No TWDA End-Run via Official-Capacity Pleading; Fifth Circuit Reaffirms Subjective Deliberate-Indifference Standard for Pretrial Detainee Medical Care

No TWDA End-Run via Official-Capacity Pleading; Fifth Circuit Reaffirms Subjective Deliberate-Indifference Standard for Pretrial Detainee Medical Care

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date: October 1, 2025

Case: Estate of Dontriel Jovan Coates et al. v. Hawthorne et al., No. 24-40561

Disposition: Affirmed (unpublished, per curiam), with a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Judge Stewart

Introduction

This appeal arises from the in-custody death of Dontriel Jovan Coates at the Chambers County Jail in Texas. The plaintiffs—the Estate of Coates, his mother (Cherrie E. Coates), and his minor children—sued the Chambers County Sheriff (official capacity), the Chambers County Sheriff’s Office, and Chambers County, asserting:

  • Texas Wrongful Death Act (TWDA) claims;
  • 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) conspiracy claims tied to alleged withholding and falsification of records about the death; and
  • 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for constitutional violations, including deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

The district court dismissed the wrongful-death claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6). It also declined to grant the plaintiffs additional discovery under Rule 56(d). The Fifth Circuit affirmed across the board, though Judge Stewart would have allowed the Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim to proceed past the pleading stage.

The opinion clarifies two points with practical bite for civil-rights and tort litigants in Texas federal courts: (1) plaintiffs cannot use official-capacity pleading against a sheriff to circumvent the Texas Wrongful Death Act’s definition of “person,” which excludes counties; and (2) the Fifth Circuit continues to require subjective awareness under Farmer v. Brennan for pretrial detainee medical-care claims, rejecting an objective “obviousness” standard at the pleading stage—at least on the facts alleged here.

Summary of the Opinion

  • TWDA jurisdiction: Because Texas counties are not “persons” under the TWDA, suing the sheriff in his official capacity (which is treated as a suit against the county) cannot revive a TWDA claim. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) was affirmed.
  • Section 1985(3): Plaintiffs failed to plead class-based invidious discriminatory animus or facts suggesting an agreement. Allegations premised on a “Texas citizens” class and conclusory assertions of bias were insufficient. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was affirmed.
  • Section 1983—Deliberate indifference: The court held plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that jail officials or the nurse subjectively drew the inference that Coates faced a substantial risk of serious harm, as required by Farmer. The nurse’s “he is good” assessment after checking vitals—even if negligent—did not amount to deliberate indifference. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was affirmed.
  • Monell: Conclusory assertions of failures to train, supervise, or discipline did not identify an “official policy” or “custom,” nor show a moving-force causal link. Dismissal was affirmed.
  • Discovery: Rule 56(d) applies to summary judgment, not a Rule 12(b) motion. Plaintiffs had six months to conduct discovery before dismissal; denying their request was not an abuse of discretion.

Judge Stewart concurred in part and dissented in part, concluding that the deliberate-indifference claim should survive a motion to dismiss because the alleged ongoing seizure and acute distress made the risk of serious harm obvious, rendering the nurse’s cursory “good” assessment plausibly unreasonable—and permitting a reasonable inference of subjective awareness at the pleading stage.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1) Wrongful Death (TWDA) and Official-Capacity Pleading

  • Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 71.001–.002 define who is a “person” under the TWDA and the scope of wrongful-death liability. Counties are not “persons” for TWDA purposes.
  • Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985): An official-capacity suit is, in all but name, a suit against the governmental entity. Applying Graham, suing Sheriff Hawthorne in his official capacity equates to suing Chambers County.
  • Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978): Official-capacity suits are another way to plead an action against an entity.
  • Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1992), and De Paz v. Duane, 858 F. App’x 734 (5th Cir. 2021): Plaintiffs cited these to suggest a pathway through § 1983 for state wrongful-death-type recovery. The panel distinguished them because the TWDA itself does not authorize claims against counties, and official-capacity pleading does not transform a county into a TWDA “person.”

