No Sua Sponte Duty to Apply Intervening Precedent or Entertain New Legal Theories on Reconsideration:
A Commentary on Lazaro Pigueiras v. U.S. Attorney General (11th Cir.)

I. Introduction

This unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision in Lazaro Pigueiras v. U.S. Attorney General concerns an immigrant with a Florida controlled-substance conviction who sought a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1) and later tried to capitalize on an intervening Eleventh Circuit decision, Said v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 28 F.4th 1328 (11th Cir. 2022). That intervening precedent cast serious doubt on whether certain Florida drug convictions actually qualify as “controlled substance” offenses for federal immigration purposes.

The core of the case is procedural rather than substantive: the Eleventh Circuit never reaches the merits of whether Pigueiras’s particular conviction falls within the ground of inadmissibility. Instead, the court addresses:

The limits imposed by the “criminal alien bar” and “discretionary decision bar” in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2);
The requirement that noncitizens exhaust issues before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in their initial appeal;
The restricted function of motions to reconsider before the BIA; and
Whether the BIA must, on its own initiative (sua sponte), apply intervening circuit precedent to issues that were never raised.

The Eleventh Circuit ultimately denies the petitions, reinforcing a key procedural principle: the BIA has no obligation to search for, raise, or apply intervening circuit precedent to unbriefed issues, and a motion to reconsider cannot be used to introduce new legal theories that could have been raised earlier.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Although the opinion is focused on legal and procedural matters, the essential background is as follows:

Conviction and removability. Lazaro Pigueiras was found removable (or inadmissible) under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) based on a controlled-substance conviction under Florida law. The precise Florida statute is not quoted in the opinion, but the Eleventh Circuit later discusses Said, which dealt with Florida Statute § 893.13(6)(a), suggesting that Pigueiras’s conviction is of the same or similar type.
Application for relief. Pigueiras applied for a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1). Section 1182(h)(1)(A) allows a waiver where the offense occurred more than 15 years before the application, the noncitizen is rehabilitated, and he is not a danger to the national welfare, safety, or security. One of the issues he presented to the BIA also concerned “extreme hardship” to his oldest son, suggesting he may have relied as well on § 1182(h)(1)(B), which requires showing “extreme hardship” to qualifying relatives.
IJ decision. An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the requested waiver and found him removable based on the controlled-substance conviction.
Appeal to the BIA. On direct appeal to the BIA, Pigueiras raised only two issues: (1) whether a defective Notice to Appear (NTA) deprived the immigration court of jurisdiction, and (2) whether his oldest son would experience “extreme hardship.” He did not challenge the legal validity of the “controlled substance” ground of removability or analyze his conviction under Said.
Intervening circuit precedent. After the IJ’s decision, but before briefing in the BIA appeal, the Eleventh Circuit decided Said v. U.S. Att’y Gen. There, the court held that a conviction under Florida Statute § 893.13(6)(a) for marijuana possession might not correspond to a federally controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 802, possibly meaning such a conviction does not trigger certain immigration consequences.
BIA’s initial decision. In an October 2023 decision, the BIA:
- Rejected the jurisdictional challenge based on the defective NTA; and
- Rejected the “extreme hardship” claim.
- Did not address whether Said undermined the controlled-substance basis for removability or altered eligibility for a § 1182(h) waiver—because those issues were never briefed.
Motion to reconsider. After losing on appeal, Pigueiras filed a motion to reconsider with the BIA, this time asking the BIA to consider the implications of Said for:
- His removability under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II); and
- His eligibility for a § 1182(h)(1)(A) waiver of inadmissibility.
The BIA denied reconsideration, reasoning that a motion to reconsider is directed to errors in the BIA’s own prior decision, not an opportunity to present brand-new legal arguments that could have been made earlier.
Petitions for review. Pigueiras then filed consolidated petitions for review in the Eleventh Circuit:
- Challenging the BIA’s October 2023 affirmance of the IJ; and
- Challenging the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

The Eleventh Circuit denies both petitions.

