Nonprecedential Clarification: District courts abuse discretion by denying Rule 60(b)(3) relief without an evidentiary hearing when alleged forgery and notice are materially disputed

Case: In re the Marriage of Han & Degennaro, 2025 MT 61N (Mont. Mar. 25, 2025)
Court: Supreme Court of Montana (memorandum opinion; noncitable and nonprecedential under IOR § I(3)(c))
Author: Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray
Disposition: Reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing

Introduction

This memorandum decision from the Montana Supreme Court addresses a recurring procedural problem: whether a district court may deny a motion for relief from judgment under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) on the basis of competing affidavits alone when the movant alleges fraud in the form of a forged signature and disputed notice. The parties—Hannah Han (Petitioner/Appellee) and Maurice Degennaro (Respondent/Appellant)—were married in 2018, later relocating to Montana to operate an antiques business. Following an expedited dissolution in which the district court entered a decree the same day the Joint Affidavit and Marital and Property Settlement Agreement (MPSA) were filed, Maurice moved one year later to modify the decree, asserting that his signature on the MPSA was forged and that he lacked notice of the decree due to Hannah’s interception of his mail.

The district court denied Maurice’s motion without a hearing, concluding he provided “no evidence” or insufficient evidence of forgery and that, in any event, he had adequate notice. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion by resolving disputed, outcome-determinative facts—particularly involving alleged fraud—without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Although nonprecedential and noncitable under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules, the decision reinforces settled Montana law: credibility determinations and sharply contested factual issues underpinning Rule 60(b)(3) claims cannot be resolved on affidavits alone. The Court remanded for a hearing to take testimony, permit cross-examination, and make findings on whether fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct occurred.

Summary of the Opinion

• Issues on appeal:
  1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Maurice’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion without holding an evidentiary hearing despite significant factual disputes (forgery of the MPSA signature and notice of the decree).
  2. Whether the district court erred in denying relief under Rule 60(b)(3) (fraud/misrepresentation/misconduct).
• Holding: The district court abused its discretion by deciding the motion on conflicting affidavits without a hearing. Because the allegations (forged signature on the MPSA and lack of notice) present material factual disputes that turn on credibility, a hearing is required before resolving Rule 60(b)(3) claims.
• Remedy: Reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing at which the court will receive testimony, allow cross-examination, and make findings regarding (i) whether Maurice signed the MPSA, (ii) the circumstances of its execution, and (iii) any interception of mail. After those findings, the court must determine whether grounds exist for Rule 60(b)(3) relief.
• Scope: The Court expressly does not predetermine whether fraud occurred or whether relief will ultimately be granted.
• Note: The Court decided the case by memorandum opinion under IOR § I(3)(c). It does not serve as precedent and may not be cited, though it applies settled law to the facts presented.

Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

The Court’s reasoning rests on established Montana and persuasive federal authorities governing Rule 60(b) motions and the necessity of evidentiary hearings where credibility is central:

• In re Marriage of Hopper, 1999 MT 310, ¶ 19, 297 Mont. 225, 991 P.2d 960. Sets the general standard of review for Rule 60(b) rulings as abuse of discretion, particularly where factual assessments are involved.
• In re Marriage of Miller, 273 Mont. 286, 291, 902 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1995). Legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness (de novo), distinguishing factual discretion from legal interpretation.
• In re Marriage of Barnes, 251 Mont. 334, 336, 825 P.2d 201, 203 (1992). Appellate deference to factual findings presupposes the trial court has heard testimony, observed demeanor, and assessed credibility. When a court decides on paper submissions alone, deference diminishes.
• Puhto v. Smith Funeral Chapels, Inc., 2011 MT 279, ¶ 18, 362 Mont. 447, 264 P.3d 1142. A hearing is not required for every Rule 60(b) motion; where material facts are undisputed, a paper ruling may suffice. The Court contrasts Puhto with the instant case to emphasize the necessity of a hearing when facts are sharply disputed.
• Willis v. Fertterer, 2013 MT 282, ¶¶ 33-35, 372 Mont. 108, 310 P.3d 544. Upholds a post-trial rejection of forgery allegations precisely because the district court had heard testimony and reviewed evidence at trial—a point underscoring that credibility-based determinations must follow an evidentiary process.
• Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 1171, 1180 (9th Cir. 2015). Persuasive authority on the federal analog to Rule 60(b)(3), requiring the movant to prove by a preponderance that the judgment was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct.
• Wagenman v. Wagenman, 2016 MT 176, ¶ 12, 384 Mont. 149, 376 P.3d 121. Discusses the Rule 60(b) standard and reinforces that fraud-based relief requires proof by a preponderance.
• Statutes:
  • M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3): Authorizes relief from judgment for “fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.”
  • § 40-4-108(4), MCA: Permits entry of an uncontested dissolution decree without a hearing only if both parties consent by affidavit and submit a settlement agreement disposing of the marital estate. If the MPSA lacks a party’s genuine assent (e.g., is forged), the statutory prerequisites are not met.
  • § 40-4-208(8), MCA: Cited by Maurice below, but the Supreme Court’s analysis centers on Rule 60(b)(3). The decision does not reach or develop a separate holding under this subsection.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The decision proceeds in two logical steps:

