No Special Forfeiture Exception for Pro Se Appellants: Fifth Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment and Flags Fabricated Citations in Scroggins v. City of Shreveport

Introduction

This Fifth Circuit decision in Scroggins v. City of Shreveport centers on a pro se Title VII appeal arising from the City’s denial of two bids for a Fire Engineer position and subsequent disciplinary actions. The case presents two overarching issues: first, whether a pro se appellant’s inadequate briefing and reliance on fabricated citations can result in forfeiture of arguments on appeal; and second, whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment on race and sex discrimination and retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework. A per curiam majority affirmed the district court on forfeiture grounds, while Judge Dennis dissented, urging remand in light of genuine factual disputes and the obligation to read pro se filings liberally.

The opinion offers an important practical reminder: appellate courts will enforce briefing rules even against pro se litigants, and fabricated authorities will undermine, rather than bolster, a party’s position. It also underscores that, to defeat summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must point to “competent summary judgment evidence” creating a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext—something the majority concluded Scroggins failed to do in her appellate briefing.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City of Shreveport on all of Felicia Scroggins’s Title VII claims. The per curiam majority held:

• Forfeiture by inadequate briefing: Scroggins, proceeding pro se on appeal, cited no relevant authority for her argument that the district court erred by ruling before she secured new counsel and, in several instances, cited fabricated cases. Under the Fifth Circuit’s forfeiture doctrine, arguments inadequately briefed or unsupported by authority are forfeited.
• Retaliation claims: The district court assumed, in Scroggins’s favor, that the challenged events were adverse employment actions, but Scroggins failed to identify record evidence of pretext sufficient to survive summary judgment. On appeal, she did not point the court to contrary record materials, thereby forfeiting any challenge to that determination.
• Discrimination claims: Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the district court concluded that although Scroggins made a prima facie case, the City articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decisions which Scroggins did not rebut with competent evidence. The majority held that her appellate briefing did not explain what was inadequate about that analysis.
• Right-to-sue letter: The court clarified that the district court did not “negate” Scroggins’s claims based on the EEOC right-to-sue letter; the court applied McDonnell Douglas to both discrimination and retaliation.

Judge Dennis dissented. He would vacate and remand, concluding that the record, viewed properly and with the leniency due to pro se filings, raises genuine disputes over pretext and causation. He also criticized the majority for applying forfeiture sua sponte when the City defended the judgment on the merits.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393 (5th Cir. 2021): Central to the majority’s approach, Rollins reaffirms that arguments inadequately briefed—such as those lacking pertinent authority or meaningful record citations—are forfeited on appeal. The majority relied on Rollins to reject Scroggins’s request for special “pro se protections” and to deem abandoned her insufficiently developed challenges to the district court’s analysis.
• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): The foundational burden-shifting framework for Title VII claims underlies both the district court’s analysis and the appellate review. The district court found that:
  • Scroggins established a prima facie case;
  • The City articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions; and
  • Scroggins failed to produce competent evidence of pretext.
  The majority affirmed because Scroggins’s appellate briefing did not adequately challenge those determinations with record citations. The dissent, by contrast, argued the record supported a triable pretext dispute.
• Saketkoo v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 31 F.4th 990 (5th Cir. 2022): Cited by the majority for applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation claims under Title VII, reinforcing that plaintiffs must adduce evidence of pretext once the employer offers a legitimate reason.
• Outley v. Luke & Associates, Inc., 840 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2016) and Haire v. Bd. of Supervisors of LSU A&M, 719 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2013): Both confirm McDonnell Douglas applies to Title VII race and sex discrimination claims, respectively. The district court’s use of this framework was not, in the majority’s view, meaningfully challenged on appeal.
• Dissent’s authorities:
  • Hager v. Brinker, 102 F.4th 692 (5th Cir. 2024), and Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Services, 551 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2008): The dissent quotes these to stress that at summary judgment, a plaintiff need only create a genuine dispute of material fact on pretext—not prove pretext conclusively.
  • Kendall v. Block, 821 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987): A plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating the employer’s explanation is “not worthy of credence.” The dissent invokes this standard to argue Scroggins’s evidence could lead a jury to disbelieve the City’s reasons.
  • Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632 (5th Cir. 2011): Restates McDonnell Douglas steps; used by the dissent to frame burden-shifting correctly.
  • Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824 (5th Cir. 2019), and Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 1995): Emphasize liberal construction of pro se filings and some tolerance for Rule 28 technical noncompliance when the appellant identifies district court error. The dissent argues Scroggins’s brief met that standard.
• Misplaced or fabricated citations: The majority notes that several cases Scroggins cited either did not stand for the propositions claimed (e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, Fowler v. Smith, and the Seventh Circuit’s Jones v. City of Chicago) or appear to be fabricated entirely. This bolstered the forfeiture ruling.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in two tracks—procedural forfeiture and, alternatively, the sufficiency of Scroggins’s challenges under McDonnell Douglas:

• Forfeiture and pro se status: The court rejected Scroggins’s contention that she was entitled to “specific protections” as a pro se litigant, noting she cited no relevant authority and, indeed, proffered fabricated citations. The Fifth Circuit applied its standard forfeiture rule: arguments not adequately briefed or supported by authority and record citations are forfeited on appeal. The panel also highlighted that the district court did not prematurely rule; it permitted multiple extensions after counsel withdrew, including a final extension to September 5, 2024, before granting summary judgment on November 13, 2024.
• Retaliation: Addressing Scroggins’s complaint that the district court failed to recognize the broader scope of retaliatory “adverse employment actions” (i.e., actions that might deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity), the majority pointed out that the district court assumed—favorably to Scroggins—that all three incidents she identified qualified as adverse actions. The barrier at summary judgment, the court held, was Scroggins’s failure to produce competent evidence of pretext and her failure on appeal to identify record evidence undermining the City’s reasons.
• Discrimination: Under McDonnell Douglas, the district court found that the City offered legitimate reasons for its choices in the Station 22 promotions and that Scroggins did not carry her burden to create a genuine dispute of pretext. On appeal, the majority concluded that Scroggins did not explain why that analysis was inadequate, again resulting in forfeiture.
• Right-to-sue letter: The majority rejected Scroggins’s argument that the district court treated the EEOC right-to-sue letter as negating her claims; the court clarified that the district court evaluated the claims under McDonnell Douglas and did not rely on the letter to dispose of them.

In dissent, Judge Dennis argued the summary judgment record contains evidence from which a jury could disbelieve the City’s stated reasons—e.g., alleged violations of internal bidding rules favoring a white male candidate; post-hoc alterations to scoring criteria; disparate training opportunities; and a timeline suggesting close temporal proximity between an initial EEOC charge and adverse employment decisions. He further contended that pro se appellate briefing, read liberally, sufficiently identified errors in the district court’s McDonnell Douglas analysis and treatment of causation in the retaliation claim, and that the majority should not have invoked forfeiture sua sponte when the City briefed the merits.

Impact

This decision reinforces several practical and doctrinal points likely to influence future cases:

• Forfeiture applies equally to pro se appellants: The Fifth Circuit will enforce briefing requirements—including the need to cite relevant authority and to direct the court to the record—regardless of pro se status. Liberal construction does not equate to the court doing the litigant’s work on appeal.
• Fabricated citations are fatal, not helpful: The court’s express identification of fake case citations is a cautionary signal. Litigants—and counsel—must verify authorities. Use of non-existent cases will damage credibility and can expedite forfeiture.
• Pretext must be supported by “competent summary judgment evidence” and pinpoint citations: Even where a plaintiff makes a prima facie case, failure to identify record evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to disbelieve the employer’s reasons will result in summary judgment. On appeal, failure to steer the court to those materials will result in affirmance.
• Retaliation: adversity and causation remain distinct: Courts may assume adversity in close cases, but plaintiffs must still prove causation and pretext. Absent record-based arguments showing those elements, claims will fail at summary judgment.
• Extensions and counsel withdrawal: The timeline here shows district courts have broad discretion to manage calendars. Multiple extensions were afforded; the appellate court found no error in proceeding to decide the fully briefed motion after reasonable opportunities to secure substitute counsel.
• Dissent signals ongoing tension over pro se leniency: Judge Dennis’s dissent may encourage future appellants to argue that liberal construction and the presence of record-supported disputes warrant merits review despite imperfect briefing. But the controlling takeaway is that the majority’s forfeiture approach—rooted in Rollins—prevails unless and until the court en banc revisits the issue.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Forfeiture vs. waiver: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; forfeiture is the loss of a right by failing to timely assert it. In appellate practice, an argument is often “forfeited” if not properly briefed with legal authorities and record citations, even if not intentionally abandoned.
• Pro se leniency: Courts “liberally construe” filings from parties without lawyers to understand their arguments. But litigants still must comply with the core requirements of appellate briefing, including citing authority and the record.
• McDonnell Douglas framework: A burden-shifting method used in discrimination and retaliation cases:
  1. Plaintiff makes a prima facie case (showing facts that, if unexplained, suggest discrimination or retaliation).
  2. Employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.
  3. Plaintiff must show that reason is a pretext—a cover for discrimination or retaliation—using competent evidence such that a reasonable jury could disbelieve the employer.
• Competent summary judgment evidence: Evidence that would be admissible at trial (e.g., sworn declarations, deposition excerpts, authenticated documents) and that is presented with enough specificity to create a triable fact dispute.
• Adverse employment action in retaliation: In the retaliation context, “adverse action” broadly covers employer conduct that might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. But plaintiffs still must establish causation and pretext.
• “Not worthy of credence”: A way of proving pretext by showing inconsistencies, implausibilities, or shifts in the employer’s explanation that could lead a jury to disbelieve it.
• Sua sponte application of forfeiture: When a court raises forfeiture or related procedural bars on its own, even if the opposing party does not press the issue. The dissent criticized that here; the majority nonetheless applied forfeiture principles.