Jurisdiction is limited by the criminal-alien and discretionary-decision bars. Because Pigueiras was found removable under the controlled-substance ground, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) restricts the court’s jurisdiction. And because he sought a discretionary waiver under § 1182(h), § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) also restricts review of the denial. Nevertheless, under § 1252(a)(2)(D) the court retains jurisdiction over “constitutional claims or questions of law.”
The merits of the Said-based argument are not properly before the court. The question whether, under Said, Pigueiras’s Florida conviction actually qualifies as a “controlled substance” offense (and thus whether he is removable or eligible for § 1182(h)) is a legal question. But:
- He did not raise that argument in his initial BIA appeal, so it was unexhausted; and
- The BIA therefore did not and was not required to address it in its first decision.
The Eleventh Circuit will not consider issues that the BIA has not first addressed.
A motion to reconsider cannot be used to raise entirely new legal theories. Although he raised the Said-based arguments in his motion to reconsider, the BIA correctly relied on its precedent (Matter of O‑S‑G‑) to decline reconsideration, because those arguments could have been presented earlier. A motion to reconsider should point out errors in the BIA’s prior decision, not be used to reframe or expand the case.
The BIA had no duty to sua sponte apply Said to unbriefed issues. The BIA is obligated to resolve “the questions before it,” not to guess or “divine” all possible arguments a noncitizen might raise in the future. It did not err or act unlawfully by not applying Said to the removability and waiver-eligibility questions that were never put in issue.
The BIA gave “reasoned consideration” to the motion to reconsider. The BIA’s order:
- Accurately recounted the procedural history;
- Summarized the arguments in the motion to reconsider; and
- Cited and applied the governing standard for such motions.
Under Eleventh Circuit precedents (e.g., Jathursan; Bing Quan Lin), that was sufficient “reasoned consideration.”

In short, the court holds that (1) the underlying Said-based challenge to removability and waiver eligibility is not properly before it, and (2) there was no legal error in the BIA’s handling of the appeal or the motion to reconsider.

IV. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Jurisdictional Framework

1. The criminal alien bar – 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)

Section 1252(a)(2)(C) withdraws jurisdiction from federal courts to review:

“any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” certain criminal offenses, including controlled-substance offenses.

Pigueiras was found removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), which covers noncitizens convicted of “a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).”

Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, this criminal-alien bar extends not just to direct review of the removal order, but also to review of decisions denying reopening or similar post-decision relief, when the underlying basis of removability is a covered offense. The panel cites Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 334 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003), which held that § 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to motions to reopen filed by criminal aliens.

However, § 1252(a)(2)(D) provides an important safety valve: even when § 1252(a)(2)(C) applies, federal courts retain jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law.”

2. The discretionary decision bar – 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)

Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that:

“no court shall have jurisdiction to review… any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section… 1182(h)…”

Section 1182(h) authorizes the Attorney General (or the Secretary of Homeland Security) to grant, in her discretion, a waiver of some criminal grounds of inadmissibility. Because such waivers are discretionary, the Eleventh Circuit may not review the BIA’s weighing of equities or factual evaluations underlying the denial of relief.

Again, however, § 1252(a)(2)(D) permits review of legal questions about the denial of a § 1182(h) waiver—such as whether the correct legal standard was applied, whether the applicant was statutorily eligible, or whether the BIA violated its own regulations.

3. Application in this case

The Eleventh Circuit therefore draws these lines:

Not reviewable: Factual findings and discretionary judgments regarding removal and waiver (e.g., how much hardship; how rehabilitated; how dangerous; how much weight to give equities).
Reviewable: Pure legal or constitutional issues about:
- How the BIA interpreted statutes, regulations, or its own precedents;
- Whether the BIA had a duty to address certain questions;
- Whether the BIA provided “reasoned consideration.”

