Non-Preclusion of Age Discrimination Claims under the RLA: Palova v. United Airlines

Introduction

In Palova v. United Airlines, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) divests federal courts of jurisdiction over a flight attendant’s age‐discrimination claims under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”). Plaintiff‐appellant Anna Palova, a near-thirty-year United Airlines flight attendant, alleged she was terminated on account of her age. United Airlines argued that Palova had violated the joint collective bargaining agreement (“JCBA”) by engaging in a prohibited scheduling practice known as “parking,” and that the RLA precluded her statutory discrimination claims from being heard in federal court. The district court agreed, granting summary judgment to United. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the RLA does not preclude or preempt Palova’s ADEA and TCHRA claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of United Airlines. The panel held that:

The RLA’s jurisdictional bar over “minor disputes” does not extend to statutory age‐discrimination claims that exist independently of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).
Palova’s ADEA and TCHRA claims do not present a “minor dispute” under the RLA because resolving them does not require conclusively interpreting the JCBA’s terms—her allegations center on discriminatory application of the parking rule, not on the rule’s fundamental validity or scope.
The district court’s alternative, that adjudicating Palova’s discrimination claims would inevitably force judicial interpretation of the JCBA, was foreclosed by controlling precedent (notably Carmona v. Southwest Airlines Co.).
The case was remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of Palova’s motion to supplement her summary‐judgment response with additional evidence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court’s decision leans heavily on the Supreme Court’s and Fifth Circuit’s RLA jurisprudence:

Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R. Co. (1957): Defines “minor disputes” under the RLA as controversies over the meaning or application of an existing CBA.
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n. (1989): Explains that minor disputes “may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing [CBA].”
Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris (1994): Distinguishes between RLA preclusion (of federal statutory claims) and preemption (of state‐law claims), confirming that statutory rights independent of a CBA are not displaced by the RLA.
Carmona v. Southwest Airlines Co. (2008): Holds that an employee’s gender‐discrimination claim under Title VII was not a minor dispute under the RLA because it did not challenge the CBA’s fundamental provisions, only their discriminatory application.
Reece v. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (1996): Under the LMRA, the Fifth Circuit found race‐discrimination claims preempted because they necessarily required interpreting promotion, seniority, and training provisions of the CBA—facts distinguishing Reece from Palova’s case.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied the “arguable basis” test to determine whether Palova’s claims were minor disputes under the RLA. Under that test, a dispute is “minor” (and thus barred from federal court) if the carrier has “at least an arguable basis” for its conduct in the express or implied terms of the CBA. Here:

Palova’s ADEA and TCHRA causes of action rest on statutory rights independent of the JCBA. United’s asserted “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for discharge—violation of the parking rule—does not transform Palova’s statutory claims into a minor dispute simply because the JCBA provides the parking rule.
Even if Palova engaged in parking, a factfinder must still determine whether United applied its parking policy in a discriminatory manner. That inquiry—whether the employer’s motive was age‐based—cannot be conclusively resolved by interpreting the JCBA.
The district court’s concern that the McDonnell‐Douglas burden‐shifting framework would force judicial interpretation of the JCBA misreads Carmona: reference to a CBA for background evidence does not trigger RLA preclusion unless the CBA’s terms are dispositive.
Reece is distinguishable because its plaintiff’s claims directly challenged the employer’s rights under the CBA—Palova’s do not.

Impact

Palova v. United Airlines reaffirms the line between RLA minor disputes and independent statutory discrimination claims:

Employers in the airline and railway industries cannot use the RLA to shield statutory discrimination claims merely because a CBA provides relevant background rules.
Employees retain access to federal courts for ADEA and analogous state‐law claims when they allege discriminatory application, rather than fundamental invalidity, of CBA provisions.
Future litigation will focus on whether a plaintiff’s statutory cause of action “brings the meaning of any CBA provisions into dispute” in a dispositive way, a stringent test that limits RLA preclusion to pure contractual controversies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Railway Labor Act (RLA): A federal statute governing labor relations in the railroad and airline industries. It requires carriers and unions to resolve “minor disputes” (interpretation or application of an existing CBA) through an administrative scheme rather than in federal court.
Minor vs. Major Disputes: Major disputes involve the creation or modification of CBAs and can be litigated; minor disputes involve interpreting or applying an existing CBA and must be arbitrated or go through RLA processes.
Preemption vs. Preclusion: Preemption means federal law displaces conflicting state‐law claims; preclusion means federal law bars federal statutory claims from being judicially adjudicated. Under the RLA, federal statutory claims (like the ADEA) can be precluded if they qualify as minor disputes.
McDonnell-Douglas Framework: A burden‐shifting method for discrimination cases: the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case; the defendant then offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; the plaintiff must then show that reason is pretextual.
“Arguable Basis” Test: A key RLA doctrine: a dispute is “minor” if the carrier has “at least an arguable basis” in the CBA for its conduct. A dispute is not minor if its resolution requires independent statutory analysis beyond CBA interpretation.

Conclusion

Palova v. United Airlines clarifies that the RLA does not bar independent statutory discrimination claims, even when a CBA provides the factual backdrop for the alleged wrongdoing. By distinguishing between challenges to a CBA’s substance and challenges to an employer’s motivation in applying its rules, the Fifth Circuit preserves employees’ access to federal courts for ADEA and analogous state-law claims. The decision underscores the need for courts to apply the “arguable basis” test narrowly and prevents carriers from using the RLA as a shield against legitimate discrimination lawsuits.