No “Presidential Tolling,” Shotgun Pleadings, and Sanctions for Political Litigation: Commentary on Trump v. Clinton (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s published decision in Donald J. Trump v. Hillary R. Clinton, et al., a consolidated appeal arising from former President Donald Trump’s civil lawsuit alleging a far-reaching conspiracy, largely centered around alleged “Russia collusion” narratives during the 2016 presidential campaign. The defendants included Hillary Clinton, the Democratic National Committee, various campaign entities, law firms (notably Perkins Coie), consultants (Fusion GPS, Orbis, Neustar), individuals associated with the Steele dossier (Christopher Steele, Igor Danchenko, Charles Dolan), former FBI and DOJ officials, and others.

Trump’s amended complaint asserted civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims and state-law tort claims (injurious falsehood and conspiracy-based torts), while the district court dismissed the action, characterized the pleading as a “quintessential shotgun complaint,” and imposed substantial sanctions against Trump and some of his attorneys under both Rule 11 and the court’s inherent authority.

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is significant for several reasons:

It clarifies that there is no special “presidential” equitable tolling of statutes of limitations for civil claims arising while a person serves as President of the United States.
It applies RICO’s nationwide service of process provision in a nuanced way, recognizing jurisdiction over domestic defendants (Joffe and Dolan) while denying it as to a foreign defendant (Orbis) served abroad.
It endorses substantial inherent-authority and Rule 11 sanctions against a former President and his counsel for shotgun pleadings, alleged false factual contentions, and legally frivolous theories pursued in bad faith.
It underscores strict standards for post-judgment relief under Rule 60(b)(6), holding that the publication of Special Counsel John Durham’s report was not an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief.
It reaffirms that a district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a broad recusal motion once an appeal is pending, absent a proper remand, even in high-profile cases.

The decision thus functions as a doctrinally dense opinion at the intersection of civil RICO, statutes of limitation and tolling, sanctions jurisprudence, federal jurisdiction, and the procedural management of politically charged litigation.

Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Court of Appeals (Chief Judge William Pryor writing for a unanimous panel) consolidated four appeals into a single decision and addressed five district court orders. In essence, the Eleventh Circuit held:

Merits – Dismissal of Claims
- The RICO and RICO-conspiracy claims were untimely under the four-year statute of limitations and not saved by statutory or equitable tolling.
- Trump forfeited key arguments on his Florida injurious falsehood and conspiracy-based state-law claims, so the dismissals were affirmed.
- The Court emphasized that the complaint was also substantively defective (e.g., no malicious prosecution without a “judicial proceeding”).
Personal Jurisdiction
- As to Joffe and Dolan, the nationwide service provision in RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1965(d)) supported personal jurisdiction because Trump’s RICO claim, though ultimately unsuccessful, was not so insubstantial as to defeat jurisdiction.
- As to Orbis, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction because service was effected abroad and RICO’s nationwide service provision does not authorize extraterritorial service. Accordingly, dismissal with prejudice as to Orbis was vacated and remanded to be entered without prejudice.
Sanctions
- The district court’s nearly $1 million fee-shifting sanction under its inherent authority (against Trump and attorney Alina Habba and her firm) was affirmed. The Eleventh Circuit upheld findings of subjective bad faith, including the use of a shotgun pleading, allegedly false factual assertions, and frivolous legal theories, all for an improper political purpose.
- The separate Rule 11 sanctions against Trump’s attorneys (particularly in relation to defendant Charles Dolan) were also affirmed. The Court found that counsel failed in their duty of reasonable pre-filing inquiry and advanced objectively frivolous contentions.
- Procedural objections to sanctions (lack of notice; no hearing) were deemed forfeited because they were not properly raised in the district court.
Durham Report and Rule 60(b)
- The publication of the Durham Report did not warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). It did not constitute newly discovered evidence under Rule 60(b)(2) (argument raised too late in any event), nor did it present “extraordinary circumstances” within Rule 60(b)(6).
Recusal / Disqualification
- The district court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain a new motion to disqualify Judge Middlebrooks while the case was on appeal, given the limited remand solely for consideration of the Rule 60(b) motion under Rule 62.1.
Appellate Sanctions
- The Eleventh Circuit denied requests by Orbis and Dolan for Rule 38 appellate sanctions, noting that although some arguments on appeal were frivolous, at least some (particularly as to personal jurisdiction and form of dismissal) had merit.