The court’s entire discussion of Said, exhaustion, and motions to reconsider falls into the latter category: it is squarely about what legal obligations the BIA had, not about reweighing facts or equities.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and Issues Not Reached by the BIA

1. Statutory exhaustion – 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)

Section 1252(d)(1) provides that a court may review a final order of removal only if:

“the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”

The Eleventh Circuit has long interpreted this to require a noncitizen to raise the “core issue” and the “discrete arguments” supporting that issue to the BIA. The panel cites:

Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792, 800 (11th Cir. 2016) (claim is exhausted when the petitioner “raise[s] the core issue before the BIA” and sets out “any discrete arguments” relied on), and
Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2015), overruled in part on other grounds by Santos‑Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023) (petitioner need not use “precise legal terminology” but must give the BIA enough to “review and correct” errors).

Although the Supreme Court in Santos‑Zacaria later clarified that § 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, the Eleventh Circuit still treats exhaustion as a mandatory claim-processing requirement: if you do not raise an issue to the BIA, the court will not consider it.

2. What Pigueiras actually raised to the BIA

On direct appeal to the BIA, Pigueiras limited his arguments to:

Whether the allegedly defective Notice to Appear deprived the immigration court of jurisdiction; and
Whether his oldest son would experience “extreme hardship.”

He did not argue:

That his Florida controlled-substance conviction was not a removable offense under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), especially in light of Said; or
That his removability and waiver eligibility had to be reevaluated under Said.

Because those legal questions were never presented to the BIA in the initial appeal, the BIA “properly did not review” them, and the Eleventh Circuit refuses to address them “in the first instance.”

3. Issues not reached by the BIA – Ponce Flores

The court underscores a distinct but related doctrine: federal courts generally do not decide issues that the BIA has not reached. The panel cites Ponce Flores v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 64 F.4th 1208, 1222 n.7 (11th Cir. 2023), where the court noted that issues not considered by the BIA are not typically addressed on judicial review.

Here, that doctrine and the exhaustion requirement converge: the BIA did not decide the Said-based arguments because they were not raised, and the Eleventh Circuit will not decide them for the first time.

4. Exhaustion via a motion to reconsider?

Pigueiras tried to cure the omission by raising the Said-based arguments in his motion to reconsider. The panel notes:

He “exhausted” those legal theories in the sense that he clearly presented them to the BIA in that motion; but
The BIA’s role on reconsideration is limited to examining its own prior decision to see if it misapplied the law or the facts, per 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1);
The BIA’s prior decision never addressed removability or § 1182(h)(1)(A) eligibility; therefore, there was nothing on those topics to “reconsider.”

As a result, the BIA properly declined to address those merits issues on reconsideration, and the Eleventh Circuit, in turn, treats them as still not properly before it.

C. The Role of Said v. U.S. Attorney General and the Controlled-Substance Ground

1. What Said held

In Said v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 28 F.4th 1328 (11th Cir. 2022), the Eleventh Circuit assessed whether a conviction under Florida Statute § 893.13(6)(a) (simple possession of marijuana) necessarily involved a “federally controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802. Because Florida’s drug schedules were broader than the federal schedules, the court concluded that a conviction under that statute could cover substances not on the federal list.

For immigration purposes, that mattered because:

Certain immigration consequences (e.g., stop-time rules for cancellation of removal, or criminal grounds of inadmissibility) depend on a conviction relating to a “controlled substance” as defined by federal law.
If the state statute covers substances beyond the federal schedules, a categorical or modified-categorical comparison may show that the conviction is not a qualifying controlled-substance offense for immigration purposes.

Said therefore held that the BIA had erred in treating the petitioner’s conviction as an automatic disqualifier for cancellation of removal. It did not necessarily say that such a conviction can never be a basis for removability, but it required a more precise analysis of the statute and record of conviction.

