No Unity-of-Interest Required to Add an Impleaded Party: Second Department Reaffirms Duffy Relation-Back Rule in Egelandsdal v. Massaro

No Unity-of-Interest Required to Add an Impleaded Party: Second Department Reaffirms Duffy Relation-Back Rule in Egelandsdal v. Massaro

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Second Department, New York

Date: November 12, 2025

Citation: 2025 NY Slip Op 06156

Introduction

In Egelandsdal v. Massaro, the Second Department clarified a recurring and practically important issue in New York civil practice: when a plaintiff may add a third-party defendant as a direct defendant after the statute of limitations has expired. The court held that a plaintiff seeking to add a party already impleaded in the action is not required to show a “unity of interest” with the original defendant where the proposed defendant had actual notice of the potential claim within the limitations period and was already a participant in the litigation. This ruling reaffirms the Court of Appeals’ decision in Duffy v. Horton Memorial Hospital and harmonizes relation-back practice with the liberal amendment policy of CPLR 3025(b).

The case arises from an alleged assault at a bar in Hempstead. The plaintiff sued the alleged assailant and the bar owner. Before the statute of limitations expired, the bar owner impleaded the bar’s security contractor, MAS Security Associates, Inc. After discovery, the plaintiff moved to add MAS as a direct defendant. Although the Supreme Court denied that request and later granted MAS summary judgment dismissing the bar owner’s third-party claims, the Second Department reversed the denial of leave to amend and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeals from orders as to which he was not legally “aggrieved.”

Summary of the Opinion

  • Leave to Amend Granted: The Second Department reversed the Supreme Court’s July 7, 2021 order to the extent it denied the plaintiff leave to serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint adding MAS as a direct defendant. The relation-back doctrine applies where the third-party defendant had timely, actual notice and was already a participant in the litigation (CPLR 203[f]; CPLR 3025[b]; Duffy v. Horton Mem. Hosp., 66 NY2d 473).
  • No Unity-of-Interest Requirement: The court expressly held that the plaintiff need not demonstrate that the original defendant (B & M Nachos Corp.) and the putative defendant (MAS) were “united in interest” to obtain relation back in this context, given MAS’s actual notice and status as a third-party defendant.
  • Appeals Dismissed in Part:
    • The appeal from the order dated July 12, 2021 (granting MAS summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint) was dismissed because the plaintiff was not aggrieved by an order affecting only the third-party claims (CPLR 5511; Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144).
    • The appeal from the March 23, 2022 order (denying reargument) was dismissed; no appeal lies from an order denying reargument (Hudesman v Dawson Holding Company, 230 AD3d 744).
  • Costs: One bill of costs was awarded to the plaintiff.

Case Background

Facts

On September 24, 2016, while at a bar owned and operated by B & M Nachos Corp. in Hempstead, the plaintiff, Tyler Egelandsdal, was allegedly punched in the head by defendant Christopher Massaro. MAS Security Associates, Inc. purportedly provided security services at the premises.

Procedural History

  • January 2017: Plaintiff sues Massaro and B & M, alleging negligence (including failure to provide adequate security).
  • June 2019: Before the three-year negligence statute of limitations expired (CPLR 214[5]), B & M impleads MAS for contractual and common-law indemnification; MAS answers.
  • November 2020: After discovery, plaintiff moves to add MAS as a direct defendant. MAS opposes and also moves for summary judgment dismissing “any and all claims against it.”
  • July 7, 2021: Supreme Court denies leave to amend.
  • July 12, 2021: Supreme Court grants MAS summary judgment dismissing the third-party claims.
  • March 23, 2022: Supreme Court denies plaintiff’s motion for leave to reargue.
  • Appeal: Plaintiff appeals all three orders; the Second Department stays the trial pending determination and ultimately issues the instant decision.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether the relation-back doctrine (CPLR 203[f]) permits the plaintiff to add a third-party defendant (MAS) as a direct defendant after the statute of limitations has expired, without a showing that MAS and the original defendant (B & M) are united in interest, where MAS had timely, actual notice and was already participating in the litigation.
  2. Whether the plaintiff is “aggrieved” for purposes of appealing an order granting summary judgment dismissing only a defendant’s third-party claims (CPLR 5511).
  3. Whether an appeal lies from an order denying reargument.

