No Second Bite at the Apple: Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms Broad Discretion to Deny Post‑Judgment Amendments that Unduly Prejudice Defendants

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in Richard Rose v. Secretary of State of the State of Georgia, No. 25‑11233 (11th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025), a follow‑on appeal in a high‑profile Voting Rights Act challenge to Georgia’s method of electing members of its Public Service Commission (“PSC”).

Four Black Georgia voters – Richard Rose, Brionte McCorkle, Wanda Mosley, and James Major Woodall – originally sued the Georgia Secretary of State contending that the statewide, at‑large method of electing PSC commissioners unlawfully diluted Black voting strength in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”). After extensive litigation and a bench trial, the district court ruled in their favor and enjoined the statewide system. The Secretary appealed, and in 2023 the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiffs lacked a legally viable § 2 theory because they had not proposed a satisfactory remedial plan that met the first Gingles precondition.

Once the appellate mandate issued, the plaintiffs attempted to amend their complaint to introduce new remedial theories and thereby resurrect their § 2 claim. The district court refused to permit amendment and entered judgment for the Secretary. The plaintiffs appealed again, arguing they should be allowed to amend under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), 59(e), or 60(b).

The 2025 decision analyzed here does not revisit the merits of the Voting Rights Act claim. Instead, it addresses a procedural but highly consequential question: when, if ever, may a plaintiff radically re‑plead a case – including new theories of remedy – after having fully litigated, lost on appeal, and received an adverse mandate? The Eleventh Circuit affirms the denial of leave to amend, emphasizing the district court’s broad discretion and focusing on the “undue prejudice” that a late‑stage amendment would inflict on the defendant.

Although marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and therefore non‑precedential under Eleventh Circuit rules, the opinion is instructive. It reinforces several significant principles:

• Leave to amend is not automatic, even under Rule 15(a)’s liberal standard.
• District courts may deny post‑judgment amendments when they would cause substantial prejudice to defendants, especially after years of intensive litigation.
• Plaintiffs are not entitled to a “second bite at the apple” by advancing new legal or remedial theories only after an appellate loss.
• The Supreme Court’s decision in Pullman-Standard v. Swint does not require district courts to permit amendment in this posture.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Institutional Background

The Georgia PSC is a five‑member body that regulates public utilities. It is described as “quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial,” with responsibilities including:

• Administering federal funds for pipeline safety,
• Setting utility rates, and
• Adjudicating rate disputes.

Each commissioner must reside in one of five PSC geographic districts, but commissioners are elected by a statewide, at‑large vote rather than by voters solely within their district.

The plaintiffs alleged that this system diluted Black voters’ influence statewide in violation of Section 2 of the VRA and proposed a single remedy: converting the PSC elections from statewide, at‑large elections to single‑member district elections (i.e., each district electing its own commissioner by district‑only voting).

B. The First Appeal: Failure of the § 2 Theory

In Rose v. Secretary, State of Georgia, 87 F.4th 469 (11th Cir. 2023), the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment for the plaintiffs. The panel held that:

1. A § 2 vote dilution claim is governed by the three Gingles preconditions from Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
2. The first Gingles precondition – that the minority group be sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a “reasonably configured district” – implies a requirement that plaintiffs “offer a satisfactory remedial plan,” citing Wright v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Registration, 979 F.3d 1282, 1302 (11th Cir. 2020).
3. The plaintiffs’ only proposed remedy was a “single, dramatic remedy—transforming a statewide voting system into a single-member districted plan,” which the court found unsatisfactory as a remedial plan under § 2.

Because the plaintiffs did not offer a legally viable remedial plan, they failed the first Gingles precondition, and thus their entire § 2 claim failed. There were no remaining, unaddressed claims or theories.

C. The Post‑Mandate Motion to Amend

The appellate mandate issued on July 18, 2024. That same day, the plaintiffs:

• Requested leave in the district court to amend their complaint under Rule 15, and
• Filed a proposed amended complaint challenging the same PSC election method but now offering “several new proposed remedies” that they argued would satisfy Gingles.

On July 22, the district court formally entered judgment for the Secretary by adopting the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for relief from judgment under Rules 59 and 60(b), again seeking the ability to amend.

The district court rejected their effort, finding that:

• The plaintiffs had unduly delayed seeking to amend,
• Allowing amendment would unduly prejudice the Secretary, and
• The proposed amendment would be futile.

D. Issues on Second Appeal

On the second appeal, the plaintiffs contended that they should be permitted to amend their complaint regardless of which rule governs:

• Rule 15(a) (liberal amendment standard),
• Rule 59(e) (altering or amending judgment), or
• Rule 60(b) (relief from judgment).

