Introduction

In this Rule 20(3) order, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reverses a circuit court determination that two sons (the Harveys) violated RSA 540-A:3, I by disconnecting cable and Wi‑Fi service at a residence shared with their stepgrandfather (Auclair). The dispositive question was threshold: did a landlord–tenant relationship exist such that RSA chapter 540‑A applied?

The Court holds it did not. Contributions toward a mortgage in the context of a family cohabitation arrangement—without a meeting of the minds on essential lease terms—do not transform the arrangement into a tenancy. Nor does the use of a statutorily prescribed eviction form that labels parties as “landlord” and “tenant” create or concede a tenancy. Because there was no tenancy, RSA 540‑A offered no remedy, and the substantial daily-penalty award was vacated.

• Core holding: RSA 540‑A applies only where there is a true lease: a landlord who “rents or leases” and a tenant “to whom” premises are rented or leased. Familial occupancy with mortgage contributions, without agreement on essential terms, is not enough.
• No “tenancy by form”: Filing a standard eviction notice that uses the words “landlord” and “tenant” does not create a landlord–tenant relationship, nor estop the filer from denying one.
• Contract principles control: A lease is a contract; without objective evidence of a meeting of the minds on essential terms, there is no lease and therefore no “tenant” under RSA 540‑A.

Background and Procedural Posture

The Harveys are the sons of Jennifer Levasseur; Auclair is their stepgrandfather. In February 2022, Auclair sold his Rollinsford home to the Harveys. Given concerns about Auclair’s ability to live alone, they informally agreed that Benjamin Harvey would live in the house with Auclair and that Auclair would contribute toward the mortgage. Levasseur managed Auclair’s payments from a joint account. No written lease existed, and the parties did not document rent amount, duration, or other lease terms.

After Auclair became verbally abusive, Benjamin moved out. Auclair continued to reside in the home and forwarded the cable/Wi‑Fi bill to Benjamin. Benjamin later entered, disconnected the router and cable box, and returned the equipment. Auclair responded by filing a tenant’s petition under RSA 540‑A:4, asserting the Harveys were his landlords and had unlawfully interrupted utilities on May 8, 2023. The circuit court issued a temporary order requiring restoration of “all utility services” and restricting entry absent consent or court order. On August 23, Levasseur installed a new router and cable box.

After a four‑day evidentiary hearing spanning June–December 2023, the circuit court found a violation of RSA 540‑A:3, I, awarded $1,000 plus fees, and ordered restoration of services. On reconsideration, the court added $105,000 as a continuing violation ($1,000 per day for 105 days). The Harveys appealed; Auclair cross‑appealed seeking additional relief.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying de novo review to the legal question of landlord–tenant status, the Court held:

• No landlord–tenant relationship existed. The record did not show that the Harveys “rented or leased” the premises to Auclair or that Auclair was a “tenant” under RSA 540‑A:1, I–II (2021). There was no meeting of the minds on essential lease terms, no rent, and no written lease.
• Eviction form terminology does not create a tenancy. Use of a standard RSA 540:3 eviction form—denominating parties as “landlord” and “tenant”—and related filings did not generate or concede a lease relationship. Eviction notices can be directed to “occupants” as well as tenants. RSA 540:12; Colburn v. Saykaly, 173 N.H. 162 (2020).
• Reversal. Because RSA 540‑A regulates landlords and tenants, and those roles were not established, the circuit court’s violation and damages rulings were reversed. The Court did not reach the remaining appellate issues given the dispositive nature of this holding.

Note: The Court applied the 2021 definition of “tenant” because it was in effect when services were disconnected. See RSA 540‑A:1 (2021). The Court flagged that the definition has since been amended, but the amendment did not control the dispute.

In-Depth Analysis

Statutory Framework

RSA chapter 540‑A “regulates the relationship between landlords and tenants of residential premises.” Anderson v. Robitaille, 172 N.H. 20, 23 (2019). As pertinent here:

• Landlord (RSA 540‑A:1, I): one who “rents or leases residential premises.”
• Tenant (RSA 540‑A:1, II (2021)): one “to whom a landlord rents or leases residential premises.”
• RSA 540‑A:3, I: prohibits a landlord from willfully interrupting or terminating a tenant’s utility services (among other forms of self‑help).
• RSA 540‑A:4: creates a tenant’s petition process and authorizes statutory damages, including per‑day penalties for continuing violations.

The statutory scheme presupposes a lease or rental relationship. Without a landlord–tenant relationship, neither rights nor remedies under RSA 540‑A attach.