The only modification to the district court’s rulings was technical: the claims against Orbis must be dismissed without prejudice, due to lack of personal jurisdiction. All other rulings, including sanctions, were affirmed.

Analysis

I. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Statute of Limitations and Tolling in Civil RICO

Civil RICO claims are governed by a four-year statute of limitations, borrowed from the Clayton Act. The Eleventh Circuit relied on:

Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) – establishing that the four-year limitations period for Clayton Act civil antitrust actions applies to civil RICO claims.
Lehman v. Lucom, 727 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2013) – confirming that civil RICO claims accrue when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, his injury.
Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2005) – a complaint can be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) where it is apparent from the face of the complaint that claims are time-barred.

For statutory tolling, the Court examined Clayton Act § 16(i), 15 U.S.C. § 16(i), which pauses limitations periods when the United States brings certain enforcement actions. It referenced:

Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965) – tolling requires a “real relation” between the government proceeding and the private action.
Morton’s Market, Inc. v. Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc., 198 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 1999) – the facts alleged by the private plaintiff must be “intertwined with and fundamentally the same” as those in the government action; both must be antitrust-type conspiracies.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965) and Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971) – historical uses of § 16(i) tolling in traditional antitrust cases.

On equitable tolling, the Court drew on:

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) – equitable tolling is a rare remedy.
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 577 U.S. 250 (2016) – equitable tolling requires both diligent pursuit and an “extraordinary circumstance” beyond the litigant’s control that prevents timely filing.
NuVasive, Inc. v. Absolute Medical, LLC, 71 F.4th 861 (11th Cir. 2023) and Jean v. Dorélien, 431 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 2005) – illustrative contexts where extraordinary circumstances (e.g., fraudulent concealment, credible fear of violent reprisal) justify tolling.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) – the President is subject to judicial process in civil litigation while in office; the demands of the presidency do not bar lawsuits against him.

These cases collectively anchor the Court’s rejection of both statutory and equitable tolling in this case and, critically, its refusal to recognize any “presidential tolling” doctrine.

B. Shotgun Pleadings and Pleading Standards

The district court had labeled Trump’s amended complaint as a “quintessential shotgun pleading,” and the Eleventh Circuit endorsed that characterization by reference to its long line of shotgun-pleading cases:

Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015) – defining four paradigmatic shotgun pleading types, including complaints that “adopt the allegations of all preceding counts.”
Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) – affirming dismissal of a RICO complaint as a shotgun pleading, demonstrating that even complex RICO actions are not exempt.
Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2021) – emphasizing that courts and defendants must be able to determine which facts support which claims.
Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991) – decrying pleadings that force the court to “sift through” voluminous, undifferentiated allegations, and identifying shotgun pleading as evidence of an intent to harass.
Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A., 898 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2018) – affirming dismissal with prejudice of a shotgun complaint and contemplating sanctions for abusive pleading.

This doctrine provides a procedural backbone to the sanctions and dismissal analysis: the Eleventh Circuit treats shotgun pleading as both a justifiable ground for dismissal and a potential indicator of bad faith.

C. Injurious Falsehood and Conspiracy Under Florida Law

The opinion relies on Florida intermediate appellate decisions to define injurious falsehood and the doctrines of civil conspiracy:

Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So. 2d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) – defining injurious falsehood as involving intentional interference with another’s economic relations through published falsehoods causing special damages.
Bothmann v. Harrington, 458 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) – setting forth elements of injurious falsehood, including the requirement of “special damages.”
Balcor Property Management, Inc. v. Ahronovitz, 634 So. 2d 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) – confirming that a conspiracy claim cannot survive the dismissal of its underlying tort.
Buchanan v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 206 So. 2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) – reiterating that the “gist” of a civil conspiracy claim is the underlying civil wrong, not the agreement itself.

These authorities undergird the Court’s conclusion that Trump’s conspiracies to commit injurious falsehood and malicious prosecution cannot stand once the underlying torts are defective or dismissed, particularly when key arguments (such as “special damages”) are forfeited on appeal.