The Secretary responded that the plaintiffs could not satisfy even Rule 15(a), the most lenient standard.

E. Holding

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend. Applying an abuse‑of‑discretion standard, the panel:

• Assumed without deciding that Rule 15(a) applied (the most favorable framework for plaintiffs).
• Held that under Rule 15(a) the district court acted within its discretion to deny leave based on undue prejudice to the Secretary.
• Rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on Pullman-Standard v. Swint as a basis to require further proceedings or leave to amend.

The court concluded that, after “years of litigation” culminating in a complete appellate rejection of their theory, the plaintiffs could not reconfigure their case by adding new remedial theories at that late stage. The decision underscores that the district court’s interest in finality and fairness to the defendant outweighed the plaintiffs’ desire to salvage their lawsuit.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Posture and Why It Matters

This appeal sits at the intersection of voting rights and civil procedure. Critically, the case was not at an early or mid‑litigation stage. By the time the plaintiffs sought to amend:

• The complaint had been on file since July 2020;
• The parties had completed extensive fact and expert discovery;
• Multiple dispositive motions (including summary judgment) had been litigated;
• A five‑day bench trial had taken place, with testimony from three experts and all PSC commissioners;
• The district court had issued a merits ruling and a permanent injunction;
• The Eleventh Circuit had reversed, holding the plaintiffs’ theory legally deficient; and
• The appellate mandate had issued, leaving only entry of final judgment in favor of the Secretary.

In this procedural posture, the plaintiffs’ attempt to amend was not a routine mid‑case refinement. It was an effort to fundamentally restructure the case after full litigation and an adverse appellate decision. That context drives the court’s emphasis on prejudice, finality, and the limits of liberal amendment policy.

B. Standards for Amending Pleadings After Judgment

1. Rule 15(a): Liberal Amendment, but Not an Absolute Right

Rule 15(a)(1) permits one amendment “as a matter of course” within 21 days after service of an answer or certain motions. That period had long since expired (by 2021). Thereafter, under Rule 15(a)(2):

“a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”

However, as the Eleventh Circuit reiterated:

“Amending a complaint is not an automatic right.” – Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008).

Citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), the court again acknowledged well‑established grounds for denying leave:

• Undue delay,
• Undue prejudice to the opposing party,
• Futility of amendment, among others.

The Eleventh Circuit has consistently treated these as legitimate bases for district courts to withhold leave to amend even where Rule 15(a)’s general policy favors liberal amendment.

2. Rules 59(e) and 60(b): Post‑Judgment Relief

Once final judgment is entered, many circuits—including the Eleventh—often require that the judgment be altered under Rule 59(e) or relieved under Rule 60(b) before an amendment can proceed. The opinion notes:

• Motions under Rule 59(e) and 60(b) are also reviewed for abuse of discretion, citing Shuford v. Fidelity Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2007) and Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 628 (11th Cir. 2014).

However, the panel intentionally sidesteps the thorny doctrinal question of which standard formally governs at this stage. Instead, it assumes arguendo that the plaintiffs get the benefit of the most generous standard – Rule 15(a) – and still lose because of undue prejudice.

This is an important methodological move: by assuming the most plaintiff‑friendly rule applies and affirming nonetheless, the court leaves untouched (and unresolved) any deeper tension between Rule 15 and post‑judgment standards. The opinion is therefore deliberately narrow but highly practical: even under the best possible procedural lens for plaintiffs, the district court’s denial stands.

C. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Rose v. Secretary, State of Georgia, 87 F.4th 469 (11th Cir. 2023)

The 2023 Rose decision is central. It provides the legal backdrop that makes the plaintiffs’ attempted amendment so significant. In that earlier appeal, the Eleventh Circuit:

• Held that plaintiffs bringing § 2 vote dilution claims must satisfy the three Gingles preconditions.
• Emphasized that the first Gingles precondition now includes a requirement that plaintiffs “offer a satisfactory remedial plan.”
• Concluded that the plaintiffs’ sole proposed remedy—overhauling the election system from statewide at‑large to district-based single‑member districts for the PSC—was not a “satisfactory remedial plan.”
• Therefore held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a cognizable § 2 claim, and reversed the district court’s injunction.

The effect of the 2023 decision was not a narrow evidentiary correction; it was a complete rejection of the plaintiffs’ theory of liability under § 2 as they had chosen to plead and prove it.

