No State-Law End-Run Around the CBA: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms § 301 Complete Preemption for Fraud and Fiduciary-Duty Claims Predicated on CBA Transfer and Grievance Rights

Introduction

In Thomas Baltrusaitis v. UAW (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 2025), the Sixth Circuit confronted a recurring question in labor law: may union-represented employees litigate state tort claims in state court where their alleged injuries flow from workplace actions governed by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), even if the allegations are framed around a criminal bribery scheme? Or does § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, completely preempt those claims and channel them to federal court?

The plaintiffs—thirty-eight current and former FCA US LLC engineers represented by the UAW—alleged they were unlawfully transferred under CBA Section 57 from the Chrysler Technical Center to the Trenton Engine Complex in 2011, adding significant commuting burdens. Years later, federal prosecutions unveiled a far-reaching bribery scheme involving both FCA executives and UAW officials. The plaintiffs responded by filing CBA grievances and, after their federal claims were dismissed as time-barred, by bringing state-law tort claims (fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy) in Michigan court. The UAW removed the case, invoking § 301 complete preemption. The district court denied remand; the parties then stipulated to dismissal, preserving the preemption ruling for appeal.

The Sixth Circuit affirms: the state-law claims are completely preempted under § 301 because the rights invoked and the merits of the alleged injuries depend on the CBA’s transfer and grievance provisions. The court underscores that plaintiffs cannot “relabel” CBA-based disputes as torts to evade federal labor law. A separate concurrence agrees with the outcome but refines the DeCoe framework, distinguishing which types of state-law claims are preempted under which prong.

Summary of the Opinion

Judge Karen Nelson Moore, joined by Judge Clay (with Judge Thapar concurring in the judgment), holds that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims are completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and were therefore properly removed to federal court. Applying the Sixth Circuit’s two-step preemption test from DeCoe v. General Motors, the court concludes:

Under DeCoe step one, the fraud and fiduciary-duty claims require interpretation of CBA terms (notably Section 57 governing transfers and Sections 18–32 governing grievance processing) to determine whether the transfers and grievance handling were wrongful. That alone compels § 301 preemption.
Under DeCoe step two, the rights plaintiffs assert and the injuries they claim exist only because of the CBA—i.e., the right to be free from certain transfers and to a particular grievance process. For this independent reason, the claims are also preempted.
The civil-conspiracy claim is derivative of the preempted fraud and fiduciary-duty claims and thus preempted as well.
Additional arguments for remand fail: Michigan’s bribery statute creates no private right of action and does not carve out an exception to § 301; Farmer/Garmon principles are inapplicable to § 301’s Supremacy Clause-driven preemption; and while NLRA § 9(a) supports a federal duty-of-fair-representation (DFR) theory, plaintiffs did not pursue such a federal claim here.

Judge Thapar concurs in the judgment, criticizing the “complete preemption” doctrine as an atextual “jurisdictional alchemy,” but follows Supreme Court precedent. He would analyze DeCoe in reverse order. In his view, the fraud claims assert state-law rights (not CBA-created rights) and thus are not preempted under step two, but they are preempted under step one because plaintiffs cannot prove loss causation without showing that their grievances had merit—a showing that necessarily requires interpreting the CBA. He agrees the fiduciary-duty claim is preempted under step two, and that the conspiracy claim and other arguments fall with the main claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