D. Inherent Authority and Rule 11 Sanctions

The Court’s sanctions analysis is deeply rooted in Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent on courts’ inherent powers and Rule 11:

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) – federal courts have inherent authority to impose sanctions for conduct that abuses the judicial process, including fee-shifting for bad faith litigation.
Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) – articulating courts’ power to manage their own proceedings to ensure orderly, expeditious resolution.
Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2017) – confirming that a finding of subjective bad faith “unlocks” the inherent power to impose sanctions.
Sciaretta v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., 778 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2015) – emphasizing subjective bad faith as the threshold for inherent-authority sanctions.
Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2002) – bad faith includes knowingly or recklessly raising frivolous arguments or using otherwise meritorious claims to harass.
In re Evergreen Security Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009) – severe failure to conduct reasonable factual inquiry can support a finding of bad faith.
Huggins v. Lueder, Larkin & Hunter, LLC, 39 F.4th 1342 (11th Cir. 2022) – describing Rule 11’s “safe harbor” requirement, which does not apply to inherent-authority sanctions.
Gulisano v. Burlington, Inc., 34 F.4th 935 (11th Cir. 2022) – an attorney must conduct a reasonable inquiry into both facts and law before filing.
Massengale v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2001) and Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1998) – identifying when a claim is frivolous for Rule 11 purposes and setting out the objective-frivolity test plus knowledge/should-have-known standards.
Johnson v. 27th Avenue Caraf, Inc., 9 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2021) – approving consideration of a party’s similar past litigation to show a pattern relevant to sanctions.

These authorities supplied the analytical framework used to evaluate the district court’s substantial sanctions awards against Trump and his counsel.

E. Personal Jurisdiction and RICO’s Nationwide Service Provision

On jurisdiction, the Court invoked:

18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) – RICO’s provision allowing service “in any judicial district in which [a] person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs,” which the Court applied domestically but not extraterritorially.
Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997) – allowing courts to consider merits issues first where personal jurisdiction turns on the non-frivolousness of federal claims; also setting the standard that a claim may confer federal jurisdiction unless it is “so insubstantial, implausible, [or] foreclosed.”
Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) – cited by analogy for the “so insubstantial” test as to federal claims.
Posner v. Essex Insurance Co., 178 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1999) – dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction must be without prejudice.
Carmouche v. Tamborlee Management, Inc., 789 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2015) – reinforcing de novo review of personal jurisdiction dismissals.

These cases support the key rulings that (1) nationwide service under RICO can support jurisdiction if the underlying RICO claim isn’t wholly insubstantial and (2) service abroad on a foreign defendant does not satisfy the domestic service language of § 1965(d).

F. Appellate Jurisdiction, Rule 60(b), and Recusal

For post-judgment proceedings, the Court leaned on:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) – relief from a final judgment, with Rule 60(b)(6) as a narrow “catchall” for “extraordinary circumstances.”
BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 145 S. Ct. 1612 (2025) – stating that only “extraordinary circumstances” justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1 – permitting district courts to issue indicative rulings on Rule 60(b) motions while an appeal is pending, but not to proceed beyond the scope of the limited remand.
Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982) – upon filing a notice of appeal, jurisdiction transfers to the court of appeals over “those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.”
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) – mandating recusal where a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”
United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993) – cited by Trump as recognizing a “continuing duty” to recuse, but distinguished by the Eleventh Circuit because Cooley involved post-trial motions within the district court’s plenary jurisdiction.

Regarding forfeiture of arguments on appeal and the need to challenge all independent grounds for a ruling, the Court cited:

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Insurance Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014) – to obtain reversal of a judgment resting on multiple independent grounds, an appellant must show each ground is erroneous; failure to brief a ground results in affirmance.
Johnson v. Miami-Dade County, 948 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2020) and Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus–Man Snacks, Inc., 528 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 2008) – refusing to consider arguments raised for the first time in reply briefs.

Collectively, these principles drive the Court’s approach to the Rule 60(b) motion and recusal, and to its treatment of Trump’s partial briefing on appeal.

II. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Dismissal of the RICO Claims as Time-Barred

The Court began by accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true, as required at the motion-to-dismiss stage. It then focused on the statute of limitations for civil RICO:

Trump’s own allegations indicated he was aware of the relevant conduct and resulting injuries by October 2017.
He filed suit in March 2022, more than four years later.

Trump did not contest the district court’s date-of-accrual findings on appeal; instead, he relied exclusively on tolling theories.

1. Statutory Tolling – Clayton Act § 16(i)

Trump urged the Eleventh Circuit to import Clayton Act tolling (15 U.S.C. § 16(i)) into RICO because the four-year limitations period is borrowed from antitrust law. The Court assumed arguendo that such tolling could apply but held that Trump still failed.

The key requirement from Leh and Morton’s Market is the “real relation” between the federal enforcement proceeding and the private suit; both must involve analogous antitrust-type conspiracies. Trump pointed to:

The Federal Election Commission investigation into Clinton and the DNC’s campaign finance reporting.
Special Counsel Durham’s prosecutions of Sussmann, Danchenko, and Clinesmith for false statements to federal authorities.

