Introduction

In American Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) may use the Federal Land Policy and Management Act’s (FLPMA) planning process to redesignate wild horse Herd Management Areas (HMAs) to Herd Areas (HAs)—and thereby set appropriate management levels (AMLs) to zero—without applying the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act’s (Wild Horse Act) core standard that herds be managed to “achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance” (TNEB), 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a).

The case arises from BLM’s 2022 amendments to its Resource Management Plan (RMP) for southern Wyoming’s “checkerboard” lands—an alternating mosaic of public and private sections tied to the Transcontinental Railroad land grants. After private landowner consent to allow wild horses on the checkerboard was revoked in 2010, BLM concluded continued herd management in two HMAs was unworkable and amended the RMP to convert the Great Divide Basin and Salt Wells Creek HMAs to HAs with AMLs of zero, and to split the Adobe Town HMA, maintaining management only in its largely public, fenced southern portion.

Three allied groupings of petitioners—American Wild Horse Campaign and allied NGOs and individuals; Return to Freedom and allied NGOs and individuals; and Friends of Animals—challenged the amendments under the Wild Horse Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and FLPMA. The State of Wyoming and the Rock Springs Grazing Association intervened in support of BLM.

The core issues:

• Whether BLM may make “Step Zero” planning choices (which areas to manage for wild horses) without applying the Wild Horse Act’s TNEB mandate;
• Whether BLM’s NEPA analysis was procedurally adequate, including on alternatives (such as land exchanges), alleged predetermination, and downstream grazing impacts;
• Whether the amendments violated FLPMA’s multiple-use and undue-degradation requirements.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit reversed in part and remanded:

• Wild Horse Act and APA: The court held BLM acted arbitrarily and capriciously by expressly declining to consider whether its HMA-to-HA redesignations and AML settings were “designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance.” Even at the RMP “Step Zero” stage, when deciding which lands are to be managed for wild horses, BLM must take account of the TNEB standard. Because BLM treated the decision as outside § 1333(a), the agency “failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.” Reversed and remanded.
• NEPA: The court rejected petitioners’ NEPA claims. It found no unlawful predetermination; upheld BLM’s dismissal of land-exchange alternatives as infeasible at this planning juncture; and, relying on the Supreme Court’s 2025 Seven County decision, held BLM need not analyze effects of potential future grazing decisions not authorized by the RMP amendment. Affirmed.
• FLPMA: The court rejected the claim that the amendments violated multiple-use or caused undue degradation. The record showed BLM balanced uses and found lower horse numbers would benefit other resources; FLPMA does not require prioritizing horses over other uses. Affirmed.
• Ripeness of removal challenges: Challenges to eventual gathers or removals are unripe; those require separate, site-specific decisions. Affirmed.
• Remedy: The court remanded for the district court to apply the Allied-Signal factors to decide whether to vacate the amendments or remand without vacatur while BLM supplies a TNEB-grounded explanation.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities That Shaped the Decision

• American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign v. Jewell, 847 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2016):

  The Tenth Circuit previously held that BLM cannot use the Wild Horse Act’s § 4 (removal from private land) to sidestep § 3’s requirements when removing horses from public lands. Jewell emphasized Section 3 remains operative and suggested that any “workable solution” might come via HMA boundary or designation changes through planning—while warning ultimate solutions might require Congress. In Raby, the court honored Jewell’s harmonization but clarified that planning-stage designation changes remain “management” requiring consideration of TNEB.

• American Horse Protection Association v. Watt, 694 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1982):

  Watt read the 1978 amendments to the Wild Horse Act as shifting from near-maximal protection of wild horses to a multiple-use regime. The Tenth Circuit embraced this reading to reject petitioners’ contention that horses must be prioritized above other uses. Horses are protected “as components of the public lands,” but not to the exclusion of competing uses.

• New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. BLM, 565 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 2009):

  Richardson is the Tenth Circuit’s lodestar on FLPMA’s multiple-use mandate: BLM must balance uses and need not prioritize any one. The court analogized wild horse management to other “possible uses” (like energy development) that BLM may, but need not, allow everywhere. Richardson was central to rejecting the notion that the Wild Horse Act elevates horses above all other uses.

• Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55 (2004):

  SUWA describes RMPs as “preliminary” instruments that guide future actions but are not themselves decisions to act. Raby uses SUWA to frame the nature of RMPs—but still holds that choosing where to manage horses is a “management decision” that must reflect the Wild Horse Act’s TNEB standard.

• Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024):

  Loper Bright reorients judicial review toward the question “Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action?” without Chevron deference. Raby reflects that approach: the court independently construed § 1333(a) to require TNEB consideration at the planning stage, rather than deferring to BLM’s “Step Zero” theory.

• Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998):

  Establishes ripeness limits for plan-level versus site-specific challenges. Raby applies Ohio Forestry to hold removal challenges unripe until BLM issues a separate gather/removal decision.

• Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 611 F.3d 692 (10th Cir. 2010):

  Sets the “high standard” for proving NEPA predetermination. Raby finds that BLM did not irreversibly commit to a foregone outcome before completing its NEPA process.

• AWARE v. Colorado DOT, 153 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1998) and Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983):

  Together, they frame NEPA’s alternatives analysis and the deference due to agencies on technical and feasibility judgments. Raby defers to BLM’s refusal to deeply analyze speculative land exchanges lacking willing partners.

• Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado, 605 U.S. —, 2025 WL 1520964 (2025):

  The Supreme Court clarified that an agency need not analyze effects of separate, future projects not authorized by the action under review. Raby applies Seven County to hold BLM need not assess potential future grazing increases when the RMP amendment does not authorize them.

• Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. Haaland, 59 F.4th 1016 (10th Cir. 2023) and Allied-Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993):

  Supply the two-factor test for vacatur versus remand without vacatur: seriousness of the deficiencies and disruptive consequences. Raby remands for the district court to apply these factors, noting a “serious possibility” BLM can substantiate its decision on remand by addressing TNEB.

• U.S. ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1988):

  Addresses restrictions on private fencing in open range, underscoring the practical management challenge of horses moving across checkerboard lands.

• Iron Bar Holdings, LLC v. Cape, 131 F.4th 1153 (10th Cir. 2025):

  Describes the checkerboard land pattern; cited for background.

Core Legal Reasoning

The decision turns on harmonizing the Wild Horse Act with FLPMA while preserving the former’s central management standard:

• Horses as “components” within multiple use: Section 3(a) authorizes and directs BLM to “protect and manage wild free-roaming horses and burros as components of the public lands,” which must be managed under FLPMA’s multiple-use, sustained-yield principles. This rejects any reading that horses must be prioritized across the board.
• TNEB as the touchstone of horse management: The same sentence ends with a mandatory command: “The Secretary shall manage wild free-roaming horses and burros in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands.” The Tenth Circuit holds that this TNEB standard applies to the agency’s choice of where to manage horses—i.e., HMA designations and redesignations are “management decisions.” The court relied on ordinary-meaning definitions of “manage” and warned that excluding TNEB from RMP-level choices would allow BLM to “skirt” the Wild Horse Act via planning.
• BLM’s admitted omission is fatal under the APA: The EIS and ROD expressly disclaimed any TNEB finding, and the government confirmed at oral argument that it made no such determination. That omission rendered the decision arbitrary and capricious for failure to consider an important statutory factor.
• NEPA claims fail notwithstanding the Wild Horse Act error:
  • Predetermination: No irreversible commitment before finishing NEPA; an agency can have a preferred alternative if it still undertakes a good-faith “hard look.”
  • Alternatives (land exchanges): BLM reasonably found that, absent a willing partner and given the scale of necessary surveys and appraisals, land exchanges were not a feasible alternative for rigorous study at this stage.
  • Downstream grazing impacts: Under Seven County, BLM need not evaluate effects of separate, future grazing decisions not authorized by the RMP amendment—those will undergo their own NEPA analyses if and when proposed.
• FLPMA compliance: The record showed BLM weighed the relevant uses and concluded the chosen alternative “accomplishes a balance of multiple-use values,” including maintaining a herd in one portion (Adobe Town’s southern HMA). FLPMA’s “undue degradation” provision is not triggered simply because BLM reduces horses; the agency reasonably found positive effects on other resources (wildlife, soils, vegetation, water) from lower horse numbers.
• Remedial path: The court did not order vacatur outright. Instead, it remanded for the district court to apply Allied-Signal—recognizing a serious possibility that BLM could justify the redesignations if it squarely addresses TNEB on remand, particularly given the changed management calculus after private landowner consent was withdrawn.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