2) Section 1985(3) Conspiracy

  • Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652–53 (5th Cir. 1994): Elements of a § 1985(3) claim include a conspiracy, purpose to deprive equal protection, an overt act, and injury, plus class-based animus under Griffin.
  • Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971): Requires racial or otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus.
  • Green v. State Bar, 27 F.3d 1083, 1089 (5th Cir. 1994): Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient; factual content is required.
  • Holdiness v. Stroud, 808 F.2d 417, 424 (5th Cir. 1987): “Mere conclusory allegations” do not state a conspiracy claim.

3) Section 1983—Pretrial Detainee Medical Care and Deliberate Indifference

  • Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013): Two elements—violation of a federal right and action under color of state law.
  • Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996), and City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983): Pretrial detainees’ due-process rights are at least as great as Eighth Amendment protections.
  • Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380–81 (5th Cir. 2020): The Fifth Circuit continues to apply the Farmer subjective deliberate-indifference framework to pretrial detainee medical-care claims.
  • Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994): Two-prong test—official must be aware of facts from which a substantial risk could be inferred and must actually draw that inference.
  • Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001): Negligence or even gross negligence is insufficient.
  • Domino v. TDCJ, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001): Deliberate indifference where officials refuse to treat, ignore complaints, intentionally treat incorrectly, or similar wanton conduct.
  • Sims v. Griffin, 35 F.4th 945, 949 (5th Cir. 2022); Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345 n.12 (5th Cir. 2006): Defines “serious medical need.”
  • Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676–77 (5th Cir. 2019): Nurse’s sincere—though erroneous—belief detainee was “faking” negated subjective awareness of an emergency; deliberate-indifference claim failed.

4) Monell Municipal Liability

  • Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 2019); Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 395 (5th Cir. 2017): Elements—official policy, policymaker, and moving-force causation.
  • Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2018): Official policy can be written policy, widespread custom, or (rarely) a single decision by a final policymaker.
  • Verastique v. City of Dallas, 106 F.4th 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2024): Failure-to-discipline claims require showing deliberate indifference and a causal link, typically through numerous prior similar incidents.
  • Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d at 459: Failure-to-train/supervise requires proof of causation and deliberate indifference.

5) Jurisdiction, Pleading Standards, and Discovery

  • Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 250–51 (5th Cir. 2015); Taylor v. City of Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2015): De novo review of Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) dismissals; allegations accepted as true.
  • Am. Family Life Assurance Co. v. Biles, 714 F.3d 887, 894 (5th Cir. 2013); Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum, 213 F.3d 841, 855 (5th Cir. 2000): Denial of Rule 56(d) discovery reviewed for abuse of discretion; district court has broad discretion over discovery.
  • Ayorinde v. Team Indus. Servs., 121 F.4th 500, 510 (5th Cir. 2024): Issues not briefed on appeal are abandoned.
  • Robinson v. Midland Cnty., 80 F.4th 704, 707 n.1 (5th Cir. 2023): Facts taken from complaints at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Legal Reasoning

TWDA Claim—No “Person,” No Claim, and No Official-Capacity Workaround

Texas counties are not “persons” for TWDA purposes. Because the plaintiffs sued the sheriff only in his official capacity, the suit is treated as a suit against the county. Under Graham and Monell, that means the complaint is, in substance, against an entity the statute does not permit to be sued. The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Attempting to route recovery through § 1983 survival or wrongful-death principles did not change the analysis because the state-law TWDA claim itself targets a non-cognizable defendant.

Section 1985(3)—No Protected Class and No Non-Conclusory Agreement

Plaintiffs’ § 1985(3) theory rested on allegedly “suppressing” public records to shield defendants. The complaint lacked facts suggesting a conspiratorial agreement and did not plausibly plead class-based animus as required by Griffin. Plaintiffs’ assertion that “Texas citizens” qualify as a protected class under § 1985(3) (via Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001(a), the Texas Public Information Act policy statement) found no legal support; nor did the pleading allege defendants harbored animus toward “Texas citizens” as a class. Conclusory allegations of a Texas Ranger’s bias based on a relationship with the sheriff also failed to plausibly allege an agreement under Green and Holdiness.