The Court held that these proceedings:

Were not antitrust cases, nor RICO prosecutions.
Did not allege the same overall racketeering enterprise that Trump sought to litigate.
At most touched on discrete factual pieces overlapping with Trump’s allegations (e.g., misreporting expenditures, discrete false statements), not the full “enterprise” or “pattern” asserted in the civil RICO suit.

Therefore, even if Clayton Act tolling applied in principle to RICO, these prior government proceedings did not bear the required “real relation” to justify tolling Trump’s claim.

2. Equitable Tolling and the “Presidential Tolling” Argument

Trump’s more novel argument was that his presidency itself constituted an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying equitable tolling, or at least that his particular circumstances in office did. The Court rejected both formulations.

First, the Court stressed that equitable tolling:

Is a “rare remedy.”
Requires that the circumstance preventing timely filing be beyond the plaintiff’s control.

Trump argued that:

His workload as President was uniquely heavy and all-consuming.
Filing such a lawsuit while the Mueller and Durham investigations were ongoing would have appeared to interfere with federal law enforcement.
He made a “presidential decision” to prioritize constitutional duties and avoid such interference.

The Court responded in two key ways:

No generalized “presidential tolling” doctrine. Drawing heavily on Clinton v. Jones, the Court reasoned that if sitting Presidents can be haled into court and forced to defend suits (which necessarily burdens their time and energy), it follows that they can also file suits to protect their own rights. The constitutional status of the President does not justify halting limitation periods wholesale during a term of office.
Trump’s reasons were within his control. By his own account, Trump chose not to sue to avoid particular optics and to focus on perceived constitutional duties. That choice, however, was voluntary and strategic, not compelled by an “extraordinary circumstance beyond his control.” Accordingly, the Menominee standard could not be met.

In short, the opinion establishes that being President, even under politically charged and investigatory circumstances, does not toll statutes of limitation. The equitable tolling theory was rejected as inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and the core requirement that the obstacle be external to the plaintiff’s control.

B. Dismissal and Forfeiture of State-Law Claims

1. Injurious Falsehood and Conspiracy to Commit Injurious Falsehood

Florida injurious falsehood requires “special damages” – concrete, pecuniary loss caused by the challenged communications. The district court dismissed Trump’s injurious falsehood claim on multiple grounds, including:

Failure to plead special damages adequately.
The fact that many statements at issue were protected by the First Amendment.

On appeal, Trump failed to challenge certain key independent grounds:

He did not contest the district court’s conclusion that he had not alleged “special damages,” a “crucial element” of the tort.
He also did not meaningfully contest the holding that a conspiracy to commit injurious falsehood cannot survive absent a viable underlying injurious falsehood tort.

Under Sapuppo, such omissions are fatal: if a judgment rests on multiple independently adequate grounds, the appellant must show error in each ground or the judgment must be affirmed. Trump tried belatedly to address these issues in his reply brief, but Eleventh Circuit practice does not allow raising new arguments at that stage.

Accordingly, while the Court did not exhaustively reanalyze the state-law injurious falsehood doctrine, it affirmed the dismissal on the simple basis that Trump had forfeited the necessary challenges.

2. Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Prosecution

The district court had earlier dismissed Trump’s underlying malicious prosecution claim, reasoning that no judicial proceeding had been instituted against him – an essential element of the tort. Trump did not appeal that dismissal directly.

On appeal, he instead argued that a conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution could stand alone so long as an “illegal combination to cause prosecution” was alleged. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this theory, citing Florida law that:

A civil conspiracy claim cannot survive without a viable underlying tort (Balcor; Buchanan).
The “gist” of civil conspiracy is the underlying wrong, not the agreement itself.

Trump also did not engage the specific authorities cited by the district court. Thus, even apart from forfeiture, Florida law foreclosed a conspiracy-to-commit-malicious-prosecution claim once the underlying malicious prosecution count fell away.

C. Personal Jurisdiction Over Joffe and Dolan; No Jurisdiction Over Orbis

Trump had advanced two theories of personal jurisdiction in the district court: (1) RICO’s nationwide service provision (§ 1965(d)) and (2) Florida’s long-arm statute. On appeal, he effectively abandoned the long-arm argument, raising it only in reply. The Eleventh Circuit therefore considered only the RICO-based nationwide service theory.

