Noncompliance with JLAP-Linked Probation as Grounds for Executing Deferred Suspension: Commentary on In re Cleophus Washington (La. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Louisiana’s per curiam decision in In re: Cleophus Washington, No. 2025-B-1474 (Dec. 11, 2025), is a concise but significant disciplinary ruling at the intersection of:

Deferred suspensions conditioned on probation,
Monitoring and recovery obligations under the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (“JLAP”), and
The mechanics of revoking probation and making a deferred suspension “executory.”

This decision, which can be seen as the sequel to In re: Washington, 24-1367 (La. 12/27/24), 397 So. 3d 842 (“Washington I”), addresses what happens when an attorney who has received a fully deferred suspension conditioned on compliance with a JLAP recovery agreement subsequently fails to comply with that agreement and with associated probation terms.

The case reinforces a clear principle: noncompliance with JLAP-linked probation conditions—especially when coupled with failure to communicate with disciplinary authorities—will lead to summary revocation of probation and execution of a previously deferred suspension, and reinstatement may be conditioned on new JLAP evaluation and documented compliance.

II. Background: Parties, Prior Proceedings, and Probation Structure

A. The Respondent and Underlying Misconduct

Respondent, Cleophus Washington, is a Louisiana attorney (Bar Roll No. 38491). The first disciplinary matter (Washington I) arose from his 2022 arrest on drug possession charges. Rather than proceeding to prosecution, the District Attorney offered him a diversion—a form of alternative resolution typically involving treatment, monitoring, or other conditions in lieu of or prior to prosecution.

As part of that response, respondent:

Was evaluated through the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (JLAP),
Entered an intensive outpatient treatment program at Palmetto Addiction Recovery Center,
Successfully completed that program in July 2024, and
Was discharged with a diagnosis of “cannabis use disorder, moderate, in remission.”

On August 6, 2024, he executed a five-year JLAP recovery agreement, committing himself to continued monitoring and compliance with JLAP conditions.

B. Washington I: The Consent Discipline and Deferred Suspension

Before formal disciplinary charges were filed, respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) entered into a joint petition for consent discipline, a mechanism by which the lawyer and ODC agree to a sanction and jointly ask the Supreme Court to approve it.

In that petition, the parties proposed:

A one-year suspension from the practice of law,
Fully deferred,
Subject to a probationary period coinciding with respondent’s five-year JLAP recovery agreement.

The Supreme Court accepted the petition on December 27, 2024, in Washington I, explicitly warning:

“[a]ny failure of respondent to comply with the terms of the [JLAP] agreement may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.”

Thus, the original one-year suspension was “hanging over” respondent’s head, deferred as long as he complied with JLAP and related conditions.

C. The Probation Agreement (February 2025)

On February 14, 2025, respondent executed a formal probation agreement (effective February 24, 2025). That agreement operationalized the conditions of Washington I and required, among other things, that he:

Comply with the August 6, 2024 JLAP agreement;
Comply with any future agreements entered into with JLAP;
Allow JLAP’s Executive Director to send quarterly compliance reports to ODC;
Respond promptly and make himself reasonably available to ODC;
Provide any needed confidentiality waivers so ODC could monitor compliance;
Comply with all bar membership requirements, including:
- Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE),
- Payment of Louisiana State Bar Association (LSBA) dues,
- Payment of the disciplinary assessment, and
- Annual trust account disclosure filings;
Recognize that any violation could result in:
- Summary revocation of probation,
- Making the deferred suspension executory, and/or
- Imposition of additional discipline.

By mid-2025, respondent also became administratively ineligible to practice law for separate reasons:

On May 28, 2025, he was declared ineligible for failure to comply with MCLE requirements.
As of September 2, 2025, he was also ineligible for:
- Non-payment of bar dues,
- Non-payment of the disciplinary assessment, and
- Failure to file a trust account disclosure form.

