No “Escape” When the State Opens the Door:
Arellano‑Sanchez v. Thrasher and Limits on Oregon DOC’s Re‑Arrest Authority Under ORS 144.350

I. Introduction

In Arellano‑Sanchez v. Thrasher, 374 Or 623 (Dec. 24, 2025), the Oregon Supreme Court exercised its original habeas corpus jurisdiction to address a stark question: may the Department of Corrections (DOC), without any judicial involvement, re‑arrest and reincarcerate a person whom DOC itself has deliberately released from prison as having completed his sentence, by labeling that person a statutory “escapee” under ORS 144.350?

DOC had recalculated Jose Rafael Arellano‑Sanchez’s sentence credits after the court’s earlier decision in State ex rel Torres‑Lopez v. Fahrion, 373 Or 816 (2025) (“Torres‑Lopez I”), and concluded his release date had already passed. It therefore released him to post‑prison supervision (PPS). Months later, DOC changed its view of the applicable law, recalculated again, decided that he still owed prison time, and—without a warrant or hearing—issued an “Order for Arrest and Return of Prisoner” under ORS 144.350, asserting that he had “escaped” and was a “fugitive from justice.”

The Supreme Court held that, “under the circumstances of this case,” ORS 144.350 did not authorize DOC’s order. Because DOC’s statutory “escape” authority did not apply, the plaintiff’s current imprisonment was unlawful, and the court ordered his immediate release, directing that the appellate judgment issue at once.

The opinion clarifies the statutory concept of “escape” for purposes of DOC’s warrant‑like arrest orders, signals serious due process concerns if the state could summarily recapture formerly released prisoners without process, and, through a concurrence, offers detailed practical guidance on how sentencing courts and DOC should handle presentence incarceration credit under ORS 137.370(4).

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Parties and Procedural Posture

Plaintiff: Jose Rafael Arellano‑Sanchez, an adult in custody (AIC) who had been released from prison onto PPS and later re‑incarcerated.
Defendant: Charlotte Thrasher, Superintendent of Coffee Creek Correctional Facility, representing the state custodial authority.
Proceeding: Original habeas corpus in the Oregon Supreme Court under Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 2 and ORS 34.310.

B. Factual Background (Uncontested)

In 2017, plaintiff was convicted of multiple offenses, including first‑degree robbery, second‑degree assault, and unlawful use of a weapon. After appellate proceedings and a 2022 remand, he pled guilty on two counts and received a total 120‑month prison sentence (90 months on one count and 70 months on another, with 30 months of the latter to be served consecutively).
The 2022 judgment ordered the sentence “with credit for time served since [plaintiff’s] arrest on November 3, 2016,” and stated that he “shall serve the entire 120 months imposed by the Court.” DOC initially projected a November 2026 release date.
In 2025, the Supreme Court decided Torres‑Lopez I (and later Torres‑Lopez II, 374 Or 423 (2025)), holding that, after a 2015 amendment, ORS 137.370(4) gives sentencing courts discretion to award “double credit” for certain presentence custody on unrelated matters, if the court “expressly orders otherwise.”
In response to Torres‑Lopez, DOC re‑audited many sentences. For plaintiff, DOC decided the judgment “expressly provided” for ORS 137.370(4) double credit across his consecutive sentences, concluded that his lawful release date had already passed, and in August 2025 released him onto PPS.
In early November 2025, the Washington County District Attorney moved in the trial court under ORS 137.172 to “correct” the judgment, to state that any ORS 137.370(4) credit should be applied only once toward the total consecutive term. A hearing was set for November 24.
Around the same time, DOC again reconsidered its credit calculations, concluded its August release decision had been legally erroneous, recalculated plaintiff’s release date to February 2027, and on November 22 issued an “Order for Arrest and Return of Prisoner” under ORS 144.350, asserting that plaintiff had “escaped from custody or has not completed service of his term of incarceration.”
When plaintiff appeared for the November 24 hearing, he was arrested pursuant to DOC’s order and returned to custody. The DA withdrew the ORS 137.172 motion as “moot.”
On December 2, plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Court for habeas relief, asserting:
- His term of incarceration was fully served under the judgment’s terms;
- DOC lacked legal authority to re‑arrest and reincarcerate him; and
- Due process entitled him to notice and a hearing before being summarily returned to prison.
The state responded that:
- The judgment did not expressly order double credit, so DOC’s August release was mistaken;
- Plaintiff was on “constructive escape” status because he should still have been in custody; and
- ORS 144.350(1)(a)(B) (escape) and ORS 144.360 authorized his arrest and detention without pre‑deprivation process, though post‑deprivation remedies (habeas, mandamus, grievances) were available.