1. Joffe and Dolan – Nationwide Service and Non-Frivolous RICO Claims

Under Republic of Panama, nationwide service under § 1965(d) is available as long as the underlying RICO claim is not “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions, or otherwise devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” The Court:

Characterized Trump’s equitable tolling theory as frivolous.
Nonetheless deemed his statutory tolling theory (via Clayton Act § 16(i)) not so implausible or foreclosed as to defeat federal jurisdiction, even though the court would (and did) reject it on the merits.

Because the RICO claim at least cleared that jurisdictional threshold, § 1965(d) allowed Trump to serve Joffe and Dolan within the United States and thereby subjected them to the district court’s personal jurisdiction. The district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction over Dolan; however, that error did not alter the ultimate dismissal of the claims on other grounds.

2. Orbis – No Jurisdiction Due to Extraterritorial Service

Orbis argued that it was served in England, not within any U.S. “judicial district,” and thus § 1965(d) did not apply. Trump conceded that service was effected abroad. The Eleventh Circuit held:

RICO’s nationwide service provision is domestic; it does not authorize service of process in foreign countries.
Because Trump did not otherwise establish personal jurisdiction under state law (and did not pursue that theory on appeal), the district court lacked jurisdiction over Orbis.
Consequently, dismissal with prejudice as to Orbis was incorrect: dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction must be without prejudice (Posner).

The Court therefore vacated the dismissal with prejudice as to Orbis and remanded with instructions to enter dismissal without prejudice. This is the one substantive modification to the district court’s judgment.

D. Inherent Authority Sanctions – Nearly $1 Million Fee Award

The district court had imposed an inherent-authority sanctions award of approximately $937,989.39 in fees and costs, jointly and severally against Trump, Alina Habba, and Habba’s firm. The Eleventh Circuit analyzed and rejected several challenges:

1. Alleged Lack of Notice and Lack of Hearing – Forfeited

Trump and Habba argued on appeal that the district court:

Failed to provide adequate “notice” akin to Rule 11’s safe-harbor requirements.
Violated due process by imposing sanctions without holding an evidentiary hearing.

The Court did not reach the merits of these procedural arguments because they were not properly raised below. Trump and Habba’s opposition to the sanctions motion:

Addressed notice only in a limited sense as to shotgun pleading and Rule 11, not as to inherent authority.
Requested a hearing, but solely in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions, not inherent-authority sanctions.
Contained, at most, a passing quotation about “fair notice,” which the Court deemed insufficient to preserve the issue.

Under Eleventh Circuit law, issues not clearly presented to the district court are forfeited on appeal, so these objections could not invalidate the sanctions.

2. Finding of Subjective Bad Faith – Not Clearly Erroneous

Bad faith is reviewed for clear error; a finding that is “plausible in light of the full record” must stand even if another interpretation is also plausible. The district court found bad faith based on:

Shotgun Pleading – The amended complaint was extraordinarily long and incorporated vast swaths of allegations into every claim. For example, the injurious falsehood count incorporated over 600 prior paragraphs, forcing the court to guess which statements were actually at issue. The Eleventh Circuit deemed this abuse of judicial resources and consistent with prior cases treating shotgun pleadings as harassment or obstruction (Pelletier, Jackson).
Knowingly False or Reckless Factual Allegations – Particularly with respect to Charles Dolan, the district court found that Trump’s attorneys had persisted in using inaccurate descriptions (e.g., falsely describing Dolan as a former DNC chairman and as a “senior Clinton campaign official”) after being specifically warned by Dolan’s counsel, and without conducting reasonable factual investigation.
Frivolous Legal Theories – Beyond tolling, the complaint included what the district court called a “malicious prosecution claim without a prosecution,” “a trade secret claim without a trade secret,” and seven “counts” that did not even state cognizable causes of action. Eleven of 16 counts were abandoned on appeal, reinforcing the view that they lacked legal merit.
Pattern of Misusing the Courts – The district court also referenced Trump’s similar prior litigations (described as “frivolous lawsuits”) as evidence of a broader pattern of misuse. The Eleventh Circuit, relying on Johnson v. 27th Avenue Caraf, held that this comparative analysis of related cases is permissible when assessing sanctions.

Taking these factors together, the Eleventh Circuit found no clear error in the conclusion that Trump and Habba acted in subjective bad faith – either by knowingly pursuing meritless claims or by recklessly failing to investigate facts and law.