These administrative ineligibilities were not themselves the core of the probation revocation, but they illustrate an overall pattern of noncompliance with professional obligations.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Motion to Revoke Probation and ODC’s Allegations

On September 25, 2025, ODC filed a motion to revoke probation and to make the previously deferred one-year suspension from Washington I executory. ODC alleged that respondent:

Was discharged from JLAP monitoring on September 10, 2025, with his file closed due to non-compliance with the JLAP recovery agreement.
Had not submitted to random drug and alcohol screenings since May 2025.
Had not provided self-reports or AA logs since April 2025, and JLAP had not received monitor reports.
Failed to follow Palmetto’s clinical recommendations, including follow-up with:
- His primary care physician,
- Return visits to Palmetto for “small group” and “mirroring,” and
- Regular appointments with Palmetto’s medical director, Michael McCormick, M.D.
Failed to respond to repeated attempts by JLAP and ODC to contact him, and, when finally reached by ODC on September 3, 2025, stated he was unwilling to complete the required conditions of probation.

ODC asked the Court to:

Revoke respondent’s probation and impose the one-year suspension that had been deferred in Washington I, or
Alternatively, impose additional discipline as warranted.

Respondent filed no answer to this motion.

B. Hearing Committee Proceedings

On November 5, 2025, the matter proceeded to a hearing before a disciplinary hearing committee:

Respondent did not appear.
No live testimony was presented, but ODC introduced documentary evidence.

On November 20, 2025, the hearing committee:

Found ODC’s factual allegations supported by the evidence;
Concluded respondent had violated both:
- The Supreme Court’s order in Washington I, and
- His probation agreement;
Recommended revocation of probation and making the one-year suspension executory;
Recommended that respondent not be allowed to apply for reinstatement until he:
- Was re-evaluated by a JLAP-approved facility, and
- Had complied with JLAP’s recommendations;
Recommended that costs and expenses be assessed to respondent.

Neither side filed any response or exception to the committee’s recommendation.

C. The Supreme Court’s Holding and Decree

The Supreme Court, after its “review of the record,”:

Found that respondent failed to comply with the requirements set out in his February 14, 2025 probation agreement.
Concluded that “to protect the public”, revocation of probation and imposition of the deferred suspension were necessary.

Accordingly, the Court:

Revoked respondent’s probation.
Made the previously deferred one-year suspension from Washington I immediately executory.
Required, as a condition precedent to reinstatement under Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 23, that respondent must:
- Provide a letter from the Executive Director of JLAP confirming:
  - He has been re-evaluated by a JLAP-approved facility, and
  - He has complied with JLAP’s recommendations.
Assessed all costs and expenses of the proceeding to respondent, with:
- Legal interest accruing 30 days from the finality of the judgment,
- Until paid, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1.

The Court’s decision thus fully activates the one-year suspension originally imposed in Washington I and ties any future reinstatement tightly to objective JLAP evidence of recovery and compliance.

IV. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Precedential and Regulatory Framework

1. Washington I as the Governing Baseline

The main “precedent” for this case is not an earlier, unrelated Supreme Court decision, but rather the Court’s own prior order in In re: Washington (“Washington I”). That order:

Accepted a consent discipline for criminal conduct (drug possession),
Imposed a one-year suspension, fully deferred,
Conditioned that deferral on compliance with JLAP’s recovery agreement, and
Explicitly warned that noncompliance could lead to making the suspension executory or to additional discipline.

In other words, the legal foundation for revoking probation in this case was already embedded in the text of the prior disciplinary order. The present decision is an application and enforcement of the conditions to which both ODC and respondent had already agreed, and which the Court had already approved.

2. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 23 – Reinstatement

The decree specifies that, before reinstatement under Rule XIX, § 23, respondent must:

“provide the court with a letter from the Executive Director of the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program confirming that he has been re-evaluated by a JLAP-approved facility and has complied with the recommendations of JLAP.”

Rule XIX, § 23 generally governs the reinstatement process for suspended or disbarred lawyers. It sets forth:

Procedural requirements for reinstatement petitions (timing, content, notice),
Substantive factors the Court must consider (rehabilitation, fitness, compliance with prior orders, etc.), and
The applicant’s burden to demonstrate fitness to resume practice.

