No Virtual-Only Public Trials: Colorado Supreme Court Requires Physical Courtroom Access to Satisfy the Sixth Amendment

Case: The People of the State of Colorado v. Michelle Re Nae Bialas, 570 P.3d 1047, 2025 CO 45 (Colo. 2025)

Court: Colorado Supreme Court (en banc)

Opinion by: Justice Berkenkotter, joined by Chief Justice Márquez, Justice Hood, and Justice Gabriel; dissent by Justice Hart, joined by Justices Boatright and Samour

Decision date: June 23, 2025

Introduction

In People v. Bialas, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal of a conviction because the trial court violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The central question was whether closing the physical courtroom to all spectators—after some family members’ misconduct was reported—while providing contemporaneous access via Webex and an auxiliary livestream room satisfied the public-trial guarantee. The Court held it did not. Anchoring its analysis in a companion decision issued the same day, Rios v. People, 2025 CO 46, the Court clarified that virtual access alone cannot satisfy the Sixth Amendment; the public must have a reasonable opportunity to be physically present in the courtroom.

The case arose from a retrial during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the court initially allowed limited public seating due to social distancing, it ultimately barred all spectators for more than half a day after jurors reported overhearing remarks by members of the alleged victim’s family. The court directed family members of both the defendant and the alleged victim, as well as all other spectators, to watch remotely from an auxiliary courtroom or virtually. The defense objected that this was a closure violating the public-trial right, particularly as it excluded the defendant’s family during her own testimony and closing arguments.

The Supreme Court agreed that a nontrivial closure occurred and that the trial court failed to satisfy the four-part test in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), which governs courtroom closures. The Court emphasized that pandemic-era hybrid arrangements with limited seating remain permissible, but a total exclusion of the public from the physical courtroom is a closure requiring Waller findings and narrow tailoring. Because those requirements were not met, the public-trial violation required reversal and a new trial.

Summary of the Opinion

• Virtual access alone (e.g., livestream/Webex) cannot satisfy the Sixth Amendment public-trial right; the public must have a reasonable opportunity to be physically present to observe proceedings (reaffirming and applying Rios v. People).
• The trial court’s decision to exclude all spectators from the courtroom for more than half a day—including during the defendant’s testimony and closing arguments—created a nontrivial courtroom closure.
• The closure was not justified under Waller’s four factors:
  • No overriding interest justified excluding the defendant’s family, where the misconduct was attributed to the alleged victim’s family.
  • The closure was broader than necessary (it was an across-the-board ban on all spectators).
  • The court failed to consider reasonable alternatives (e.g., removing only the disruptive parties).
  • The court did not make adequate findings to support the closure.
• Because the Sixth Amendment was violated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the conviction was affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Rios v. People, 2025 CO 46: The companion case, issued the same day, holds that a “public trial” means one open to physical attendance by the public; virtual access alone is insufficient. Rios supplies the definitional core that the Court applies in Bialas, including the emphasis on the jury’s being “keenly alive” to its responsibilities by virtue of live public presence.
• Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984): Establishes the four-part test for permissible courtroom closures:
  1. Overriding interest likely to be prejudiced;
  2. Closure no broader than necessary;
  3. Consideration of reasonable alternatives;
  4. Adequate findings to support the closure.
  The Colorado Supreme Court applies Waller to hold that the total exclusion here failed all four prongs.
• People v. Lujan, 2020 CO 26, 461 P.3d 494: Provides the “triviality” framework. Not every exclusion is a constitutional violation; courts consider duration, substance of proceedings closed, memorialization, intent, and whether the closure was total or partial. The closure here was nontrivial.
• People v. Jones, 2020 CO 45, 464 P.3d 735: Highlights the importance of a defendant’s family’s presence to the assurance of a fair trial. The removal of the defendant’s family during her testimony was particularly concerning.
• People v. Turner, 2022 CO 50, 519 P.3d 353: Ejecting particular persons (or groups) is itself a closure subject to Waller. Bialas involves both a total closure and the ejection of named groups (families).
• Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970): Recognizes a trial court’s authority to maintain order and remove disruptive persons. The Court accepts the need to control proceedings but faults the indiscriminate exclusion and lack of Waller-compliant findings.
• Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984): Underscore the systemic values of public access—public oversight, confidence in fairness, witness cooperation, and deterrence of perjury.
• In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980): Trace the historical and constitutional pedigree of open trials and the dangers of secret justice.
• United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634 (2019): The Constitution’s guarantees do not diminish with time or technology; invoked to reject the idea that modern tech reduces the Sixth Amendment’s demands.