Holdings

  • Relation-Back and Amendment: Leave to amend should be freely granted (CPLR 3025[b]) absent prejudice or surprise, and where claims against the third-party defendant arise from the same occurrence and the third-party defendant had actual notice within the limitations period, the amendment relates back. In this posture, the plaintiff need not establish unity of interest between the original defendant and the third-party defendant.
  • Aggrievement: The plaintiff is not aggrieved by an order that only dismisses the defendant’s third-party claims; the appeal from that order is dismissed (CPLR 5511).
  • No Appeal From Denial of Reargument: The appeal from the reargument denial is dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • CPLR 3025(b); LaLima v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 151 AD3d 832; Castaldi v Castle Restoration, LLC, 207 AD3d 618: These authorities restate the liberal standard for amendments: leave should be freely granted absent prejudice or surprise, and unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit. The Second Department relied on this framework to conclude that plaintiff’s proposed negligence claim against MAS was not palpably insufficient and posed no prejudice, despite the passage of time.
  • CPLR 203(f); Buran v Coupal, 87 NY2d 173; Duffy v Horton Mem. Hosp., 66 NY2d 473; Deputron v A & J Tours, Inc., 93 AD3d 629; Rivera v Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., 175 AD3d 522; Tyz v Integrity Real Estate & Dev., Inc., 43 AD3d 1038:
    • Buran articulates the general relation-back doctrine for claims and parties added after limitations have expired. Traditionally, relation back requires that (1) the claims arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence; (2) the new and original parties are united in interest such that the new party is not prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (3) the new party knew or should have known that, but for a mistake, it would have been named in the original pleading.
    • Duffy creates a crucial, practically oriented pathway for relation back when the party to be added is already a third-party defendant. Because that party is “a participant in the litigation,” and has timely, actual notice of the underlying occurrence and potential exposure by virtue of the third-party complaint, the rationale for strict adherence to unity-of-interest and mistake requirements is diminished. The Second Department leans on Duffy to hold that unity of interest is not required here.
    • Deputron, Rivera, and Tyz are Second Department applications reinforcing that when a party to be added was impleaded within the limitations period and had actual notice, relation back is appropriate even if unity of interest is not shown, provided the claims arise from the same occurrence and there is no prejudice.
  • Richards v Passarelli, 77 AD3d 903: Cited for the proposition that adding a party as a direct defendant under these circumstances is neither palpably insufficient nor prejudicial, reinforcing the court’s conclusion that leave to amend should be granted.
  • CPLR 5511; Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144: Establishes that only an “aggrieved” party may appeal. Because the July 12, 2021 order disposed of B & M’s third-party claims against MAS, it did not adversely affect the plaintiff’s rights; hence the appeal was dismissed for lack of aggrievement.
  • Hudesman v Dawson Holding Company, 230 AD3d 744: Reaffirms the settled rule that no appeal lies from an order denying reargument. The Second Department invoked this to dismiss that aspect of the appeal.

Legal Reasoning

The court begins with the amendment standard under CPLR 3025(b): leave should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice or surprise, unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit. Delay alone is not a bar; the opponent must show significant prejudice.

Because the negligence limitations period (three years under CPLR 214[5]) had expired by the time plaintiff moved to amend in November 2020, the dispositive question was whether the claim against MAS would relate back under CPLR 203(f). The court held that it would:

  • Same Occurrence: The third-party complaint (asserting indemnification against MAS for the bar incident) and the plaintiff’s proposed negligence claim against MAS plainly arose from the same occurrence at the bar.
  • Actual Notice and Participation: MAS had actual notice of the potential claim within the limitations period, having been impleaded in June 2019 (before the September 2019 expiration), and it answered and participated in discovery. As a “participant in the litigation,” MAS was on timely notice of the operative facts and its potential exposure.
  • No Prejudice; Non-Frivolous Pleading: The proposed negligence claim was not palpably insufficient or devoid of merit, and MAS failed to demonstrate prejudice from the amendment.

Critically, the Second Department rejected the Supreme Court’s insistence on proof that MAS and B & M were united in interest. Citing Duffy and its progeny, the court held that the unity-of-interest requirement does not apply where the party to be added was (a) impleaded within the limitations period, (b) had actual notice of the potential claim during that period, and (c) actively participated in the litigation arising out of the same occurrence. That framework satisfies the fairness and notice concerns that animate relation back, without demanding the more stringent unity-of-interest showing typically associated with misidentification or misnomer scenarios under Buran.

On the appellate procedure issues, the court applied straightforward rules: the plaintiff cannot appeal an order that affects only a defendant’s third-party claims (CPLR 5511; Mixon), and no appeal lies from an order denying reargument (Hudesman).