• Planning-stage constraints under the Wild Horse Act: The decision sets a clear precedent in the Tenth Circuit that the Wild Horse Act’s TNEB standard applies at the RMP stage when BLM draws, redraws, or zeroes out HMAs and sets AMLs. Agencies cannot silo substantive statutory standards into later, site-specific decisions; they must be reflected in the planning rationale.
• Practical effect on checkerboard regions: Where private consent is withdrawn and horses roam across public-private borders, BLM must explain why redesignations and AML adjustments still comport with TNEB. That does not mean horses must be maintained everywhere; it means the record must demonstrate that, in context, the decision is “designed” to maintain thriving ecological balance—possibly by concentrating herds where management is feasible (as with Adobe Town’s fenced southern HMA).
• Administrative law after Loper Bright: Raby showcases courts’ increased willingness to independently construe the governing statute and demand that agencies square their planning choices with explicit statutory standards. Agencies should anticipate building TNEB (and analogous program-specific standards) into the “purpose and need,” alternatives, and rationale of planning documents.
• Limited leverage for NEPA challenges to big-picture plans: NEPA challenges based on predetermination and speculative alternatives remain difficult given the high bar and deference for feasibility judgments. After Seven County, plaintiffs face added headwinds when arguing agencies must analyze effects of future, separate actions (like potential grazing allocation changes) not authorized by the plan.
• Multiple-use baseline confirmed: FLPMA does not require prioritizing horses. The opinion will likely be cited to defend planning choices that rebalance among uses—so long as the specific, programmatic statutes (like the Wild Horse Act) are substantively addressed.
• Remedy and on-the-ground consequences: Because the panel remanded the vacatur question, operations in the affected HMAs/HAs may or may not be disrupted in the interim. If the district court remands without vacatur, BLM can attempt to cure by issuing a TNEB-grounded rationale. If it vacates, pre-amendment designations may temporarily govern management until a new decision issues.
• Guidance for agency planners:
  • Explicitly tie HMA designations/redesignations and AML settings to the TNEB standard, even in broad RMPs.
  • Explain how multiple-use balancing intersects with TNEB; identify resource tradeoffs (e.g., sage-grouse, mule deer) and show the chosen plan is “designed” to maintain ecological balance.
  • Document feasibility constraints (e.g., lack of private consent, absence of willing partners for land exchanges, fencing limitations) and how they affect TNEB outcomes.
  • Segregate and reserve analysis of truly separate future actions (grazing allocations, gathers) for their own processes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Herd Area (HA) vs. Herd Management Area (HMA): HAs map where horses existed in 1971; they are not actively managed for herd populations and have an AML of zero. HMAs are areas designated for active horse management and include AMLs (population ranges) based on forage and water on public lands.
• Appropriate Management Level (AML): BLM’s target range for the number of horses in an HMA. Setting an AML of zero “zeroes out” an HMA and functionally eliminates managed herds there, though any actual removal requires a separate decision.
• Thriving Natural Ecological Balance (TNEB): The Wild Horse Act’s core standard. BLM must manage horses “in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain” an ecologically balanced state on the public lands. TNEB informs both whether and how BLM manages horses in a given area.
• “Step Zero” management decision: An agency’s threshold choice about where to manage particular uses or resources in a plan. Raby holds that such choices for wild horses are still “management” and must be consistent with TNEB.
• Checkerboard lands: Alternating square-mile sections of public and private land along a railroad corridor. The pattern complicates management because horses roam freely across parcel boundaries, and private owners may withdraw consent for wild horse use of private parcels.
• Gather/removal: Site-specific operations to remove excess horses under § 1333(b) after a finding that removal is needed to maintain TNEB. Raby holds challenges to gathers are unripe at the plan stage.
• Allied-Signal vacatur test: Courts deciding whether to vacate an unlawful agency action weigh (1) the seriousness of the deficiencies and (2) the disruptive consequences of vacatur. Remand without vacatur may be ordered if the agency can likely fix the error and vacatur would be highly disruptive.
• NEPA predetermination: An agency violates NEPA if it irreversibly commits to a specific outcome before completing environmental review. Having a preferred alternative is lawful if the agency still takes a good-faith “hard look.”
• Separate-project effects under NEPA: Agencies need not analyze environmental effects stemming from separate, future projects not authorized by the action at hand (Seven County).

Conclusion

American Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby establishes a significant planning-stage rule: BLM cannot avoid the Wild Horse Act’s TNEB mandate by characterizing HMA redesignations and AML settings as preliminary FLPMA planning choices. When deciding where wild horses will be managed—and where they will not—BLM must expressly consider whether its plan is “designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance.” The court simultaneously reaffirmed that horses are one component among many in a multiple-use framework and that NEPA’s procedural demands, while real, do not require agencies to analyze speculative alternatives or downstream effects of separate future actions.

On remand, the district court will decide whether to vacate the RMP amendments or allow them to stand while BLM supplies a TNEB-grounded explanation. Substantively, the opinion nudges BLM to frontload statutory program standards into RMPs and similar planning documents. Doctrinally, post–Loper Bright judicial review will likely continue to press agencies to demonstrate, in the record, how their planning choices satisfy the specific aims of governing statutes. For wild horse management—particularly on checkerboard landscapes—Raby demands a transparent accounting of how the chosen management geography and AMLs serve ecological balance within a multiple-use regime.