock element. Here, Jenna’s belief that she would be served personally is such a mistake.

Tabakman extends this line of authority from “lost or forgotten suit papers” to the context of alternative service where the defendant credibly claims never to have received the papers at all.

2. Second and third prongs: Meritorious defense and lack of injury

For the remaining Craddock elements, the Court draws heavily on Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009), and Director, State Employees Workers’ Compensation Division v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994).

Meritorious defense (second prong): Under Dolgencorp, a defendant “sets up” a defense by alleging facts which, if true, would constitute a defense in law and providing affidavits or other evidence that prima facie support those facts. The court is not to weigh conflicting evidence or require proof by a heightened standard at this stage.
No undue delay or injury (third prong): Dolgencorp and Evans jointly establish that:
- The defendant initially bears a light burden—to allege that a new trial will not delay or injure the plaintiff, show readiness for trial, and, typically, offer to reimburse costs tied to the default.
- The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove specific prejudice to the ability to present the merits at a new trial. Generalized claims of cost, inconvenience, or emotional strain do not suffice.

Applying these principles, the Court finds Jenna’s reimbursement‑type defense adequate and Gary’s claimed harms inadequate.

B. Service, Notice, and the Role of Alternative Service

The opinion leans on several important authorities concerning service of process and notice:

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 22 and 99(c): Rule 22 states that a lawsuit is commenced by filing a petition. Rule 99(c) prescribes what a citation must tell a defendant, including the warning that a default judgment may be taken if the defendant fails to answer.
Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2002): Explains the function of a citation—directed to the defendant, informing them they have been sued and commanding them to answer.
Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990): Establishes a critical principle reiterated in Tabakman: absent service, waiver, or citation, mere knowledge of a pending suit does not place any duty on a defendant to answer. Knowledge of the lawsuit is not the same as knowledge of service.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b) and State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1993): Rule 106(b) authorizes alternative service when personal service is impracticable. Costley states that proof of alternative service establishes how and when service was executed, but is “no evidence in the record of when defendant received actual notice.”
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a and Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987): Under Rule 21a, proper mailing creates a presumption that a document was received, but Cliff holds that this presumption is not itself “evidence” and disappears when opposing evidence of non‑receipt is introduced. The Tabakman Court uses this analogy to show that alternative‑service compliance likewise does not automatically prove actual notice.
Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, 713 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2025): Cited generally for the distinction between actual and constructive knowledge in the context of notice of a judgment under Rule 306a. Tabakman draws on this broader principle to emphasize that constructive notice (from compliance with procedural rules) is not the same as actual, subjective awareness.

Taken together, these authorities undergird the central doctrinal move in Tabakman: the Court refuses to treat valid alternative service as proof that the defendant actually knew she had been served.

C. Default Judgments and Systemic Concerns: In re Lakeside Resort

The Court situates Tabakman within its broader jurisprudence on default judgments, especially In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024). Lakeside underscores:

The strong preference for decisions on the merits, where the “adversarial clash” of evidence and arguments increases the likelihood of truthful results.
The “inherent unfairness” of adjudications in the absence of the losing party.
The “threat to judicial integrity and independence” when courts enforce potentially erroneous default judgments.
The principle that any doubts about default judgments—not just doubts about service—must be resolved against the party who obtained the default.

Tabakman applies these themes in a concrete setting: a default divorce where the losing spouse promptly appears once she learns of the judgment and where the method of service inherently increases the risk that she never actually saw the citation.

D. Family‑Law Specific Precedents: Separate Property and Post‑Default Relief

The Court invokes family‑law precedents to address property‑division and injury arguments:

Texas Family Code § 3.003: Creates a presumption that property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is community property, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence. Gary relied on this to argue Jenna had not established a meritorious defense. The Court holds this standard governs the merits at trial, not the threshold Craddock inquiry.
In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2021): Held it appropriate to allow a separate‑property claim to be litigated later without upsetting the underlying divorce, custody, support, or division of community assets. The Court cites Sandoval to illustrate that allowing a new trial to consider Jenna’s separate‑property reimbursement claim would not cause the sort of systemic or irreparable injury that defeats the third Craddock element.

E. Judicial Economy and Issue Selection: Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital

Jenna also challenged the validity of service itself, but the Supreme Court declined to address that issue, concluding that she had not shown reversible error and that further discussion would not advance the jurisprudence of the State. The Court cites Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital, 703 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2024), for the proposition that, as “stewards of scarce judicial resources,” it may dispose of issues without extended explanation when no reversible error is present and further elaboration would not be jurisprudentially useful.

This choice highlights that the critical doctrinal development in Tabakman is not about the validity of alternative service itself, but about the post‑judgment equitable relief available when an ostensibly valid method of service fails, in fact, to give the defendant actual notice.

