No State Exhaustion Bar to § 1983 Due‑Process Delay Claims; Alabama Supreme Court Remands for Fact‑Finding on Mootness After SCOTUS Reversal

No State Exhaustion Bar to § 1983 Due‑Process Delay Claims; Alabama Supreme Court Remands for Fact‑Finding on Mootness After SCOTUS Reversal

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Alabama Supreme Court’s post-remand opinion in Aaron Johnson, et al. v. Greg Reed, Secretary of the Alabama Department of Workforce, following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Reed, 604 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 465 (2025). The case arises from pandemic-era delays in Alabama’s unemployment compensation system and presents two layers of significance:

  • At the federal level, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court’s prior judgment that had effectively required claimants to exhaust state administrative remedies before pursuing due-process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on delay. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the state court’s approach “contravened its precedents.”
  • On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court refrained from reaching the merits and instead directed the trial court to determine whether the case has become moot, given the Secretary’s assertion that all plaintiffs have either been paid in full or received administratively final denials.

The plaintiffs — 26 individuals who alleged systemic delay and related due-process violations — sought only injunctive relief against the Secretary in his official capacity. Their complaint focused on the Department’s “policies, practices, and procedures” for handling unemployment compensation applications, asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) of the Social Security Act and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, enforceable through § 1983. During the litigation, Alabama’s Department of Labor was renamed the Department of Workforce, and Greg Reed was substituted as Secretary.

Summary of the Opinion

The Alabama Supreme Court acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court’s reversal of its prior exhaustion-based dismissal and the directive to conduct “further proceedings not inconsistent” with that federal decision. Responding to supplemental briefing on remand, the Court noted the Secretary’s contention that all individual plaintiffs’ claims have been resolved administratively (either by full payment or final denial), which — if accurate — would render the injunctive relief claims moot. The plaintiffs disputed that assertion and asked that the matter be remanded to the circuit court for a determination.

Applying Alabama’s mootness doctrine, the Court remanded the case to the circuit court for fact-finding on mootness, observing that while an appellate court may receive facts bearing on mootness, a live factual dispute is better resolved by the trial court. The Court also addressed, and found not satisfied on this record, the plaintiffs’ argument that even a moot case would fall within the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception, emphasizing the unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 circumstances that generated the alleged delays. The Court instructed the circuit court to make due return within 42 days.

Disposition: Remanded with instructions to determine mootness; due return in 42 days.

Detailed Analysis

Procedural Background and Relief Sought

The plaintiffs initially sued the Secretary and the Department over the handling of their unemployment benefits applications. After motions to dismiss, they amended to drop several claims and the Department as a defendant, proceeding against the Secretary in his official capacity on federal claims under § 1983. They sought injunctive orders aimed at systemic and individual relief, including:

  • Directing prompt decisions on all applications;
  • Issuing an initial nonmonetary decision within ten days for plaintiffs without decisions;
  • Paying any approved claim within two days of approval;
  • Confirming hearing requests and scheduling hearings within 90 days of request;
  • Providing hearing dates within ten days for plaintiffs who requested hearings;
  • Rewriting program information and notices so they are easily understood by people with an eighth-grade education;
  • Filing a plan within two weeks to implement rewritten notices and information sheets;
  • Attorney’s fees.

The trial court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss without specifying grounds. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the courts lacked power to address the merits because plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that the Alabama Supreme Court’s interpretation of the State’s administrative-exhaustion requirement effectively immunized the Secretary from § 1983 due-process suits over unlawful delays in benefits processing, contrary to the Court’s precedents. It remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Williams v. Reed, 604 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 465 (2025): The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court’s prior decision (Johnson v. Alabama Secretary of Labor Fitzgerald Washington, 387 So. 3d 138 (Ala. 2023)) and held that state administrative exhaustion cannot be applied to “in effect immunize the … Secretary … from § 1983 due process suits alleging that the Department has unlawfully delayed in processing benefits claims.” This is the controlling federal directive on remand.
  • Slawson v. Alabama Forestry Commission, 631 So. 2d 953 (Ala. 1994) (quoting Adams v. Warden, 422 So. 2d 787 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982)): Articulates Alabama’s general rule that if an event occurs pending appeal that makes determination unnecessary, the appeal is dismissed.
  • Aliant Bank v. Carter, 197 So. 3d 981 (Ala. 2015): Confirms that the Alabama Supreme Court may receive facts on mootness; however, where facts are disputed, trial courts are better positioned to resolve them.
  • Johnson v. New York State Education Department, 409 U.S. 75 (1972): The U.S. Supreme Court remanded to the district court to determine mootness; cited to support the propriety of remanding for a mootness determination.
  • Crosby v. Seminole Landing Property Owners Association, 265 So. 3d 266 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018): The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals remanded for the trial court to determine whether the issue on appeal was moot.
  • Plunk v. Reed, [Ms. SC-2024-0021, Jan. 17, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2025) (quoting McCoo v. State, 921 So. 2d 450 (Ala. 2005)): Explains the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception and the plaintiff’s burden to establish it.
  • Rogers v. Burch Corp., 313 So. 3d 555 (Ala. 2020): Cited in the Secretary’s supplemental brief for the proposition that a favorable decision that “would accomplish nothing” indicates mootness; noted but not adopted as the Court’s holding here.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning on Remand

