No Summons Before IFP Screening; Plausibility Requires Facts: Second Circuit Affirms § 1915(e) Dismissal in Lewis v. Redline Hockey

No Summons Before IFP Screening; Plausibility Requires Facts: Second Circuit Affirms § 1915(e) Dismissal in Lewis v. Redline Hockey

Introduction

In Lewis v. Redline Hockey, LLC, No. 24-1342-cv (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2025) (summary order), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Northern District of New York’s sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The plaintiff, Scott Phillip Lewis, sued his former employers and individuals connected to those entities—Redline Hockey, LLC (doing business as USA Hockey Store and USA Spirit Shop), USA Hockey Inc., and Matthew and Michael Nyman—alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), New York Civil Rights Law (NYCRL) § 50, and defamation.

The appeal presented two principal issues: (1) whether the district court erred by declining to issue summonses before conducting its § 1915(e) screening, and (2) whether the complaint stated plausible claims under the ADA, NYCRL § 50, and New York defamation law. The Second Circuit held that the district court properly withheld summonses pending in forma pauperis (IFP) screening and correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, despite the “special solicitude” afforded to pro se litigants.

Because the court issued a summary order, it does not have precedential effect. Nonetheless, the opinion reinforces two recurring principles: courts may screen and dismiss IFP complaints before service and issuance of summons; and even pro se complaints must include factual content sufficient to make claims plausible under Twombly/Iqbal.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Judges Walker, Sack, and Lee) affirmed the judgment of the Northern District of New York, which had:

  • Denied Lewis’s request for issuance of summonses as premature while IFP screening under § 1915(e) was pending; and
  • Sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, while granting leave to amend (which Lewis did not timely pursue before appealing).

On appeal, the Second Circuit held:

  • Withholding summonses was proper because district courts may dismiss IFP complaints prior to service and defendants’ appearance, and a complaint is not “filed” for purposes of Rule 4(b) until the fee is paid or IFP status is granted. See Pino v. Ryan; Hughes v. City of Albany.
  • The complaint did not state an ADA claim: it alleged neither a requested accommodation nor facts supporting an inference of disability-based discrimination or a refusal to accommodate.
  • The NYCRL § 50 claim failed because it relied on speculation rather than factual allegations that defendants used Lewis’s name or likeness for advertising or trade within New York without consent.
  • The defamation claim failed because the complaint lacked specifics necessary to plead falsity, publication, and special damages or per se actionability.
  • Lewis’s request to file a supplemental brief was denied; all remaining arguments lacked merit.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b): Requires the clerk to issue a summons once a complaint is filed. The court reconciled this with § 1915(e) screening by noting that “filing” for Rule 4 purposes occurs after the fee is paid or IFP status is granted, and even then, courts may dismiss before service under § 1915(e).
  • Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1995): Recognizes that courts may dismiss IFP complaints before service and without a responsive pleading. This supports early screening to weed out complaints that fail to state claims.
  • Hughes v. City of Albany, 76 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996): Clarifies that a complaint is not considered “filed” for Rule 4 purposes until the fee is paid or IFP is granted; only then is the plaintiff entitled to summons issuance. This directly addresses the timing dispute over summonses.
  • Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep’t, 879 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2018): Establishes de novo review for § 1915(e)(2) dismissals. The panel applied this standard.
  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Require plausible factual allegations, not mere labels, conclusions, or speculation. These cases provide the pleading baseline applied to each claim.
  • Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2011): Confirms that courts construe pro se complaints liberally to raise the strongest arguments they suggest—“special solicitude”—but do not relax the plausibility standard.
  • Woolf v. Strada, 949 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam): States elements of ADA discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims; the opinion quotes Woolf for the discrimination standard and as part of the failure-to-accommodate framework.
  • Tudor v. Whitehall Cent. Sch. Dist., 132 F.4th 242 (2d Cir. 2025): Articulates the elements for a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA (employer subject to ADA, disability, qualification, and refusal to accommodate).
  • Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) and Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 804 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam): Set the minimal inference pleading standard under the McDonnell Douglas framework, applicable to ADA discrimination claims via Davis.
  • Souza v. Exotic Island Enters., Inc., 68 F.4th 99 (2d Cir. 2023) and Electra v. 59 Murray Enters., 987 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2021): Explain the elements of NYCRL §§ 50–51 claims (use of name, portrait, picture, or voice within New York for advertising or trade without written consent).
  • Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 31 N.Y.3d 111 (2018): Emphasizes the narrow scope of New York’s statutory right of privacy/publicity, reinforcing that not all depictions or suggestive resemblances suffice.
  • Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2011): Courts need not entertain pure speculation and conjecture; applied to reject Lewis’s speculative assertions about possible use of “footage.”
  • Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 940 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 2019): Recites the elements of defamation under New York law, requiring falsity, fault, publication, and damages or per se actionability; underscores the need for factual detail to survive a motion to dismiss.

Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit’s reasoning is structured around two axes: procedural propriety of pre-service screening and substantive sufficiency of the pleaded claims.

1) Withholding Summonses During IFP Screening

Although Rule 4(b) directs the clerk to issue a summons upon “filing the complaint,” Hughes teaches that a complaint is not “filed” for Rule 4 purposes until the plaintiff pays the filing fee or obtains IFP status. Here, while Lewis’s IFP motion was pending, the magistrate judge correctly denied his request for summonses as premature. Once IFP was granted, § 1915(e) authorized the court to screen the complaint and dismiss it before service. Pino squarely supports dismissal of IFP complaints “prior to service upon defendants and the filing of a motion or answer.” In short:

  • IFP motion pending → no Rule 4 “filing” yet → no entitlement to summons issuance.
  • IFP granted → § 1915(e) screening applies → if dismissal warranted, court may dismiss sua sponte before service.

The district court thus acted within its authority by declining to issue summonses before completing its § 1915(e) review and by dismissing upon finding the complaint implausible.

2) Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Under § 1915(e)

Applying de novo review, the court confirmed that Twombly/Iqbal governs plausibility. Even allowing for pro se “special solicitude,” the allegations must provide factual content enabling a reasonable inference of liability.

  • ADA Claims:
    • Failure to accommodate: Under Tudor/Woolf, the plaintiff must plead disability, qualification, and the employer’s refusal to make a reasonable accommodation. The court found no allegation that Lewis requested any specific accommodation or that any request was refused. Absent such facts, the claim cannot proceed.
    • Disparate treatment: Under Woolf/Littlejohn/Davis, the plaintiff must plausibly allege an adverse employment action because of disability and provide “plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” The court found no connection between any defendant conduct and any disability, and no facts supporting even a minimal inference of discriminatory animus or causation.
  • NYCRL § 50 Claim:
    • Sections 50–51 narrowly prohibit the use of a person’s name, portrait, picture, or voice within New York for advertising or trade without written consent. The court emphasized that Lewis failed to identify any specific image or footage used, any platform or campaign, or any nonconsensual use for advertising or trade. The allegations were speculative (“could have been used”) and therefore insufficient. Gallop confirms that courts need not entertain conjecture.
  • Defamation:
    • Under Palin, a New York defamation claim requires a specific false statement “of and concerning” the plaintiff, publication to a third party, fault, falsity, and special damages or per se actionability. The complaint did not specify what was said, when, to whom, or why it was false. Nor did it allege special damages (pecuniary loss) or facts fitting a per se category (e.g., serious crime or statements injurious to trade/profession). A conclusory allegation that a defendant “made false statements” fails under Iqbal.

The district court had granted leave to amend; Lewis did not timely amend and appealed instead. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal and denied the request to file a supplemental brief.

Impact and Significance

While nonprecedential, this summary order has practical resonance for litigants and courts in the Second Circuit.