2. Why Said mattered to Pigueiras

Pigueiras’s immigration case rested on a Florida drug conviction very similar to the one analyzed in Said. If Said applied to his case, he might be able to argue:

That his conviction is not a “controlled substance” offense as defined in § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II); or
That the conviction should not bar eligibility for certain relief, such as a § 1182(h)(1)(A) waiver.

The Eleventh Circuit acknowledges that whether his conviction qualifies as a “controlled substance” offense under Said is a “question of law.” If properly presented, the court would have jurisdiction to decide it under § 1252(a)(2)(D), despite the criminal-alien bar.

3. Why the Eleventh Circuit refused to reach the Said-based question

The key is procedural: the issue arrived too late and in the wrong vehicle.

On direct BIA appeal, he never mentioned Said or challenged the basic premise that he was removable for a controlled-substance offense.
The BIA’s initial decision reflected the issues presented: NTA jurisdictional defect and extreme hardship; there was no reason for it to analyze Said on its own motion.
On reconsideration, he asked the BIA to decide brand-new legal questions that were never part of its prior decision, contrary to the function of a motion to reconsider as defined in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Thus, while Said might have provided a substantive path to relief, the panel holds that Pigueiras procedurally defaulted that path by not timely raising it.

D. Motions to Reconsider: Scope and Limits

1. Regulatory framework – 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider is:

“a request that the Board reexamine its decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, or an argument or aspect of the case that was overlooked.”

But critically, it must:

“state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.”

In other words, the question is: Did the BIA’s prior decision contain a legal or factual error? It is not an open invitation to relitigate the entire case or raise issues that could have been—but were not—presented earlier.

2. BIA precedent: Matter of O‑S‑G‑

The BIA’s leading precedent is Matter of O‑S‑G‑, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 58 (BIA 2006), which holds:

“A motion to reconsider based on a legal argument that could have been raised earlier in the proceedings will be denied.”

The Eleventh Circuit relies heavily on that principle:

Pigueiras’s Said-based arguments “could have been raised earlier”—indeed, during his direct BIA appeal, after Said was decided.
Because those arguments are not framed as showing that the BIA misapplied the law it had previously applied, but rather as brand-new theories, they fall squarely within the category that O‑S‑G‑ says must be denied.

3. Distinguishing Matter of Medrano and In re Ramos

Pigueiras attempted to rely on:

Matter of Medrano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 1990), specifically a dissent suggesting that the BIA may, in its discretion, address new legal arguments on reconsideration; and
In re Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA 2002), where the BIA granted reconsideration based on an overlooked aspect of the record that the government later highlighted.

The Eleventh Circuit responds:

The Medrano dissent is not controlling and, in any event, posits only that the BIA can address new arguments; it does not require it to do so.
Ramos involved a situation where the BIA had overlooked evidence already in the record, and the motion to reconsider simply asked the BIA to reassess its decision in light of that existing record. That is consistent with the regulatory idea of pointing out “an aspect of the case that was overlooked.”
By contrast, Pigueiras’s motion raised “pure legal arguments that could have been raised previously and are not based on the BIA’s first decision.” Those are exactly what O‑S‑G‑ instructs the BIA to deny.

Therefore, the panel concludes that the BIA followed its own precedents correctly and did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration.

E. Reasoned Consideration and the BIA’s Duty to Apply Circuit Law

1. Reasoned consideration standard

The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that the BIA must give “reasoned consideration” to the claims presented. A decision shows reasoned consideration when it:

Reflects that the BIA has “heard and thought and not merely reacted,” Jathursan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 17 F.4th 1365, 1372 (11th Cir. 2021);
Lists basic facts, cites relevant statutes and regulations, and explains why relief is denied, Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 874–75 (11th Cir. 2018), overruled in part on other grounds by Santos‑Zacaria.

If the BIA fails to address central arguments or mischaracterizes the record, it may have failed to provide reasoned consideration, which is a reviewable “question of law.”