1) Implementing the U.S. Supreme Court’s Mandate

The Alabama Supreme Court recognized that its prior exhaustion-based affirmance cannot stand after Williams v. Reed. In compliance with the mandate to conduct further proceedings not inconsistent with the federal opinion, the Court refrained from resurrecting exhaustion as a threshold bar to the plaintiffs’ § 1983 due-process delay claims. Instead, it proceeded to a different threshold question: mootness.

2) Mootness as a Threshold Justiciability Inquiry

The Court applied Alabama’s settled rule that events occurring pending appeal that render a decision unnecessary require dismissal as moot. Here, the plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief. If all named plaintiffs’ claims have, in fact, been resolved administratively — either through payment in full or administratively final denials — there would be no effective injunctive relief left for a court to grant. That would moot the case.

However, because the plaintiffs contested the Secretary’s mootness assertions, the Court declined to decide mootness on a disputed factual record at the appellate level. Citing Aliant Bank, the Court recognized its capacity to receive facts on mootness but concluded that where a live factual dispute exists, the circuit court is the proper forum to resolve it. To that end, the Court remanded “to determine whether this case has become moot,” citing Johnson v. New York State Education Department and Crosby as procedural analogs, and set a 42-day deadline for the trial court’s return.

3) “Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review” Exception

The plaintiffs argued that even if their claims have become moot, the case should proceed under the exception for issues “capable of repetition yet evading review.” The Court articulated the governing standard from Plunk/McCoo: the exception applies where a significant issue will likely evade appellate review because of an intervening circumstance, typically the passage of a relatively brief period of time, and the party invoking the exception bears the burden of establishing it.

On this record, the Court found the plaintiffs had not carried that burden. It emphasized the extraordinary, “unprecedented” surge in unemployment claims caused by COVID-19 — “nearly 1.5 million” applications between April 2020 and March 2022, compared to 737 applications filed in May 2019 — and concluded that those particular circumstances do not support applying the exception here. The Court thus declined to hold the case justiciable under that exception in the absence of a factual predicate showing likely repetition under similar time-compression conditions.

What the Opinion Does — and Does Not — Decide

  • Decided:
    • Remand is required to determine mootness because facts relevant to mootness are disputed.
    • The “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception is not established on this record.
  • Not decided:
    • The merits of the plaintiffs’ § 1983 due-process claims or any asserted rights under 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1).
    • Specific procedural or remedial standards for how quickly the Department must adjudicate or pay claims under federal or state law (beyond the mootness posture).
    • Classwide or systemic relief issues (the case was not presented here as a certified class action).

Impact and Implications

A. Federal Civil Rights Litigation in State Court

The most consequential doctrinal development stems from the U.S. Supreme Court’s reversal: Alabama courts may not interpret state-law administrative exhaustion in a way that forecloses access to § 1983 due-process suits challenging unlawful agency delay in processing benefits. In practical terms, individuals alleging unconstitutional delay in unemployment benefits processing may bring § 1983 due-process claims in Alabama courts without first exhausting state administrative remedies to completion, at least where the state’s exhaustion rule would “in effect immunize” the official from suit.