What is distinctive in this case is that the Court adds a specific, JLAP-based documentary condition on top of those general reinstatement requirements. This affirms that, where the underlying misconduct and prior discipline are rooted in substance use issues, the Court is prepared to:

Use JLAP as a formal gatekeeper for reinstatement, and
Require objective, expert verification of rehabilitation and compliance with treatment recommendations.

3. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1 – Costs and Interest

The decision also cites Rule XIX, § 10.1, which governs the assessment of costs and expenses in disciplinary proceedings. Under this provision:

Costs (investigative, administrative, hearing-related, etc.) are typically assessed against the respondent if misconduct is found.
The Court may order that these costs bear legal interest from a specified date, here:
- 30 days after the judgment becomes final,
- Until paid.

This is standard in Louisiana disciplinary matters and serves both:

A compensatory function (reimbursing disciplinary agencies), and
A deterrent function (discouraging dilatory or noncooperative behavior that increases costs).

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Core Determination: Noncompliance with Probation Conditions

The Court grounds its decision in a factual finding:

“A review of the record supports a finding that respondent has not complied with the requirements set forth in the probation agreement he executed on February 14, 2025.”

The noncompliance is multi-layered:

JLAP noncompliance: failure to attend random screenings, lack of AA logs and self-reports, absence of monitor reports, and ultimate discharge from JLAP for noncompliance.
Failure to follow clinical recommendations from Palmetto Addiction Recovery Center.
Failure to communicate with JLAP and ODC, despite repeated outreach.
Express unwillingness (when contacted by ODC) to complete probationary conditions.
Separate administrative ineligibilities (MCLE, dues, trust account disclosure), which reflect a broader disregard of professional obligations.

In the disciplinary context, probation is conditioned on ongoing compliance. The opinion reflects that once the Court is satisfied, on the record, that those conditions are violated, it is both authorized and obliged to enforce the consequences spelled out in its prior order.

2. Protective Purpose: “To Protect the Public”

The Court succinctly articulates why revocation and suspension are warranted:

“To protect the public, we believe it is necessary to revoke respondent's probation and impose the previously deferred suspension.”

This language refers to a foundational principle in attorney discipline: the primary purpose is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public, maintain the integrity of the profession, and preserve confidence in the justice system. In this case:

Respondent has a documented substance use disorder history.
His continued practice was allowed only under structured monitoring designed to safeguard clients and the public.
His noncompliance, discharge from JLAP, and stated unwillingness to complete conditions undercut the safeguards that justified deferring the suspension in the first place.

Given this, the Court concludes that allowing him to continue in the same status would expose the public to unacceptable risk. The natural consequence under the prior order is to make the deferred suspension real.

3. Deference to the Hearing Committee’s Findings

While the per curiam is brief, its acceptance of the hearing committee’s recommendation is implicit evidence of:

Recognition that ODC had met its evidentiary burden (typically “clear and convincing evidence” in Louisiana attorney discipline), and
Agreement with the committee’s legal conclusion that the probation violation justified revocation.

The Court states:

“we will accept the hearing committee's recommendation and grant the motion to revoke respondent's probation…”

This demonstrates the usual institutional structure of Louisiana disciplinary matters: factual record development at the committee level, followed by Supreme Court review and final disposition. Even in a relatively straightforward revocation case, that two-tiered process is preserved.

4. Calibration of Sanction: No Additional Suspension, but Tightened Reinstatement

ODC’s motion left room for the imposition of additional discipline beyond execution of the deferred one-year suspension. The Court, however, chose:

Not to impose a new or extended suspension at this stage,
But to:
- Execute the original one-year suspension, and
- Condition future reinstatement on new JLAP evaluation and compliance.