V. Legal Reasoning in Detail

A. First Craddock Element: Why Jenna’s Excuse Sufficed

1. The controlling inquiry: “Why did the defendant not appear?”

Citing Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Drewery Construction Co., the Court emphasizes that the overarching question under Craddock is: Why did the defendant not appear? Here, the explanation was:

She expected personal service and believed no lawsuit would proceed without it.
She did not encounter a process server, nor did anyone hand her papers.
She never saw the citation posted on the door and no one mentioned it to her.
She took action quickly once she learned of the default.

This narrative, if accepted, removes the critical element of “I knew I was sued and didn’t care.” Instead, it is consistent with mistake, misunderstanding, and non‑receipt—all paradigmatic grounds for relief under Craddock.

2. Mistake of law and misunderstanding of procedure

Jenna’s assumption that she would be served in person is legally incorrect because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b) authorizes alternative service. But under Bank One v. Moody, even a mistake of law can support Craddock relief. The Court therefore treats this misunderstanding not as evidence of indifference, but as part of a broader picture of confusion and lack of sophistication about legal procedures.

3. Non‑receipt of citation in alternative‑service cases

The Court draws a critical analogy between:

Cases where suit papers were received and later lost or misplaced (Sutherland, Milestone, Fidelity & Guaranty); and
The present scenario, where the defendant credibly claims never to have seen the papers actually posted pursuant to an alternative‑service order.

In the former category, the Court has repeatedly held that losing or forgetting the papers—so long as the explanation is plausible and supported—is sufficient to negate conscious indifference. In Sutherland, for example, the citation was “left in a stack of papers on a desk and forgotten,” due in part to weather and holiday disruptions.

The Court then reasons that if such internal mishandling of papers within a defendant’s possession is excusable, it follows “with greater force” that non‑receipt of papers affixed to the outside of a residence—where others (family members, construction workers, building staff) may remove or obscure them—is also excusable.

The opinion recognizes that in alternative‑service cases, defendants often cannot explain precisely how they failed to receive the papers. As the Court noted in Fidelity & Guaranty, “People often do not know where or how they lost something—that is precisely why it remains ‘lost.’” Still, the defendant must offer “some explanation” and, where possible, supporting testimony from those likely to have handled or seen the papers.

In Tabakman, Jenna’s father provided such corroboration: he described the ongoing construction at the house, how the security officer would normally notify him of visitors, and testified that neither the guard nor the workers brought any documents to his attention. He never saw anything posted on the door.

4. Distinguishing knowledge of lawsuit from knowledge of service

A central legal correction in the opinion is the Court’s criticism of the court of appeals for conflating Jenna’s knowledge of the lawsuit with her knowledge that she had been served with citation.

The Court re‑states three key propositions:

Filing a petition commences a lawsuit (Tex. R. Civ. P. 22), but does not alone impose a duty on the defendant.
A citation (Rule 99(c)) is what tells the defendant: “You have been sued. You must answer by a certain date. If you fail to answer, a default judgment may be taken against you.”
Under Wilson v. Dunn, absent service, waiver, or citation, mere knowledge of a pending suit does not create any duty to answer. Likewise, as noted in Fidelity & Guaranty, actual notice obtained through a procedure not authorized for service is treated as if no notice were received for purposes of default.

Jenna knew Gary had filed for divorce and that someone had attempted to serve her, but the record did not show that she knew service by posting had been executed or that she had seen the citation itself. The Supreme Court holds that this distinction matters for Craddock: being aware of the lawsuit is not the same as deliberately ignoring a served citation.

5. Why Gary’s evidence did not “controvert” Jenna’s excuse

Under R.R., if the plaintiff fails to controvert the defendant’s explanation, the first Craddock element is conclusively established. Gary argued that he had controverted Jenna’s account by:

Showing that alternative service was validly executed; and
Testifying (as summarized by the court of appeals) that he informed Jenna about the citation.

The Supreme Court rejects both contentions:

Alternative service: Following Costley, the Court explains that proof of alternative service is evidence only of what was done by the process server—not of when or whether the defendant actually saw the papers. Thus, it does not rebut a sworn statement of non‑receipt.
Alleged notice from Gary: The opinion notes that Gary’s own testimony merely referenced talking with Jenna about “hiring an attorney,” “the divorce proceeding,” “a process server,” and “the citation of service,” without tying those conversations to the timing of the alternative service or to any clear statements that she had already been served by posting. The record therefore did not show that Jenna was on notice of the completed service.

Accordingly, the Court holds that Jenna’s explanation was not effectively controverted, and she met the first Craddock element as a matter of law.

B. Second Craddock Element: “Setting Up” a Meritorious Defense

On the second element, the Court reiterates that a defendant’s burden is light. Under Dolgencorp, she must:

Allege facts that, if true, would constitute a legal defense; and
Provide affidavits or evidence that prima facie support those alleged facts.

