No Stalking Required: Assault-Based Orders of Protection and Deference to Trial Courts Under Montana’s Abuse-of-Discretion Review

Note: This is a memorandum opinion designated noncitable under Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of the Montana Supreme Court’s Internal Operating Rules. It does not establish precedent and may not be cited. The commentary below analyzes the Court’s reasoning and its practical implications.

Introduction

This case arises from a neighborhood dispute in Helena that escalated into threatening conduct and culminated in a long-term civil order of protection. Inman v. Spreadbury (DA 25-0221; 2025 MT 236N) is a Montana Supreme Court memorandum decision affirming a 10-year order of protection issued by the Helena Municipal Court and affirmed by the First Judicial District Court (Lewis and Clark County). Both parties appeared pro se.

The dispute centers on a January 22, 2025 confrontation in which respondent–appellant Michael E. Spreadbury yelled at petitioner–appellee Austin Jorge Inman, followed him in town, and then parked outside Inman’s residence, brandishing a large piece of wood and stating, “if you fuck with me again I got this, all right, because I didn’t bring a gun today.” Inman recorded the encounter and later petitioned for a Temporary Order of Protection (TOP), which was continued and made long-term (10 years) after an evidentiary hearing.

On appeal, Spreadbury challenged the protective order, asserting among other arguments that the municipal court improperly relied on “stalking,” that he acted in self-defense and was the true victim, and that the Supreme Court should adopt his proposed “Spreadbury Test” for protective orders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no abuse of discretion in finding that the January 22 conduct constituted assault—specifically, causing reasonable apprehension of bodily injury—supporting the order of protection under Montana law.

Key issues addressed include:

Whether the municipal court abused its discretion in granting a 10-year order of protection based on assault under § 45-5-201(1)(d), MCA.
Whether stalking is required to obtain an order of protection (it is not).
The deference owed to trial courts on witness credibility and factfinding, particularly where video and live testimony are presented.

Summary of the Opinion

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s affirmance of the Helena Municipal Court’s order of protection. It concluded that the municipal court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Spreadbury’s conduct on January 22, 2025 met the statutory definition of assault—purposely or knowingly causing reasonable apprehension of bodily injury in another—under § 45-5-201(1)(d), MCA. The Court emphasized:

Orders of protection may be granted to victims of assault regardless of the relationship between the parties. See § 40-15-102(2), MCA.
The reasonable apprehension element is judged by an objective “reasonable person” standard, relying on State v. Vukasin and State v. McCarthy.
Trial courts receive substantial deference on witness credibility and evidentiary weight (State v. Barrus).
The district court correctly applied §§ 40-15-201 et seq., MCA, and the standard of review is abuse of discretion (Groenke v. Gabriel).
The municipal court did not base its ruling on stalking; a footnote expressly corrects Spreadbury’s contrary assertion.

Given these findings, the Court declined to address Spreadbury’s other arguments, including his proposed “Spreadbury Test,” because they were unnecessary to resolve the appeal.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Appellate pathway from municipal court and standard of review:
- §§ 3-5-303, 3-6-110, MCA: The district court acts as an intermediate appellate court when reviewing municipal court decisions; further review lies to the Montana Supreme Court.
- Fritzler v. Bighorn, 2024 MT 27, ¶ 7, 415 Mont. 165, 543 P.3d 571: The Supreme Court reviews district court decisions on municipal court appeals as if the appeal were originally filed in the Supreme Court.
Standard for reviewing protective orders—abuse of discretion:
- Groenke v. Gabriel, 2025 MT 91, ¶ 14, 421 Mont. 465, 571 P.3d 86: Decisions to continue, amend, or make permanent orders of protection are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- In re Marriage of Lockhead, 2013 MT 368, ¶ 12, 373 Mont. 120, 314 P.3d 915 (citing Newman v. Lichfield, 2012 MT 47): Abuse of discretion occurs when a court acts arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason.
Substantive basis for the order of protection—assault causing reasonable apprehension:
- § 40-15-102(2), MCA: Any person may petition for an order of protection if the person is a victim of assault, regardless of the relationship to the respondent.
- § 45-5-201(1)(d), MCA: Assault includes purposely or knowingly causing reasonable apprehension of bodily injury in another.
- State v. Vukasin, 2003 MT 230, ¶ 19, 317 Mont. 204, 75 P.3d 1284, quoting State v. McCarthy, 1999 MT 99, ¶ 27, 294 Mont. 270, 980 P.2d 629: The reasonable apprehension element is judged by a reasonable person under similar circumstances.
Deference to trial courts on credibility and evidentiary weight:
- State v. Barrus, 2025 MT 183, ¶ 33, 423 Mont. 391, 573 P.3d 1188: The fact-finder is best positioned to assess credibility based on demeanor and other intangibles observed live; appellate courts defer to those assessments.