3. Reasonableness of the Fee Award

The district court performed a detailed review of defendants’ fee and cost submissions, considered Trump and Habba’s line-by-line objections, and adjusted some billing entries (e.g., for vague or block billing). On appeal, Trump and Habba advanced a new argument: that because the amended complaint was similar to the original complaint, defense counsel’s time spent on successive motions to dismiss was “excessive.”

Because this particular reasonableness objection was not raised below – it had not been part of the line-by-line objections – the Eleventh Circuit again treated it as forfeited. Given the district court’s careful review and partial reductions, and the lack of preserved, specific objections, the fee award was affirmed.

E. Rule 11 Sanctions – Frivolous Pleadings Against Dolan

Separately, the district court had granted Charles Dolan’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Trump’s attorneys, imposing a $50,000 penalty and awarding Dolan $16,274.23 in fees. The Eleventh Circuit upheld these sanctions using the familiar Rule 11 test:

Were the filings objectively frivolous?
Should the signatory attorney have known they were frivolous after a reasonable inquiry?

The Court essentially incorporated its reasoning on inherent-authority sanctions:

The complaint’s allegations about Dolan’s roles and connections were demonstrably false or unsupported.
Dolan’s counsel had directly notified Trump’s counsel of specific inaccuracies, yet the amended complaint repeated many of the challenged assertions.
The underlying legal theory tying Dolan to a RICO enterprise was deemed to have “no chance of success.”

Because Rule 11 imposes an affirmative duty of pre-filing inquiry regardless of subjective good faith, and because the attorneys clearly had access to contrary factual information, the court found Rule 11 sanctions well within the district court’s discretion.

F. Denial of Rule 60(b)(6) Relief Based on the Durham Report

While appeals were pending, Trump and his attorneys sought relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b), relying on the release of Special Counsel Durham’s Report. After an indicative-remand procedure under Rule 62.1, the district court declined to alter its rulings. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

For Rule 60(b)(6), the Court stressed:

The standard is exceptionally high; only “extraordinary circumstances” justify relief.
The Durham Report was “long-expected” and largely confirmed or elaborated on facts already known and pleaded in the amended complaint.
The movants did not identify any new material facts in the Report that would cure the legal deficiencies (e.g., timeliness, elements of the causes of action).
Trump’s equitable tolling theory, which he tried to repackage via the Report’s existence, still failed for the reasons already stated: executive-branch investigations do not prevent a President from filing civil suits.

Because the Report did not fundamentally change the legal landscape or the factual basis of the claims, its publication was not an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting reopening the case under Rule 60(b)(6). To the extent Trump later argued that the Report was “newly discovered evidence” under Rule 60(b)(2), that argument was deemed waived as it appeared for the first time in the reply brief.

G. Denial of the Second Motion to Disqualify the District Judge

Trump and his attorneys filed a second motion to disqualify Judge Middlebrooks while the case was on appeal and after the limited remand for the Rule 60(b) motion. The district court denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit agreed.

The logic is rooted in Griggs: once an appeal is taken, jurisdiction over “those aspects of the case involved in the appeal” shifts to the appellate court. Here:

The appeal encompassed the merits dismissal and sanctions orders.
The Eleventh Circuit remanded only for consideration of the Rule 60(b) motion under Rule 62.1, a very narrow and specific remand.
The recusal motion sought not only to disqualify Judge Middlebrooks for the limited Rule 60(b) issue but also to have a new judge take over “all future proceedings.”

The Court distinguished United States v. Cooley (10th Cir.), which recognized a continuing duty of recusal in circumstances where the district court retained full jurisdiction (e.g., post-trial motions). In Trump v. Clinton, by contrast, the district court’s authority had been sharply curtailed by the pending appeal and the narrow scope of the remand.

The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that the recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), is waivable and not jurisdictional in itself; by contrast, the jurisdictional division between trial and appellate courts is governed by procedural “formalities” that cannot be ignored. Hence, the district court properly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to act on the broader recusal motion.

H. Denial of Rule 38 Appellate Sanctions

Finally, Orbis and Dolan sought Rule 38 sanctions for a frivolous appeal. The Eleventh Circuit declined, reasoning:

Trump’s arguments regarding Orbis (lack of personal jurisdiction and improper dismissal with prejudice) had merit and in fact led to partial modification of the judgment.
His challenge to the district court’s personal-jurisdiction ruling as to Dolan was also at least colorable.
While some appellate arguments were frivolous (especially the equitable tolling theory), the presence of at least one non-frivolous issue generally weighs against Rule 38 sanctions.

Citing a Seventh Circuit observation in McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., the Court expressed reluctance to impose appellate sanctions “every time one or two arguments in an appeal might arguably be deemed frivolous.”