Jenna asserted, among other defenses, a claim for reimbursement to her separate estate for funds allegedly used as the down payment on the marital home. She offered both testimony and documents supporting this claim.

Gary argued that she had not overcome the presumption of community property under Family Code § 3.003 by clear and convincing evidence. The Court’s answer is twofold:

Whether Jenna ultimately prevails on her reimbursement claim is a question for trial, not for the new‑trial motion.
Imposing a clear‑and‑convincing evidentiary burden at the Craddock stage would contradict Dolgencorp’s instruction that the defendant need only “set up” a defense with prima facie proof, not prove it to a directed‑verdict standard.

The trial court had already found that Jenna had a meritorious defense; the Supreme Court agrees and treats this prong as satisfied.

C. Third Craddock Element: No Undue Delay or Injury

On the third element, Jenna:

Alleged that a new trial would not cause undue delay or injure Gary.
Affirmatively stated she was ready to proceed to trial.
Offered to pay Gary’s reasonable costs incurred in obtaining the default and recognized the court’s discretion to award related attorney’s fees.

This satisfied her initial burden under Dolgencorp, shifting the burden to Gary to show injury. Gary asserted:

Financial harm, including attorney’s fees associated with administering the community estate and sale of the marital home; and
That undoing the standard‑possession order and custody provisions in the default decree would place strain on the child.

The Court, invoking Evans, holds that these kinds of generalized harms do not constitute “injury” within the meaning of Craddock, because they do not show how Gary would be disadvantaged in presenting the merits of his case at a new trial. Costs and emotional strain are real burdens, but the equitable analysis focuses on prejudice to the litigation position, not on the mere reversal of a favorable but default‑based outcome.

Further, the Court cites In re Marriage of Sandoval to underscore that allowing a defendant to assert a separate‑property claim in a new proceeding need not “upset the underlying divorce, custody, support, or division of the community assets.” By analogy, granting Jenna a new trial on property issues (and related matters) does not inherently cause the sort of irreparable or structural injury that defeats a Craddock motion.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is a Default Judgment?

A default judgment occurs when a defendant fails to answer or appear by the deadline stated in the citation, and the plaintiff obtains judgment without the defendant’s participation. In a no‑answer default (as here), the defendant has not filed an answer at the time the court renders judgment.

In Tabakman, the trial court orally rendered a default divorce at the hearing before Jenna appeared, but signed the written decree after she had filed an answer. Jenna did not challenge, on appeal, the court’s authority to sign the decree after her appearance. Instead, she sought relief exclusively through Craddock.

B. The Craddock Test in Plain Terms

Under Craddock, a defaulting defendant is entitled to a new trial if she shows:

It wasn’t on purpose: She did not intentionally ignore the lawsuit or act with “conscious indifference.” She must give some reasonable explanation for not answering (for example, confusion, mistake, or genuinely not receiving the papers).
She has a real argument: She can point to at least one defense that, if proven, would defeat or reduce the plaintiff’s claim, and she has some basic evidence to back it up.
No unfair prejudice to the plaintiff: Granting a new trial will not unduly delay the case or make it unfairly harder for the plaintiff to prove his case, especially if the defendant is ready for trial and willing to reimburse certain costs.

If these conditions are met, the trial court must grant a new trial; it has no discretion to deny it.

C. Conscious Indifference vs. Negligence

“Conscious indifference” in this context means more than carelessness. It means the defendant:

Knew she was sued; and
Chose not to act because she did not care about the lawsuit.

By contrast, negligence or mistake involves failing to respond because of confusion, misunderstanding, or oversight—even if, with hindsight, the defendant should have been more careful. Texas law is intentionally forgiving of such errors in the default‑judgment context.

D. Alternative Service Under Rule 106(b)

Ordinarily, a defendant is personally served with citation. Rule 106(b) allows the court to authorize alternative methods—such as posting on the door—when personal service is impracticable. The goal is to use a method “reasonably effective” in giving actual notice.

Importantly, Tabakman clarifies:

Alternative service can be valid (satisfying due process and procedural rules) even if, in fact, the defendant never sees the papers.
The validity of service and the availability of a new trial under Craddock are related but distinct issues. Even when service is valid, a new trial may be required if the defendant truly did not receive actual notice and otherwise satisfies Craddock.

E. Citation vs. Mere Knowledge of a Suit

A “citation” is the document issued by the clerk that:

Identifies the court and the parties;
States the nature of the lawsuit;
Commands the defendant to file a written answer; and
Warns that a default judgment may be entered if no answer is filed by the stated deadline.

In contrast, mere knowledge that “my spouse filed for divorce” does not reproduce this formal legal warning or the deadline. Tabakman draws a bright line: unless and until the defendant is properly served with citation (or waives it), she has no legal duty to answer—no matter how much informal awareness of the suit she may have.