Impact and Practical Significance

The decision meaningfully clarifies and strengthens a plaintiff-friendly avenue for relation back in multi-party tort litigation:

  • Third-Party Defendant Pathway: When a defendant impleads a contractor, vendor, or other potentially responsible party within the limitations period, the plaintiff can later add that party as a direct defendant—even after the statute has run—without proving unity of interest, so long as the third-party defendant had timely, actual notice and has been participating in the case.
  • Reduced Emphasis on “Mistake” Prong: In this specific context, courts focus on notice and participation rather than on whether plaintiff can show a Buran “mistake” about identity. That mitigates the often contentious debates over whether a plaintiff’s omission was a “mistake” or a strategic choice.
  • Defense Counsel Considerations: Impleading a party before the limitations period expires may open the door to plaintiff’s direct claim via relation back. Defense counsel should weigh this litigation dynamic and consider early communication and coordination among defendants and third-party defendants.
  • Case Management: Even where discovery is significantly advanced, courts may still grant amendment if the proposed claims arise from the same occurrence and the added party cannot demonstrate real prejudice beyond the mere passage of time.
  • Procedural Guardrails on Appeals: Litigants should assess aggrievement under CPLR 5511 before appealing, and avoid appeals from orders denying reargument. This case underscores the importance of targeting appealable orders that directly affect the appellant’s rights.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Relation-Back Doctrine (CPLR 203[f]): A way to treat an amended pleading as if it were filed on the date of the original complaint, avoiding statute-of-limitations problems. It usually requires same occurrence, notice to the new party, and (in many contexts) a showing that the new party knew or should have known it was an intended defendant but for a mistake. Where the new party was impleaded within the limitations period and had actual notice, courts—following Duffy—allow relation back without the unity-of-interest showing.
  • Unity of Interest: Two parties are “united in interest” if they stand or fall together such that their defenses are the same, and a judgment against one will similarly bind the other. This requirement may be relaxed when the party to be added was already impleaded and on notice within the limitations period.
  • “Palpably Insufficient or Patently Devoid of Merit” (CPLR 3025[b]): A standard for denying amendments to pleadings. If the proposed claim clearly lacks merit as a matter of law, a court may deny leave to amend. Otherwise, leave is liberally granted, especially absent prejudice or surprise.
  • Prejudice in Amendment Context: More than delay. Prejudice usually means the added party would be hindered in preparing a defense on the merits—for example, loss of evidence, unavailability of witnesses, or an inability to investigate because of the timing. Participation as a third-party defendant often undercuts any claim of prejudice.
  • Aggrievement (CPLR 5511): Only a party whose rights are adversely affected by an order or judgment can appeal it. A plaintiff typically is not “aggrieved” by an order that solely dismisses a defendant’s third-party claims against another party.
  • Reargument vs. Renewal: An order denying reargument is not appealable. Reargument asks the court to reconsider based on the same facts/law. Renewal, by contrast, involves new facts that might change the prior determination; orders on renewal may be appealable.

Practice Pointers

  • For Plaintiffs:
    • Track impleader activity closely. If a target defendant is impleaded before the statute runs, you may add that entity later via relation back without proving unity of interest.
    • Build a record of the third-party defendant’s timely actual notice: proof of impleader date, answer, discovery participation, and the overlap of facts.
    • When moving to amend, emphasize absence of prejudice and that your claim is not palpably insufficient.
  • For Defendants and Third-Party Defendants:
    • Be aware that early impleader can facilitate plaintiff’s later relation-back amendment. Consider litigation strategy and coordination early.
    • If opposing amendment, articulate concrete prejudice beyond delay—e.g., specific lost evidence or impaired defenses—not mere passage of time.
  • For Appellate Practitioners:
    • Confirm aggrievement before appealing. Orders affecting only third-party claims generally do not aggrieve the plaintiff.
    • Avoid appeals from orders denying reargument; consider whether renewal is appropriate if new facts exist.

Conclusion

Egelandsdal v. Massaro is a clear reaffirmation of the Duffy relation-back pathway: when a third-party defendant has been impleaded within the limitations period and is participating in the litigation, a plaintiff may add that party as a direct defendant after the statute of limitations without demonstrating unity of interest. The decision harmonizes liberal amendment policy with fairness-based notice principles, reduces undue emphasis on the “mistake” prong in this specific context, and provides practical guidance on when and how relation back should apply. On procedure, the opinion also reinforces core appellate rules concerning aggrievement and the nonappealability of reargument denials. Together, these holdings provide litigants and trial courts with a roadmap for efficiently aligning the parties and claims actually at issue—without sacrificing due process or imposing undue prejudice.

Note: The opinion is published pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431 and is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, New York

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