2. No obligation to “divine” unraised arguments – Indrawati

The court relies on Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 1303, to say:

“The BIA’s failure to divine and discuss any possible arguments [the Petitioner] might make at a future point does not reflect a lack of reasoned consideration.”

Applied here:

Because Pigueiras did not raise a Said-based challenge to removability or waiver eligibility in his BIA appeal, the BIA was under no obligation to address those issues sua sponte.
“Even though the law changed,” the BIA’s obligation remained limited to “the issues before it on appeal”: the NTA-jurisdiction argument and the extreme-hardship question.

3. Duty to follow circuit law – 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)

Pigueiras invoked 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1), which states that the BIA:

“shall resolve the questions before it… in a manner that is timely, impartial, and consistent with the Act and regulations”

and that it “shall be governed by… applicable law… and by decisions of the Attorney General.”

He argued that this language imposed an “affirmative obligation” to make his case consistent with Eleventh Circuit precedent, including Said, even if he had not raised it.

The panel rejects that reading. The regulation requires the BIA to:

Apply controlling law to the questions presented (“questions before it”); but
Does not impose a duty to comb through the record to identify unbriefed issues made potentially meritorious by intervening precedent.

4. Reasoned consideration in denying reconsideration

Finally, the court holds that the BIA’s denial of the motion to reconsider met the reasoned-consideration standard because the BIA:

Described the procedural posture;
Accurately summarized the arguments Pigueiras made in his motion (chiefly the effect of Said);
Cited Matter of O‑S‑G‑ and the motion-to-reconsider regulation; and
Explained why the motion did not identify any error in its prior decision but instead tried to raise new, previously available legal theories.

This was sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review, so there was no failure of reasoned consideration.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Controlled substance” offense in immigration law

Immigration law only counts certain drug crimes as “controlled substance” offenses:

The conviction must relate to a drug listed in the federal Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802 and schedules), not just any substance covered by state law.
Some state statutes (like Florida’s § 893.13) are broader than the federal schedules, so not every conviction under such statutes categorically qualifies as an immigration “controlled substance” offense.

Said showed that some Florida simple-possession convictions might not carry the immigration consequences the government assumes.

2. Waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

Section 1182(h) is a discretionary tool allowing the government to forgive certain criminal inadmissibility grounds. Two key pathways are:

§ 1182(h)(1)(A): The offense occurred more than 15 years before the application; the noncitizen is rehabilitated; and is not a danger to national welfare, safety, or security.
§ 1182(h)(1)(B): Denial of admission would result in “extreme hardship” to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter.

Even if a person is statutorily eligible, the Attorney General can still deny the waiver as a matter of discretion. Courts generally cannot review that discretionary weighing, only legal issues such as whether the person was correctly found eligible or ineligible based on statutory criteria.

3. Motion to reconsider vs. motion to reopen

Motion to reconsider (8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)):
- Asks the BIA to reassess its prior decision because of an alleged error of law or fact.
- Must identify specific errors; cannot simply introduce new arguments that could have been made earlier.
Motion to reopen (8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)):
- Seeks to present new evidence or changed circumstances.
- Primarily about new facts, not re-analysis of the same record.

Pigueiras filed a motion to reconsider, but his arguments functioned more like an attempt to introduce a new legal theory than to correct an error in the BIA’s earlier decision.

4. “Reasoned consideration”

When courts say the BIA must provide “reasoned consideration,” they mean:

The BIA must show it understood and considered the central issues presented;
It must connect the facts, its legal analysis, and its conclusion in a way that allows a reviewing court to follow the reasoning;
It does not have to respond explicitly to every minor argument, nor does it have to address issues never raised.

5. “Sua sponte” action

“Sua sponte” means “on its own initiative.” When Pigueiras argues that the BIA should have “sua sponte” applied Said to his case, he is saying the BIA should have:

Noticed how Said might affect the controlled-substance ground and waiver eligibility; and
Addressed those legal questions even though he never put them in issue in his briefs.