B. Mootness as a Live Gatekeeping Issue

Even with the federal door open to § 1983 due-process claims, the immediate path forward runs through mootness. Where plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief and the government subsequently resolves the named plaintiffs’ claims (paying or issuing final denials), Alabama appellate courts will require a clear, trial-level determination whether any live controversy remains. This opinion underscores:

  • Appellate courts may consider mootness facts, but factual disputes belong in the trial court;
  • Timeline discipline: the 42-day return accelerates resolution, preventing extended limbo post-remand;
  • Exception narrowing: absent a showing that similar delays are likely to recur and inherently evade review, the “capable of repetition” exception will not salvage otherwise moot injunctive claims.

C. Administrative Practice and Litigation Strategy

For agencies, this decision (in tandem with Williams) carries two countervailing messages:

  • Agencies cannot rely on state exhaustion to preclude § 1983 suits alleging unconstitutional delay; litigation risk persists until claims are processed lawfully and timely.
  • Post-filing remediation that resolves the named plaintiffs’ individual claims can render purely injunctive suits moot unless an exception applies or a certified class maintains a live controversy.

For plaintiffs, practical implications include:

  • Framing urgent due-process “delay” claims under § 1983 in state court remains viable without prior administrative exhaustion;
  • To avoid mootness, consider whether broader, ongoing controversies can be presented and supported factually (e.g., recurring practices affecting multiple claimants) and whether class certification is appropriate in future cases;
  • Be prepared to substantiate the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception with concrete evidence of likely recurrence under timeframes that routinely outpace judicial review — a burden the Court emphasized lies with plaintiffs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Section 1983 (42 U.S.C. § 1983): A federal statute allowing individuals to sue state officials for violations of federal rights, including constitutional rights like due process. A key feature, underscored by the U.S. Supreme Court’s remand directive, is that states cannot impose administrative exhaustion requirements that effectively bar such suits.
  • Due Process (Fourteenth Amendment): The constitutional guarantee that government will follow fair procedures before depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property. In this context, extreme or unlawful delay in processing unemployment benefits applications can be alleged as a deprivation of property without due process.
  • 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1): A federal provision governing state unemployment insurance administration, invoked here to argue that state systems must operate with promptness and fairness. The opinion does not decide whether § 503(a)(1) creates a right enforceable via § 1983.
  • Administrative Exhaustion: The doctrine requiring claimants to complete agency processes before seeking judicial relief. After Williams v. Reed, Alabama courts may not apply state exhaustion rules to block § 1983 due-process suits alleging unlawful delays in processing benefits claims.
  • Mootness: A justiciability doctrine: courts only decide live controversies. If events occur (like benefits being paid or final denials issued) that leave no effective relief for the court to grant, the case is “moot” and must be dismissed, absent an exception.
  • “Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review” Exception: A narrow mootness exception allowing courts to decide issues that (1) are likely to recur and (2) by their nature tend to become moot before appellate review is possible. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving both elements.
  • Remand for Fact-Finding: When material facts pertinent to a threshold issue like mootness are disputed, appellate courts commonly send the case back to the trial court to develop and resolve the factual record. The Alabama Supreme Court did so here with a 42-day “due return” instruction.

Conclusion

This post-remand opinion from the Alabama Supreme Court marks two important developments. First, in the wake of Williams v. Reed, Alabama’s courts must not interpret state administrative-exhaustion requirements to preclude § 1983 due-process suits challenging unlawful delay in processing unemployment benefits. Second, before any merits can be reached in this case, the trial court must resolve a live factual dispute over mootness. If the Secretary’s assertion is correct that every plaintiff has either been fully paid or finally denied, then the purely injunctive claims may be dismissed as moot; if not, the litigation will proceed consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s directive.

The Court’s rejection of the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception on the present record — grounded in the unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 surge — signals a cautious approach to extending that exception absent concrete evidence of recurrence and time-compressed evasion of review. Meanwhile, the 42-day remand timeline seeks to promptly resolve whether a live controversy exists.

In the broader legal landscape, this case reinforces federal supremacy over access to § 1983 remedies in state courts while highlighting mootness as a practical, fact-intensive gatekeeper in injunctive litigation over time-sensitive public benefits. The ultimate significance for Alabama’s unemployment system — including whether the Department’s procedures comport with federal due process and § 503(a)(1) — will depend on whether the case survives mootness and proceeds to a merits adjudication in the circuit court.

Panel note: Stewart, C.J., and Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Cook, and McCool, JJ., concur; Shaw, J., concurs in the result; Wise, J., recuses.

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