C. Holding

The Oregon Supreme Court held:

Under ORS 144.350(1)(a)(B) and (3), DOC may issue an arrest and detention order only if it has reasonable grounds to believe the person has “escaped,” defined as an “unlawful departure” from a correctional facility or custodial supervision.
On the undisputed facts, plaintiff’s release—deliberately ordered by DOC based on its then‑current legal view—was not an “unlawful departure,” and thus not an “escape.”
Therefore, ORS 144.350 did not authorize DOC’s order or plaintiff’s subsequent reincarceration. His present imprisonment is unlawful.
The court ordered his immediate discharge from custody and directed the State Court Administrator to issue the appellate judgment at once, waiving ORAP provisions on reconsideration and judgment issuance.

The court expressly did not decide:

Whether plaintiff’s August release was substantively correct under ORS 137.370(4);
Whether ORS 137.172 permits trial courts to “correct” criminal judgments to clarify credit for time served in this context; or
Precisely where the outer boundaries of “escape” or “constructive escape” lie in other factual scenarios.

Justice James, joined by Justice Bushong, concurred fully in the result and reasoning, and added practical guidance on:

How courts and practitioners should draft and interpret “credit for time served” provisions post‑Torres‑Lopez; and
How DOC and trial courts should address thousands of existing judgments potentially affected by ORS 137.370(4).

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory Framework and Key Concepts

1. ORS 144.350 and DOC’s Arrest Power

ORS 144.350 authorizes DOC or other “supervisory authorities” to issue orders for the arrest and detention of persons under their “supervision, custody or control” when there are reasonable grounds to believe the person has:

Violated conditions of parole, PPS, probation, conditional pardon, or other conditional release, ORS 144.350(1)(a)(A); or
“Escaped from the supervision, custody or control” of DOC or the supervisory authority, ORS 144.350(1)(a)(B).

Crucially, ORS 144.350(3) defines “escape” for purposes of this arrest authority:

“‘Escape’ means the unlawful departure of a person from a correctional facility, as defined in ORS 162.135, or from the supervision, custody or control of a corrections officer or other person authorized by the department or supervisory authority to maintain supervision, custody or control of the person while the person is outside the correctional facility.”

Under ORS 144.360, any such DOC order “constitutes full authority for the arrest and detention of the violator,” and is treated like a warrant of arrest. Thus, when “escape” is properly found, DOC can unilaterally trigger an arrest, without going through a judge.

In Arellano‑Sanchez, there was no allegation of a PPS violation; DOC’s authority had to rest entirely on the “escape” prong.

2. ORS 162.135 and the Definition of “Escape”

ORS 144.350(3) cross‑references ORS 162.135, which defines terms for the criminal escape statutes. ORS 162.135(5) provides:

“‘Escape’ means the unlawful departure of a person from custody or a correctional facility. ‘Escape’ includes the unauthorized departure or absence from this state or failure to return to this state by a person who is under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board…. ‘Escape’ does not include failure to comply with provisions of a conditional release in ORS 135.245.”

The concept of “unlawful departure” has existed in the statutory definition of escape since Oregon adopted the 1971 Criminal Code, and the Criminal Law Revision Commission explained that the definition of “escape” was intended as a restatement of its “generally accepted legal meaning.” Contemporary legal sources, such as Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968), defined “escape” to include a person’s leaving lawful custody before lawfully entitled to freedom, and the negligent allowing of a lawfully confined person to leave.

However, the specific phrase “unlawful departure” itself was new and never separately defined by statute; the court therefore turned to ordinary dictionary meanings: “unlawful” as conduct “contrary to or prohibited by law” or “not authorized…by law,” and “departure” as “removal from a place” or the “act of going away.”

