No Shortcuts After Alston: Seventh Circuit Requires Independent Market Proof and Competitive Harm for NCAA Eligibility Challenges

Introduction

In Nyzier Fourqurean v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Seventh Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction that would have barred the NCAA from enforcing its “Five-Year Rule” to prevent a University of Wisconsin–Madison football player from competing in a fifth collegiate season. The case sits at the intersection of antitrust law and the rapidly evolving economics of college sports following NCAA v. Alston (2021) and the post-Alston name, image, and likeness (NIL) revolution—including a 2025 settlement authorizing revenue sharing by Division I schools.

The core legal issue was whether, at the preliminary injunction stage, a student-athlete challenging an NCAA eligibility rule under Sherman Act § 1 must independently define the relevant market and present evidence of likely anticompetitive effects. The district court had relied on Alston to treat “men’s Division I FBS football” as the relevant market and found that excluding experienced athletes at the height of their NIL value likely caused anticompetitive effects. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that Alston did not resolve market definition and that individual exclusion, without more, does not establish likely harm to competition.

Judge St. Eve authored the majority opinion (joined by Judge Kolar). Judge Ripple dissented, emphasizing deference to the district court’s urgent preliminary injunction decision, recognizing Division I football as the relevant labor market, and viewing the Five-Year Rule as suppressing competition and NIL compensation by removing the most experienced players.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of a preliminary injunction. Applying the rule of reason, the court held that:

Alston did not decide market definition; plaintiffs must independently define the relevant market in each case.
At the preliminary injunction stage, a plaintiff must do more than offer conclusory allegations; the showing is more searching than at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Mere exclusion of a single athlete from participation is not, by itself, evidence of anticompetitive effects; the plaintiff must connect the restraint to harm to competition (e.g., reduced output, depressed wages, or harm to rivals) in a properly defined market.
Quick-look approval is not appropriate; although some rules necessary to “produce the game” may qualify, the NCAA did not show that the Five-Year Rule is necessary in that sense.
On the current record, the plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits; the court encouraged expedited merits proceedings and noted internal NCAA waiver mechanisms that could mitigate hardship.

The dissent would have affirmed, concluding that Division I football is a cognizable labor market in which the NCAA wields monopsony power and that the Five-Year Rule likely reduces competition by excluding the most experienced players and depressing NIL compensation, with no persuasive procompetitive justification.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021): The majority emphasizes that Alston did not decide market definition. In Alston, the parties did not contest the district court’s defined market (“athletic services in men’s and women’s Division I basketball and FBS football”), so the Supreme Court “observed” (but did not hold) that the NCAA possessed monopsony power there. The Seventh Circuit thus rejects the district court’s reliance on Alston as if it had pre-defined a market for future cases. Alston also rejected “product feature” relabeling to evade § 1 scrutiny and left open quick-look approval for rules necessary to “produce the game” (e.g., players on the field, time rules)—a narrow category not shown to include the Five-Year Rule.
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984): Board of Regents struck down NCAA television restrictions and discussed amateurism values. Pre-Alston, some courts read its language as support for presumptive procompetitiveness for rules linked to amateurism. The majority reads Alston as limiting that approach; generalized “amateurism” justifications do not insulate rules from § 1 scrutiny. Any quick-look approval turns on necessity to produce the game, not broad appeals to amateurism.
Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012): Agnew suggested eligibility rules might be “essential” to the product of college sports. The majority narrows that suggestion post-Alston, cautioning against treating eligibility bylaws as presumptively procompetitive. The dissent relies on Agnew to accept Division I football as a labor market subject to antitrust scrutiny.
Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979): These cases frame the three antitrust modes—per se, quick-look, and full rule of reason—and emphasize tailoring the analysis to the restraint’s economic logic. The majority applies ordinary rule of reason; quick-look approval is unwarranted.
Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery, 472 U.S. 284 (1985); Jefferson Parish v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), abrogated on other grounds; Roland Machinery v. Dresser, 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); Dentsply, 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005); Fashion Originators’ Guild, 312 U.S. 457 (1941): These decisions supply the majority’s template for evaluating exclusionary restraints: plaintiffs must show market definition, market power, and a causal link between the restraint and harm to competition—often by showing how the restraint creates, protects, or enhances dominance or suppresses rivals. The majority faults Fourqurean for focusing solely on his own exclusion without connecting it to market-wide harm or harm to rivals.
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940): Underscores that § 1 targets restraints that affect price/output or deprive consumers of the benefits of competition. The majority uses this to insist on evidence of competitive harm beyond individual hardship.
Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Nichols v. Spencer International Press, 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967): The dissent draws on these labor-market cases to highlight antitrust scrutiny of employer-side restraints (blacklisting in Radovich; no-switching agreements in Nichols). The majority distinguishes these lines because Fourqurean did not tie the eligibility rule to foreclosure of rivals or demonstrable wage suppression.
Doe v. Univ. of Southern Indiana, 43 F.4th 784 (7th Cir. 2022); Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008): The majority reiterates that the preliminary injunction standard demands a neutral, evidence-sensitive assessment and is more demanding than a motion to dismiss; likelihood of success on the merits must be shown with record support.

