No “Naked” Remands in Social Security Appeals: Third Circuit Reaffirms that § 405(g) Remands Must Be Either a Merits Judgment under Sentence Four or a Good‑Cause Remand under Sentence Six

Introduction

This commentary examines the Third Circuit’s nonprecedential opinion in Cecilia A. Clinkscale v. Commissioner of Social Security (No. 24‑2191, Sept. 3, 2025), which vacates a district court’s remand order in a Social Security disability appeal on the ground that the order did not fit within either of the two statutorily authorized remand pathways under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Although designated “not precedential,” the opinion offers clear, practice‑shaping guidance: district courts may not grant the Commissioner’s early “voluntary remand” requests unless the remand is tethered to a proper sentence‑four judgment on the merits or a sentence‑six remand supported by a good‑cause finding and retention of jurisdiction.

Background: Ms. Clinkscale applied for disability benefits. After she failed to appear for an ALJ hearing, the ALJ dismissed her request, asserting she did not respond to a show‑cause order. The Appeals Council declined review. Proceeding pro se in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Clinkscale sought judicial review under § 405(g), asking for benefits or a remand. Before answering or filing the administrative record, the Commissioner moved for a remand under sentence four, vaguely asserting that “further evaluation of the ALJ dismissal is warranted,” particularly in light of a March 9, 2023 show‑cause response. The district court granted the motion the next day, labeled it a sentence‑four remand, and entered a “final order” without further explanation. Clinkscale appealed.

Key Issue: Whether a district court may enter a “voluntary remand” at the Commissioner’s pre‑answer request and call it a sentence‑four remand without (a) the administrative record, (b) a merits determination affirming, modifying, or reversing the agency’s decision, and (c) the other statutory hallmarks of sentence‑four or sentence‑six remands.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit vacated and remanded to the district court. The panel held that the district court’s order was not a valid sentence‑four remand because it:

• Was not entered “upon the pleadings and transcript of the record,”
• Did not affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s decision, and
• Made no substantive ruling on the merits.

Nor was the order a valid sentence‑six remand, because the district court:

• Made no finding of “good cause,” and
• Did not retain jurisdiction (instead entering a final judgment).

Because the remand order fit neither statutory category, it was unauthorized under § 405(g). The Third Circuit therefore vacated and remanded for the district court to proceed in conformity with sentence four or sentence six.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991): The foundation. The Supreme Court held that § 405(g) authorizes only two kinds of remands—under sentence four or sentence six. The Third Circuit relied on Melkonyan to frame the exclusive pathways and to emphasize that “remand orders must either accompany a final judgment… in accordance with sentence four, or conform with the requirements… in sentence six.”
• Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993): Clarifies that a sentence‑four remand is a final judgment on the merits and divests the district court of jurisdiction; a sentence‑six remand retains jurisdiction and delays final judgment until after administrative proceedings. The panel cited Schaefer for both the jurisdictional consequences and for the mechanics of each sentence.
• Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266 (1998): Confirms that a sentence‑four judgment is final and appealable; a claimant can appeal even if some relief (remand) is granted when the claimant sought more (e.g., benefits). The panel used Forney to explain appellate jurisdiction and why Clinkscale could appeal despite obtaining a remand.
• Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 (1990): Labels do not control; substance governs. The Third Circuit invoked Finkelstein to hold that merely calling an order a sentence‑four remand does not make it one if the statutory elements are missing.
• Kadelski v. Sullivan, 30 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 1994): Third Circuit recognition of Melkonyan’s two‑track framework for § 405(g) remands; supports the panel’s application of those limits.
• Johnson v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2005): Cited for the jurisdictional distinction between sentence‑four (final judgment, no retention) and sentence‑six (retention until post‑remand proceedings conclude).
• Krishnan v. Barnhart, 328 F.3d 685 (D.C. Cir. 2003): A cautionary parallel. A court cannot “sanitize” a defective remand by saying it could have been sentence four; a merits ruling is a necessary prerequisite to a valid sentence‑four remand.
• Buckner v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 2000): Shows that a remand may qualify under sentence four if it sufficiently implicates the merits; the Third Circuit considered and rejected such a reading here because the district court made no substantive ruling and the record was inadequate.
• Istre v. Apfel, 208 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2000); Raitport v. Callahan, 183 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam): Sister‑circuit support for vacating remands that do not fit sentence four or sentence six.
• In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 855 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2017): The court’s inherent authority to determine its own jurisdiction, used here to characterize the district court’s order and reach the merits of the remand question.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in clear steps tied to § 405(g)’s text and Supreme Court guidance:

1. Two exclusive remand routes. Melkonyan restricts remands to sentence four or sentence six; there is no free‑floating “voluntary remand” power.
2. Substance over labels. Relying on Finkelstein, the panel held that the district court’s designation of its order as “sentence four” is not controlling. The court scrutinizes what the order actually did.
3. No sentence‑four remand without a merits judgment. Sentence four allows a court to “enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing” the Commissioner, with or without remanding for rehearing. Here:
   • No “pleadings and transcript of the record” were before the district court. A pre‑answer motion is not a “pleading” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 7, and the administrative record was not filed.
   • No merits judgment was entered—nothing affirming, modifying, or reversing. The order simply returned the matter to the agency for “further administrative proceedings,” which Schaefer and Melkonyan say is not enough.
4. No sentence‑six remand without good cause and retention of jurisdiction. Sentence six permits a pre‑answer remand “for good cause shown,” with the court retaining jurisdiction (no final judgment). The district court made no good‑cause finding and explicitly entered a final order terminating the case. Thus sentence six was unavailable.
5. Speculation cannot cure the defect. Even if one might infer that the ALJ overlooked a show‑cause response, the district court made no merits ruling and had no record to support one. Following Krishnan, the panel declined to retroactively recast the defective order as a valid sentence‑four judgment.