LMRA § 301 and uniform federal labor law: Lucas Flour (369 U.S. 95) and Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck (471 U.S. 202) establish that § 301 ensures uniform federal interpretation of CBAs, preventing states from giving “different meanings” to the same contractual terms and from recasting CBA disputes as torts.
Complete preemption and removal: Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams (482 U.S. 386) and Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson (539 U.S. 1) recognize § 301’s “unusually powerful” preemptive force, enabling removal even when a complaint pleads only state-law claims. The majority leans on this to justify federal jurisdiction over these claims.
The Sixth Circuit’s DeCoe test: DeCoe v. GM (32 F.3d 212) provides a two-step framework: (1) does resolution require interpreting the CBA; and (2) is the right asserted created by the CBA rather than by state law? A claim preempted at either step is a § 301 claim. The majority finds preemption at both steps for the fraud and fiduciary-duty claims.
Adamo Demolition (3 F.4th 866) and Mattis v. Massman (355 F.3d 902): Recent Sixth Circuit applications of DeCoe’s framework confirm that interpretation of a CBA or reliance on CBA-created rights brings a claim within § 301.
Fox v. Parker Hannifin (914 F.2d 795) and Terwilliger v. Greyhound (882 F.2d 1033): These cases, central to the majority’s analysis, hold that “nebulous” tort claims are preempted where plaintiffs’ grievances and remedies are creatures of the CBA; a plaintiff cannot dress a breach-of-CBA theory in the garb of fraud to escape § 301. The majority reads the plaintiffs’ fraud theory here as exactly such a relabeling.
Odell v. Kalitta Air (107 F.4th 523): Odell, involving Title VII and ADA claims created independently of a CBA, is treated by the majority as a “step-one” case—illustrating that claims based on independent statutory rights may still be preempted if adjudication would require interpreting the CBA. Judge Thapar deploys Odell to emphasize that where the underlying right is independent (as with Michigan fraud), preemption rises or falls on step one; he disagrees with the majority’s step-two analysis on fraud.
Vaca v. Sipes (386 U.S. 171): Cited in the concurrence to note that unions need not pursue frivolous grievances—a point tied to why causation for fraud would require showing the grievances had merit under the CBA.
Garmon/Farmer line: Farmer v. Carpenters (430 U.S. 290) (a Garmon preemption case) is deemed inapplicable to § 301’s complete preemption, per DeCoe’s distinction that § 301 implicates Supremacy Clause concerns rather than Garmon’s balancing of federal/state interests.
Pratt v. UAW Local 1435 (939 F.2d 385): Recognizes that NLRA § 9(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1337 furnish federal jurisdiction for DFR claims independent of § 301. The court notes plaintiffs did not plead such a federal claim here.
Williams v. NFL (582 F.3d 863) (8th Cir.): Supports preemption of state-law fiduciary-duty claims where the duty’s scope and breach turn on CBA interpretation.
Seventh Circuit’s S.C. Johnson (697 F.3d 544): Distinguished because it addressed FAAAA preemption, not § 301. The majority rejects analogies to that case to evade § 301 preemption for bribery-based tort damages.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds on two reinforcing tracks that together close the door on a state-law forum for these claims.

1) DeCoe Step One: These tort claims require interpreting the CBA

Fraud (silent and positive): Michigan law requires plaintiffs to prove, among other elements, a material misrepresentation or omission and causation of injury. The majority and concurrence converge on a critical point: whether the union’s alleged misrepresentations or concealments caused plaintiffs’ losses depends on whether the 2011 transfers violated the CBA and whether the grievances should have succeeded under the CBA. Determining if the transfers were wrongful—or if the grievances had merit—requires interpreting Section 57 (transfers) and the grievance procedures (Sections 18–32). Without a CBA-based showing that the transfers were improper and the grievances meritorious, plaintiffs cannot establish that but for the alleged deceit they would have obtained relief from “honest” union officials, eliminating their commuting losses.
Breach of fiduciary duty: The claim alleges disloyalty and failure to diligently advocate in grievances. Whether any such duty was breached, and whether it caused cognizable harm, also turns on the CBA-defined scope of grievance processing, the union’s authority, and the merits of the underlying transfer dispute.
Complaint-as-pled: The court underscores that roughly 63.6% of the complaint’s numbered allegations explicitly reference the CBA, the collective bargaining process, or the grievance process. Plaintiffs themselves pleaded their case through the lens of CBA rights and processes, tying adjudication to the contract.

