No Stipulation to Competency by Agreeing to Written Reports: Florida Supreme Court Reaffirms Procedural Bars, Strickland, and Rule 3.852 Limits in Mesac Damas v. State

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Florida’s October 1, 2025 opinion in Mesac Damas v. State of Florida and Mesac Damas v. Secretary, Department of Corrections. The Court affirmed the denial of Damas’s initial Rule 3.851 postconviction motion and denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The decision revisits a notorious capital case—Damas’s 2009 murders of his wife and five children—through the lens of postconviction competency challenges, ineffective assistance of counsel claims, public-records discovery limits in capital postconviction litigation, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Three principal issues were presented on appeal: (1) whether Damas was incompetent at every stage and whether counsel was ineffective in failing to expose that incompetency; (2) whether trial counsel failed to conduct a timely and adequate mitigation investigation; and (3) whether the trial court’s denial of additional public-records requests under Rule 3.852 violated Damas’s constitutional rights. The habeas petition alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not challenging use of competency reports at sentencing, not appealing denial of additional expert funding, and inadequately challenging the denial of self-representation.

At the core of the opinion are clarifications with substantial practical importance to capital litigation: postconviction competency claims are procedurally barred if not raised on direct appeal; counsel’s agreement that the court may decide competency based on written expert reports is not a stipulation to competency; Strickland’s deficiency and prejudice standards remain the touchstone for ineffective assistance; Rule 3.852 cannot be used as a fishing expedition; and habeas cannot relitigate claims or fault appellate counsel for not raising non-meritorious or unpreserved issues.

Summary of the Opinion

Competency claims are procedurally barred in postconviction if they could have been raised on direct appeal. The Court held that Damas’s present competency arguments are barred and, in any event, the trial court applied the correct Dusky standard codified in section 916.12 and Rule 3.211.
Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims premised on competency failed under Strickland. Defense counsel did not stipulate to competency; they only agreed the court could decide competency on written reports. Additional evaluations would have been futile given Damas’s refusal to cooperate.
IAC claims attacking the timing/adequacy of mitigation investigation failed: counsel mounted extensive mitigation efforts with specialists (including travel to Haiti), developed 47 mitigation factors, and—despite Damas’s waiver—presented mitigation at the Spencer hearing. The record showed diligent work and a reasonable strategy; no prejudice was shown against substantial aggravation.
Public records: The Court affirmed denial of additional records under Rule 3.852(g) and (i), reiterating that postconviction discovery is not an open-ended fishing expedition and requires a nexus to colorable claims.
Habeas/ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: Denied. Appellate counsel is not ineffective for omitting unpreserved or meritless issues; habeas cannot be used to relitigate claims previously decided or that should have been raised earlier.
Special concurrence (Labarga, J.): Emphasized the robust competency record—twelve evaluations by five experts, multiple competency orders (2011, twice in 2014, and 2017), documented malingering, and persistent noncooperation—undermining any claim that Damas was tried while incompetent.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904 (Fla. 2013); Reynolds v. State, 373 So. 3d 1124 (Fla. 2023); Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 2023). These cases reinforce that postconviction is not a second appeal; issues that could have been raised earlier are procedurally barred.
Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672 (Fla. 2014). Critical for two points: (1) competency claims (procedural or substantive) cannot be raised in a postconviction motion; and (2) with concurrence of the parties and court, competency can be decided on written reports, but a defendant cannot stipulate to his own competency. The Court applies this to reject Damas’s assertion that counsel “stipulated to competency.”
Wickham v. State, 124 So. 3d 841 (Fla. 2013); Carroll v. State, 815 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2002). Also support the procedural bar of competency claims not raised on direct appeal.
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); Noetzel v. State, 328 So. 3d 933 (Fla. 2021); Peede v. State, 955 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2007). Establish and reaffirm that the standard for competence to stand trial also governs competence to plead guilty or waive counsel; the test is present ability to consult with counsel and rational/factual understanding of proceedings.
Carter v. State, 706 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1997); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210–3.212; § 916.12, Fla. Stat. These codify and structure the competency framework and procedures.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Smith v. State, 330 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 2021); Martin v. State, 311 So. 3d 778 (Fla. 2020); Davis v. State, 383 So. 3d 717 (Fla. 2024); Sheppard v. State, 338 So. 3d 803 (Fla. 2022). Provide the deficiency and prejudice standard, and the mixed standard of review for IAC claims.
Nixon v. State, 932 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2006); Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 2005). Explain that if there is no reason to suspect incompetence, failure to request an evaluation is not deficient, and a presumption of competence attaches after a competency finding absent a bona fide question.
Smith v. State, 310 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 2020); Brown v. State, 894 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2004); Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000); Sims v. State, 602 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1992). Support that noncooperation can limit counsel’s performance, negate deficiency, and justify strategic choices; counsel honoring client’s instructions is not IAC.
Valentine v. State, 98 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 2012); State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2000). Emphasize the “strict duty” to investigate mitigation in capital cases.
Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2013); Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2005); Rose v. State, 617 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1993). Recognize that a defendant’s statements and actions may reasonably narrow investigations.
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2000); Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1998); State v. Bolender, 503 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1987). Strategic choices, if reasonable, are not IAC.
Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1914 (2025); Cole v. State, 392 So. 3d 1054 (Fla. 2024); Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2000); Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695 (Fla. 2017); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2011); Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 2002). Reiterate that Rule 3.852 is not a vehicle for speculation; requests must relate to colorable claims and may be denied if overly broad or of questionable relevance.
Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 2000); Knight v. State, 225 So. 3d 661 (Fla. 2017); Hendrix v. State, 908 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2005); State v. Murray, 262 So. 3d 26 (Fla. 2018). Establish the framework for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: parallel to Strickland; cannot fault counsel for omitting unpreserved or meritless issues; habeas is not a mechanism to relitigate prior or defaulted claims.
Smiley v. State, 295 So. 3d 156 (Fla. 2020); Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2001). Fundamental error standard for unobjected-to issues on direct appeal.
San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1997); Martin v. State, 455 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1984). Trial courts’ discretion on funding for experts; abuse of discretion standard.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993); Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). Context for self-representation, waiver of mitigation, and the post-verdict hearing at which courts consider additional mitigation.

