No Second Bite at the Apple under Montana’s MHRA: Exclusive Administrative Pathways, Strict 30/90-Day Deadlines, and Mailing Suffices for Due-Process Notice

No Second Bite at the Apple under Montana’s MHRA: Exclusive Administrative Pathways, Strict 30/90-Day Deadlines, and Mailing Suffices for Due-Process Notice

Note: The Montana Supreme Court designated this as a memorandum opinion under its Internal Operating Rules. It is noncitable and does not serve as binding precedent. Nonetheless, it provides clear guidance on applying settled law to recurring procedural pitfalls in Montana Human Rights Act litigation.

Introduction

This commentary examines Lake v. Montana Department of Labor & Industry, Human Rights Bureau (HRB), DA 25-0198 (Mont. Sept. 30, 2025), a Montana Supreme Court memorandum decision affirming the district court’s dismissal of a “Second Petition” filed by a pro se appellant after the district court had already affirmed the Montana Human Rights Commission’s (HRC) Final Agency Decision.

The case sits at the intersection of administrative law and employment discrimination procedure under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA), Title 49, MCA. It addresses three recurring issues:

  • MHRA’s “exclusive remedy” provision and the limited avenues for judicial recourse following an HRC Final Agency Decision;
  • The strict 30-day (judicial review) and 90-day (civil action) statutory deadlines, and the consequences of missing them; and
  • What constitutes adequate due-process notice of a dispositive motion in district court practice.

The parties are: Austin Lake (self-represented appellant) and the Montana Department of Labor & Industry, Human Rights Bureau (appellee). Lake also named two HRB employees, Shaunie Aklestad and Kimberly Cobos, in their individual capacities. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, concluding the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the “Second Petition” and, even if construed as a new civil action, it was time-barred. The Court also held that mailing the motion to dismiss to Lake’s address of record satisfied due-process notice requirements.

Summary of the Opinion

Key holdings, in plain terms:

  • Due-process notice was satisfied where HRB mailed its motion to dismiss to the address Lake listed on his Second Petition (and another address he had used). Lake had 17 days to respond under MUDCR 2(b) and M. R. Civ. P. 6(d). The district court ruled only after that period expired.
  • MHRA provides the exclusive remedy for claims within its scope. After the HRC affirms an HRB dismissal, a charging party has two options:
    • File a petition for judicial review under § 49-2-511(3)(b), MCA, within 30 days; or
    • Commence a civil action for appropriate relief on the merits under § 49-2-511(3)(a) or § 49-2-512(3), MCA, within 90 days.
  • Lake timely sought judicial review the first time (June 26, 2024), and the district court affirmed the HRC on October 8, 2024. At that point, his recourse was to appeal to the Montana Supreme Court under § 2-4-711, MCA, within 60 days—not to file a Second Petition in the district court on October 10, 2024.
  • The Second Petition failed two ways:
    • As a petition for judicial review, it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction (MHRA exclusivity) and was untimely; and
    • As a civil action, it was filed after the 90-day window had closed (no later than August 28, 2024).
  • Because dismissal was warranted on jurisdictional and timeliness grounds, the Court did not reach the alternative issue of state-employee immunity under § 2-9-305, MCA (though it noted that statute and the Gardiner-Park County precedent).