1. Standard of Review and Process Error: While Rule 60(b) rulings are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, that deference is premised on the district court’s vantage point in hearing evidence and assessing credibility. Here, no evidentiary hearing was held. The district court rejected Maurice’s sworn allegations of forgery and lack of notice, expressly crediting Hannah’s competing affidavit. Because the material facts were sharply disputed and turned on credibility, the district court’s paper-only resolution constituted an abuse of discretion. The Court draws a clear distinction between cases like Puhto (where facts were undisputed) and cases—like this one—where allegations of fraud and forgery demand live testimony and cross-examination.
2. Substantive Framework Under Rule 60(b)(3): Forgery of a signature on a dispositive settlement agreement would, if proven, qualify as “fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct” sufficient to undermine a judgment entered on its basis. The court emphasizes two legal consequences of a proven forgery:
   • It would vitiate the consent prerequisite for an uncontested dissolution decree under § 40-4-108(4), MCA.
   • It would satisfy the Rule 60(b)(3) threshold of fraud/misrepresentation by a preponderance, if established on the evidentiary record.
   Because the factual record (dueling affidavits) was insufficient to resolve whether a forgery occurred or whether notice was obstructed (via alleged mail interception), the Court remands for a full evidentiary hearing at which the district court can make credibility-based findings.

3) Impact and Practical Significance

Nonprecedential status: This is a memorandum opinion under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules. It “shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent.” Even so, it applies settled law in a way that offers practical guidance:

• For trial courts: When a Rule 60(b)(3) motion turns on materially disputed facts (especially alleged forgery and notice), the court should not resolve the matter on affidavits alone. An evidentiary hearing is generally required to:
  • Receive live testimony;
  • Permit cross-examination;
  • Assess demeanor and credibility;
  • Create an adequate record for appellate review.
• For practitioners in family law:
  • Decree by affidavit demands scrupulous consent. Under § 40-4-108(4), MCA, an uncontested dissolution without a hearing hinges on both parties’ genuine assent and submission of a valid settlement agreement. Where consent is challenged as forged, the decree’s foundation is at risk.
  • Request a hearing when fraud is alleged. Counsel moving under Rule 60(b)(3) should affirmatively seek an evidentiary hearing and be prepared to present foundational evidence (notary testimony, witnesses to execution, document metadata, handwriting analysis, communications surrounding execution).
  • Beware of relying on dueling affidavits. Where credibility is central, paper submissions are unlikely to carry the day—either to establish or to defeat a fraud claim.
• Beyond family law: The same evidentiary-hearing principle applies across civil cases: courts should not adjudicate fraud-based Rule 60(b)(3) motions by choosing between conflicting affidavits without live evidence and credibility findings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 60(b)(3) relief: A mechanism to ask the court to set aside or reopen a final judgment when the adverse party obtained it through “fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct.” The moving party bears the burden to prove fraud by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not).
• Evidentiary hearing vs. oral argument: An oral argument is lawyer argument about the law; an evidentiary hearing is where witnesses testify under oath, documents are received into evidence, and credibility is tested through cross-examination. When facts are disputed and credibility matters, courts typically need an evidentiary hearing.
• Credibility determinations: Judgments about which witness to believe based on demeanor, consistency, corroboration, and the plausibility of testimony. Appellate courts defer to such determinations when the trial court has observed live testimony—but not when the trial court relied only on paper submissions.
• Uncontested dissolution by affidavit (§ 40-4-108(4), MCA): A streamlined process allowing courts to enter a dissolution decree without a hearing only if both parties consent by affidavit and submit a settlement agreement disposing of the marital estate. A forged signature on the settlement agreement, if proven, defeats the statutory prerequisites.
• Memorandum opinion; nonprecedential decision: Under the Montana Supreme Court’s Internal Operating Rules, certain decisions are resolved via memorandum opinion when controlled by settled law or clear application of standards of review. These may not be cited as precedent and do not establish new binding rules, though they can illuminate how settled principles apply to common fact patterns.