This reflects a balanced approach:

It preserves the sanction originally agreed upon and approved in Washington I.
It recognizes that the core problem is ongoing recovery and compliance, not necessarily new substantive misconduct.
It uses JLAP’s expertise as the primary tool for assessing rehabilitation before the respondent can safely return to practice.

In effect, the sanction now has two phases:

Execution of the one-year suspension (protective and deterrent); and
Post-suspension scrutiny via JLAP evaluation and recommendations, which becomes a crucial part of the reinstatement inquiry.

C. The Role of JLAP and the Emerging Principle

A central structural feature of both Washington I and this decision is the integration of JLAP into the disciplinary regime. Key points:

Respondent’s initial discipline was explicitly keyed to his JLAP recovery agreement.
His probation agreement required:
- Compliance with all JLAP conditions,
- Cooperation with JLAP reporting (quarterly reports to ODC), and
- Waivers of confidentiality as needed to monitor compliance.
His discharge from JLAP for noncompliance became the central factual basis for probation revocation.
The Court now makes fresh JLAP involvement (evaluation and compliance) a precondition for reinstatement.

The emerging legal principle from this decision can be stated as follows:

When the Louisiana Supreme Court has conditioned a deferred suspension on compliance with a JLAP recovery agreement, failure to comply with JLAP monitoring and treatment obligations, coupled with noncooperation with disciplinary authorities, will justify summary revocation of probation and execution of the deferred suspension. Furthermore, the Court may condition any later reinstatement on a new JLAP evaluation and proof of compliance with JLAP’s recommendations.

Functionally, this makes JLAP not just a voluntary assistance program, but a key institutional actor in determining both ongoing eligibility to practice and eventual reinstatement in cases tied to substance use or mental health issues.

D. Procedural Aspects: Nonappearance and Nonresponse

Respondent’s choices in the process also matter:

He filed no answer to ODC’s motion to revoke probation.
He failed to appear at the hearing before the disciplinary committee.

While the opinion does not elaborate on procedural presumptions, in practice, such nonparticipation has important consequences:

ODC’s evidence is uncontroverted, making findings of noncompliance more straightforward.
The Court and committee have no mitigating explanation or evidence from respondent to consider.
Noncooperation itself is often viewed as aggravating in disciplinary matters, suggesting disregard for the process and for professional regulation.

This reinforces an implicit normative message: attorneys facing disciplinary exposure who want to preserve their licenses must actively engage with ODC, JLAP, and the Court. Silence and disappearance are likely to lead to the most severe available consequences under existing orders.

E. Impact on Future Cases and the Broader Area of Law

1. For Attorneys Under JLAP-Linked Probation

For lawyers similarly situated—those with discipline tied to substance use issues and conditioned on JLAP monitoring—this decision sends a clear message:

Strict enforcement: The Court will rigorously enforce JLAP-related probation conditions.
Noncompliance alone, even without new misconduct or a new crime, can trigger:
- Revocation of probation, and
- Execution of a previously deferred suspension.
JLAP discharge for noncompliance is effectively evidence that the foundational condition of continued practice is no longer satisfied.

2. For the Structuring of Consent Discipline

From a systemic standpoint, the case illustrates how the Court is likely to treat future consent discipline agreements involving:

Deferred suspensions, and
Conditions incorporating JLAP recovery plans.

Given this case:

Lawyers agreeing to such terms should understand that these conditions are not symbolic; they will be strictly enforced.
ODC will likely continue to negotiate probationary terms that:
- Require express waivers to allow JLAP–ODC communication, and
- Make JLAP monitoring a central enforcement mechanism.
The Court is comfortable using JLAP compliance as a proxy for fitness to practice in the context of substance-related discipline.

3. For Reinstatement Practice

The decision also contributes to the evolving practice of tailored reinstatement conditions. While Rule XIX, § 23 provides a general framework, the Court here:

Superimposes a specific evidentiary showing – a JLAP Executive Director letter with defined content.
Signals that in cases where underlying misconduct is tied to addiction or mental health issues, reinstatement may hinge on specialized, third-party assessments.