Legal Reasoning

Standard of Review. The Court reviews courtroom-closure rulings under a mixed standard: deference to factual findings absent abuse of discretion; de novo review of legal conclusions.

What counts as a “public trial” after Rios. The Sixth Amendment is “best understood as a trial that is open to the public,” meaning the public has a reasonable opportunity to be physically present. The Court grounds this in: (1) the purposes of the right (jurors’ sense of accountability, oversight of judges and prosecutors, witness-related benefits); (2) ordinary meanings of “public” and “presence”; and (3) the Framers’ understanding that public trials entailed physical presence. Though livestreaming can expand access and is laudable, it cannot replace the constitutional core.

Closure occurred. The trial court ejected the families of both the defendant and the alleged victim and then closed the courtroom to all spectators for the remainder of the day. Even with simultaneous virtual access and an auxiliary viewing room, this was a closure because the public was totally excluded from physical attendance. The Court carefully distinguishes: (a) capacity limitations due to pandemic-era spacing (not a closure); (b) hybrid proceedings where the courtroom remains open with limited seating plus virtual options (not a closure); from (c) total exclusion of the public from the courtroom (a closure triggering Waller).

The closure was nontrivial under Lujan. The factors weighed decisively against triviality: - Duration: Exclusion lasted for the remainder of the defendant’s testimony and all closing arguments—more than half a day in a four-day trial. - Proceedings affected: Substantive and critical phases (defendant’s testimony; closing arguments) directly tied to fairness and perceived legitimacy. - Intentionality: The court deliberately adopted a “uniform rule” of exclusion for the rest of the trial day. - Total/partial: Both a total closure (all spectators) and targeted ejections (both families). - Memorialization: No curative memorialization in open court could undo the contemporaneous exclusion’s effect on public-trial values. On these facts, the closure implicated core protections and values of the public-trial guarantee.

Failure to satisfy the Waller test. - Overriding interest: While the trial court had a legitimate concern about spectator misconduct and juror exposure, the record indicated the alleged victim’s family made the comments; there was no basis to exclude the defendant’s family. No party requested their removal. Thus, no overriding interest justified excluding all spectators, particularly the defendant’s family. - Narrow tailoring: The court applied a blanket ban, rather than a tailored remedy. Narrower measures were available (e.g., removing only those responsible). - Consideration of alternatives: The court did not consider reasonable alternatives on the record. Even if it perceived virtual access as an “alternative,” Rios makes clear that virtual access alone cannot constitutionally substitute for physical attendance. - Adequate findings: The court made no Waller-compliant findings; it expressly declined to identify who misbehaved or to calibrate relief. Substantive compliance was lacking.

The Dissent

Justice Hart, joined by Justices Boatright and Samour, dissented. In her view—echoing her separate writing in Rios—a public trial remains “open” when (1) critical proceedings are subject to contemporaneous public scrutiny, whether in-person or virtual, and (2) trial participants know the proceedings are being observed in real time. Under that test, she would find no Sixth Amendment violation here. The majority rejected this approach, grounding its rule in the historical, textual, and functional understanding of the Sixth Amendment, and insisting that virtual access cannot, by itself, serve as a constitutional substitute for physical presence.