Impact and Practice Implications

Although nonprecedential, the opinion has practical significance across the Third Circuit and beyond, especially given the frequency of “voluntary remand” motions in Social Security cases:

• District courts must choose and comply with a statutory path. A remand order must be:
  • Sentence four: based on the pleadings and the administrative record; include a merits judgment (affirm, modify, or reverse); and result in a final judgment with no retention of jurisdiction.
  • Sentence six: typically pre‑answer; supported by an explicit “good cause” finding; no final judgment at that time; and the court retains jurisdiction pending remand proceedings.
• No “naked remands.” Courts cannot issue bare remand orders that neither adjudicate the merits nor make the statutory findings required by sentence six. The Commissioner’s preference for early remands must align with the statute’s architecture.
• Commissioner’s motion practice must be specific and supported. If seeking sentence four, the Commissioner should file the administrative record and articulate a merits basis that supports a judgment reversing or modifying. If seeking sentence six, the motion must make a concrete good‑cause showing and request retention of jurisdiction, clarifying that no final judgment should enter.
• EAJA timing and fee implications. Under Schaefer, a sentence‑four remand triggers a final judgment, starting the Equal Access to Justice Act filing clock. A sentence‑six remand does not trigger finality until after post‑remand proceedings and the court’s entry of final judgment. Mislabeling can cause confusion and prejudice to parties on EAJA deadlines.
• Pro se claimants and record access. The opinion acknowledges the practical difficulties for pro se litigants like Ms. Clinkscale, who wanted to review the administrative record. The decision implicitly encourages courts to ensure that remand procedures do not deprive claimants of meaningful review or a clear path back to court.
• Future procedural posture options. The panel notes possible “further developments” at the agency since the remand and suggests—without directing—that the district court might now consider retaining jurisdiction (i.e., a sentence‑six path) to protect the integrity and efficiency of review, particularly where the Commissioner seeks pre‑answer remand.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Sentence four (42 U.S.C. § 405(g)): After the Commissioner answers and files the administrative record, the court decides the case on the merits—affirming, modifying, or reversing the agency decision—and may remand for a rehearing. This comes with a final judgment that ends the district court’s involvement.
• Sentence six (42 U.S.C. § 405(g)): Before answering, the Commissioner can move for a remand “for good cause shown,” or the court can remand for consideration of new and material evidence. The court does not enter final judgment and instead keeps the case open to review what happens on remand.
• “Good cause” (sentence six): A concrete, case‑specific justification—e.g., a conceded legal error that the agency must correct, missing or defective proceedings, or new evidence that could affect the outcome. Boilerplate references to “further evaluation” are generally insufficient.
• “Upon the pleadings and transcript of the record” (sentence four): The court’s merits ruling must be grounded in the actual administrative record and the parties’ pleadings. A motion alone (especially pre‑answer) is not a substitute for the record.
• “Naked remand”: A shorthand for an order that remands without a merits judgment (sentence four) and without good‑cause findings and retention of jurisdiction (sentence six). This case explains such orders are unauthorized under § 405(g).
• Retention of jurisdiction: In sentence‑six remands, the district court keeps the case open—no final judgment—so the claimant can return if needed after the agency acts.

What This Means for Future Cases

• For courts: When the Commissioner moves for voluntary remand before answering, require either:
  • A sentence‑six showing of good cause and an order expressly retaining jurisdiction; or
  • If the court prefers sentence four, require the record and issue a merits judgment that clearly affirms, reverses, or modifies, with or without a remand for rehearing.
• For the Commissioner: Tailor motions with specificity. Identify conceded errors or reasons that constitute good cause for sentence six; or file the record and propose a sentence‑four merits resolution identifying the precise legal error and appropriate judgment.
• For claimants (including pro se litigants): If you want to review the record or seek a merits decision, object to pre‑answer remands that lack good‑cause findings or that purport to be “final” without adjudicating the merits. Clarify whether you seek a sentence‑six remand (to keep jurisdiction open) or a sentence‑four judgment (to finalize and potentially trigger EAJA timelines).

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in Clinkscale reinforces a bright‑line rule rooted in Supreme Court authority: district courts have only two options for remanding Social Security cases under § 405(g). A court must either enter a sentence‑four merits judgment (affirm, modify, or reverse) based on the pleadings and the administrative record, or it must make a sentence‑six good‑cause finding, remand pre‑answer, and retain jurisdiction without entering final judgment. The district court’s “naked remand” here—labeled sentence four but lacking both a record‑based merits judgment and the hallmarks of sentence six—was invalid and properly vacated.

In practical terms, the opinion curbs the common but statutorily unsound practice of granting early, lightly supported remand motions. It safeguards the clarity of appellate rights and EAJA timing and ensures claimants receive either a true merits determination or a structured, supervised remand process. Even as a nonprecedential disposition, Clinkscale offers a clear roadmap that will influence how district courts, the Commissioner, and litigants structure remand requests and orders in Social Security appeals.