Future applicants with similar backgrounds can expect that:

The Court may seek specialized, program-based verification of rehabilitation, not merely self-reporting or character references.
Completion of a suspension alone will not suffice; evidence of sustained treatment and compliance will be pivotal.

V. Simplifying Key Legal and Disciplinary Concepts

1. Deferred Suspension

A deferred suspension means:

The Court imposes a suspension (e.g., one year),
But allows the lawyer to continue practicing,
So long as the lawyer complies with specified conditions (like JLAP participation, probation terms, etc.).

If the lawyer:

Complies throughout the probation period: the suspension may never actually take effect.
Violates the conditions: the Court can “make the deferred suspension executory,” meaning the lawyer is now actually suspended for the stated period.

2. Executory Suspension

An executory suspension is a suspension that is currently in force and must be served. When the Court says the one-year suspension is “made immediately executory,” it means:

Respondent is now formally suspended from the practice of law for one year, starting immediately.
He may not practice law during that period, subject to the rules governing suspended attorneys.

3. Probation in Attorney Discipline

In the disciplinary context, probation is a period during which:

The lawyer remains allowed to practice,
But under supervision and conditions (such as treatment, monitoring, reporting, and administrative compliance),
With the understanding that violation of those conditions can trigger more severe sanctions (like activation of a deferred suspension).

4. JLAP (Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program)

JLAP is a confidential program aimed at:

Helping judges and lawyers with substance use disorders, mental health issues, and similar impairments;
Providing evaluation, treatment referrals, monitoring, and support;
Serving as a bridge between the legal profession and treatment providers.

In disciplinary matters:

Participation in JLAP can be a mitigating factor or a condition of probation.
With appropriate waivers, JLAP reports can be used by ODC and the Court to monitor compliance and assess the lawyer’s fitness to practice.

5. Reinstatement under Rule XIX, § 23

After a suspension, an attorney typically must:

Wait the required time period,
File a petition for reinstatement,
Show they have:
- Complied with all prior disciplinary orders,
- Maintained moral fitness,
- Kept up with legal knowledge (or cured any deficiencies), and
- Rehabilitated any underlying problems (substance use, mental health, etc.).

Rule XIX, § 23 provides the basic structure. This case adds an extra layer: a specific JLAP letter requirement as part of that showing.

6. Costs and Legal Interest

In Louisiana disciplinary matters:

The lawyer who is disciplined is typically responsible for costs and expenses incurred by the disciplinary system.
“Legal interest” is the statutory interest rate applied to unpaid obligations from the time specified by the Court (here, 30 days after the judgment is final) until the obligation is paid.

This ensures the disciplinary system is financially supported and discourages attorneys from delaying payment.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of In re Washington (2025)

The Supreme Court of Louisiana’s per curiam in In re: Cleophus Washington (2025) is brief but doctrinally important. It:

Enforces the conditional structure of a deferred suspension tied to JLAP compliance from Washington I.
Affirms that noncompliance with JLAP obligations and probation conditions is sufficient, in itself, to justify revocation of probation and execution of the deferred suspension.
Demonstrates the Court’s willingness to:
- Use JLAP not just as a support resource, but as an institutional gatekeeper for reinstatement, by requiring a JLAP Executive Director letter documenting re-evaluation and compliance.
Reinforces the primacy of public protection in disciplinary decisions, especially where substance use disorders are implicated.
Signals to the bar that:
- Probationary terms are real and enforceable,
- Noncooperation with JLAP and ODC will be treated seriously, and
- Active engagement with treatment and oversight is essential to preserving one’s license in such cases.

In the broader landscape of professional responsibility, this decision underscores a contemporary model of discipline for impairment-related misconduct: one that combines conditional leniency (through deferred suspension and treatment-based probation) with firm enforcement (through swift revocation and JLAP-based reinstatement conditions) when those conditions are disregarded. For attorneys laboring under similar agreements, In re Washington serves as a cautionary and clarifying precedent on the consequences of walking away from JLAP and probation obligations.