No Standing Once Eligibility Expires: Cepiel v. NHIAA Clarifies Persistent Redressability and Limits Antitrust Standing in New Hampshire Scholastic Athletics

Introduction

In Quinton Cepiel & a. v. New Hampshire Interscholastic Athletic Association & a. (N.H. June 17, 2025), the New Hampshire Supreme Court resolved a student-athlete eligibility dispute by short order under Supreme Court Rule 20(3). The plaintiffs, Quinton Cepiel (a former high school lacrosse player) and his father, challenged the New Hampshire Interscholastic Athletic Association’s (NHIAA) eight-semester eligibility rule and waiver process after Bishop Guertin High School (BG) refused to certify Quinton’s eligibility or submit a waiver request to the NHIAA. They also alleged that the Department of Education (DOE) and State Board of Education (BOE) had unconstitutionally delegated regulatory authority to the NHIAA, that the NHIAA denied Quinton due process by refusing to afford a merits hearing, and that the NHIAA violated New Hampshire’s antitrust statute, RSA chapter 356.

The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss on the merits. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated that merits ruling and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on standing. In doing so, the Court crystallized two linked principles: redressability must persist throughout the litigation for standing to exist, and injuries alleged in high school sports eligibility disputes do not constitute “injury to business or property” necessary for antitrust standing under RSA 356:11. The Court confined its review to the NHIAA, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to brief claims against the DOE and BOE.

Summary of the Opinion

Scope of appeal: Although the notice of appeal referenced all defendants, the plaintiffs did not brief arguments against the DOE or BOE; accordingly, the Court limited review to the NHIAA (In re M.M., 174 N.H. 281, 298 (2021)).
Count I (APA/unlawful delegation): Quinton lacked standing because any declaratory judgment would not redress his injury; by the time of appeal he was no longer eligible to compete under NHIAA rules (redressability failure). Declaratory relief cannot issue where it would have no “conclusive” effect (Asmussen v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Safety, 145 N.H. 578, 587 (2000)).
Count II (state due process/Article 14): While Quinton initially had standing when he sought a hearing for the 2022–2023 season, his claim lost redressability as he became ineligible to compete; subject matter jurisdiction must exist throughout the proceeding, including on appeal (Joyce v. Town of Weare, 156 N.H. 526, 531 (2007)).
Count III (antitrust/RSA 356): The alleged harms (denial of a hearing and lost ability to play interscholastic sports) are not injuries to “business or property” under RSA 356:11. Family expenditures for out-of-state schooling are too indirect/speculative to satisfy antitrust standing, guided by federal precedents (Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Associated General Contractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); RSA 356:14).
Father’s standing: Donald Cepiel alleged no direct injury from Counts I and II and thus lacked standing to pursue those claims.
Disposition: Vacatur of the trial court’s merits decision and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; merits rulings without jurisdiction are void (Richard v. Governor, 2024 N.H. 53, ¶24).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Richard v. Governor, 2024 N.H. 53. The Court relied on Richard to restate state standing doctrine: standing is rooted in separation of powers; requires a concrete legal injury, adversity, and redressability; and may be raised at any stage because it implicates subject matter jurisdiction. Richard also provides that judgments rendered without subject matter jurisdiction are void. This case supplied the jurisdictional framework for vacating the trial court’s merits ruling and ordering dismissal.
Joyce v. Town of Weare, 156 N.H. 526 (2007). Joyce reinforced that a plaintiff must maintain standing at the outset and throughout appeal. The Court used Joyce to conclude that even if the due process claim was initially live, Quinton’s subsequent ineligibility extinguished redressability on appeal.
Asmussen v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Safety, 145 N.H. 578 (2000). Asmussen’s requirement that declaratory judgment resolve a concrete dispute of a “conclusive character” supported the ruling that a declaration regarding NHIAA rulemaking or delegation would not affect Quinton’s now-expired eligibility, rendering Count I non-justiciable.
Avery v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 173 N.H. 726 (2020). Avery instructs trial courts to look beyond bare allegations when standing is challenged. This endorsed the appellate court’s approach to assess actual redressability rather than accept pleadings at face value.
In re M.M., 174 N.H. 281 (2021). The Court cited M.M. to limit the appeal to the NHIAA because the appellants did not brief arguments against DOE or BOE—an appellate practice point emphasizing waiver for unbriefed issues.
Teeboom v. City of Nashua, 172 N.H. 301 (2019). Plaintiffs invoked Teeboom to argue that their financial outlays established injury. The Court implicitly distinguished Teeboom by focusing not on injury-in-fact but on redressability; even a monetary outlay cannot salvage standing where no court order can confer meaningful relief.
Duffley v. N.H. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 122 N.H. 484 (1982). Cited for background that the NHIAA is a private corporation that oversees interscholastic sports, not to decide its status as a state agency or actor—questions the Court did not reach.
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). Adopted via RSA 356:14 for guidance on antitrust injury: the plaintiff must show injury of the type antitrust laws were designed to prevent. Loss of a scholastic playing opportunity and denial of a hearing are not injuries to business or property.
Associated General Contractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983). Provided the multi-factor framework for antitrust standing, emphasizing directness and non-speculative harm. Family tuition expenses arising from a choice to enroll elsewhere were deemed too indirect/speculative.
RSA 356:11 and RSA 356:14. Together, these provisions impose a “business or property” injury requirement for injunctive relief under New Hampshire antitrust law and counsel reliance on federal antitrust jurisprudence to define and limit standing.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds from first principles of justiciability. Standing in New Hampshire requires a concrete, personal injury that is causally connected to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision. Because subject matter jurisdiction is at stake, the Supreme Court addressed standing even though the trial court had reached the merits after assuming standing.