F. Separate vs. Community Property and Reimbursement

Texas assumes that property acquired during marriage is community property. To overcome this presumption, a spouse claiming separate property must prove it by clear and convincing evidence at trial. A reimbursement claim arises when one estate (separate or community) has unfairly benefited another, such as when separate funds pay for a community asset.

In Tabakman, Jenna’s reimbursement claim for the marital home’s down payment is a classic example of a meritorious defense in a default‑divorce case. She does not have to conclusively prove her separate‑property claim at the Craddock stage; it is enough that she has a plausible claim supported by some evidence.

VII. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Strengthening Protection for Defaulting Defendants—Especially in Family Law

Tabakman continues a clear trajectory in Texas jurisprudence toward ensuring that default judgments are the exception, not the norm. Its particular impact in the family‑law arena is substantial:

Spouses who truly never received citation—especially where service was by posting or other alternative means—will find it easier to obtain new trials if they promptly come forward and present a plausible, supported explanation.
Trial courts are reminded that once the Craddock elements are met, they must grant a new trial, even when they believe the plaintiff’s position on the merits is stronger or default was properly obtained.
Family‑law practitioners representing plaintiffs should be cautious in relying on alternative‑service defaults as final resolutions, particularly when the defendant later appears with a credible excuse and colorable property or custody defenses.

B. Clarifying the Role of Alternative Service in Default Litigation

Perhaps the most doctrinally important aspect of Tabakman is the insistence that:

Compliance with alternative‑service procedures demonstrates that the plaintiff did what the rules require;
But such compliance does not prove that the defendant actually saw or read the citation; and
Therefore, valid alternative service does not, by itself, defeat a sworn, corroborated claim of non‑receipt for Craddock purposes.

Practically, plaintiffs and process servers may increasingly seek alternative methods that increase the likelihood of provable actual notice (for example, methods that generate electronic “read” receipts or photographs documenting delivery) in addition to formal compliance with Rule 106(b).

C. Reinforcing a Generous Reading of “Meritorious Defense” and “Injury”

The Court’s treatment of the second and third Craddock elements confirms that:

The “meritorious defense” requirement is intentionally low‑threshold. Courts should not perform mini‑trials on the underlying merits at the new‑trial stage.
“Injury” under Craddock means prejudice to the plaintiff’s legal position at a new trial, not mere loss of a default judgment, increased costs, or the emotional difficulty of re‑litigating sensitive issues like custody and property division.

This approach avoids converting Craddock motions into quasi‑appellate reviews of the default judgment itself and keeps the focus on whether the parties should have their day in court on the merits.

D. Relationship to Broader Systemic Concerns About Ex Parte Adjudications

Citing In re Lakeside Resort, the Court again stresses the structural risks of ex parte justice:

Undermining public confidence in the judicial system if judgments are seen as products of one‑sided presentations.
Elevating the risk of factual or legal error, especially in complex property or custody disputes.
Putting courts in the uncomfortable role of policing fairness in the other party’s absence, which may compromise perceived neutrality.

Tabakman is consistent with a systemic preference for adversarial resolution, particularly in family law where the consequences of error—on property rights, financial obligations, and child custody—are far‑reaching.

VIII. Conclusion

Tabakman v. Tabakman is a significant decision in Texas default‑judgment jurisprudence, especially in the context of family law and alternative service. It establishes, or at least strongly reaffirms, several key principles:

Knowledge of a lawsuit is not equivalent to notice of service of citation. A defendant’s mere awareness that a suit has been filed does not create a duty to answer absent proper service, waiver, or citation.
Nonreceipt of citation after alternative service can satisfy the first Craddock element. A sworn, corroborated assertion that the defendant did not actually receive the posted citation, coupled with a prompt response upon learning of the default, negates conscious indifference—even when alternative service was validly executed.
Proof of valid alternative service is not proof of actual notice. It shows compliance with procedural rules, not that the defendant saw the papers. It therefore does not automatically controvert the defendant’s explanation under Craddock.
The “meritorious defense” and “no injury” requirements remain modest. A plausible reimbursement claim with basic evidentiary support is enough; generalized financial and emotional burdens are not “injury” in the Craddock sense.
Default judgments are disfavored and to be closely scrutinized. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of allowing a trial on the merits.

By reversing the denial of Jenna Tabakman’s motion for new trial, the Supreme Court reinforces Texas’s longstanding commitment to substantive justice over procedural traps, especially where a party’s actual opportunity to be heard has been undermined by the peculiar risks of alternative service. The decision will guide trial courts, litigants, and appellate courts in future default cases and stands as a clear signal that, in Texas, the absence of real notice remains a powerful equitable ground for relief.

Nonreceipt of Alternative Service and the First Craddock Prong: Commentary on Tabakman v. Tabakman