2. Thornburg v. Gingles and Allen v. Milligan

The 2025 opinion reiterates the classical framework for § 2 vote dilution claims from Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and quotes Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 18 (2023), for the formulation of the first Gingles precondition:

“the minority group must be sufficiently large and [geographically] compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district.”

The panel links this precondition to the need for a “satisfactory remedial plan,” relying on Wright v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Registration, 979 F.3d 1282, 1302 (11th Cir. 2020). Thus, even in this procedural appeal, the earlier substantive voting‑rights doctrine frames why the plaintiffs now want to amend: they are trying to fix the remedial defect illuminated by Rose (2023).

3. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962)

Foman is the foundational Supreme Court case on leave to amend under Rule 15. It held that leave should be “freely given” unless there is a legitimate reason to deny it, such as:

• Undue delay,
• Bad faith,
• Repeated failure to cure deficiencies,
• Undue prejudice, or
• Futility.

The Eleventh Circuit invokes Foman as the doctrinal anchor for recognizing “undue prejudice” as a valid, independent ground for denying leave to amend.

4. Eleventh Circuit Amendment Cases: Reese and Maynard

The court relies heavily on its own precedents interpreting and applying Foman:

• Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that a district court may deny leave to amend based on undue delay, prejudice, or futility, and that courts have inherent power to manage litigation by doing so.
• Maynard v. Board of Regents of Div. of Univs. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ. ex rel. Univ. of S. Fla., 342 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2003), where the court affirmed denial of leave to amend before trial because allowing amendment at the end of discovery would cause undue prejudice by forcing the defendant to re‑open discovery and incur additional costs.

By analogy, the panel reasons that if prejudice justified denial of amendment at the end of discovery but before trial in Maynard, then a fortiori prejudice justifies denial:

• After full discovery,
• After a full bench trial,
• After an appeal and reversal, and
• After issuance of the appellate mandate.

5. Abuse‑of‑Discretion Cases: Burger King, Shuford, Arthur

The panel cites:

• Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999) for the general rule that denials of leave to amend are reviewed for abuse of discretion;
• Shuford and Arthur for abuse‑of‑discretion review of Rule 59(e) and 60(b) motions, respectively.

These citations emphasize that the appellate court’s role is not to substitute its judgment de novo, but to ask only whether the district court’s decision was within a broad range of permissible choices. That deference substantially strengthens the case for affirmance here.

6. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)

The plaintiffs argued that Pullman-Standard required further proceedings – and implicitly, an opportunity to amend – because the original district court decision allegedly rested on an “erroneous view of the law.” They relied on the Supreme Court’s statement:

“When an appellate court discerns that a district court has failed to make a finding because of an erroneous view of the law, the usual rule is that there should be a remand for further proceedings to permit the trial court to make the missing findings.” (emphasis added).

The Eleventh Circuit rejects this argument on two grounds:

1. Pullman-Standard articulates a “usual rule,” not a mandatory command. It describes typical appellate practice when factual findings are missing due to legal error, not an ironclad obligation.
2. Pullman-Standard governs appellate procedure, not district‑court discretion on amendments. It instructs appellate courts on how to handle incomplete factual findings; it says nothing about whether a district court must permit amendment after judgment and appeal.

Thus, Pullman-Standard does not alter the district court’s discretion under Rule 15, nor does it create a right for plaintiffs to re‑plead their case after losing on appeal.

D. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Detail

1. Undue Prejudice to the Secretary

The panel’s core holding is that allowing amendment at this stage would “severely prejudice the Secretary.” The opinion details several categories of prejudice:

1. Reopened Discovery – The district court would have to reopen discovery to allow plaintiffs to develop a record to support their “new allegations” and newly proposed remedial plans. This would compel:
   • New depositions,
   • New document production,
   • Likely retention of new experts on both sides.
2. Additional Motions Practice – The new theories would almost certainly generate:
   • Fresh motions to dismiss,
   • New summary judgment motions,
   • New evidentiary motions (motions in limine), and related briefing.
3. Potential Retrial – The parties might need to “spend considerable resources to retry the case,” because the operative legal and factual questions would significantly change with the new remedial theories.

The court also notes an additional complication: the plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint alleges that Georgia’s “existing” method of electing PSC members violates the VRA. If the “existing” method has changed since the original 2020 filing, that would require litigating:

• Whether the method has, in fact, changed,
• Whether the three‑year‑old trial record remains current, and
• Whether new, more timely evidence must be developed and presented.

All of this, the court concludes, constitutes “significant” prejudice to the Secretary and squarely justifies denial of leave under Foman and Maynard.