For Count I (APA/unlawful delegation), the Court did not decide whether the NHIAA is a state agency or whether unlawful delegation occurred. Instead, it asked whether any declaratory judgment would meaningfully benefit Quinton. The answer was no. By the time of appeal, Quinton had indisputably exhausted his high school eligibility (whether by the eight-semester rule or the age-limit framework), rendering any decision about the legality of NHIAA rulemaking processes incapable of affording relief to him. Under Asmussen and Richard, issuing such a declaration would be an advisory opinion beyond judicial power.

For Count II (due process), the Court acknowledged that Quinton initially stated a concrete injury in September 2022—the denial of a merits-based eligibility hearing that could have enabled him to play in the 2022–2023 season. But standing must persist throughout the case, including on appeal (Joyce). Once Quinton became ineligible due to time and age, even an order granting a hearing could not resurrect an opportunity to compete. That extinguished redressability and thus subject matter jurisdiction.

For Count III (antitrust), the Court turned to the statutory standing requirement in RSA 356:11 (injury to “business or property”), interpreted in light of federal law via RSA 356:14. The harms described—loss of a season, denial of a hearing, and family expenditures to enroll elsewhere—do not constitute direct business or property injury cognizable under antitrust law. Brunswick requires injury of a type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent, and Associated General Contractors cautions against speculative or indirect injuries. The alleged tuition costs were deemed too attenuated to satisfy these standards. Thus, antitrust standing failed as a matter of law.

Because standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, the Court vacated the superior court’s merits dismissal and remanded with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, consistent with Richard’s directive that merits rulings without jurisdiction are void.

Impact and Practical Implications

Persistent Redressability in Student-Athlete Litigation. Cepiel underscores that challenges to interscholastic eligibility rules must be litigated swiftly. Once a student-athlete ages out or exhausts eligibility, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief will be dismissed as non-redressable. Plaintiffs should seek expedited or preliminary relief during the live season and consider procedural devices (e.g., class actions, successor plaintiffs) to keep controversies live.
No Antitrust Workaround for Eligibility Disputes. The Court decisively held that lost playing opportunities and collateral educational expenditures are not “business or property” injuries under RSA 356. Future litigants should not expect antitrust to supply standing in scholastic eligibility disputes absent a direct commercial injury.
Unresolved Merits Questions Remain Open. Cepiel leaves for another day whether the NHIAA is a state actor, whether the DOE/BOE have unconstitutionally delegated regulatory authority, and whether the NHIAA is subject to the APA. Those issues could be reached in a future case with live redressable stakes.
Appellate Practice: Brief All Parties. The limitation of review to the NHIAA illustrates that failure to brief arguments against particular defendants can forfeit appellate review as to them. Precision in framing the scope of appeal is critical.
Merits Rulings Without Jurisdiction Are Void. Trial courts should resolve jurisdiction first; if standing is lacking, a merits dismissal risks vacatur on appeal. Cepiel reaffirms that appellate courts will undo merits decisions issued without jurisdiction.
Potential Mootness Exceptions Not Invoked. Although New Hampshire recognizes narrow exceptions for issues that are capable of repetition yet evading review or present pressing public importance in some contexts, the Court did not apply any exception here. Future litigants seeking systemic review of time-limited eligibility rules should expressly develop these arguments and the record supporting them.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Standing. A gateway requirement to sue. You must show a personal injury caused by the defendant that a court ruling can fix. Without it, the court lacks power to decide the case.
Redressability. The “can the court help?” piece of standing. Even if you were harmed, you need a remedy that would make a real difference. If you have already aged out of eligibility, an order changing the rules won’t help—redressability is missing.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction. The court’s power to hear a type of case. If standing fails, the court lacks jurisdiction and cannot issue a valid decision on the merits.
Vacatur and Remand. When an appellate court sets aside (vacates) a lower court’s decision and sends the case back (remands) with instructions—in Cepiel, to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Declaratory Judgment. A court declaration about the legal status or meaning of rules. Courts issue them only when the decision will settle a real dispute; they cannot give advisory opinions on abstract questions.
Antitrust Standing; Injury to Business or Property. To sue under RSA 356, you must show harm to your commercial interests (business or property). Personal disappointments or educational choices typically do not qualify. Federal cases like Brunswick and Associated General Contractors guide this analysis in New Hampshire.
NHIAA Eligibility Rules. The eight-semester rule limits participation to eight consecutive semesters starting with initial ninth-grade enrollment; the age rule allows students who turn 19 on or after September 1 to play that school year. Only a principal may request eligibility waivers from the NHIAA.

Conclusion

Cepiel v. NHIAA establishes a clear, practical jurisdictional rule in the scholastic athletics context: once a student-athlete’s eligibility expires, claims seeking declaratory or injunctive relief about that eligibility lack redressability and must be dismissed for want of standing. The decision also forecloses an antitrust pathway for such disputes absent direct injury to business or property and emphasizes that appellate courts will vacate merits rulings entered without subject matter jurisdiction.

Doctrinally, Cepiel harmonizes New Hampshire’s standing jurisprudence (Richard, Joyce, Asmussen) with federal antitrust standing principles (Brunswick, Associated General Contractors) and tightens the link between redressability and judicial power. Practically, it is a cautionary guide for student-athletes and schools: eligibility disputes are perishable. To obtain judicial review on the merits—including systemic challenges to NHIAA governance—litigants must move quickly, maintain a live stake throughout, and frame claims and parties to ensure that relief, if granted, will still matter when the court speaks.