No Standing Without Specific Plans and Redressability Amid Overlapping Firearm Bans: The Tenth Circuit’s Guidance in Springer v. Grisham

Springer v. Grisham, Nos. 23-2192 & 23-2194 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 2025), is an order and judgment of the Tenth Circuit that, while non-precedential, offers potent guidance on Article III standing in pre-enforcement Second Amendment challenges. Writing for a panel that included Judges Hartz, Eid, and Federico, Judge Eid held that plaintiff James Springer lacked standing to challenge a New Mexico Department of Health (NMDOH) public health order banning firearm possession in Albuquerque and Bernalillo County parks and playgrounds. The court emphasized two independent standing defects: (1) the absence of concrete, imminent plans to carry in specific regulated locations and (2) lack of redressability because separate, unchallenged state and local restrictions independently bar the same conduct. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to dissolve the preliminary injunction the district court had entered against the parks restriction.

Introduction

Against a backdrop of heightened gun-violence concerns, New Mexico’s Governor declared a public health emergency in September 2023 and directed state agencies to respond, prompting NMDOH to issue public health orders restricting firearm possession in various places. After the initial order was amended and narrowed on October 6, 2023, the operative order prohibited, with limited exceptions, firearm possession in public parks and playgrounds within Albuquerque and Bernalillo County.

James Springer, a Torrance County resident, brought a federal suit alleging that the order violated his Second Amendment, First Amendment, and substantive due process rights. He sought a preliminary injunction against the parks and playgrounds restrictions. The district court found he had standing to challenge the parks restriction (and enjoined it as likely unconstitutional under Bruen), but not the playgrounds restriction. Both sides appealed.

While the appeal was pending, the Tenth Circuit decided We the Patriots, Inc. v. Grisham, 119 F.4th 1253 (10th Cir. 2024), which addressed similar challenges to the same order. The Springer panel then called for supplemental briefing on We the Patriots. Ultimately, the court held that Springer lacked standing across the board and ordered dissolution of the injunction, without reaching the Second Amendment merits.

Summary of the Opinion

• Standing as a threshold: The court “began—and ended—with standing,” declining to reach the constitutional merits. At the preliminary injunction stage, a plaintiff must make a clear showing of likely standing.
• No injury in fact: Springer’s submissions did not identify concrete, imminent plans to carry a firearm in any specific affected park or playground. General assertions of past visits, a desire to attend parks in Albuquerque during the balloon fiesta, or a “planned” rally at Civic Plaza (without specifics) were insufficient.
• No redressability: Even if the public health order were enjoined, overlapping and unchallenged state statutes and municipal/county ordinances independently bar carrying firearms in the relevant parks and playgrounds. Springer did not allege a willingness to violate those overlapping laws, so his injury would persist and could not be redressed by relief limited to the NMDOH order.
• Non-enforcement statements do not cure standing: Extrajudicial media statements by local law enforcement officials were not part of the record and, even if considered, suggested a lack of a credible threat of enforcement—undermining injury rather than establishing redressability.
• Voluntary cessation and mootness: Although the order expired during litigation, the court applied the voluntary cessation doctrine and found the controversy not moot because defendants did not show the challenged policy would not recur.
• Universal injunctions and mootness: The court signaled that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025), which rejects universal injunctions, undermines the notion that an injunction in a separate case can moot a later request for similar relief. But the panel did not decide the full extent of CASA’s effect; it simply noted that other injunctions no longer automatically moot Springer’s claims.
• Disposition: The court affirmed the district court’s denial of an injunction as to playgrounds (on standing), reversed the injunction as to parks, and remanded with instructions to dissolve the injunction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Article III Standing Framework
  • TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016); Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. 53 (2020): Reaffirm that a plaintiff must show injury in fact, traceability, and redressability, and bears the burden to establish standing.
  • Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009): “Some day” intentions and vague desires do not suffice; a plaintiff must show concrete plans tied to specific locations and timelines.
  • Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43 (2024); Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008): At the preliminary injunction stage, a “clear showing” that the plaintiff is likely to establish standing is required.
  • Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014); Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289 (1979): Pre-enforcement standing demands a credible threat of prosecution and a plan to engage in proscribed, constitutionally protected conduct.
  • Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96 (10th Cir. 2024): Vague intentions to potentially violate a law are insufficient in the Tenth Circuit.
  • LaFave v. County of Fairfax, 149 F.4th 476 (4th Cir. 2025): Gun owners lacked standing to challenge sensitive place restrictions without identifying specific events or areas they intended to visit while armed.
• Redressability and Overlapping Laws
  • Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014): Where unchallenged, independently enforceable laws impose the same barrier, an injunction against one law does not redress the injury.
  • We the Patriots, Inc. v. Grisham, 119 F.4th 1253 (10th Cir. 2024): Applied overlapping restriction logic to the same NMDOH order; plaintiffs lacked redressability as other city/county restrictions would continue to bar carry in playgrounds.
  • O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974): Courts presume individuals will conduct themselves within the law; absent allegations of willingness to violate overlapping laws, redressability fails.
• Evidentiary and Record Principles
  • Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 2008); Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884): Standing must affirmatively appear in the record; the court would not consider media reports to establish or defeat standing.
  • Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 824 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2016): Absent evidence to the contrary, courts presume government will enforce its laws as written.
• Limits on Judicial Power and Redressability via Opinions
  • California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659 (2021): Courts do not operate on legal rules in the abstract; they resolve cases and controversies through judgments.
  • Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring): Emphasizes the judgment-centric nature of judicial power.
  • Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255 (2023); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring): Redressability requires relief via the court’s judgment, not the persuasive heft of the court’s opinion.
• Mootness and Universal Injunctions
  • Robert v. Austin, 72 F.4th 1160 (10th Cir. 2023); Prison Legal News v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868 (10th Cir. 2019): Voluntary cessation does not moot a case unless recurrence is clearly unlikely; defendants did not make that showing.
  • Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025): Federal courts lack statutory authority to issue universal injunctions; the panel observed this undermines earlier reasoning that a universal injunction in a separate case moots relief in a subsequent suit.