Legal Reasoning

1) Competency and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Court first drew a bright procedural line: competency challenges—procedural or substantive—must be raised on direct appeal. Damas could have appealed the competency determination but did not; instead, he argued the trial court wrongly denied his Faretta request. Because the same Dusky/Godinez standard governs competency to stand trial, to plead guilty, and to waive counsel, Damas’s attempt to assert postconviction incompetency was barred.

On the linked ineffective-assistance claim, the Court applied Strickland and held that Damas could not show deficiency (and thus the Court did not need to reach prejudice). Two pivotal factual/legal findings:

Defense counsel did not stipulate to competency. Rather, consistent with Dougherty, they agreed the trial court could decide competency on the basis of written expert reports. The trial court then made its own independent competency determinations.
Additional evaluations would have been futile because of Damas’s persistent noncooperation and documented malingering. Counsel had no good-faith basis to challenge competency following restoration; a presumption of competence attached absent a bona fide new question. The record supported counsel’s view that Damas understood the proceedings but refused to engage.

In short, the Court reaffirmed that counsel’s reasonableness is judged in context: there was an extensive, multi-year competency record; the court repeatedly found Damas competent; and counsel could reasonably avoid redundant or futile steps that Damas would obstruct. That did not amount to deficient performance.

2) Mitigation Investigation and Presentation

The Court acknowledged the “strict duty” to investigate mitigation in capital cases. But it also emphasized that a defendant’s own conduct can reasonably limit or shape that investigation. The record demonstrated robust efforts by both the Public Defender and successor court-appointed counsel:

Early and continuing mitigation work focused on mental health, social history, and cultural background (including travel to Haiti by a cultural expert and mitigation specialist).
Retention of multiple experts, including a neuropsychologist and neurologist; procurement of MRI and PET scans; development of 47 mitigation factors.
Despite Damas’s waiver of mitigation, counsel presented mitigation at the Spencer hearing, including testimony on brain abnormalities and the cultural context of fear of sorcery.

The defense’s decision on the timing of additional neuroimaging/testing was treated as a reasonable strategic choice. Plans anticipating a longer guilt phase were disrupted by Damas’s sudden guilty plea and mitigation waiver. Under Occhicone, reasonable strategic decisions cannot ground an IAC claim. Moreover, Damas could not show prejudice: the trial court found 12 mitigators and still afforded “great weight” to multiple, powerful aggravators—prior violent felony, cold/calculated/premeditated (CCP), child victims under 12 and under custodial authority, and HAC for three victims—rendering any additional mitigation unlikely to alter the outcome.

3) Public-Records Requests under Rule 3.852

The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of broad public-records requests under Rule 3.852(g) and (i), reiterating long-standing limits:

Postconviction discovery is not a fishing expedition. A movant must identify specific records relevant to particular, colorable claims for relief.
Trial courts have discretion to deny requests that are overly broad, of questionable relevance, or unlikely to lead to admissible evidence.

Damas failed to tie his requests to specific postconviction issues; the denials therefore were not an abuse of discretion, nor a violation of due process or access to courts.