2. Judicial Economy vs. Prejudice

The plaintiffs argued that judicial economy favored allowing amendment in this existing case rather than forcing a separate, future lawsuit. The court responds in two ways:

1. Judicial economy is a general policy; prejudice is a concrete harm. The court holds that “general policy concern[s]” about efficiency “do not refute the specific prejudice that the Secretary would face,” which is a sufficient, standalone ground for denial.
2. Speculative future litigation is not a sound basis to override present prejudice. The panel notes:
   • The plaintiffs “do not specify who would bring this hypothetical new case.”
   • If the same plaintiffs brought a new suit, they would face substantial hurdles under the doctrine of claim preclusion (res judicata).
   • No specific alternative plaintiffs are identified who could bring a new case immune from preclusion concerns.

Thus, the court declines to prioritize hypothetical efficiency in possible future litigation over the concrete, immediate prejudice that amendment would cause the Secretary.

3. Inherent Power to Manage Litigation

Citing Reese, the court observes that a district court may use its “inherent power to manage the conduct of litigation” by denying leave to amend when the amendment would result in undue prejudice. This reinforces the idea that case management, finality, and fairness to both parties are legitimate institutional interests that can outweigh the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15.

4. No Entitlement to a Second Merits Round

A key theme of the opinion is that the plaintiffs had already fully litigated their chosen theory:

• They selected a particular theory of liability and remedy under § 2.
• They litigated that theory from complaint through trial and appeal.
• The Eleventh Circuit definitively rejected that theory as legally non‑viable.

To then allow amendment to present new remedial plans – effectively a new theory of how § 2 could be violated and remedied – would give plaintiffs a “second bite at the apple” after the first bite failed. The court implicitly views this as inconsistent with basic principles of finality and fair notice to defendants about the case they must defend.

E. Impact and Implications

1. For Future Voting Rights Act Litigation

Even though non‑precedential, the decision has important practical implications for § 2 litigation in the Eleventh Circuit:

• Front‑load remedial planning. Plaintiffs in VRA vote‑dilution cases must think carefully at the outset about the remedial plans they are prepared to propose. Waiting until after an adverse appellate ruling to introduce alternative remedies will likely be too late.
• One shot at satisfying Gingles. Once a § 2 case has gone through trial and an appeal, plaintiffs should not expect to be able to cure a defective Gingles showing (especially the remedial aspect of the first precondition) by amending the complaint post‑mandate.
• Strategic caution in choosing a single, “dramatic” remedy. If plaintiffs choose to pin their entire case on a single, sweeping remedy—as in the PSC case—failure of that remedy may end the litigation entirely, without a chance to pivot to more modest or alternative remedies later.

2. For Civil Procedure and Amendment Practice in General

More broadly, the case sends a clear message about amendment practice in complex federal litigation:

• The later in the case, the stronger the showing plaintiffs must make. While Rule 15(a) speaks of “freely giv[ing]” leave, that liberality is tempered by heightened concerns about prejudice and finality when litigation is far advanced.
• Post‑judgment amendments are exceptional, not routine. Especially after an appeal and mandate, attempts to amend will face serious skepticism unless the proposed changes are minor or the prejudice to defendants is negligible.
• Defendants’ litigation investment is legally cognizable prejudice. The court explicitly treats the Secretary’s sunk costs—extensive discovery, expert work, a bench trial, and an appellate victory—as relevant and weighty when assessing “undue prejudice.”

3. For Litigation Against Statewide Bodies Like the PSC

The case underscores the special complexity of suing state‑wide regulatory bodies:

• Remedies that wholly restructure statewide election systems for functionally statewide offices are likely to face intense scrutiny under the remedial component of Gingles.
• Courts may be wary of “single, dramatic remedies” that essentially transform the political character of such bodies, particularly if alternative, less disruptive remedies are not seriously explored.

Although the 2025 opinion does not itself address the substantive merits of such remedies, it functionally channels future litigants toward more thoroughly developed remedial theories from the outset.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and Vote Dilution

Section 2 of the VRA prohibits any voting practice or procedure that “results in a denial or abridgment” of the right to vote on account of race or color. In vote‑dilution cases (as opposed to voter suppression), the claim is that the structure of an election system—such as at‑large voting—dilutes the voting power of a minority group.

In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court established three “preconditions” a plaintiff generally must prove in a vote‑dilution case involving districting or at‑large systems:

1. The minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured single‑member district.
2. The minority group is politically cohesive (its members tend to vote together).
3. The white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.

Failure to prove any one of these preconditions is usually fatal to a § 2 vote dilution claim.