Additional Context from the Dissent

Judge Dennis emphasized evidence he believed created genuine disputes of material fact:

• First Fire Engineer bid (Station 22): City’s explanation that it chose a white male (Hayes) for his “pre-plan” maintenance experience was allegedly contradicted by statements from the department’s IT specialist and the station captain indicating Hayes lacked pre-plan experience. The dissent also cites evidence that internal policy barred paramedics from bidding on non-paramedic posts unless all paramedic slots were filled.
• Second bid: The selected white male comparator (Standridge) allegedly scored 38%—below a passing threshold—and the Fire Department later changed scoring criteria to justify the award. Scroggins also presented evidence that she was denied training shifts at the station while the comparator trained for months.
• Retaliation timeframe: The dissent contends the district court artificially narrowed the causation window by focusing only on an October 5, 2015 EEOC amendment, ignoring that Scroggins filed her initial EEOC charge on July 24, 2015, followed by September 2015 job denials and related conduct. In the dissent’s view, this chronology supports a causal chain and a jury question.
• Pro se briefing leniency: Citing Grant and Coleman, the dissent argued Scroggins’s brief “at least argues some error,” warranting merits review rather than forfeiture.

The dissent would vacate and remand for further proceedings on both the discrimination and retaliation claims.

Practice Pointers

• Verify every citation; never rely on unverified authorities. Courts are increasingly vigilant about fabricated citations.
• On appeal, tie each argument to specific record citations and relevant legal authorities. Absent that, even strong factual records may be lost to forfeiture.
• When challenging summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas, marshal “competent” evidence aimed at pretext—policy deviations, comparator evidence, shifting explanations, timing, and denial of training opportunities—then cite precisely where each appears in the record.
• Pro se litigants receive liberal construction, not a pass on briefing standards. Consider seeking appellate counsel, but do not delay filing a thorough, citation-supported brief.
• Do not assume a right-to-sue letter strengthens or weakens the merits; courts will still apply McDonnell Douglas to assess the substantive claims.

Conclusion

Scroggins v. City of Shreveport is best read as a stringent reassertion of appellate forfeiture doctrine in the Fifth Circuit and a cautionary tale about the use of fabricated citations. The per curiam majority did not engage the merits in depth; instead, it affirmed because Scroggins’s appellate briefing failed to supply relevant legal authority and record citations sufficient to challenge the district court’s McDonnell Douglas determinations. The court also made clear that pro se status does not relax those core requirements.

The dissent underscores a countervailing view: that the record reflects genuine factual disputes on pretext and retaliation causation and that pro se briefs should be read liberally to reach the merits. While that view may influence future panels, the controlling lesson from this case is clear: appellate arguments live or die by disciplined briefing and reliable authorities. For Title VII litigants, this decision reinforces the imperative to present competent, pinpoint-cited evidence of pretext and to avoid procedural pitfalls that foreclose merits review.