Legal Reasoning

1) Injury in Fact—Concrete, Imminent Plans Required. The court applied the familiar Lujan/Summers framework. Springer’s affidavit asserted that the order had “prohibited” him from carrying at parks he “attend[s]” during fall events and that he “planned” to organize a pro-Second Amendment rally at Civic Plaza. The court found these statements lacked the requisite specificity: no particular park or playground identified; no dates; no concrete plan to step onto a specific regulated property while armed. Past visits did not suffice to predict future conduct. The “Civic Plaza” assertion failed for the same reason: a “some day” plan without time, place, or logistics is inadequate. This analysis mirrors the strict approach in Summers, Lujan, and the Tenth Circuit’s own Rocky Mountain Gun Owners.

2) Credible Threat of Enforcement. A pre-enforcement plaintiff must show a credible threat of prosecution. Springer attempted to rely on media statements by local officials suggesting a refusal to enforce playground and park bans. The court declined to consider them because they were outside the record, and in any event, those statements—aimed at the NMDOH order—would tend to negate, not establish, a credible threat of enforcement under the challenged order.

3) Redressability—Overlapping Prohibitions Defeat Relief. The court emphasized that overlapping municipal and county restrictions, as well as certain state statutes, “appear” to independently prohibit firearms in the very parks and playgrounds at issue, including:

• Bernalillo County Ordinance § 58-12(b)(27) (prohibiting firearms in recreational facilities and parks).
• Albuquerque Code of Ordinances § 5-8-6(G) (restricting firearms on “Open Space Lands”).
• New Mexico Statutes Annotated §§ 30-7-2.1(A), (B)(2) and § 30-7-2.4(A), (C)(2)(b) (prohibitions tied to school- and university-related activities on public buildings or grounds, covering at least 25 playgrounds per City Administrative Instructions Nos. 5-19 and 5-20).

Given these independent barriers, invalidating the NMDOH order alone would not permit Springer to carry. He did not allege an intent to violate the other prohibitions, so the court presumed lawful conduct and concluded redressability was lacking under Renne, Bishop, and We the Patriots.

4) No Redressability via the Persuasive Effect of an Opinion. Springer suggested that success in the Tenth Circuit would influence state court challenges to the overlapping restrictions. The panel rejected that theory: redressability must flow from the judgment the federal court can issue, not from the hoped-for persuasive effect of its opinion on actors not before it (Haaland; Franklin).

5) Voluntary Cessation and Universal Injunctions. The NMDOH order’s expiration did not moot the case because the state did not make a “formidable” showing that similar measures would not reissue. And although earlier litigation involved a universal injunction against the parks restriction, the Supreme Court’s decision in CASA casts doubt on using third-party universal relief to moot later suits. The panel, however, did not need to resolve CASA’s full implications; it simply proceeded to the standing analysis.

Impact

1) Second Amendment Litigation After Bruen—Heightened Pleading Discipline for Standing. The opinion reinforces that pre-enforcement challenges to “sensitive places” firearm restrictions will founder without granular, near-term plans. Plaintiffs should expect courts to require:

• Identification of the specific regulated place(s) the plaintiff will visit while armed (e.g., named park/playground),
• Concrete timing (dates or a definable window) and reason for the visit, and
• Facts showing a credible threat of enforcement (e.g., past enforcement actions, warnings, policies in the record).

