Non-Hearsay Admission and Limiting Instructions Under the Confrontation Clause

Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Patrick Reed v. Harold May, decided April 11, 2025, addresses whether admission of a confidential informant’s out-of-court statement violated Reed’s rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Reed, convicted of multiple drug and firearms offenses, objected when a detective testified that an informant had told him where Reed hid narcotics on a garage roof. The Ohio trial court admitted the testimony for a “non-hearsay” purpose—explaining why the detective conducted that part of the search—and gave a limiting instruction. Reed appealed through state and federal courts; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that testimonial hearsay admitted for a valid non-hearsay purpose, with limiting instructions, does not run afoul of Confrontation Clause precedent.

Summary of the Judgment

• The police conducted controlled buys, obtained a warrant, and searched Reed’s residence on Larchmont Drive. In addition to firearms, cash, scales and residue, officers found bags of heroin and fentanyl mixed with heroin in a coffee mug tucked into a roof gutter.

• On direct examination, a detective explained that a confidential informant told police Reed concealed narcotics in various places, including the garage roof gutter—prompting the detective to obtain a ladder and retrieve those drugs.

• The trial court overruled Reed’s hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections, admitted the informant tip solely to explain the detective’s conduct, and instructed the jury not to consider it for its truth.

• Reed’s conviction was affirmed by the Ohio appellate and supreme courts; his subsequent federal habeas petition was denied. Under AEDPA deference, the Sixth Circuit held that clearly established Supreme Court precedents permit admission of testimonial statements for non-hearsay purposes, and that limiting instructions are presumed effective.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Crawford v. Washington (2004) – Established that testimonial hearsay is barred unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
Davis v. Washington (2006) – Defined “testimonial” statements by reference to their “primary purpose” (gathering evidence for prosecution versus addressing an ongoing emergency).
Tennessee v. Street (1985) – Held that testimonial statements accusing a defendant can be admitted with a limiting instruction when offered for a legitimate, non-hearsay purpose such as rebutting a coercion defense.
Williams v. Illinois (2012) – Reaffirmed that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to non-hearsay uses of testimonial statements where there is a distinctive and limited purpose and jury instructions.

Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit first reviewed AEDPA’s standards: a state court’s decision must be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established Supreme Court law. The court recognized that the informant’s tip was testimonial but concluded it was not admitted for its truth. Instead, the sole purpose was to explain why police searched the roof. Because the Confrontation Clause prohibits only testimonial hearsay, not all out-of-court statements, and because Supreme Court precedents exempt non-truth-of-the-matter uses, the court found no constitutional violation. It emphasized that the trial court’s limiting instruction—presuming the jury heeded it—further satisfied Street and Williams.

Reed’s argument that any testimonial statement implying his guilt must trigger Confrontation protections was rejected: no Supreme Court decision clearly establishes that non-hearsay “course-of-the-investigation” testimony, accompanied by instructions, is impermissible. Under AEDPA deference, reasonable jurists could disagree with Reed’s position, so the federal courts may not override the state ruling.

Impact of the Judgment

This decision clarifies that:

Testimonial statements admitted for a valid non-hearsay purpose (such as explaining police conduct) do not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
A properly tailored limiting instruction is presumed effective to confine the jury’s use of the testimony.

Future criminal trials may therefore continue to introduce informant tips or similar statements when the prosecution articulates and confines them to a non-truth purpose, so long as courts instruct jurors accordingly. The ruling also reinforces the high deference AEDPA affords to state court adjudications of federal claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Testimonial vs. Non-Testimonial: Testimonial statements are made to gather evidence for prosecution (e.g., a suspect identifying friend’s voice on a recording). Non-testimonial might be casual, off-the-record remarks.
Hearsay vs. Non-Hearsay Purpose: Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” If used only to show why someone did something (police searching a roof), it’s a non-hearsay purpose.
Limiting Instruction: A judge’s direction telling jurors they can consider certain evidence only for a narrow purpose (e.g., “don’t treat this tip as proof of guilt; only use it to understand why the officer acted”).
AEDPA Deference: Federal habeas review must defer to state court rulings unless they transcend a high threshold of being “contrary to” or “unreasonably applying” clear Supreme Court precedents.

Conclusion

In Patrick Reed v. Harold May, the Sixth Circuit confirmed that testimonial hearsay admitted for a non-hearsay purpose—here, to explain the detective’s decision to search a roof—and accompanied by a proper limiting instruction, does not breach the Confrontation Clause. Under AEDPA’s stringent deferential standard, the state courts’ rulings were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. The decision reinforces the viability of course-of-the-investigation testimony in criminal trials and underscores the effectiveness of limiting instructions in protecting defendants’ confrontation rights.