2) DeCoe Step Two: The asserted rights and injuries are CBA-created

Source of rights: The majority emphasizes that the plaintiffs’ immunity from certain transfers and their expectations about the grievance process exist only by virtue of the CBA. Absent Section 57’s transfer constraints and the CBA’s grievance machinery, there would be no basis to claim wrongfulness of the transfer or mishandling of grievances, and therefore no tort damages based on those specific interests.
“Nebulous fraud” as relabeled CBA claims: Drawing on Fox and Terwilliger, the court treats the fraud theories as attempts to convert alleged breaches of CBA obligations into common-law tort claims. Where the CBA “affords the single mechanism” for managing the grievances that underlie the alleged deception, § 301 preemption applies.

3) Derivative civil conspiracy

Because the underlying fraud and fiduciary-duty claims are preempted, the conspiracy claim—wholly derivative of those torts—falls as well.

4) No exceptions based on bribery statutes or Garmon

Michigan bribery statute: Michigan’s criminal anti-bribery law does not create a private cause of action and does not carve out a preemption exception. The court declines to analogize to the Seventh Circuit’s FAAAA case (S.C. Johnson), reiterating that § 301 preemption turns on DeCoe’s interpretive/creation-of-rights inquiries, not on whether a separate criminal law exists.
Farmer/Garmon inapplicability: The balancing framework used in Garmon-based preemption does not apply to § 301 complete preemption. DeCoe already clarifies that § 301 rests on Supremacy Clause uniformity in contract interpretation, not Garmon’s labor-regulatory field preemption.
NLRA § 9(a) DFR: Section 9(a) can supply an independent federal DFR claim and jurisdiction via 28 U.S.C. § 1337, as Pratt explains, but plaintiffs did not plead such a claim in this action. Invoking § 9(a) as an analogy cannot defeat § 301 preemption of the state-law torts they did plead.

5) The concurrence’s analytical refinements

Order of analysis: Judge Thapar would start with DeCoe step two: if the right is created by the CBA, preemption is straightforward; if not, move to step one and ask whether adjudication requires interpreting the CBA. This sequence, he suggests, aligns with how courts distinguish breach-of-contract claims (step two) from tort claims arising from state-imposed duties (step one).
Fraud claims can be state-law rights yet still preempted: In his view, Michigan’s anti-fraud duties exist independent of the CBA (so not step-two preempted), but these particular fraud claims are step-one preempted because proving loss causation requires showing that the grievances would have prevailed—an analysis inseparable from the CBA.
Doctrinal guardrails: The concurrence signals that some state tort claims by union employees might escape § 301 preemption if they vindicate rights wholly independent of the CBA and can be proven without construing it. But where any element (like causation) depends on grievance merits under the CBA, preemption attaches.
Candid critique of complete preemption: While bound to apply Supreme Court authority (Avco; Beneficial National Bank), Judge Thapar reiterates concerns that “complete preemption” departs from the well-pleaded complaint rule by transmuting state claims into federal ones to secure a federal forum for the preemption decision itself.