3. ORS 137.370(4), Presentence Credit, and Torres‑Lopez

Although the merits of sentence timing were not resolved in Arellano‑Sanchez, the case arose out of DOC’s implementation of ORS 137.370(4) after Torres‑Lopez. ORS 137.370 governs credit for time served; subsection (4) states:

“Unless the court expressly orders otherwise, a person who is confined as the result of a sentence for a crime or conduct that is not directly related to the crime for which the sentence is imposed, or for violation of the conditions of probation, parole or post-prison supervision, shall not receive presentence incarceration credit for the time served in jail toward service of the term of confinement.”

In Torres‑Lopez I and II the Supreme Court held that the 2015 amendment to ORS 137.370(4) gave sentencing courts discretion to “expressly order” credit for certain custody time that otherwise would not count—effectively authorizing limited “double credit.” In Torres‑Lopez the trial court’s judgment made that double credit unmistakably clear by specifying that credit included time served on another case and invoking ORS 137.370(4) and (5).

DOC’s systemwide recalculations post‑Torres‑Lopez—including in plaintiff’s case—were the catalyst for this litigation.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Interpretation of “Escape” and “Unlawful Departure”

Applying the familiar three‑step methodology from State v. Gaines and State v. Klein, the Court examined:

Text: ORS 144.350(3) and ORS 162.135(5) both define “escape” as the “unlawful departure” from custody or a correctional facility. “Unlawful” suggests conduct not authorized or permitted by law at the time; “departure” means leaving or removal.
Context: The escape statutes create three degrees of escape, with escape from a correctional facility punished more severely (second‑degree escape, ORS 162.155) because it involves planning, premeditation, and threatens institutional security.
Legislative history: The Criminal Law Revision Commission intended “escape” to reflect its generally accepted legal meaning, which historically involved a person’s departure from lawful imprisonment before lawful entitlement to release, or a custodian’s negligent allowance of such departure.

The Court acknowledged that the terms “escape” and “unlawful departure” are capacious enough to cover a variety of scenarios, possibly even some inadvertent or mistaken releases. But the Court concluded that this case lies beyond even the broadest plausible scope of “unlawful departure.”

The salient facts, as the Court recapped them, were:

DOC possessed full knowledge of the underlying facts and the sentencing judgment;
DOC applied what it then believed to be the correct law regarding presentence credit;
DOC deliberately determined that plaintiff’s term of incarceration was complete, and formally released him from the correctional facility to PPS;
Only later, without any change in the underlying facts, DOC changed its view of the law, recalculated, and concluded that he still had time to serve.

In that scenario, the Court reasoned, plaintiff’s “departure” from custody was lawful when it occurred:

“Whatever else ‘unlawful departure’ may mean, we conclude that the legislature did not intend for it to include circumstances in which DOC (1) determines that a person is lawfully entitled to be released because he has served his term of incarceration; (2) pursuant to that determination releases the person from the correctional facility to begin serving PPS; and (3) later changes its mind as to whether the person should have been released.” (374 Or at 633)

The Court emphasized that DOC’s later change of legal interpretation could not retroactively transform a formerly lawful release into an “unlawful departure,” especially when the proper interpretation of the judgment remained contested.

2. Constitutional Avoidance and Due Process Concerns

Recognizing that the statutory text arguably could be stretched toward the state’s interpretation, the Court invoked the constitutional‑avoidance canon:

“[W]hen a statute is capable of more than one plausible interpretation, the court will avoid an interpretation that raises a constitutional problem.” (citing Bonner v. American Golf Corp., 372 Or 814 (2024); Westwood Homeowners Assn. v. Lane County, 318 Or 146 (1993)).

If “escape” under ORS 144.350 were read to include persons like plaintiff—who were told by the state they had lawfully completed their sentence and were released—serious procedural due process concerns would arise under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court drew on federal precedents:

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US 471 (1972) (parole revocation requires due process);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 US 778 (1973) (probation revocation similarly implicates liberty interests);
Young v. Harper, 520 US 143 (1997) (pre‑parole supervision program created a protected liberty interest); and
Hurd v. District of Columbia, 864 F3d 671 (DC Cir 2017) (thoroughly analyzing due process interests of a mistakenly released prisoner).

From those cases, the Court distilled the principle that in at least some situations, a person who is no longer physically confined—though subject to revocation of that liberty—has a protected liberty interest and may not be summarily reincarcerated without appropriate process.

