Non-Speculative Causation Required in Louisiana Slip-and-Fall Claims: Adger v. TA Operating

Introduction

In Adger v. TA Operating, L.L.C. (5th Cir. May 2, 2025), the Fifth Circuit clarified the evidentiary burden that plaintiffs face under Louisiana’s Merchant Liability Act when pursuing slip-and-fall claims against a merchant. Levon Adger, Sr., collapsed in a service pit while inspecting his semi-truck at a Travel Centers of America facility in Shreveport, Louisiana. He sued TA Operating for negligence, alleging that oil on the pit floor caused his fall. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant and denied Adger’s Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. On appeal, Adger challenged both rulings. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that a plaintiff must present admissible, non-speculative evidence—direct or circumstantial—of cause-in-fact, and must timely submit all relevant expert opinions and deposition testimony.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its denial of the Rule 59(e) motion. Applying de novo review, the court held that:

Under the Louisiana Merchant Liability Act (La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.6), a slip-and-fall plaintiff must prove that (1) the condition posed an unreasonable, foreseeable risk; (2) the merchant had actual or constructive notice; (3) the merchant failed to exercise reasonable care; and (4) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the injury.
Adger failed to submit any reliable evidence linking the presence of oil in the service pit to his collapse. His primary evidence—testimony that oil was present, photographs of oil and absorbent material, and a general safety policy requiring slip-resistant shoes—was too speculative to demonstrate causation.
Adger’s motion for reconsideration, which sought to introduce deposition testimony and supplemental expert reports prepared before the summary-judgment ruling, likewise failed because the materials were not “newly discovered” and could have been timely presented.
Accordingly, the court reinforced that “mere speculation” cannot defeat summary judgment in slip-and-fall cases under Louisiana law.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Fifth Circuit anchored its decision in both federal summary-judgment standards and Louisiana tort law:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (304 U.S. 64 (1938)): A federal court sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law—here, Louisiana’s substantive tort and Merchant Liability Act.
Bagley v. Albertsons, Inc. (492 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2007)): Louisiana places a heavy burden on slip-and-fall plaintiffs; “mere speculation or suggestion” cannot satisfy it.
Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center (476 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2007)) and Ruiz v. Whirlpool, Inc. (12 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 1994)): Conclusory allegations or speculation are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.
Holladay v. Lowe’s Home Centers, L.L.C. (No. 23-30769, 2024 WL 3688533 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2024)): Reiterated that “cause of fall unknown” defeats slip-and-fall claims where causation is purely speculative.
Templet v. HydroChem Inc. (367 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2004)): A Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration must present newly discovered evidence or correct manifest errors; evidence available at the time of summary judgment but not timely submitted does not qualify.

Legal Reasoning

1. Substantive Law and Burden of Proof
Under the Merchant Liability Act, a plaintiff must prove both (a) that the dangerous condition was unreasonable and foreseeable and (b) the defendant’s breach was the cause-in-fact of the injury. Louisiana jurisprudence treats causation as a “but for” inquiry: would the injury have occurred but for the defendant’s substandard conduct?

2. Insufficiency of Speculative Evidence
Adger’s three pieces of evidence—(i) TA employees’ testimony that oil existed in the pit, (ii) photographs of oil and absorbent material (“kitty litter”), and (iii) the employer’s safety policies—failed to show a causal link between oil and his collapse. The court refused to infer causation from the mere presence of oil. It declined circular logic (“Adger fell because the floor was slippery; we know it was slippery because he fell”), and it held that generalized safety precautions (slip-resistant footwear) do not establish causation.

3. Circumstantial Evidence vs. Speculation
While circumstantial evidence can sometimes suffice, it must enable a rational, non-speculative inference of causation. Here, neither the technician’s deposition (he did not see or hear the fall), nor the expert opinions (offered late and internally inconsistent), nor the video and photographic record provided a reliable account of what caused Adger to collapse. Louisiana and Fifth Circuit precedents uniformly reject claims based on a plaintiff’s admission that he “did not know” what caused his fall.

4. Rule 59(e) and Reconsideration
Adger’s Rule 59(e) motion sought to supplement his opposition with expert reports and depositions taken before the summary-judgment deadline. The Fifth Circuit held that evidence “available at the time of the summary judgment motion” but not timely presented cannot serve as “newly discovered” evidence. Because Adger neither sought leave to supplement nor explained his failure to do so, the district court’s denial of reconsideration was not an abuse of discretion.

Impact

Adger v. TA Operating reinforces several key points for future slip-and-fall litigation in Louisiana and federal diversity cases:

Plaintiffs cannot rely on generalized or circumstantial evidence that does not directly link a hazardous condition to the fall.
A concession that “I don’t know what caused me to fall” is fatal to a slip-and-fall claim under Louisiana law.
Plaintiffs must timely disclose all expert reports and deposition testimony supporting their theories of causation; failure to do so precludes their use at the summary-judgment stage or in a motion for reconsideration.
Federal courts applying Louisiana law will strictly enforce the Merchant Liability Act’s causation requirement and the personal-knowledge rule for affidavits and depositions.

This decision is likely to be cited in future motions for summary judgment and reconsideration in slip-and-fall cases, particularly where plaintiffs attempt to survive summary judgment on the basis of speculative or belatedly disclosed evidence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Judgment (Rule 56): A procedural tool to dispose of claims if no material facts are in dispute and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Cause-in-Fact (“But For” Test): The plaintiff must show that, without the defendant’s breach, the injury would not have occurred.
Mere Speculation vs. Circumstantial Evidence: Speculation is a guess unsupported by concrete facts. Circumstantial evidence can prove a fact by inference, but only if the inference is rational and supported by evidence.
Merchant Liability Act (La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.6): Imposes a heightened burden on plaintiffs in slip-and-fall cases to prove the merchant’s notice, breach, and causation.
Rule 59(e) Motion for Reconsideration: An “extraordinary remedy” to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence—not to relitigate issues or introduce evidence that was available but not timely offered.

Conclusion

Adger v. TA Operating reaffirms that under Louisiana’s Merchant Liability Act, plaintiffs in slip-and-fall cases must meet a strict causation standard with admissible, non-speculative evidence. The decision underscores the imperative of timely-disclosed expert testimony and deposition materials and confirms that mere presence of a dangerous condition—or a plaintiff’s uncertainty about how the fall occurred—cannot sustain a negligence claim. This ruling will serve as a touchstone for both defense practitioners and litigants about the evidentiary rigors required to survive summary judgment in slip-and-fall litigation.