Generic statements of intent, past practices, or plans to someday protest with a firearm are unlikely to suffice.

2) Redressability and Litigation Strategy—Bundle or Bypass Overlapping Laws at Your Peril. The opinion operationalizes a powerful redressability filter: where overlapping, unchallenged legal regimes independently forbid the same conduct, a plaintiff must either (a) challenge those laws (and join the proper enforcement defendants), or (b) plead a willingness to violate them—something most “law-abiding” plaintiffs will not do. The result is a strategic imperative for plaintiffs to map the regulatory landscape comprehensively and structure pleadings accordingly.

3) Evidentiary Rigor—Put Non-Enforcement Positions in the Record. Defendants and plaintiffs alike should note that extra-record media statements are not a reliable vehicle to establish or defeat standing. If non-enforcement is material, parties should secure sworn declarations or official documents and place them in the record. Moreover, plaintiffs should be careful: official non-enforcement positions may defeat the “credible threat” needed for pre-enforcement standing.

4) Remedial Law—The Waning Relevance of Universal Injunctions to Mootness. By flagging Trump v. CASA, the panel signals that a prior universal injunction in another plaintiff’s case no longer automatically moots later claims for injunctive relief by different plaintiffs. Litigants should prepare to litigate their own entitlement to relief rather than rely on global injunctions entered elsewhere.

5) First Amendment “Expressive Carry” Claims. Although the court did not reach Springer’s First Amendment theory, the standing analysis applies with equal force: expressive intent to open-carry at a protest must be anchored in concrete, imminent plans at a specific place and time, with a credible threat of enforcement, to reach the merits.

6) Government Defendants—A Blueprint to Defeat Standing. The opinion models several defense tactics:

• Document overlapping, unchallenged prohibitions that would independently prevent the plaintiff’s conduct.
• Highlight the absence of specific, imminent plans and the lack of location-specific allegations.
• Avoid creating a record of a “credible threat” where a policy choice not to enforce exists; if appropriate, formalize a non-enforcement position for the challenged law (recognizing this may undercut injury and invite different litigation dynamics).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Injury in Fact: You must show a personal, concrete, and imminent harm. “I plan to go to some park someday with a gun” is too vague. “On November 15, I will attend my child’s soccer game at XYZ Park in Albuquerque and carry my licensed firearm” is the kind of specificity courts look for.
• Credible Threat of Prosecution: In pre-enforcement cases, you must plausibly face enforcement. If officials have formally said they will not enforce the challenged rule against you (and that shows up in the record), you may lack injury.
• Redressability and Overlapping Laws: If multiple laws block the same conduct, and you challenge only one, striking down your target may still leave you blocked. Courts cannot help if other, unchallenged rules independently forbid what you want to do.
• Voluntary Cessation: Government cannot usually moot a case by temporarily stopping the challenged conduct. But even if not moot, you still must meet standing requirements.
• Universal Injunctions vs. Party-Specific Relief: Courts generally provide relief to the parties before them. A universal injunction that bars enforcement “against everyone” is now sharply curtailed. That means you cannot count on someone else’s injunction to resolve your case.
• Judgment vs. Opinion: A court’s judgment must provide the remedy. The persuasive force of the court’s opinion cannot substitute for a remedy the court has the power to grant within the case before it.

Conclusion

Springer v. Grisham is a forceful reminder that Article III standing is not a pleading formality but a substantive, evidence-based gateway—especially in pre-enforcement Second Amendment suits. The Tenth Circuit crystallizes two core requirements:

• Specificity: Plaintiffs must allege concrete, imminent plans tied to identifiable locations and times, showing a credible threat of enforcement.
• Redressability amid overlap: Where overlapping, unchallenged laws independently bar the same conduct, plaintiffs must address those laws or accept that relief against just one regime will not redress their injury.

In refusing to consider extra-record media statements and in distinguishing judgments from mere opinions, the court underscores evidentiary rigor and remedial limits. And by acknowledging the implications of Trump v. CASA for universal injunctions, the panel signals an evolving remedial landscape where party-specific relief is paramount and third-party injunctions are poor substitutes for one’s own standing and merits showing.

The upshot is both practical and profound: Second Amendment litigants must draft standing allegations with precision and breadth, often challenging the full lattice of overlapping restrictions and naming the correct enforcing authorities. Government defendants, for their part, can deploy the overlap and specificity requirements to police the courthouse doors. In this way, Springer will exert a significant persuasive pull on future pre-enforcement challenges to “sensitive places” laws in the Tenth Circuit and beyond.