Although plaintiff here was not a parolee or probationer in the classic sense, the Court found that distinction not dispositive. It highlighted the far‑reaching implications of the state’s theory:

The state’s reading contained no temporal limit. A person could be released as having completed a sentence, establish a life in the community for years or decades, and later be seized without notice or hearing based solely on a revised legal interpretation by DOC.
At oral argument, the state candidly conceded that at some point (after sufficient time has passed), such a person would likely acquire a liberty interest requiring pre‑deprivation process.

The Court saw no principled way to say that a liberty interest arises only after a “long” period of freedom yet is absent after a shorter period, such as plaintiff’s months of release. Without definitively resolving the scope of the liberty interest, the Court held that its existence was at least “arguable” enough that reading ORS 144.350 to authorize summary seizure in this context would raise serious constitutional questions. The Court therefore chose the narrower interpretation that avoided those problems.

The Court expressly rejected reliance on the Fourth Circuit’s statement in Henderson v. Simms, 223 F3d 267 (4th Cir 2000), that mistakenly released prisoners lack a protected liberty interest. It found Henderson’s reasoning conclusory and instead favored the more thoughtful analysis in Hurd, which analogized mistakenly released prisoners to parolees in terms of lived liberty interests, such as employment and family ties.

3. Distinguishing Fredericks v. Gladden and “Constructive Escape”

The state invoked Fredericks v. Gladden, 211 Or 312 (1957), where the Court had described a prematurely released prisoner as a “constructive escapee.” In Fredericks the Court said that when a prematurely released prisoner is apprehended and returned before his term expires, “we need not inquire how he got there.”

The Arellano‑Sanchez Court declined to treat that language as controlling for several reasons:

Temporal context: Fredericks predated the 1999 amendment adding ORS 144.350(1)(a)(B) and the current statutory definition of “escape” used in DOC’s arrest authority.
Nature of the release: In Fredericks it was undisputed that the plaintiff’s release was “illegal”—the warden’s certificate erroneously claimed entitlement to sentence reductions that the plaintiff concededly did not have.
Constitutional analysis: Fredericks did not consider the due process implications central to the present decision.

The Court carefully noted that its decision does not foreclose the possibility that “constructive escape” may still exist in some circumstances. It referenced an Oregon Administrative Rule:

OAR 291‑100‑0008(13): “Escape: Unauthorized departure of an AIC from the physical or legal custody of the Department of Corrections. Escape includes ‘constructive escape’ where an AIC has any unserved Department of Corrections felony sentence(s) and, by no effort of the AIC, is voluntarily absent from the Department of Corrections (for example, where an AIC is released from custody after serving a local supervisory sentence despite the AIC having an unserved Department of Corrections felony sentence(s)).”

But the Court distinguished that scenario: here there was a live dispute over whether plaintiff in fact had any “unserved” DOC sentence at the time of his release in August. The state’s constructive‑escape theory assumed the very point in dispute.

4. Limited Scope: “Under the Circumstances of This Case”

The Court repeatedly limited its holding to “the circumstances of this case,” signaling that:

It was not defining the full outer boundaries of “unlawful departure” or “escape” for all possible mistaken‑release scenarios;
It was not precluding DOC from ever treating an erroneously released AIC as an escapee; but
Where the release is an intentional, considered act by DOC based on its own legal interpretation of undisputed facts—and the only change is DOC’s later view of the law—ORS 144.350(1)(a)(B) does not authorize re‑arrest.

In such cases, if the state believes the person was wrongly released, it must look to other lawful mechanisms, rather than invoking DOC’s unilateral escape‑arrest power.

C. The James Concurrence: Practical Guidance on Presentence Credit and Judgment Correction

Justice James, joined by Justice Bushong, wrote separately to emphasize two practical points, while fully agreeing that DOC’s warrantless seizure of plaintiff was unlawful because no “escape” occurred under ORS 144.350.

1. Drafting and Interpreting “Credit for Time Served” After Torres‑Lopez

The concurrence begins with a description familiar to practitioners:

It is “common practice” for Oregon criminal judgments to include generic notations like “credit for time served” or “CTS.”
In most cases, everyone involved expects that credit to be applied straightforwardly against the “primary” offense’s incarceration term (as defined in ORS 144.079), with no thought to double credit.