Precedents and Prior Authority

• Evans v. J Four Realty, 164 N.H. 570 (2013): Supplies the standard of review—legal rulings de novo, factual findings if supported by the record—and underscores that “landlord” status requires evidence of renting or leasing. The Court cites Evans in concluding there was no evidence the Harveys rented or leased the premises to Auclair, necessitating reversal.
• Anderson v. Robitaille, 172 N.H. 20 (2019): Describes RSA 540‑A’s role in policing landlord–tenant conduct, such as barring self‑help. Anderson frames the gatekeeping inquiry here: do the parties fit within the landlord–tenant categories at all?
• Tulley v. Sheldon, 159 N.H. 269 (2009) & Syncom Indus. v. Wood, 155 N.H. 73 (2007): Affirm that leases are contracts governed by ordinary contract principles, including the requirement of a “meeting of the minds” on essential terms under an objective standard. Absent assent to essential terms (e.g., rent amount, duration, obligations), no enforceable lease exists.
• Colburn v. Saykaly, 173 N.H. 162 (2020) & RSA 540:12: Clarify that eviction statutes apply to various categories—“lessee, occupant, mortgagor, or other person in possession”—and that recipients of eviction notices need not be tenants. Thus, serving an eviction notice on someone does not convert them into a tenant under RSA 540‑A.
• RSA 540:3 (statutory eviction form): The required form labels parties “landlord” and “tenant,” but the Court warns against elevating “form over substance,” citing In re Morrison Estate, 106 N.H. 388, 390 (1965). The mere use of statutory form language cannot manufacture a tenancy where none exists.
• Robinson v. Morgan, 58 N.H. 412 (1878): Establishes that a property owner is not estopped from denying a landlord–tenant relationship simply because they initiated a landlord action. The Court uses Robinson to reject an estoppel theory premised on the Harveys’ filings.
• Antosz v. Allain, 163 N.H. 298 (2012): Permits the Court to refrain from addressing other issues when one issue (here, absence of a tenancy) is dispositive.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds in three principal steps.

1. Plain-text statutory interpretation. RSA 540‑A protects “tenants” and regulates “landlords,” defined by renting or leasing. The Court applies the statute’s ordinary meaning, declines to add terms the legislature did not include, and interprets words in the broader statutory scheme (Evans).
2. Contract law overlay. A lease is a contract; therefore, there must be an objective “meeting of the minds” on essential terms (Tulley; Syncom). The record showed no written lease, no stated rent amount, no agreed term, and no rental payments to the Harveys. Auclair’s contributions to the mortgage were unspecific and administered by Levasseur from a joint account. Those facts defeated the existence of a lease.
3. Rejection of “tenancy by form” and estoppel theories. The trial court had reasoned that a tenancy was “created” or at least “asserted” because the Harveys vacated and served an eviction notice. The Supreme Court rejects this: eviction notices can be directed to “occupants” (RSA 540:12; Colburn), and the statutory eviction form’s labels do not prove a tenancy (RSA 540:3; Morrison Estate). Nor does filing an eviction action estop the filer from denying a landlord–tenant relationship (Robinson).

“Relying upon the fixed terms of a standard, statutorily prescribed form does not demonstrate that a landlord‑tenant relationship existed. To conclude otherwise would elevate form over substance.”