Section 1983—Deliberate Indifference and the Subjective Farmer Standard

The panel applied the Fifth Circuit’s settled rule that pretrial detainee medical-care claims sound in the Fourteenth Amendment but use the Farmer subjective deliberate-indifference test. Even if a serious medical need existed (and the panel assumed arguendo that it did), the complaint did not plausibly allege that any jail official subjectively recognized a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded it. The nurse’s brief assessment—checking pulse and blood pressure and stating Coates was “good”—may have been negligent or even grossly negligent, but without facts showing subjective recognition of a life-threatening emergency, Farmer’s second prong was not satisfied. Cleveland v. Bell provided close precedent: a nurse’s incorrect judgment, without evidence of subjective awareness of risk, defeats deliberate-indifference liability.

Monell—Conclusory “Failure” Allegations Do Not Make a Policy

The complaint recited failures to screen, hire, train, supervise, and discipline and alleged post-incident ratification by the absence of discipline. But it identified no written policy, widespread custom supported by similar prior incidents, or single policymaker decision that caused a constitutional violation. The failure-to-discipline and failure-to-train theories lacked the required pattern and deliberate-indifference showing. Absent facts establishing an official policy and moving-force causation, Monell liability could not be imposed.

Discovery—No Rule 56(d) Lifeline for Pleading Deficiencies

Rule 56(d) is a summary-judgment tool, not a mechanism to salvage insufficient pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court dismissed on the pleadings, relied on no materials outside the complaint, and had provided a six-month discovery window, much of which elapsed before dismissal. Denial of additional discovery was within its discretion.

Judge Stewart’s Partial Dissent: Why the Deliberate-Indifference Claim Should Survive

Judge Stewart agreed with the majority on all points except deliberate indifference. He would reverse the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal because the complaint plausibly alleged that Coates exhibited “signs of acute distress” and an “ongoing full body seizure,” yet jail personnel provided no care beyond a cursory vitals check followed by a “good” pronouncement. At the pleading stage, those allegations support a reasonable inference that the nurse and officers recognized a substantial risk and consciously disregarded it.

Key distinctions and cases:

  • Distinguishing Cleveland v. Bell: There, the nurse believed the detainee was “faking,” and the symptoms were less acute. Here, the allegations describe continuous seizure activity and groans of pain—symptoms inconsistent with being “good.”
  • Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411 (5th Cir. 2021): Reversing dismissal where paramedics provided no meaningful treatment for a head injury with visible signs of trauma. Knowledge may be inferred if risk was obvious.
  • Ford v. Anderson County, 102 F.4th 292 (5th Cir. 2024): At summary judgment, evidence of acute symptoms, stable vitals, and later collapse created fact issues. By analogy, at the pleading stage, the complaint here sufficiently alleges obvious risk disregarded by officials.
  • Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 2003): Delay in calling an ambulance for a juvenile who lay unconscious and vomiting supported deliberate-indifference claims.

Judge Stewart emphasized that “deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard,” but not insurmountable; given the acute symptoms alleged and the total lack of further examination or monitoring, the case should proceed beyond Rule 12(b)(6).

Impact and Practical Implications

1) Wrongful Death Claims Against Texas Counties

  • Confirming the TWDA’s limits: Plaintiffs cannot sue Texas counties under the TWDA because counties are not “persons” under the statute. Suing a sheriff in his official capacity is not a workaround; it remains a suit against the county.
  • Pleading strategy: If pursuing Texas wrongful-death liability, plaintiffs must target “persons” under the statute—typically individual actors in their individual capacities—and plead the elements of state-law negligence or wrongful death accordingly.

2) Section 1983 Medical Care Claims in the Fifth Circuit

  • Subjective standard reaffirmed: The panel applies Farmer’s subjective test to pretrial detainee medical claims, consistent with Dyer. Plaintiffs should not assume an “objective reasonableness” standard post-Kingsley applies to medical-care claims in the Fifth Circuit.
  • Pleading guidance: Allege concrete facts showing officials actually appreciated the risk (e.g., admissions by staff, repeated pleas for help, alarms, training that clearly classified observed symptoms as emergent, knowledge of ingestion of contraband, explicit disregard of protocols requiring EMS activation, or prior similar incidents that put the facility on notice).
  • Dissent’s signal: Where symptoms are extreme (e.g., seizures) and response is minimal, some Fifth Circuit judges may view the risk as sufficiently obvious to support subjective awareness at the pleading stage.