B. The “Remedial Plan” Aspect of the First Gingles Precondition

The first Gingles precondition is not purely theoretical. Plaintiffs must do more than show that, “on paper,” a compact district could exist. In the Eleventh Circuit, they must also propose a concrete, “satisfactory remedial plan” – a specific, workable districting or election scheme that the court could realistically adopt.

In the original Rose appeal, the plaintiffs proposed only one remedy: converting the PSC system from a statewide, at‑large election for a statewide regulatory body into a series of local, single‑member district elections. The Eleventh Circuit found this remedy legally unsatisfactory, which meant the first Gingles precondition was not met, and the § 2 claim failed.

C. At‑Large vs. Single‑Member District Elections

• At‑large elections: All voters in the jurisdiction (e.g., the entire state) vote for all seats. This can dilute minority votes if the minority is geographically concentrated but outvoted statewide.
• Single‑member district elections: The jurisdiction is divided into districts; each district elects one representative. If lines are drawn fairly, a geographically concentrated minority group may be able to elect candidates of choice in some districts.

The plaintiffs sought to replace Georgia’s statewide PSC elections with district-based elections, arguing that this would allow Black voters concentrated in certain areas to elect their preferred candidates.

D. “Undue Delay,” “Undue Prejudice,” and “Futility”

Under Rule 15(a) and Foman v. Davis, courts may deny amendment if:

• Undue delay – The plaintiff waits an excessively long time without a good reason to amend, especially if the information was available earlier.
• Undue prejudice – The amendment would unfairly disadvantage the other side, usually by:
  • Requiring extensive new discovery,
  • Changing the theory of the case late in the process, or
  • Forcing duplication of costly litigation efforts.
• Futility – Even if allowed, the amended complaint would still fail to state a claim or would be barred as a matter of law.

In this case, the district court found all three, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed solely on the basis of undue prejudice, which by itself is sufficient.

E. “Per Curiam,” “Non‑Argument Calendar,” and “Not for Publication”

• Per curiam – An opinion issued in the name of the court rather than a specific judge. Here, Judges Jill Pryor, Branch, and Brasher comprise the panel.
• Non‑argument calendar – The case was decided without oral argument, based solely on the briefs and record.
• Not for publication – Under Eleventh Circuit rules, the opinion is non‑precedential. It does not bind future panels, though it may be cited as persuasive authority.

F. Mandate and Claim Preclusion

After an appeal is decided, the court of appeals issues a mandate to the district court instructing it on the disposition (e.g., affirm, reverse, remand). Once the mandate issues, the district court must act in accordance with it; its room to diverge is very limited.

The panel also alludes to claim preclusion (res judicata), the doctrine that prevents parties from relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in a prior action that ended in a final judgment on the merits between the same parties. The court suggests that:

• If the same plaintiffs filed a new case about the same PSC election method, they would likely face claim preclusion obstacles.
• This undermines the plaintiffs’ argument that, for judicial economy, amendment should be allowed to avoid a separate lawsuit – because such a lawsuit might be barred altogether.

V. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

The Eleventh Circuit’s 2025 decision in Rose v. Secretary of State of Georgia delivers a clear procedural message in the context of high‑stakes voting rights litigation:

• Leave to amend is liberal, but not limitless. Plaintiffs do not have a guaranteed right to re‑plead their case after fully litigating and losing on appeal.
• Undue prejudice to the defendant is a powerful brake on late‑stage amendments. Years of discovery, expert testimony, trial, and appellate work are not costs that can be casually imposed twice on a defendant, especially when plaintiffs seek to introduce new legal or remedial theories post‑mandate.
• Remedial theories in § 2 cases must be developed and vetted early. The case underscores the risk of relying on a single, sweeping remedial proposal: if it fails, plaintiffs are unlikely to get a post‑judgment opportunity to develop alternatives.
• Pullman-Standard does not open a back door to serial relitigation. The Supreme Court’s guidance on remand for missing factual findings due to legal error does not require district courts to grant leave to amend after judgment and appeal.

In the broader legal context, this decision strengthens the principle of finality in federal civil litigation and reinforces district courts’ authority to manage their dockets and protect defendants from repetitive, costly relitigation. While plaintiffs retain robust tools to refine and expand their claims earlier in the process, those tools become sharply limited once the case has gone to trial, on appeal, and back again with a clear directive that their original theory fails as a matter of law.

For litigants, particularly in complex civil rights and election cases, the lesson is straightforward: fully develop both your liability theory and your remedial options before the case reaches trial and appeal. The courts will not readily permit a second retooling of the case after the first has been conclusively resolved.