  • Procedural management of IFP cases: The decision reaffirming Pino and Hughes offers clear guidance to clerks, magistrate judges, and pro se litigants. Courts may:
    • Withhold summonses while IFP status is unresolved;
    • Conduct § 1915(e) screening before service even after IFP is granted; and
    • Dismiss complaints sua sponte that fail to state a claim, conserving judicial resources and avoiding unnecessary service on defendants.
  • Pleading standards for ADA claims: The opinion underscores that ADA claims—whether failure to accommodate or disparate treatment—require concrete factual allegations:
    • Failure to accommodate claims typically require pleading a specific accommodation request, employer knowledge, and a refusal or failure to engage in an interactive process.
    • Disparate treatment claims require facts supporting an inference that an adverse action was taken because of disability, even under the “minimal inference” standard.
  • Right of publicity under NYCRL §§ 50–51: Plaintiffs must identify the actual use—what image, where, when, and how it was deployed for advertising or trade—and allege lack of written consent. Speculation that footage “could have been used” is inadequate.
  • Defamation pleading in New York: The decision reiterates that defamation claims must specify the actual words, who spoke them, the audience, falsity, and damages or per se categories. Vague assertions of “false statements” will be dismissed at the threshold.
  • Pro se “special solicitude” has limits: Courts will construe pro se complaints liberally, but Twombly/Iqbal applies with full force. This order signals that generalized grievances and conjecture will not survive § 1915(e) screening.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • In forma pauperis (IFP): Permission to proceed without paying filing fees due to indigence. When IFP is sought, courts screen the complaint under § 1915(e) to ensure it states a viable claim. This screening can occur before defendants are served.
  • Sua sponte dismissal: Dismissal initiated by the court without a motion from the opposing party. Under § 1915(e), courts may sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that fails to state a claim.
  • Rule 4(b) and summons issuance: The clerk must issue summons once the complaint is “filed.” For Rule 4 purposes, “filing” occurs after the filing fee is paid or IFP is granted. Even after IFP is granted, a court can dismiss the complaint before service as part of § 1915(e) screening.
  • Plausibility (Twombly/Iqbal): A complaint must contain factual allegations that, if true, make liability plausible—not merely possible. Labels, conclusions, and speculation do not suffice.
  • ADA failure-to-accommodate: Requires that the plaintiff (1) is disabled; (2) is otherwise qualified; and (3) requested a reasonable accommodation that was refused. The plaintiff must typically identify the accommodation sought and link the refusal to the disability.
  • ADA disparate treatment: Requires a plausible inference that the employer took an adverse action because of the plaintiff’s disability. Minimal inference can be supported by timing, comments, comparators, or other contextual facts.
  • NYCRL §§ 50–51: New York’s statutory right of privacy/publicity. It bars use of a person’s name, portrait, picture, or voice for advertising or trade in New York without written consent. Section 51 provides the civil cause of action. Plaintiffs must identify the actual use and lack of consent; newsworthiness exceptions and the statute’s narrow scope frequently limit claims.
  • Defamation basics in New York:
    • Elements: a false, defamatory statement “of and concerning” the plaintiff; publication to a third party; fault; falsity; and special damages or per se actionability.
    • Per se categories include statements charging serious crime, imputing a loathsome disease, impugning professional competence, or (historically) imputing unchastity. If per se, special damages need not be pleaded.
    • Pleading specificity: Federal courts applying New York law generally require the complaint to set out the actual words, who said them, to whom, when, and why they are false.

Practical Lessons for Litigants

  • If seeking IFP status, expect pre-service screening. Do not assume summons will issue before the court evaluates the complaint under § 1915(e).
  • For ADA accommodation claims, specify the disability, the essential job functions, the precise accommodation requested, when and to whom it was requested, and how the employer refused or failed to engage in an interactive process.
  • For ADA discrimination claims, allege facts linking adverse actions to disability—temporal proximity, discriminatory remarks, comparator evidence, or other indicia of animus.
  • For NYCRL §§ 50–51 claims, identify the exact use of your name, portrait, picture, or voice in an advertisement or trade context within New York; allege the absence of written consent; and address potential newsworthiness or related defenses.
  • For defamation, plead the exact statements, speaker, audience, date or timeframe, falsity, and damages (or per se basis). Conclusory assertions that “false statements were made” will almost certainly fail.
  • When a court grants leave to amend, use the opportunity to add facts and cure deficiencies. Failure to amend can foreclose relief on appeal.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Lewis v. Redline Hockey, LLC affirms two bedrock principles of federal civil practice in IFP cases and modern pleading:

  • District courts may defer issuance of summonses and dismiss complaints before service as part of § 1915(e) screening.
  • Even with pro se solicitude, claims must satisfy Twombly/Iqbal plausibility through concrete factual allegations tied to each element of the asserted causes of action.

On the merits, the court concluded that Lewis’s ADA claims failed for lack of any alleged request for accommodation and lack of facts supporting a minimal inference of disability-based discrimination; the NYCRL § 50 claim failed for want of any non-speculative allegation of unauthorized commercial use; and the defamation claim failed for lack of specificity and damages or per se actionability. While not precedential, the order offers a clear procedural roadmap for IFP screening and a substantive reminder that plausibility requires more than conjecture. In the broader legal context, it reinforces the judiciary’s consistent application of Rule 8 as explicated by Twombly and Iqbal, ensuring that only well-pleaded claims proceed to the burdens of service and discovery.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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