Factual and Procedural Background

  • March 27, 2023: Lake files an EEOC charge alleging disability discrimination by Town Pump under MHRA and ADA Title I.
  • May 17, 2023: The EEOC matter is settled.
  • Spring–Summer 2023: Lake applies for multiple jobs (including with Town Pump), listing Town Pump as a reference; he is not hired.
  • August 23, 2023: Lake submits a petition/complaint to HRB alleging Town Pump retaliated post-settlement by giving negative references and failing to hire him, asserting violations of MHRA, ADA Title I, and the Age Discrimination Act.
  • February 7, 2024: HRB issues a Final Investigative Report, finding no reasonable cause.
  • February 25, 2024: Lake objects to HRB’s findings.
  • May 30, 2024: HRC issues a Final Agency Decision affirming HRB’s findings; the FAD acknowledges the Department issued a Notice of Dismissal (assumed to predate the FAD).
  • June 26, 2024: Lake petitions the district court for judicial review; this filing is timely.
  • October 8, 2024: The district court affirms the HRC’s FAD.
  • October 10, 2024: Rather than appeal to the Supreme Court, Lake files a “Second Petition for Judicial Review” in the district court, alleging constitutional violations and naming HRB employees individually.
  • January 14, 2025: HRB moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; alternatively argues time bar and employee immunity; serves Lake by mail at his addresses of record.
  • February 12, 2025: District court grants dismissal and dismisses Aklestad and Cobos as parties.
  • March 13, 2025: Lake appeals. The Montana Supreme Court affirms.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Jacky v. Avitus, 2013 MT 296, 372 Mont. 134, 311 P.3d 423: Establishes that a district court’s conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. The Court applied this standard to the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ruling.
  • Harrington v. Energy West Inc., 2015 MT 233, ¶¶ 7–9, 380 Mont. 298, 356 P.3d 441: Clarifies that dismissals under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo, and the court may consider the complaint alone to assess jurisdiction. This guided the Supreme Court’s independent assessment of the Second Petition’s justiciability under MHRA.
  • City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co., 2016 MT 183, ¶ 25, 384 Mont. 193, 378 P.3d 1113: Articulates the core due-process requirements—notice and an opportunity to be heard. Used to test Lake’s notice argument.
  • Montanans for Justice v. State ex rel. McGrath, 2006 MT 277, ¶ 30, 334 Mont. 237, 146 P.3d 759: Emphasizes that the specifics of due process vary with circumstances, interests at stake, and risk of error. Applied to conclude mailing was adequate due process in this context.
  • Gardiner-Park County Water & Sewer Dist. v. Knight, 2024 MT 121, 417 Mont. 1, 549 P.3d 1151: Recognizes § 2-9-305, MCA, which affords government employees immunity for acts within the course and scope of employment. The Court noted this authority but did not need to resolve the immunity issue given the dispositive jurisdictional and timeliness holdings.

Statutory Framework and Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning is anchored in the MHRA’s exclusivity and the procedural strictures for post-agency review.

1) MHRA is the exclusive remedy for covered claims

Under § 49-2-512(1), MCA, when a party alleges violations of MHRA chapters 2 or 3—including acts that may also implicate constitutional or other discrimination provisions—district courts “may not entertain a claim or request for relief” other than by the procedures specified in Title 49, chapter 2, MCA. This exclusivity clause precludes litigants from bypassing or re-litigating MHRA claims through collateral filings couched in constitutional terms, or through duplicative petitions once the statutory avenues have been exhausted or foreclosed.

2) Post-Final Agency Decision options are fixed and time-bound

Once the HRC affirms HRB’s dismissal, the charging party has limited options:

  • Petition for judicial review within 30 days of the HRB’s notice of dismissal (§ 49-2-511(3)(b), MCA; § 2-4-702, MCA); or
  • Commence a civil action for appropriate relief on the merits within 90 days of the FAD (§ 49-2-511(3)(a), MCA) or the HRB’s notice of dismissal (§ 49-2-512(3), MCA).

Lake used one of these routes: he timely sought judicial review on June 26, 2024, and the district court affirmed the HRC on October 8, 2024. After that, the proper recourse was not to file a Second Petition in the same district court; rather, § 2-4-711, MCA, required any further challenge to proceed by appeal to the Montana Supreme Court within 60 days of the district court’s judgment.

3) The Second Petition failed under any characterization

  • As a petition for judicial review: The district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because MHRA’s exclusivity limits the district court’s role to the routes expressly provided; moreover, the Second Petition was untimely because it was not filed within 30 days of the relevant agency action.
  • As a new civil action: The filing on October 10, 2024, came too late. Calculated in Lake’s favor, the 90-day period from the May 30, 2024 FAD expired August 28, 2024. The Court also assumed the HRB’s notice of dismissal predated the FAD, which would only make the deadline earlier. Either way, the Second Petition was beyond 90 days and time-barred.

4) Due-process notice was satisfied

The HRB mailed its motion to dismiss on January 14, 2025, to the address Lake provided on the Second Petition and to another address he used in related litigation. Under MUDCR 2(b) and M. R. Civ. P. 6(d), Lake had 17 days to respond (14 days plus 3 days for mailing), i.e., until January 31, 2025. The district court did not grant dismissal until February 12, 2025, so it did not act prematurely, and Lake had the requisite notice and opportunity to be heard.

5) Employee immunity not reached

Although HRB argued that employees Aklestad and Cobos were immune under § 2-9-305, MCA, the Court did not need to decide the issue because the Second Petition was properly dismissed on jurisdictional and timeliness grounds. The Court’s footnote underscores that such immunity exists in Montana law but was not outcome-determinative here.