Impact

Pleading strategy and forum control: Plaintiffs cannot avoid § 301 preemption and federal removal by recasting CBA-centric disputes (transfers, seniority, grievance processing) as state-law fraud or fiduciary-duty claims—even when serious misconduct like bribery is alleged. If the injury flows from rights defined by the CBA, or proving the claim requires interpreting the CBA, removal and preemption follow.
Odell’s boundary lines: Odell remains an important waypoint for claims premised on independent statutory rights (e.g., Title VII, ADA), but such claims can still be preempted if their resolution requires CBA interpretation. Here, the court demarcates Odell as a step-one case and declines to extend it to tort claims that, in substance, arise from CBA-created entitlements.
Bribery allegations are not a preemption bypass: Criminality does not recharacterize the legal source of the rights or the analytic method for preemption. Without a private right of action in a bribery statute and without an independent, non-CBA-based injury theory, plaintiffs remain within § 301’s ambit.
DFR as the appropriate federal vehicle: Where the gravamen is union mishandling or disloyalty in grievance representation, a federal DFR or hybrid § 301/DFR claim is the proper path. But timeliness is critical: Baltrusaitis I shows that the federal courthouse door can close on statute-of-limitations grounds if plaintiffs wait too long.
Employer and union exposure: Employers and unions remain subject to federal labor-law claims and, where applicable, criminal prosecution. But state-law tort exposure will be curtailed in disputes intertwined with CBA rights and processes. Counsel should anticipate removal and preemption challenges early.
Potential room at the margins: The concurrence hints at scenarios where state torts might proceed—for example, where the injury and its causation can be shown without addressing whether a grievance would have succeeded under the CBA. That is a narrow lane; litigants seeking to use it must isolate injuries independent of CBA-defined rights.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA): A labor contract between an employer and a union that sets terms and conditions of employment (e.g., transfers, seniority, grievance procedures). It is the central document in unionized workplaces.
LMRA § 301 and “complete preemption”: § 301 provides a federal cause of action for disputes over CBAs. “Complete preemption” means that certain state-law claims are recharacterized as federal § 301 claims from the outset, allowing removal to federal court. It is different from ordinary “defensive preemption,” where a defendant merely asserts federal law as a defense.
The DeCoe test: Sixth Circuit framework for § 301 preemption: (1) Does resolving the claim require interpreting the CBA? (2) Is the right asserted created by the CBA rather than by state law? A “yes” to either yields preemption.
Hybrid § 301/DFR claim: A lawsuit alleging an employer violated the CBA and the union breached its duty of fair representation in handling the grievance. Both components must typically be timely and proven.
Duty of Fair Representation (DFR): A union’s federal-law duty to represent members fairly and in good faith, including in grievance handling. Breach can be sued under federal law; it is not dependent on the existence of a CBA for jurisdiction, but often arises in CBA contexts.
Garmon preemption vs. § 301 preemption: Garmon (NLRA) preemption balances state and federal interests in regulating labor activities. § 301 preemption is rooted in the need for uniform interpretation of CBAs under federal law and operates via complete preemption for claims intertwined with the CBA.
Removal and remand: Removal allows a defendant to transfer a state-court case to federal court if there is federal jurisdiction. If jurisdiction is lacking, a federal court must remand the case to state court. § 301 complete preemption often supplies the jurisdictional hook for removal.

Conclusion

Baltrusaitis v. UAW fortifies a familiar yet potent rule: when the gravamen of a dispute is rights and processes defined by a CBA—here, transfer rules and grievance handling—state-law tort claims seeking redress for those injuries are completely preempted by LMRA § 301. The Sixth Circuit applies DeCoe’s two-step, finding preemption because adjudication requires interpreting the CBA and because the asserted rights exist only by virtue of the CBA. Fraud and fiduciary-duty labels cannot convert a CBA dispute into a state tort, even amidst allegations of a serious bribery scheme.

The concurrence refines the analytical map by urging courts to ask first whether the right is contract-created (step two), and only then whether interpretation is required (step one). On that approach, the fraud claims assert independent state-law rights but still succumb at step one because causation hinges on grievance merits under the CBA. Either way, the destination is the same: federal court, federal law, and here, dismissal once removed due to timeliness.

The opinion’s practical message is clear. Unionized employees and their counsel must calibrate litigation strategies to the CBA. Where the claimed injury cannot be disentangled from CBA-governed rights or requires showing that a grievance should have succeeded, § 301 preemption will control forum and law. Independent statutory or tort rights remain viable in principle, but only if they can be proven without construing the CBA and without relying on CBA-created entitlements. And even then, as Odell reminds, step-one preemption risks remain. This decision thus reaffirms that there is no state-law end-run around the CBA.