The Eleventh Circuit makes clear that immigration law imposes no such obligation on the BIA.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

1. For noncitizens with Florida drug convictions

This case is a warning shot: substantively strong arguments can be lost through procedural missteps. Even where an intervening case like Said meaningfully undermines the government’s theory of removability, a noncitizen must:

Expressly raise the Said-based argument to the IJ and/or BIA at the earliest opportunity;
File supplemental briefing or a motion to remand while the appeal is pending if new precedent arises;
Not rely on the BIA to identify and address these issues on its own.

Failing to do so can forfeit the ability to secure judicial review of those issues later.

2. For counsel representing noncitizens

The opinion underscores several practice points:

Monitor new precedent continuously. When circuit or Supreme Court decisions arise that bear on your case, you must promptly raise them in the forum currently handling the case (IJ, BIA, or court of appeals).
Preserve all plausible theories early. Do not “save” legal arguments for motions to reconsider; such motions are narrowly focused on errors in the decision already rendered, not a second appeal.
Frame “change in law” arguments as errors in the prior decision. If intervening precedent truly shows that the BIA’s previous decision misinterpreted the law, a motion to reconsider can be appropriate—but you must tie the new precedent directly to an error in the BIA’s analysis, not simply introduce a new claim that was never addressed before.
Understand the interplay with jurisdictional bars. Where criminal or discretionary bars apply, your only path to judicial review may be through “questions of law.” That makes precise issue preservation and careful framing of legal questions even more critical.

3. For the BIA and administrative practice

Even though this decision is unpublished and technically non-precedential, it reflects the Eleventh Circuit’s consistent approach:

The BIA’s duty is to resolve the issues before it, applying correct, controlling law to those issues;
It is not required to search for issues that a represented party did not raise, even in light of intervening case law;
Its application of precedent limiting reconsideration (such as Matter of O‑S‑G‑) will generally be upheld when it declines to entertain new legal theories on reconsideration.

This rewards clarity and completeness in initial briefing and reinforces the procedural discipline of the immigration adjudication system.

4. Broader doctrinal significance

The decision fits squarely within, and slightly sharpens, several existing lines of doctrine:

Exhaustion after Santos‑Zacaria. Even though exhaustion is now understood as nonjurisdictional, the Eleventh Circuit continues to treat it as strictly mandatory, especially in the immigration context.
Scope of § 1252(a)(2)(D). While § 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves review of “questions of law,” those questions must have been presented to and decided by the BIA; the savings clause does not convert unexhausted or unaddressed issues into reviewable ones.
Intervening precedent and agency responsibility. The decision underscores that agencies must follow new circuit law in deciding the issues presented to them, but have no obligation to proactively raise new legal theories on behalf of litigants.

VII. Conclusion

Lazaro Pigueiras v. U.S. Attorney General is less about the substantive reach of Said and more about the procedural limits that govern immigration litigation. The key takeaways are:

Even potentially dispositive legal developments like Said must be timely raised to the BIA to be preserved for judicial review.
The BIA is not required to sua sponte identify and apply intervening circuit precedent to issues that the parties did not put in play.
A motion to reconsider is not a second chance to present arguments that were previously available; it is narrowly targeted at errors in the decision already issued.
The Eleventh Circuit will enforce exhaustion and its “issues not reached by the BIA” doctrine robustly, particularly where criminal and discretionary decision bars restrict its jurisdiction.

In the broader legal context, the opinion reinforces a rigid but predictable message: procedural rigor is as important as substantive merit in immigration cases. Noncitizens and their counsel must diligently preserve all viable legal theories—especially those grounded in evolving case law—at each stage of the administrative process, or risk losing them forever.

No Sua Sponte Duty to Apply Intervening Precedent or Entertain New Legal Theories on Reconsideration: A Commentary on Lazaro Pigueiras v. U.S. Attorney General (11th Cir.)