Impact and Practical Implications

While nonprecedential, the opinion’s clear application of settled law provides practical guidance:

  • Strict adherence to MHRA pathways: Claimants must choose and timely pursue one of the statutory options after an HRC affirmation—judicial review within 30 days or a civil action within 90 days. A litigant cannot create a new hybrid or “second” district court proceeding to revisit the same agency decision.
  • Appeal, don’t refile: After the district court resolves a timely petition for judicial review, any further challenge must proceed by appeal to the Montana Supreme Court under § 2-4-711, MCA. Filing another petition in the district court is jurisdictionally improper.
  • Deadlines are dispositive: The Court enforced the 30-day and 90-day statutory periods strictly, even when it calculated deadlines favorably to the pro se litigant. Tolling or relation back was neither argued nor implied.
  • Constitutional repackaging is not an end-run: Recasting MHRA complaints as constitutional claims (e.g., due process, right to know) does not avoid MHRA’s exclusivity and deadlines.
  • Service by mail satisfies due process in this context: Agencies and opposing parties can rely on mailing to the address of record to meet notice obligations for dispositive motions, with response time extended by three days for service by mail.
  • Targets of agency process should preserve appellate rights: Pro se litigants in particular should calendar and track: the 30-day judicial-review deadline, the 90-day civil-action deadline, and the 60-day deadline to appeal a district court’s judgment to the Supreme Court under § 2-4-711, MCA.
  • Employee immunity remains a backstop: Although not reached, § 2-9-305, MCA, continues to shield state employees for acts within the scope of employment, as recognized in Gardiner-Park County v. Knight.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • MHRA Exclusivity (Title 49, MCA): If your claim is within MHRA’s scope, you must use MHRA’s process. Courts cannot entertain alternative or collateral actions about that same conduct outside the MHRA framework.
  • Final Agency Decision (FAD): The HRC’s ruling after reviewing HRB’s findings. Once issued, strict deadlines govern your next steps.
  • Judicial Review vs. Civil Action:
    • Judicial Review (§ 49-2-511(3)(b), MCA; § 2-4-702, MCA): File within 30 days. The district court reviews the agency record under the standards of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act.
    • Civil Action (§ 49-2-511(3)(a) or § 49-2-512(3), MCA): File within 90 days for “appropriate relief on the merits.” This is a separate lawsuit on the merits.
  • Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: A court’s legal power to hear a category of cases. If MHRA exclusivity or statutory timing removes jurisdiction, the court must dismiss.
  • Rule 12(b)(1) Dismissal: A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; reviewed de novo on appeal (Harrington).
  • Due Process—Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard: Satisfied when a party receives notice in a manner reasonably calculated to inform them and a fair chance to respond. Mailing to the address of record suffices; time to respond includes 3 extra days when service is by mail (M. R. Civ. P. 6(d)).
  • Noncitable Memorandum Opinion: Under the Montana Supreme Court’s Internal Operating Rules, memorandum decisions resolve cases controlled by settled law. They do not create binding precedent and cannot be cited, but they often clarify how settled rules apply to common fact patterns.
  • Appeal from District Court Judgment in Judicial Review: If dissatisfied with the district court’s judgment on judicial review, a party must appeal to the Montana Supreme Court within 60 days (§ 2-4-711, MCA). Refiling in the district court is improper.

Conclusion

Lake v. MTDLI-HRB underscores the disciplined procedural architecture of MHRA litigation. After the HRC affirms an HRB dismissal, a charging party has narrowly defined and time-bound choices: judicial review within 30 days or a civil action within 90 days. Once a district court has ruled on judicial review, the sole recourse is an appeal to the Montana Supreme Court within 60 days; a second filing in the district court is jurisdictionally infirm. The decision also confirms that due-process notice is satisfied by mailing a dispositive motion to a party’s address of record, with response time extended for mail service.

Although nonprecedential, the opinion provides a cautionary roadmap for litigants—especially those proceeding pro se—on how to preserve and pursue MHRA claims. The takeaways are straightforward: adhere strictly to MHRA’s exclusive procedures, calendar and meet every statutory deadline, channel further challenges through the correct appellate route, and recognize that repackaging claims in constitutional terms will not circumvent MHRA’s exclusivity or timing rules. Finally, although not reached here, state-employee immunity under § 2-9-305, MCA, remains a significant barrier to individual-capacity lawsuits arising from actions within the scope of public employment.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Montana

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