Nonprecedential Affirmance of HRC Retaliation Dismissals: Rebutted Presumption and Harmless Procedural Error Under MAPA (Vaccaro v. Three Forks Area Ambulance Service)

Nonprecedential Affirmance of HRC Retaliation Dismissals: Rebutted Presumption and Harmless Procedural Error Under MAPA

Case: Vaccaro v. Three Forks Area Ambulance Service, 2025 MT 230N (Mont. Oct. 7, 2025)

Court: Supreme Court of Montana (memorandum opinion; noncitable and nonprecedential)

Author: Justice Jim Rice

Introduction

This commentary examines the Montana Supreme Court’s memorandum decision affirming the Human Rights Commission’s (HRC) dismissal of two employment retaliation complaints brought by Daniela Vaccaro against the Three Forks Area Ambulance Service (TFAAS), a volunteer, nonprofit ambulance provider. Although the opinion is nonprecedential under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules, it offers a clear application of settled administrative law principles under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), including:

  • How the HRC and reviewing courts apply the “disputable presumption” of retaliation that arises from temporal proximity under Admin. R. M. 24.9.603(3);
  • The scope of judicial review under MAPA, Mont. Code Ann. § 2-4-704(2), including the prohibition on reweighing facts and the requirement of showing prejudice to substantial rights for reversal; and
  • Harmless error analysis when investigative omissions or procedural irregularities are alleged.

The key issues included whether: (1) the HRC investigators acted arbitrarily or without conscientious judgment, particularly by failing to interview a witness; (2) the HRC applied the correct standard of review; (3) the procedural irregularity of TFAAS board members speaking during HRC oral argument prejudiced the complainant; and (4) substantial evidence supported rebuttal of the retaliation presumption.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order upholding the HRC’s Final Agency Decisions dismissing both retaliation complaints. The Court held:

  • Both HRB/HRC investigations were comprehensive and properly applied Admin. R. M. 24.9.603(3), which creates a disputable presumption of retaliation based on timing but allows employers to rebut with legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons.
  • TFAAS rebutted the presumption in both cases with substantial evidence: (a) the selection of a more qualified Narcan trainer (Dr. John Andrews) over Vaccaro; and (b) the routine, uniformly-applied skills test and lack of evidence of aggressive or improper conduct by board members, coupled with Vaccaro’s own leave/availability issues.
  • Even assuming an investigator failed to interview a witness and that board members made comments during HRC oral argument, these did not cause substantial prejudice to Vaccaro’s rights or render the decisions unlawful under § 2-4-704(2), MCA.
  • The HRC’s reference to whether investigators acted “without conscientious judgment” did not impose an improper legal burden on Vaccaro; it was a permissible articulation within abuse-of-discretion review.
  • Given the settled legal standards and substantial evidence, affirmance was required. The decision is a noncitable memorandum opinion under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Blaine County v. Stricker, 2017 MT 80, 387 Mont. 202, 394 P.3d 159. The Court cites Stricker for the MAPA standard of judicial review and the rule that the District Court’s review of an agency decision—and the Supreme Court’s subsequent review of the District Court—use the same framework. Under MAPA, a reviewing court may not substitute its view of the evidence for the agency’s on factual issues. Reversal is permissible only on enumerated grounds (e.g., unlawful procedure, clear error, arbitrary/capricious, etc.) where substantial rights are prejudiced.
  • Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), § 2-4-704(2), MCA. Provides the controlling standard of review for agency decisions. Courts may affirm, remand, reverse, or modify, but may not reweigh evidence. Reversal requires a showing that the decision was: (i) unconstitutional/illegal; (ii) beyond statutory authority; (iii) made upon unlawful procedure; (iv) affected by other legal error; (v) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (vi) arbitrary/capricious/abusive of discretion—and that the appellant’s substantial rights were prejudiced.
  • Admin. R. M. 24.9.603(3). Establishes that when an adverse action follows protected activity within a specified period (here, the investigators applied a six-month benchmark), a disputable presumption of retaliation arises. The employer may rebut that presumption by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the action.
  • Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, Section I, ¶ 3(c). Authorizes memorandum opinions that are noncitable and do not serve as precedent. The Court invoked this provision, signaling that the case involves the clear application of settled law and standards of review.

Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Decision

The Court’s analysis proceeds from the MAPA standard: courts do not substitute their view of the facts for that of the agency and may reverse only if enumerated legal defects caused prejudice to substantial rights. Against that backdrop, the Court assessed the two retaliation complaints and the corresponding records.

1) First Retaliation Complaint (Narcan Training; HRB Case No. 0220495)

After Vaccaro settled a marital-status discrimination claim and resumed at TFAAS, she asked to provide Narcan training. The Board chose an external trainer, Dr. John Andrews. The investigator recognized that the timing of this decision post-settlement triggered a disputable presumption of retaliation under Admin. R. M. 24.9.603(3). The investigator then evaluated whether TFAAS rebutted the presumption by showing legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons.

The record showed that Dr. Andrews had extensive medical experience and hands-on Narcan administration in emergencies, while Vaccaro had limited EMT experience and no field administration experience. The decision to use Dr. Andrews was consistent with qualifications-based selection, not retaliatory animus. The investigator thus found the presumption rebutted, and the HRC dismissed.

On judicial review, both the District Court and the Supreme Court agreed the selection was supported by substantial evidence and that—even assuming a witness (Sue Foreman) was not interviewed—there was no material prejudice because the dispositive issue (qualifications for training) was decisively established. It “would have been a stretch” to find retaliation on this record.