Torres‑Lopez presented a different situation. The trial court there:

Originally wrote “credit for time served since December 21, 2019[,] including time credited to Clackamas County case #18CR85288” on the judgment; and
Later amended the judgment to state explicitly that the defendant “shall receive incarceration credits pursuant to ORS 137.370(4) and (5) for all time since his arrest on these charges including any time served on other sentences.”

Despite that clarity, DOC had treated the credit as if it were a generic CTS notation, applying it only once against the primary offense. Torres‑Lopez held that this was error because the 2015 amendment to ORS 137.370(4) authorized the trial court to grant what would otherwise be “double credit” in limited circumstances, and the court had clearly done so.

Justice James characterizes Torres‑Lopez as a “reminder” that the law changed in 2015, while practice may not have fully adjusted. He urges courts and lawyers, going forward, to:

First, determine whether ORS 137.370(4) applies at all. That is, is the court considering presentence credit for custody time that is “not directly related” to the offense for which it is sentencing (such as confinement on an unrelated charge or on a supervision violation)?
If ORS 137.370(4) applies, consciously decide whether to exercise the discretion to “expressly order otherwise.” In other words, does the court intend to grant double credit (credit that otherwise would be denied by subsection (4))?

If a court wants to apply credit to multiple counts or cases in a way that yields double credit, the concurrence advises:

Use explicit language, as in Torres‑Lopez, specifying case numbers, counts, and the statutory authority (e.g., “pursuant to ORS 137.370(4)”).

If a court does not intend to grant double credit under ORS 137.370(4), Justice James recommends:

Consider expressly stating that the court is declining to apply ORS 137.370(4) double credit, which can dispel ambiguity and avoid future disputes.

The underlying message is that generic CTS language may be inadequate in a post‑2015, post‑Torres‑Lopez world whenever ORS 137.370(4) is in play.

2. Existing Judgments and the Role of Courts vs. DOC

DOC represented in this case that as many as 11,000 existing judgments might be affected by ORS 137.370(4). For those judgments entered before Torres‑Lopez—often using generic CTS language—what is DOC to do?

Justice James suggests a systematic approach:

Confirm applicability of ORS 137.370(4). If the custody credited is “directly related” to the sentenced offense, subsection (4) does not apply, and the judgment can be implemented as usual.
If ORS 137.370(4) does apply, classify the judgment:
- Clearly grants double credit: Like Torres‑Lopez, where the judgment explicitly invokes ORS 137.370(4) or unambiguously states that time on another case or sentence is credited. DOC should apply the judgment as written.
- Clearly denies double credit: The judgment expressly states that ORS 137.370(4) credit is not being applied or is limited to a single application. DOC should respect that limitation.
- Potentially ambiguous: Where the judgment says merely “credit for time served” or “CTS” and circumstances suggest ORS 137.370(4) could be implicated, but the intended scope is unclear.

In that third category—ambiguous judgments—Justice James is clear: DOC should not unilaterally resolve the ambiguity. Instead, some form of judicial clarification is necessary.

He discusses ORS 137.172, which allows trial courts to “modify the judgment…to correct any arithmetic or clerical errors or to delete or modify any erroneous term in the judgment,” either on a party’s motion or sua sponte with notice. The parties in this case disputed whether ORS 137.172 could be used to clarify ambiguous CTS language:

The state argued that, in light of Torres‑Lopez, generic CTS in a context where ORS 137.370(4) applies is at least ambiguous, and any resulting miscalculation is an “erroneous” application that ORS 137.172 permits the court to correct after fact‑finding about the court’s true intent at the time of sentencing.
Plaintiff argued that ORS 137.172 addresses “arithmetic or clerical errors” and “erroneous terms,” not ambiguous ones, and does not authorize courts to change clear CTS language merely because DOC now applies it differently.

The majority avoided deciding whether ORS 137.172 is the proper procedural vehicle. Justice James notes that other procedural pathways might exist but does not specify them. Crucially, he insists that any resolution of ambiguity in a criminal judgment must be judicial, not administrative.

To reduce uncertainty, Justice James suggests a simple legislative fix: amend ORS 137.172 to authorize correction of “erroneous or ambiguous” terms in a criminal judgment. Whether to adopt that change is, of course, left to the legislature.

D. Impact and Future Implications

1. Immediate Effect on DOC’s Authority

The central doctrinal takeaway is this:

DOC may not use its ORS 144.350 “escape” authority to re‑arrest and reincarcerate a person whose release was deliberately and lawfully ordered by DOC based on its then‑current legal interpretation, merely because DOC later changes its mind about the law.