Impact and Prospective Implications

Immediate doctrinal rule in Colorado. After Rios and Bialas, a Colorado trial court: - Must preserve some reasonable opportunity for physical attendance by the public during criminal trials; - May use remote/livestreaming as a supplement, not a substitute; - Must treat total exclusion of the public, or targeted ejections, as closures requiring Waller analysis and findings on the record; - Should narrowly tailor any spectator controls to the proven source of disruption and consider less restrictive alternatives.

Courtroom management during disruptions. Allen confirms judges’ authority to maintain order. Bialas clarifies how: disruptors may be removed, but across-the-board bans that sweep in non-disruptors—especially a defendant’s family—are constitutionally suspect without Waller-compliant justification. Practical tools include: - Identifying and removing only the disruptive spectators; - Warning, admonishing, and seating adjustments (e.g., distance from jury); - Increased monitoring and security presence; - Short recesses to investigate and make on-the-record findings; - Relocation to larger courtrooms if feasible; - Clear instructions to jurors and spectators about decorum.

Pandemic and high-demand trials. The Court expressly distinguishes capacity limits from closures. During public-health constraints or high-profile cases, limited seating does not violate the Sixth Amendment so long as the courtroom remains physically open to some members of the public; hybrid solutions are permissible supplements. But once the courtroom doors are fully shut to the public, Waller applies.

Appellate practice. Public-trial violations are structural error under Colorado law, necessitating reversal without harmless-error analysis. Timely objections and a clear record are critical. Counsel should: - Object to any total exclusion of spectators; - Propose narrower alternatives and request Waller findings; - Preserve the identity and role of excluded persons (e.g., defendant’s family); - Seek curative measures targeted to misconduct.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Public-trial right (Sixth Amendment): A defendant’s entitlement to have proceedings open to public observation. It serves both the defendant and broader public oversight and confidence in the judicial system.
• Closure vs. capacity limits: - Closure: The public is excluded from physically attending (totally or particular persons/groups). Triggers Waller and must be justified. - Capacity limits/hybrid: Limited seating with the courtroom still open to some spectators; virtual access may supplement. Not a closure.
• Nontrivial vs. trivial closures: Minor, fleeting, or inconsequential exclusions may be “trivial” and not constitutional violations. Courts weigh duration, importance of proceedings closed, intent, memorialization, and total/partial nature. Excluding the public during testimony and closing arguments for hours is nontrivial.
• Waller test: The four-step constitutional test for any courtroom closure: 1) overriding interest, 2) narrow tailoring, 3) consideration of reasonable alternatives, 4) adequate findings on the record.
• Structural error: A fundamental error affecting the entire framework of the trial; not subject to harmless-error analysis and typically requires automatic reversal. Public-trial violations fall into this category.
• Why virtual isn’t enough: According to Rios and Bialas, the constitutional core contemplates physical presence, which uniquely reminds jurors of their responsibilities and allows the public to perform its oversight role. Virtual viewers are generally not visible to jurors, and technology can be unreliable. The Framers’ understanding of “public” proceedings was inherently physical.

Conclusion

People v. Bialas cements a clear rule in Colorado: a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial requires a reasonable opportunity for physical public attendance. Virtual or livestream access—while valuable for transparency and convenience—cannot, standing alone, satisfy the constitutional guarantee. When courts confront spectator misconduct, they must narrowly tailor remedies to the specific problem and make Waller-compliant findings on the record before excluding the public or particular spectators.

Applying these principles, the Court held that excluding all spectators—including the defendant’s family—during crucial portions of trial was a nontrivial closure unsupported by Waller. The decision underscores that hybrid and capacity-limited models remain permissible when the courtroom is physically open, but blanket closures—even for good-faith courtroom management—require rigorous constitutional justification. As a result, Bialas not only affirms the Court of Appeals but also provides a durable framework for trial judges, litigants, and appellate courts navigating the interplay of courtroom order, modern technology, and the enduring demands of the Sixth Amendment.