2) Second Retaliation Complaint (Skills Test, Alleged Exclusion/Hostility; HRB Case No. 0230107)

Vaccaro alleged she was required to perform a Narcan skills test, was subjected to argument by board members, and was excluded from meetings/communications, all in retaliation for her prior protected activity. The investigator again applied Admin. R. M. 24.9.603(3): the timing created a disputable presumption. But the evidence showed that:

  • Other EMTs were also required to complete the same skills test; it was routine and not unique to Vaccaro.
  • Vaccaro had been on vacation and had taken a leave of absence, limiting opportunities for training/testing—circumstances attributable to her own choices rather than retaliatory exclusion.
  • The claim that board members acted aggressively or improperly during the August 1, 2022 meeting was not supported by the evidence.

The investigator found the presumption rebutted, the HRC dismissed, and the District Court affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed: the record supported the HRC’s determinations; the agency exercised conscientious judgment; and no legal error or prejudicial procedural defect warranted reversal.

3) Alleged Investigative and Procedural Defects

Vaccaro argued that investigators acted arbitrarily—especially by not interviewing witness Sue Foreman—and that HRC oral argument included improper comments from TFAAS board members. The Court addressed these claims within MAPA’s prejudice and unlawful-procedure framework:

  • Investigative Omission: The record did not show selective interviewing designed to ignore exculpatory or inculpatory testimony; the investigations were otherwise comprehensive. More importantly, any omission did not materially affect the outcome, which turned on qualifications (first complaint) and uniform application of testing and Vaccaro’s own availability (second complaint). No substantial prejudice was shown.
  • Oral-Argument Comments: Assuming a procedural irregularity occurred when board members spoke before being admonished, there was no showing that the comments materially influenced the HRC’s decision or prejudiced Vaccaro’s substantial rights. Under § 2-4-704(2), MCA, harmless error is not a basis for reversal.
  • “Without Conscientious Judgment” Language: The HRC’s statement that investigators did not act “without conscientious judgment” did not impose an improper burden on Vaccaro; rather, it was a permissible articulation within abuse-of-discretion review of agency determinations.

Impact

While this is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion and cannot be cited, it offers useful guidance for practitioners navigating human rights retaliation claims and MAPA review:

  • Practical application of the “disputable presumption” of retaliation: Temporal proximity can trigger a presumption, but employers can rebut with credible, specific, and job-related explanations—e.g., qualifications-based decisions for training assignments and uniformly applied skills assessments.
  • Documentation matters: The agency and courts credited documented differences in experience and evidence of uniform application of skill tests. Employers should contemporaneously document qualifications and process consistency.
  • Harmless error and prejudice to substantial rights: Allegations of investigative omissions or minor procedural irregularities require a showing of material prejudice. Absent a demonstration that the outcome was likely affected, reversal is unlikely under § 2-4-704(2), MCA.
  • Scope of judicial review: Courts will not reweigh evidence or substitute their factual judgments for the agency’s. Parties must tailor appellate arguments to MAPA’s specific grounds (unlawful procedure, clear error, arbitrary/capricious, etc.) and show prejudice.
  • Volunteer settings: Even in volunteer-driven organizations, the same analytical framework for retaliation claims and administrative review applies where the HRC proceeds under employment discrimination statutes.

For complainants, the case underscores the importance of: (i) amending complaints to include all adverse actions they want investigated; (ii) marshalling direct, material evidence of retaliatory motive; and (iii) demonstrating how alleged procedural defects would likely have altered the outcome.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Protected activity: Conduct such as filing a discrimination complaint. Retaliation claims allege adverse actions taken because of that activity.
  • Disputable presumption of retaliation (Admin. R. M. 24.9.603(3)): If an adverse action occurs close in time to protected activity, the law presumes retaliation. The employer may rebut by showing a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • Preponderance of the evidence: More likely than not; the standard used to weigh whether the employer’s explanation is credible and sufficient to rebut the presumption.
  • Substantial evidence: Relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Courts reviewing agencies ask whether such evidence supports the decision, not whether they would have reached the same result.
  • Abuse of discretion / arbitrary or capricious: Decisions made without conscientious judgment, or based on clearly untenable or unreasonable grounds. The HRC asked whether investigators acted with conscientious judgment; the Supreme Court found that formulation acceptable.
  • MAPA review (§ 2-4-704(2), MCA): Courts do not reweigh evidence. Reversal requires a listed type of error (unlawful procedure, clear error, etc.) and prejudice to substantial rights.
  • Harmless error: Even if a procedural misstep occurred (e.g., a missed interview, unsolicited comments at oral argument), courts will not reverse unless the error likely affected the outcome or prejudiced substantial rights.
  • Memorandum opinion; noncitable: Under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules, some decisions, including this one, are issued as nonprecedential memorandum opinions and cannot be cited as authority.

Conclusion

In this nonprecedential memorandum opinion, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed HRC dismissals of two retaliation complaints brought by a volunteer EMT against a volunteer ambulance service. The decision reinforces settled administrative law principles:

  • Temporal proximity can create a presumption of retaliation, but employers may rebut it with legitimate, well-documented reasons tied to qualifications, safety, and uniformly applied practices.
  • On judicial review, courts do not reweigh the evidence. They will affirm if substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision and if no unlawful procedure or prejudicial error occurred.
  • Alleged investigative or procedural defects will not warrant reversal absent a showing that substantial rights were prejudiced.
  • Language assessing whether an investigator acted “without conscientious judgment” is consistent with abuse-of-discretion review and did not shift burdens improperly.

Although it cannot be cited, Vaccaro v. Three Forks Area Ambulance Service provides practical guidance for litigants and agencies handling retaliation allegations: focus on contemporaneous, nonretaliatory explanations; apply and document uniform practices; identify and correct procedural irregularities; and, on appeal, frame arguments within MAPA’s narrow, prejudice-based grounds for reversal.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Montana

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