Practically, this means:

DOC cannot treat every allegedly mistaken release as an “escape” under ORS 144.350(1)(a)(B);
When DOC believes a release was unlawful due to legal misinterpretation (rather than fraud, identity error, or a prisoner’s wrongful act), it must seek judicial involvement (e.g., through motions like ORS 137.172 or other processes), not rely on unilateral, warrant‑like DOC orders; and
Law enforcement officers asked to execute DOC “escape” orders must be aware that such orders are only valid if the statutory concept of “escape” is properly invoked.

2. Separation of Powers and the Role of Courts in Sentencing

The decision implicitly reinforces the separation of powers:

Sentencing—including decisions about credit for time served—is a judicial function.
DOC’s role is to execute the sentence according to law and the judgment, not to re‑interpret or revise it when ambiguity or disagreement arises.
When the meaning of a judgment is contested—especially as to whether double credit under ORS 137.370(4) was intended—only the sentencing court (or another court with proper jurisdiction) may clarify or modify it.

Arellano‑Sanchez thus curtails any tendency for DOC to act as both interpreter and enforcer of sentencing judgments where serious liberty interests are at stake.

3. Due Process and Liberty Interests of Released Prisoners

Although the Court ultimately resolved the case on statutory grounds, it grounded its interpretation in due process concerns and acknowledged that mistakenly or prematurely released prisoners may possess constitutionally protected liberty interests.

This has several implications:

The longer a person lives in the community based on a state‑ordered release, the stronger the due process arguments become against summary re‑incarceration.
Even shorter periods of release, as in plaintiff’s case, can suffice to raise “substantial question[s]” of due process when the state seeks to revoke that freedom without notice or hearing.
States must design procedures—ideally judicial, with notice and an opportunity to be heard—before re‑incarcerating people who have reasonably relied on a formal release.

Future litigation may more squarely present the federal constitutional question avoided here: whether and when a mistakenly released prisoner acquires a liberty interest equivalent to that of a parolee for due process purposes.

4. Systemic Review of Presentence Credits and Potential Legislative Action

Because DOC is re‑evaluating thousands of sentences in light of ORS 137.370(4) and Torres‑Lopez, Arellano‑Sanchez will likely:

Force DOC to collaborate closely with circuit courts and district attorneys whenever recalculations suggest that an AIC was either over‑ or under‑incarcerated;
Encourage the bench and bar to draft sentencing judgments that clearly indicate:
- whether ORS 137.370(4) applies; and
- whether the court is granting or declining double credit;
Prompt legislative review of:
- ORS 137.172 (to make clear whether courts can clarify ambiguous credit terms);
- ORS 144.350 (to address recovery of mistakenly released prisoners while ensuring due process); and
- Administrative rules on constructive escape, to align them with the Court’s interpretation.

If the legislature perceives a “gap” in the statutory scheme—namely, a lack of clear procedures for correcting releases later deemed erroneous—it can create a tailored remedy that:

Provides for prompt judicial review;
Respects due process rights; and
Gives DOC clear, limited authority to detain in narrowly defined, urgent circumstances pending that review.

5. Habeas Corpus as a Check on Executive Overreach

This decision also underscores the continuing importance of habeas corpus:

The Court exercised its original jurisdiction to issue an “order in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus,” reflecting the gravity of unlawful imprisonment claims.
ORS 34.700(1) mandates that when imprisonment is found illegal, the plaintiff must be “discharged forthwith,” which the Court implemented here.
By waiving normal appellate timelines (ORAP 9.25, 14.05(3)(b)), the Court signaled that protecting personal liberty from unauthorized detention warrants extraordinary procedural acceleration.

At the same time, the Court declined to award attorney fees under ORS 34.700(2), finding that the state’s legal position—though incorrect—was not “frivolous,” given the complexity of the interplay between ORS 144.350, ORS 137.370(4), and post‑Torres‑Lopez recalculations.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is Habeas Corpus?

Habeas corpus is a legal mechanism by which a person who is “imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty” can ask a court to examine whether that detention is lawful. If the detention is illegal, the court must order the person’s immediate release. It is essentially a “show me the legal basis for this custody” procedure.