3) Section 1985(3) Conspiracy

  • Class-based animus is essential: Generalized grievances about withholding records or “bias” are not enough. Plaintiffs must identify a protected class (most commonly race) and plead invidious discriminatory motivation.
  • Agreement must be factual, not conclusory: Detail the who, what, when, where, and why of the conspiracy; mere suspicion of coordination or friendship between officials does not suffice.

4) Monell Liability

  • Conclusions are not policies: Bare assertions of failure to train, supervise, or discipline are inadequate. Plaintiffs should plead specific policies or a widespread practice, backed by similar prior incidents, and explain how the policy was the moving force of the violation.
  • Failure-to-discipline/train demands pattern evidence: Absent a pattern of similar violations, these theories rarely survive.

5) Discovery and Motion Practice

  • Rule 56(d) is not a shield against Rule 12(b)(6): Courts may dismiss on the pleadings without discovery. Parties should be prepared to plead with sufficient specificity from the outset.
  • Scheduling orders matter: If a discovery window exists, parties should act; failure to seek discovery within the set period undermines later requests.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Official-capacity vs. individual-capacity suits: An official-capacity claim is treated as a claim against the governmental entity; an individual-capacity claim targets the person themselves and can result in personal liability.
  • Deliberate indifference (medical care): More than negligence. Plaintiffs must show officials actually knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to health or safety, not merely that they should have known.
  • Monell liability: A city or county is liable under § 1983 only for constitutional violations caused by its policy or custom—not simply because it employs a wrongdoer.
  • Section 1985(3) class-based animus: The conspiracy must be motivated by invidious discrimination against a protected class (e.g., race). General hostility or bureaucratic stonewalling does not meet the standard.
  • Rule 12(b)(1) vs. 12(b)(6): Rule 12(b)(1) challenges subject-matter jurisdiction (the court’s power to hear the case); Rule 12(b)(6) challenges whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief.
  • Rule 56(d) discovery: A tool to defer summary judgment if the nonmovant shows it cannot present facts essential to justify opposition; it is generally inapplicable at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Conclusion

In this unpublished decision, the Fifth Circuit underscores several recurring principles in civil-rights and state-law wrongful-death litigation:

  • No TWDA workaround: Plaintiffs cannot convert a non-suable county into a TWDA “person” by suing a sheriff in his official capacity.
  • Subjective deliberate-indifference standard persists: Pretrial detainee medical-care claims require pleading facts that officials actually perceived and disregarded a serious risk of harm. Negligent or cursory assessments, without more, typically do not suffice.
  • Monell and § 1985(3) claims demand specificity: Conclusory allegations of “failures” or conspiracy are insufficient, and class-based animus remains a distinct and necessary element under § 1985(3).
  • Procedural discipline: Rule 56(d) does not rescue insufficient pleadings, particularly where a discovery period was available.

Judge Stewart’s partial dissent signals a line of argument for plaintiffs: obvious, acute symptoms coupled with a near-total lack of care may, at the Rule 12 stage, plausibly imply subjective awareness. Nevertheless, unless and until the Fifth Circuit shifts from Farmer’s subjective standard for pretrial medical-care claims, litigants must plead concrete facts that show officials actually recognized and disregarded a substantial risk.

Although nonprecedential, this decision offers practical guidance to both sides. Plaintiffs should plead individualized knowledge and specific municipal policies or patterns; defendants should document contemporaneous clinical judgments and ensure protocols for emergent symptoms are clear, trained-on, and followed. The case thus reinforces exacting pleading standards and confirms the Fifth Circuit’s continued adherence to Farmer’s subjective test in detainee medical-care cases.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

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