4) Habeas Corpus: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

The Court denied habeas relief for three reasons:

Use of competency reports at sentencing: Appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise an unpreserved issue unless it is fundamental error. Given Damas’s knowing waiver of a penalty-phase jury and mitigation, and the weight of aggravators, no fundamental error existed. Habeas cannot relitigate competency.
Denial of funds for additional testing and expert travel: Trial courts have broad discretion, and the record showed the court considered existing neuroimaging and mitigation waiver. Raising this issue on direct appeal would likely have been meritless; counsel is not ineffective for omitting weak claims.
Self-representation: Damas litigated this on direct appeal and lost. Habeas cannot be used to reargue the same claim under the guise of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Special Concurrence (Justice Labarga)

Justice Labarga concurred, underscoring the unusually thorough competency record: twelve evaluations by five experts, multiple competency orders across years, a commitment for incompetency followed by restoration, and repeated findings of malingering and noncooperation. This robust record both informed counsel’s reasonable strategy and negated any inference that Damas was proceeded against while incompetent.

Impact and Practical Implications

Competency litigation in postconviction: The opinion powerfully reaffirms that competency challenges must be taken on direct appeal. Postconviction counsel must frame related issues as Strickland claims and be prepared to overcome the heavy barriers of deficiency, prejudice, prior findings, and the client’s own conduct (noncooperation/malingering).
Stipulating to written reports is not stipulating to competency: The Court clarifies the line drawn in Dougherty. Defense counsel may agree that the court can decide competency on written reports without conceding the ultimate issue. Trial judges should still make an independent competency determination; counsel should memorialize that any stipulation is limited to process, not outcome.
Futility matters: Where defendants categorically refuse cooperation, demand for additional evaluations or testing can be reasonably withheld. This reduces the risk that counsel’s prudence will be second-guessed as deficient.
Mitigation strategy and timing: The decision affirms wide berth for strategic choices in sequencing expert testing, especially where the posture changes unexpectedly (e.g., sudden guilty pleas or mitigation waivers). Counsel should document strategic rationales and continue developing mitigation for a Spencer hearing even when mitigation is waived.
Public-records discipline: The opinion reinforces that Rule 3.852 requests must be targeted and claim-linked. Capital postconviction litigants should articulate a clear nexus between requested categories and specific, viable claims.
Appellate practice: Appellate counsel is not obligated to raise every conceivable issue—particularly unpreserved or weak ones. Habeas remains a narrow remedy focused on genuinely outcome-determinative omissions that satisfy Strickland.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Competency to proceed (Dusky/Godinez): A defendant must be able to understand the proceedings and consult with counsel rationally. This same standard applies to standing trial, pleading guilty, and waiving counsel.
Procedural bar: If an issue could have been raised on direct appeal but was not, it generally cannot be raised later in a postconviction motion.
Strickland test: To prove ineffective assistance, the defendant must show (1) counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable (deficient), and (2) a reasonable probability that, but for the deficiency, the result would have been different (prejudice).
Stipulation to written reports vs. stipulation to competency: Agreeing that a judge can decide competence on written evaluations is a procedural agreement; it is not conceding that the defendant is competent.
Malingering: Feigning or exaggerating symptoms for secondary gain. Documented malingering can support findings of competence and justify counsel’s strategic choices.
Faretta hearing: Court inquiry to ensure a defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary. Noncooperation can prevent a valid waiver.
Koon/Spencer: Koon addresses counsel’s obligations when a capital defendant instructs counsel not to present mitigation. Spencer requires the court to hold a hearing to consider additional mitigation and argument before sentencing, even after a jury recommendation or waiver.
Aggravators in capital sentencing: Examples include prior violent felony, murders that are cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), victims under 12 and under custodial authority, and murders that are especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). These are weighed against mitigation.
Fundamental error on appeal: An unobjected-to issue on direct appeal must be so egregious that it undermines the validity of the proceeding to qualify as fundamental error.
Rule 3.852 public records: Designed for targeted, relevant discovery to support concrete postconviction claims—not broad exploratory requests.

Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Mesac Damas v. State does not chart new doctrinal territory so much as it consolidates and clarifies several core principles in Florida capital postconviction jurisprudence. The Court:

Reaffirms that competency claims belong on direct appeal and are barred in postconviction.
Clarifies that counsel’s agreement to proceed on written competency reports is not a concession of competency.
Applies Strickland rigorously, recognizing the practical constraints imposed by a noncooperative, malingering defendant and validating reasonable timing and scope decisions in mitigation investigations.
Reiterates that Rule 3.852 cannot be used for fishing expeditions and that habeas is not a vehicle for unpreserved, meritless, or previously litigated claims.

Justice Labarga’s special concurrence underscores the strength of the record: extensive evaluations, repeated court findings, and documented malingering. The opinion’s lasting significance lies in its practical guidance for counsel and courts: build a careful record on competency, make independent judicial findings, document strategic choices, and keep postconviction discovery tethered to concrete claims. In Florida’s capital litigation landscape, Damas stands as a clear reaffirmation of procedural discipline and Strickland’s demanding standards.