Having found no tenancy, the Court reverses the RSA 540‑A judgment and damages, leaving all other issues (including the size of daily penalties and the characterization of cable/Wi‑Fi as utility services) unaddressed as unnecessary to the outcome.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Threshold gatekeeping reemphasized. RSA 540‑A remedies (including injunctions and daily penalties) will be unavailable unless the petitioner proves a bona fide landlord–tenant relationship. Courts will scrutinize whether the arrangement is a lease or, instead, a familial or caretaker license to occupy.
• Mortgage contributions ≠ rent (without more). Payments toward an owner’s mortgage within a family arrangement, absent agreed rent, term, or other essential lease terms, do not, by themselves, create landlord–tenant status.
• Forms and labels won’t carry the day. Using the statutory eviction form or referring to parties as “landlord” and “tenant” in filings does not create or concede a lease. Practitioners should avoid assuming that form usage will foreclose later arguments about status.
• Intra‑family housing arrangements. Families who intend to create a lease—and thereby invoke RSA 540‑A protections and obligations—should memorialize essential terms in writing. Conversely, families intending a revocable, caretaker‑style license should document the non‑tenancy nature of the arrangement.
• Remedial redirection. Occupants who are not tenants may still have other avenues (e.g., ejectment defenses, equitable claims, protective orders, or property/contract claims where applicable). But RSA 540‑A’s self‑help prohibitions and daily penalties are not the path unless a tenancy exists.
• Elder care contexts. This decision will likely reduce misuse of RSA 540‑A in elder‑care family disputes absent a formal lease. Counsel should assess alternative protective strategies if tenancy cannot be proven.
• Damages exposure tamed. The reversal eliminates a six‑figure continuing‑violation award. Going forward, trial courts must confirm the existence of a tenancy before considering RSA 540‑A’s per‑day penalties.
• Precedential posture. Although issued as an order under Sup. Ct. R. 20(3), the Court’s reasoning is rooted in existing precedent and provides clear guidance. Practitioners should consult local rules on the citation and precedential weight of such orders.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Landlord–tenant vs. occupant. A tenant has a lease—an agreement with essential terms conferring the right to exclusive possession for a term, typically in exchange for rent. An “occupant” may live in a property with the owner’s permission (a license) but without lease rights. RSA 540‑A protects tenants; eviction statutes allow removal of both tenants and non‑tenant occupants. See RSA 540:12.
• Meeting of the minds (contract formation). Courts look for objective manifestations of agreement on essential terms (rent, duration, premises, key obligations). Vague understandings or informal family arrangements typically fail this test.
• Form over substance. Legal outcomes depend on the real nature of an arrangement, not the labels on a form. Statutory eviction forms use standardized party titles for administrative clarity; they do not adjudicate status.
• Continuing violation damages (RSA 540‑A:4). If a landlord violates RSA 540‑A and the violation continues, the statute authorizes per‑day penalties. But those damages are available only after the threshold landlord–tenant relationship is established.
• Judicial estoppel/estoppel by pleading (here, rejected). One cannot usually force an opposing party to accept the legal consequences of labels used in standard forms. The Court reaffirmed that bringing an action styled as a landlord action does not bar the owner from later denying a tenancy (Robinson v. Morgan).

Unresolved Questions and Parallel Proceedings

• Nature of services under RSA 540‑A:3, I. Because the Court resolved the case on the absence of a tenancy, it did not decide whether disconnecting cable and internet constitutes interrupting “utility services” under the operative version of RSA 540‑A:3, I—an issue with increasing practical importance.
• Damages calibration. The Court did not reach the correctness of the circuit court’s initial $1,000 award or the $105,000 continuing‑violation calculation. Those questions remain open for another day in a case where tenancy is proven.
• Life estate claim. Auclair’s separate action asserting a life estate in the residence was pending at oral argument. If successful, a life estate would ground rights of possession independent of landlord–tenant law.
• Effect of amendments to RSA 540‑A:1, II. The Court applied the 2021 definition of “tenant” and noted subsequent amendments without opining on their scope. Future cases may test whether any changes affect the tenancy threshold analysis.

Practice Pointers

• To create a tenancy: Use a written lease that specifies rent amount, payment terms, duration, premises, and core obligations. Collect rent as such. Avoid ambiguous “mortgage contribution” arrangements if RSA 540‑A protections are desired.
• To avoid unintended tenancy: For family or caretaker occupancy, document a revocable license, clarify that no rent is charged, specify that the arrangement is not a lease, and retain control consistent with a license rather than exclusive possession.
• Before filing an RSA 540‑A petition: Vet the status question first. Absent a demonstrable lease, consider alternative remedies.
• When serving eviction notices: Recognize that the statutory form and its labels do not resolve status. Be prepared to prove or disprove tenancy with evidence of lease formation.

Conclusion

Auclair v. Harvey fortifies a clear threshold rule: RSA 540‑A’s powerful anti‑self‑help protections and daily penalties apply only within a true landlord–tenant relationship proven by lease formation. Informal family living arrangements, mortgage contributions managed through a joint account, and post‑hoc reliance on eviction forms will not substitute for a meeting of the minds on essential lease terms. The decision restores the primacy of substance over labels and directs litigants and lower courts to anchor RSA 540‑A analysis in contract law. For families and practitioners alike, the message is simple: define the relationship clearly at the outset—or RSA 540‑A may not be there when you need it.

Key Takeaways

• Leases are contracts; no lease without objective agreement on essential terms.
• Mortgage contributions in a family setting, without clear rent/terms, do not create tenancy.
• Eviction forms and filings using “landlord/tenant” terminology do not manufacture a tenancy.
• RSA 540‑A remedies require a landlord–tenant relationship; otherwise, seek alternative remedies.
• The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s violation finding and six‑figure continuing‑violation award.

Panel: MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT, DONOVAN, and COUNTWAY, JJ., concurred. Decided by order under Sup. Ct. R. 20(3).

This commentary is for informational purposes and is not legal advice.