Points the District Court Must Resolve on Remand

The Supreme Court outlined the evidentiary issues for the district court to address:

• Did Maurice sign the MPSA? If not, what evidence supports the assertion of forgery (e.g., testimony from witnesses/notary, forensic handwriting analysis, document history) versus genuine execution?
• What were the circumstances of the MPSA’s execution (where, when, who was present, manner of signature collection)?
• Did Hannah intercept Maurice’s mail and conceal the decree or related filings, thereby impairing his notice and opportunity to challenge the decree sooner?
• Based on credibility findings and the evidence, has Maurice proven by a preponderance that Hannah engaged in “fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct” within Rule 60(b)(3)?

What the Opinion Does Not Decide

• Whether forgery actually occurred—this remains an open factual question.
• Whether notice was inadequate or obstructed—also an open factual question.
• Whether relief under § 40-4-208(8), MCA, is independently warranted—the Court focused its analysis on Rule 60(b)(3).
• The precise remedy if fraud is proven—on a sufficient record, the district court will decide what portions of the decree (e.g., property distribution) must be set aside and how to proceed.

Practice Takeaways

• When a Rule 60(b)(3) motion turns on alleged forgery or contested notice, request and conduct an evidentiary hearing. Do not expect the court to resolve credibility contests on affidavits alone.
• For uncontested dissolutions, ensure that:
  • All required affidavits and the MPSA are properly executed;
  • Execution is documented (e.g., notarization where applicable, witnesses);
  • Filing practices preserve original signatures and metadata where possible.
• Build a factual record: Emails, texts, drafts, notary logs, and forensic analyses can corroborate or refute signature authenticity and notice.
• Be mindful that deference on appeal depends on the existence of a live evidentiary record with credibility findings.

Conclusion

This nonprecedential memorandum opinion applies settled Montana law to a familiar scenario: a Rule 60(b)(3) motion premised on alleged forgery and disputed notice. The Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying relief without first holding an evidentiary hearing to resolve the material factual disputes and make credibility findings. On remand, the district court must take testimony, allow cross-examination, and decide—on a proper evidentiary record—whether fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct occurred and whether relief from the dissolution decree’s property provisions is warranted.

While not citable precedent, the decision underscores a robust procedural principle: when Rule 60(b)(3) claims hinge on credibility and sharply contested facts, paper submissions cannot substitute for a hearing. The message is clear for trial courts and practitioners alike—fraud allegations require live proof, not just dueling affidavits.

Key Citations

• In re Marriage of Hopper, 1999 MT 310, ¶ 19, 297 Mont. 225, 991 P.2d 960.
• In re Marriage of Miller, 273 Mont. 286, 291, 902 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1995).
• In re Marriage of Barnes, 251 Mont. 334, 336, 825 P.2d 201, 203 (1992).
• Puhto v. Smith Funeral Chapels, Inc., 2011 MT 279, ¶ 18, 362 Mont. 447, 264 P.3d 1142.
• Willis v. Fertterer, 2013 MT 282, ¶¶ 33-35, 372 Mont. 108, 310 P.3d 544.
• Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 1171, 1180 (9th Cir. 2015) (federal analog).
• Wagenman v. Wagenman, 2016 MT 176, ¶ 12, 384 Mont. 149, 376 P.3d 121.
• M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); § 40-4-108(4), MCA; § 40-4-208(8), MCA.