2. What Is “Escape” in This Context?

In everyday language, “escape” suggests a prisoner breaking out of jail. Legally, Oregon’s statutes define “escape” as an “unlawful departure” from custody or a correctional facility. That can include:

Climbing the fence and running away;
Leaving a work crew or hospital without authorization; or
Certain “constructive” scenarios where a person is supposed to be in DOC custody but is absent.

However, Arellano‑Sanchez makes clear that if DOC itself deliberately opens the door and tells you that you are lawfully free because you have completed your sentence, your departure at that moment is not “unlawful” and therefore not an “escape” under ORS 144.350.

3. What Is “Constructive Escape”?

“Constructive escape” is a term used to describe a situation where a person is legally supposed to be in custody, but, through no effort of their own—perhaps because of an administrative error—they are at liberty. Some rules treat that as an “escape” for certain purposes.

In this case, DOC labeled plaintiff a “constructive escapee” because it believed his release was a mistake. The Court rejected that label in this specific context: there was no undisputed “unserved sentence,” and his release was not merely a clerical slip but a deliberate decision DOC later regretted.

4. What Is “Double Credit” for Time Served?

“Credit for time served” typically means that time a defendant spends in jail before sentencing counts toward, and therefore shortens, the ultimate prison sentence.

“Double credit” refers to a situation where the same period of time is credited toward two different sentences—for example:

You are in jail because of a prior sentence in County A; then you are charged in County B and remain in custody on both matters;
Normally, ORS 137.370(4) says you do not get credit on the County B sentence for the time you were held on the unrelated County A sentence; that would be double counting.
But after a 2015 amendment, a judge in County B can “expressly order” that you do receive credit on the County B sentence, even though you were already getting credit on County A—that is “double credit.”

Torres‑Lopez confirmed that judges have that discretion, if they say so explicitly. Arellano‑Sanchez arose when DOC attempted to infer that kind of double credit from relatively generic judgment language.

5. What Is “Procedural Due Process” in This Setting?

Procedural due process is about fairness in government decision‑making. In the context of incarceration, the core idea is:

Before the state takes away your liberty (or a significant part of it), you are typically entitled to notice of the reasons and some kind of hearing or opportunity to respond.

For parolees and probationers, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that revoking conditional liberty requires due process hearings. Arellano‑Sanchez suggests that people who have been told by the state that they have completed their sentence and are free may also have similar protections, especially as time passes and they live normal lives in the community.

V. Conclusion

Arellano‑Sanchez v. Thrasher establishes an important limit on the Oregon Department of Corrections’ unilateral arrest power:

A person whom DOC intentionally releases from prison as having completed his sentence has not “escaped” within the meaning of ORS 144.350, and DOC may not later re‑arrest and reincarcerate him under that statute simply because it changes its legal interpretation of the sentencing judgment.

The Court’s reasoning rests on:

A careful reading of “escape” and “unlawful departure” in the statutory and historical context;
Concern that the state’s broad “constructive escape” theory would create serious due process issues, allowing summary seizure of people long after their purported completion of sentence; and
A reaffirmation that ambiguity in criminal judgments—especially regarding sentence credit—must be resolved by courts, not by administrative fiat.

The concurrence by Justice James complements the majority by offering concrete guidance for:

Drafting criminal judgments to clearly reflect whether ORS 137.370(4) double credit is intended;
DOC’s approach to existing judgments potentially affected by ORS 137.370(4); and
Possible legislative refinements to ORS 137.172 to better enable courts to correct or clarify ambiguous sentencing terms.

In the broader legal landscape, Arellano‑Sanchez underscores that:

Liberty, once conferred by the state—even mistakenly—cannot be lightly taken away;
Executive agencies must operate within clear statutory bounds, especially where liberty is concerned; and
Habeas corpus remains a vital safeguard against unlawful imprisonment, ensuring that courts can promptly correct executive overreach.

By ordering plaintiff’s immediate discharge and limiting DOC’s reliance on “escape” as a catchall to recapture formerly released prisoners, the Oregon Supreme Court has reinforced both the rule of law and the central role of judicial process in decisions that affect personal liberty.

No “Escape” When the State Opens the Door: Arellano‑Sanchez v. Thrasher and Limits on Oregon DOC’s Re‑Arrest Authority Under ORS 144.350