2) Legal Reasoning

The court structures its analysis around the rule of reason and the preliminary injunction standard:

Mode of analysis: Both sides accepted rule-of-reason review. The NCAA gestured toward “quick-look” approval by urging presumptive procompetitiveness for eligibility rules, but the court rejected this: under Alston, only restraints necessary to “produce the game” might be eligible for quick-look approval, and the Five-Year Rule is not such a rule. College football can proceed without it; the NCAA offered no evidence that teams would disband absent the rule.
Market definition: The court holds that Alston did not define the market for future cases. Because Fourqurean made no independent market showing, he failed the first essential step. The majority underscores that preliminary injunctions require more than notice-pleading; conclusory assertions of “dominant position” will not suffice at this stage.
Anticompetitive effects: The majority insists on evidence linking the restraint to market harm (reduced output, increased price, or wage suppression) in the defined market, often by showing foreclosure of rivals or enhanced dominance. Fourqurean’s proof consisted of his own exclusion. That is insufficient: § 1 does not condemn all exclusionary effects. The court notes the economic intuition that reducing the supply of labor tends to raise, not lower, wages—distinguishing this rule from no-poach restrictions that suppress mobility and reduce employer competition for labor. On the current record, there is no evidence of wage suppression or harm to rivals.
Preliminary injunction posture: The court “starts and ends” with likelihood of success; because Fourqurean did not show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the injunction should not have issued. The panel nevertheless encourages expedited merits proceedings and flags the NCAA’s internal legislative-relief process as a potential interim avenue.

3) The Dissent’s Counter-Framework

Judge Ripple would affirm. His key points:

Deference and urgency: Appellate courts should defer to district judges who act under extreme time pressure in preliminary injunction settings and should weigh the harms of reversal. Here, reversal may cost an athlete a non-recoverable season; the NCAA identified no countervailing harm.
Labor-market focus: Division I football is a cognizable labor market (Agnew), and the NCAA has monopsony power there. The Five-Year Rule suppresses competition by excluding the most experienced, marketable athletes, thereby depressing NIL compensation and degrading product quality (a competition dimension), harming athletes and related industries (e.g., broadcast).
Weak procompetitive justifications: The NCAA’s linkage of eligibility to academic progression is undermined by its transfer rules, NIL commercialization, and broad age exceptions (e.g., for military or mission service). If older athletes can play via those exceptions, the NCAA’s asserted “youthfulness” rationale is ill-fitted to the rule’s design.
Irreparable harm: Lost eligibility, development, and NIL opportunities cannot be adequately monetized ex post. The athlete acted promptly; delay is no bar.

4) Impact and Significance

This decision is the first federal appellate opinion post-Alston squarely addressing antitrust challenges to NCAA eligibility restrictions. It sets meaningful ground rules:

No “market definition by Alston.” Plaintiffs cannot rely on Alston’s uncontested market description. Each case requires an independent market analysis, with evidence appropriate to the procedural posture.
Preliminary injunctions require evidence, not pleadings. Conclusory assertions of NCAA dominance are insufficient. Expect courts to demand economic support—e.g., labor-market delineation (employer substitutability, geographic/functional scope), measures of market power, and evidence of output or wage effects or rival foreclosure.
Eligibility rules are not presumptively procompetitive. After Alston, “amateurism” does not confer a blanket presumption. Quick-look approval is reserved for rules necessary to the game’s existence (e.g., rules of play), not general eligibility windows.
Labor-market theory must be developed. Plaintiffs challenging eligibility limits as buyer-side restraints must show how the rule depresses wages/NIL or harms competition—e.g., by limiting mobility, facilitating collusion, or foreclosing rival leagues. The majority’s “reduced labor supply tends to raise wages” observation puts the burden on plaintiffs to explain contrary mechanisms (for example, that the rules coordinate buyer conduct to cap total compensation budgets and shift surplus away from late-career athletes, or that removal of experienced players reduces bargaining leverage league-wide).
Immediate litigation strategy. Student-athletes seeking preliminary relief against eligibility limits will need:
- Rigorous labor-market definition (which employers and leagues compete for their services; whether non-NCAA options are reasonable substitutes; the role of revenue-sharing and NIL in making NCAA opportunities non-substitutable);
- Evidence of market power and effects (wage/NIL data, roster composition, transfer portal dynamics, elasticity of substitution, effects on product quality and broadcast output);
- Mechanisms tying the rule to depressed compensation or rival foreclosure;
- Rebuttals to “necessary to produce the game” and to asserted educational justifications, including mismatch between rule design and stated goals.
District court split likely to narrow. Several district courts granted preliminary injunctions against aspects of the Five-Year Rule (e.g., Pavia; Elad), while another denied relief (Goldstein). This appellate decision will likely make preliminary relief harder within the Seventh Circuit and persuasive elsewhere, especially on market proof and the inapplicability of Alston as a shortcut.
Policy and governance. The panel’s nod to the NCAA’s Committee for Legislative Relief signals judicial preference for tailored administrative accommodations while merits litigation proceeds—particularly where individualized hardship is compelling but market-wide harm is unproven at an early stage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule of reason: A case-by-case analysis asked by the Sherman Act to determine if a restraint harms competition. Plaintiffs must show anticompetitive effects in a defined market; defendants may then justify the restraint as procompetitive; plaintiffs can still prevail by proving less restrictive alternatives.
Per se vs. quick look: Per se rules condemn obvious restraints (e.g., price fixing) without detailed analysis. Quick look is abbreviated analysis for restraints whose effects are obvious but not per se. The court held quick look does not apply to the Five-Year Rule.
Relevant market: The arena of meaningful competition. In labor markets, it is the set of employers who are reasonable substitutes from workers’ perspective. Plaintiffs need to supply this definition with evidence.
Monopsony power: Market power on the buying side (here, schools buying athletes’ services). It allows buyers to depress wages below competitive levels; proving it requires a defined market and share/power evidence.
Exclusionary restraints: Agreements that exclude competitors or suppliers. Antitrust law asks whether such restraints entrench dominance or harm market competition—not merely whether one person is excluded.
No-poach vs. supply restriction: No-poach agreements restrict employers from competing for each other’s workers, which can depress wages. A pure reduction in the total number of eligible workers (a supply restriction) can, by standard economics, increase wages for remaining workers; plaintiffs must show why a specific rule instead suppresses pay or harms competition.
Preliminary injunction standard: A plaintiff must show likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, favorable balance of equities, and that the injunction serves the public interest. Courts at this stage do not accept allegations as true but assess likely merits on an emerging record.

Conclusion

Fourqurean v. NCAA marks a pivotal doctrinal clarification in post-Alston antitrust challenges to NCAA eligibility rules. The Seventh Circuit definitively holds that Alston did not settle market definition and that plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief must shoulder a meaningful evidentiary burden: define the relevant market, show market power, and tie the restraint to likely anticompetitive effects beyond individual exclusion. The court declines to extend quick-look deference to eligibility rules untethered to the basic production of the game and underscores that generalized appeals to “amateurism” or “collegiate identity” cannot short-circuit § 1 analysis.

For future litigants, the decision recalibrates strategy. Plaintiffs must foreground rigorous labor-market economics and demonstrate mechanisms by which eligibility constraints suppress wages/NIL or foreclose rivals. Defendants can no longer rely on broad, pre-Alston presumptions but may still succeed by emphasizing the absence of market harm on incomplete early records. As NIL revenue sharing becomes entrenched and labor-market data become richer, the evidentiary landscape may shift. For now, the appellate message is clear: no shortcuts on market proof or competitive effects—especially at the preliminary injunction stage.

Key Takeaways

Alston does not define relevant markets for future NCAA antitrust cases; plaintiffs must prove market definition anew.
At the preliminary injunction stage, evidence—not pleadings—must show likely anticompetitive effects.
Individual exclusion is insufficient; plaintiffs must link eligibility rules to market-wide harm (e.g., wage suppression, output reduction, or rival foreclosure).
Quick-look approval is limited to rules necessary to “produce the game”; eligibility windows do not qualify on this record.
The door remains open on a fuller record; expedited merits discovery is encouraged, and NCAA administrative relief may provide interim remedies.