Impact of the Decision

A. No Special Tolling for Presidents – A Clear Message on Equality Before the Law

One of the most significant doctrinal statements is the rejection of any de facto “presidential tolling” of civil claims. By explicitly positioning its analysis alongside Clinton v. Jones, the Eleventh Circuit underscored:

If a sitting President may be sued in civil court, he also must adhere to ordinary filing deadlines when bringing his own suits.
Personal strategic choices – even when made in the name of public duty or optics – do not constitute external, uncontrollable barriers justifying equitable tolling.

This principle will likely guide future attempts by high officeholders to delay civil litigation based on their official responsibilities, reaffirming that the office does not suspend the ordinary operation of statutes of limitations.

B. RICO Litigation – Nationwide Service, Foreign Defendants, and Timeliness

The decision refines the procedural architecture of RICO litigation:

Timeliness is strictly enforced. Plaintiffs, including prominent political figures, must file civil RICO claims within four years of injury discovery, absent robust tolling grounds.
Nationwide service has limits. Section 1965(d) supports jurisdiction over domestic defendants when the RICO claim is at least non-frivolous, but it does not reach foreign defendants served abroad.
Government investigations do not pause the clock. Neither campaign finance investigations nor false-statements prosecutions automatically toll civil RICO limitations periods, especially when they do not allege a parallel antitrust or RICO conspiracy.

These holdings collectively make it more difficult to bootstrap stale civil RICO claims to later, narrower criminal or administrative proceedings.

C. Sanctions in Politically Charged Litigation

Perhaps the most visible aspect of the opinion is its robust endorsement of sanctions against a former President and his legal team. Key implications:

Shotgun pleadings are not just bad practice; they can evidence bad faith. Extensive, cross-incorporating complaints, especially in high-profile political suits, risk both dismissal and fee sanctions.
Lawyers remain gatekeepers even for high-profile clients. The Court’s reliance on Rule 11 and inherent-authority standards reinforces lawyers’ duties to investigate facts and law independently, rather than simply echoing a client’s narrative.
Courts can consider patterns. By approving the district court’s reliance on Trump’s previous similar suits as context for sanctions, the opinion signals that repeated misuse of litigation for political or public-relations purposes can have cumulative consequences.
Monetary consequences can be severe. A nearly $1 million fee award (plus additional sanctions) sends a strong deterrent message, particularly in cases using federal courts as stages for political narratives rather than viable legal claims.

D. Post-Judgment Relief and “New” Government Reports

The Court’s Rule 60(b)(6) analysis suggests a cautious approach to reopening judgments based on subsequent official reports:

Government reports that largely confirm or detail previously known facts are unlikely to meet the “extraordinary circumstances” standard for reopening civil judgments.
Litigants should assume that once they know an investigation is underway, they bear responsibility to litigate based on existing information, not to wait indefinitely for final reports in hopes of reviving claims.

This has broader significance in civil litigation involving parallel governmental investigations or special counsel inquiries.

E. Jurisdiction and Recusal – Respecting the Division Between Trial and Appellate Courts

Finally, the decision reinforces procedural discipline concerning jurisdiction:

Once an appeal is taken, district courts are tightly constrained; a limited remand for one purpose (e.g., Rule 60(b)) does not open the door for broad new motions (e.g., full recusal and reassignment motions).
Recusal obligations, while serious, are not free-floating; they must be exercised within the ordinary jurisdictional framework.

This is particularly important in politically sensitive cases where parties might seek to change the trial judge mid-appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

The following concepts feature prominently in the opinion; here they are explained in more accessible terms:

Civil RICO
RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) allows civil suits against individuals or entities alleged to have engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity” (a series of specified crimes) as part of an “enterprise.” Successful plaintiffs can obtain treble damages. Civil RICO is often used to attack alleged long-running schemes involving multiple actors.
Statute of Limitations
This is the time limit within which a lawsuit must be filed. For civil RICO, it is four years from the time the plaintiff discovers (or should have discovered) the injury. If you miss that deadline, the claim is generally barred, unless an exception applies.
Statutory Tolling
Some statutes pause (or “toll”) the limitations period when certain government proceedings are underway. For antitrust law, the Clayton Act tolls deadlines while the government is pursuing related antitrust cases. Trump argued that this tolling should apply to his RICO claim; the court held it did not fit the facts of his case.
Equitable Tolling
This is a judge-made doctrine allowing deadlines to be extended in rare situations where:
1. The plaintiff diligently pursued their rights; and
2. Some extraordinary circumstance, beyond their control, prevented timely filing.
Personal choices, including strategic or political choices, usually do not qualify.
Shotgun Pleading
A shotgun complaint is one that is overly long, confusing, and repeatedly incorporates all prior paragraphs into each new claim. This makes it hard for defendants and courts to know which facts support which causes of action. The Eleventh Circuit strongly disfavors such pleadings, which can lead to dismissal and even sanctions.
Inherent Authority Sanctions
Federal courts possess inherent power to sanction parties and lawyers who abuse the judicial process, such as by acting in bad faith or using litigation purely to harass. Sanctions can include ordering the offending party to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees.
Rule 11 Sanctions
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, attorneys must ensure that pleadings and motions are:
- Supported by a reasonable factual investigation.
- Warranted by existing law or a non-frivolous extension of it.
- Not filed for an improper purpose (e.g., harassment or delay).
Violations can result in monetary penalties and fee awards.
Nationwide Service of Process (RICO § 1965(d))
Normally, a court’s power over a defendant depends on the state’s long-arm statute. RICO allows plaintiffs to serve certain defendants anywhere in the United States, which can expand personal jurisdiction. However, this does not authorize service in foreign countries.
Personal Jurisdiction
This is a court’s power to make binding decisions about a particular defendant. Without proper service of process and satisfaction of jurisdictional rules, a court cannot enter a binding judgment against that defendant. If jurisdiction is lacking, the case must be dismissed as to that defendant, usually without prejudice.
Rule 60(b) Relief from Judgment
After a final judgment, a party may, in very limited circumstances, ask the court to reopen the case under Rule 60(b). The catchall provision, Rule 60(b)(6), is reserved for extraordinary situations – major, unforeseen developments that fundamentally call the fairness of the judgment into question. New reports that mainly confirm facts already known typically do not qualify.
Recusal (Disqualification) of Judges – 28 U.S.C. § 455
A federal judge must recuse (step aside) from any case where their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. However, recusal motions must be made in the right court at the right time; when a case is on appeal, the trial court’s power is limited.
Rule 38 Appellate Sanctions
If an appeal is wholly frivolous – meaning it has no legitimate legal or factual basis – the court of appeals may award damages and costs against the appellant. However, where at least one issue is substantial or leads to partial relief, courts often decline to impose such sanctions even if other arguments were weak or frivolous.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Trump v. Clinton is a far-reaching precedent in several dimensions of federal civil practice. It squarely rejects any form of “presidential tolling” of civil claims, affirming that even sitting Presidents are bound by ordinary statutes of limitations and must live with strategic choices not to sue within those periods. It tightens the use of statutory and equitable tolling in civil RICO, emphasizing the need for close factual alignment with government enforcement actions and for truly external obstacles to justify equitable relief.

On procedure and sanctions, the opinion is a clear warning that sprawling, politically charged complaints that rely on shotgun pleading, questionable factual assertions, and legally untenable theories are not simply to be dismissed – they may incur substantial financial penalties. The Court’s willingness to uphold nearly $1 million in inherent-authority sanctions, plus Rule 11 sanctions, against a former President and his counsel underscores the judiciary’s insistence that political grievances must be translated into legally viable pleadings, or not filed at all.

At the same time, the Court preserves important limits: it declines to treat government investigative reports as a routine basis for reopening judgments, and it respects the jurisdictional divide between trial and appellate courts in handling recusal motions and post-judgment proceedings. Its refusal to impose appellate sanctions under Rule 38, despite acknowledging frivolous aspects of the appeal, reflects a measured approach: not every poorly grounded argument warrants punitive measures when at least some issues are substantial.

In the broader legal landscape, Trump v. Clinton will likely be cited for:

Its explicit refusal to create special tolling rules for Presidents or other high officials.
Its reaffirmation of strict pleading standards and the dangers of shotgun complaints.
Its robust use of inherent-authority and Rule 11 sanctions in politically sensitive litigation.
Its clarification of the reach and limits of RICO’s nationwide service provision, particularly as to foreign defendants.
Its high bar for Rule 60(b)(6) relief even in the face of significant, widely publicized government reports.

Taken together, the opinion both applies and refines several core doctrines of civil procedure, sanctions law, and federal jurisdiction, while sending a strong institutional message: federal courts are not venues for unbounded political score-settling, and all litigants – including former Presidents – must comply with the same substantive and procedural rules as everyone else.