Legal Reasoning and Application

The Court’s reasoning is linear and firmly grounded in settled law:

Framing the review: The Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s affirmance of the municipal court’s protective order under the abuse-of-discretion standard, as guided by Groenke and Fritzler. The Court did not revisit the case de novo on facts; its role was to ensure the municipal court acted within the bounds of reason and applied the correct legal framework.
Identifying the statutory basis: The Court confirmed that § 40-15-102(2), MCA permits protective orders for victims of assault, irrespective of any domestic or familial relationship. Importantly, via footnote 1, the Court clarified that stalking (§ 45-5-220, MCA) is not a required predicate; here the municipal court relied exclusively on assault.
Applying the assault standard: The municipal court found that Spreadbury’s conduct—yelling at Inman without provocation, appearing again in town exhibiting “rage,” then brandishing a large piece of wood while saying he didn’t “bring a gun”—caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury. Under § 45-5-201(1)(d), MCA, and the objective standard articulated in Vukasin and McCarthy, a reasonable person could certainly apprehend bodily injury in those circumstances.
Credibility determinations and the record: The municipal court heard multiple witnesses (including Inman and Spreadbury), viewed video evidence of the January 22 incident, and received documentary exhibits. Relying on Barrus, the Supreme Court deferred to the municipal court’s credibility judgments—especially where it credited Inman’s account that Spreadbury had been outside 713 Poplar before the Van’s parking lot encounter—consistent with the principle that the trial court is best positioned to weigh live testimony and demeanor.
Rejecting collateral arguments: Because the municipal court’s assault finding was sufficient, the Court declined to reach Spreadbury’s other arguments (e.g., claims of self-defense, references to unrelated disputes, and his proposed “Spreadbury Test” for protective orders). The Court also noted that no criminal charges were required as a predicate to a civil protective order; the civil standard and relief are independent of prosecutorial decisions.
Duration of the order: The municipal court’s decision to issue a 10-year order rested on findings that Spreadbury’s behavior was “erratic” and that he repeatedly engaged with Inman “without provocation,” both at Van’s and in the community. Given the abuse-of-discretion standard and the evidentiary support, the Supreme Court found no basis to disturb the duration selected by the municipal court.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although nonprecedential, the decision meaningfully reinforces several practical points for Montana protective-order litigation:

Assault (reasonable apprehension) suffices; stalking is not required. The footnote expressly correcting the appellant’s stalking premise may reduce confusion in future protective-order proceedings. Petitioners can ground relief on assault under § 45-5-201(1)(d) without proving a stalking pattern.
Video evidence can be pivotal. The municipal court reviewed a recording of the incident. Clear audiovisual evidence, particularly where threats and weapon-like objects are shown, can strongly support a finding of reasonable apprehension.
Appellate review is deferential and record-bound. Re-arguing facts on appeal rarely succeeds. Courts defer to the trial judge’s credibility determinations and evidentiary weighing, especially after live testimony.
Self-defense claims face hurdles in this context. A civil protective order focuses on whether the respondent’s conduct created reasonable apprehension of harm. Where the trial court finds the respondent was the aggressor and issued threats with an object (and referenced a firearm), assertions of self-defense are unlikely to prevail.
Lengthy orders are within the trial court’s discretion. The 10-year duration stands as an example of the breadth of remedial discretion where the record shows repeated, provocative conduct and credible risk.
Noncriminal disposition is not dispositive. The absence of criminal charges does not preclude a civil protective order. The civil protective remedy serves a preventive function, using a different legal standard and purpose than criminal law.

In aggregate, the opinion signals that Montana’s appellate courts will uphold well-reasoned, evidence-supported protective orders that rest on an objective fear of bodily injury—even in neighbor disputes and irrespective of stalking allegations—so long as the trial court applies the correct statutes and exercises conscientious judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Memorandum opinion (noncitable): A short-form appellate decision used when the case turns on settled law or clear application of standards. It cannot be cited as precedent and does not create new legal rules, but it reflects how the Court applies existing law to common fact patterns.
Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard. The question is not whether an appellate court would have reached a different result, but whether the trial court acted arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or beyond the bounds of reason. If the trial court heard evidence, weighed credibility, and grounded its decision in the statutes, affirmance usually follows.
Reasonable apprehension of bodily injury: An objective test. Would a reasonable person in the petitioner’s position fear bodily injury under the same circumstances? Threats coupled with menacing conduct—such as brandishing a large piece of wood and referencing a gun—typically satisfy this element.
Order of Protection vs. Temporary Order of Protection (TOP): A TOP is an interim measure issued quickly to prevent harm pending a hearing. After a hearing with evidence and testimony, the court may continue, amend, or issue a longer-term order of protection. The duration depends on statutory authority and judicial discretion guided by safety considerations and the evidentiary record.
Appellate path from municipal court: A municipal court’s decision is appealed to the district court, which acts as an intermediate appellate court. A further appeal goes to the Montana Supreme Court, which treats the matter as if originally filed there but still applies deferential review to trial-level discretionary decisions.
Civil protective orders and criminal charges: Civil protective orders aim to prevent harm and can be issued even if no criminal charges are filed. The civil process centers on protecting the petitioner, not punishing the respondent.

Conclusion

In this nonprecedential memorandum opinion, the Montana Supreme Court affirms a 10-year order of protection grounded in assault under § 45-5-201(1)(d), MCA. Applying settled law, the Court reiterates that:

Orders of protection may rest on assault causing reasonable apprehension—stalking is not required.
Trial courts are accorded substantial deference on credibility and evidence weighing, particularly where video corroborates testimony.
Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, well-reasoned protective orders supported by the record will be affirmed.

Although not citable as precedent, the opinion provides practical guidance: threatening, weapon-adjacent behavior and explicit references to firearms can readily establish reasonable apprehension for civil protective purposes; collateral disputes and self-defense claims are unlikely to overcome a trial court’s credible, evidence-supported findings. The decision underscores the judiciary’s commitment to preventive relief where the record demonstrates a real risk of harm, reinforcing the protective function of Montana’s civil order-of-protection framework.