No Sale Required, No Private Enclave: Eleventh Circuit Clarifies NPS Solicitation and Interference Rules within Park Boundaries

Case: United States v. Rady Williams, Nos. 24-14167 & 24-14168 (11th Cir. Oct. 21, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Panel: Judges Jill Pryor, Luck, and Kidd

Introduction

This appeal arises from two misdemeanor convictions entered by a magistrate judge after a bench trial. The defendant, Rady Williams, was convicted under National Park Service (NPS) regulations for (1) soliciting business within a park area without a permit, 36 C.F.R. § 5.3, and (2) intentionally interfering with (and resisting) a government employee engaged in official duties, 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1), with penalties authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1865(a). The incidents occurred in and around the Martin Luther King, Jr. National Historical Park in Atlanta, Georgia—an urban park with mixed land ownership inside its boundaries.

Williams challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on both counts, arguing that the government failed to prove he actually completed any sales and that rangers lacked jurisdiction on private property. He also argued the government failed to establish he possessed the requisite intent to “intentionally interfere.” The district court affirmed. On further appeal, the Eleventh Circuit likewise affirmed, clarifying two key points:

For § 5.3, the government need not prove an actual sale; “soliciting business” includes attempts or efforts to sell.
For § 2.32(a)(1), NPS enforcement authority applies within park boundaries regardless of land ownership, and “intentional interference” does not require proof that the defendant knew the officer’s authority or that the land was federally owned.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit, reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, held:

Solicitation without a sale: Evidence that Williams displayed shirts to passersby on park property—corroborated by ranger testimony and photographs—sufficed to show he was “soliciting business” under 36 C.F.R. § 5.3 without a permit. The court relied on the ordinary meaning of “solicitation” (as an attempt or effort to gain business) and concluded that a completed transaction is unnecessary.
Interference within park bounds, regardless of ownership: Video and witness testimony showed Williams obstructed a sidewalk with a drink cooler, refused to comply with orders to remove it, and actively resisted arrest—actions that constituted “intentional interference” with a ranger performing official duties under 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1). The court rejected arguments that the arrest was invalid because it occurred on private property, citing the regulation’s application “regardless of land ownership” to areas within park boundaries (36 C.F.R. § 2.32(b)). It also rejected the contention that “intentional interference” required proof that Williams knew of the ranger’s authority or jurisdiction.

Disposition: Affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Martin Luther King, Jr. National Historical Park is an urban national park in Atlanta. The NPS has agreements with state and local authorities allowing federal rangers to enforce federal regulations within the park’s boundaries. In 2022, a ranger observed Williams outside the park’s visitor center holding and displaying white T-shirts to visitors while also carrying a bag with more shirts. The ranger, who had previously warned Williams against park solicitation without a permit, photographed the display, advised Williams he could not sell in the park, and issued a citation.

About a year later, the same ranger encountered Williams again, this time selling drinks from a clear container that obstructed a sidewalk. The ranger and Atlanta Police Department (APD) officers told him to stop blocking the walkway and asked him to leave. Five days later, the chief ranger saw Williams again, now on a church driveway that was privately owned but inside the park’s boundaries. Williams’s drink container sat on the public sidewalk, forcing pedestrians into the street. When ordered to remove his belongings, Williams refused and said he would call APD. The chief ranger attempted to arrest him; Williams resisted, and the chief ranger was injured.

Williams was charged by information with violating 36 C.F.R. § 5.3 (commercial solicitation without a permit) and 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1) (interference with a government employee), both punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 1865(a). After a bench trial at which two rangers testified and body-camera video and photographs were admitted, the magistrate judge found Williams guilty on both counts and imposed one year of unsupervised probation. The district court affirmed on appeal. Williams then sought review in the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed.

Analysis

Regulatory Framework and Key Provisions

18 U.S.C. § 1865(a): General federal statute authorizing penalties for violations of NPS regulations.
36 C.F.R. § 5.3: Prohibits “soliciting any business in park areas” without a permit.
36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1): Prohibits “threatening, resisting, intimidating, or intentionally interfering with a government employee or agent engaged in an official duty.”
36 C.F.R. § 2.32(b): Clarifies § 2.32 applies “regardless of land ownership” on lands within park areas.
36 C.F.R. § 2.31(a)(5): Prohibits the “intentional or reckless obstruction of any sidewalk” in park areas, relevant to the lawfulness of the ranger’s enforcement actions.

Precedents Cited and Their Role

United States v. Pilati, 627 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 2010): The court invoked Pilati to explain the unique posture of appeals following magistrate-judge bench trials. The Eleventh Circuit functions as a “second tier of appellate review,” applying the same standard the district court used. This frames the appellate lens for sufficiency challenges.
United States v. Daniels, 91 F.4th 1083 (11th Cir. 2024): Daniels supplied the general standard for sufficiency-of-the-evidence review: evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict; all reasonable inferences are drawn in that direction; reversal occurs only if no reasonable factfinder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This deferential standard strongly influenced the outcome.
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024), “Solicitation”: The court consulted Black’s to fix the ordinary meaning of “solicitation” as an attempt or effort to obtain business. That definition allowed the court to hold that proof of attempts—without proof of completed sales—satisfies § 5.3.

Legal Reasoning

1) “Soliciting any business” under § 5.3 does not require proof of a completed sale

Williams’s principal contention was that no evidence established he actually sold items, arguing that a completed transaction is necessary to violate § 5.3. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this narrow view. Using Black’s Law Dictionary, the court emphasized that “solicitation” captures attempts or efforts to obtain business. Ranger testimony and photographs showing Williams displaying shirts to passersby while on park property, coupled with the ranger’s familiarity distinguishing commercial solicitation from panhandling or begging, provided sufficient evidence that Williams attempted to sell merchandise without a permit.

The court’s approach is consistent with reading § 5.3 as targeting the conduct of commercial outreach itself (the solicitation), rather than requiring consummated sales. By focusing on attempts, the court clarified the evidentiary threshold: observable efforts to induce purchases in park areas suffice for liability.

2) Interference with a ranger under § 2.32(a)(1) applies inside park boundaries regardless of land ownership; “intentional interference” does not require knowledge of authority

Williams advanced two arguments against the interference conviction: (a) that the chief ranger lacked jurisdiction to act on private property, and (b) that the government failed to prove he acted with the requisite intent because he did not know the ranger could lawfully arrest him.

The court disagreed on both fronts. First, it pointed to § 2.32(b)’s explicit coverage “regardless of land ownership” so long as the conduct occurs within the park area. Although the arrest happened on a church driveway (privately owned), that parcel was still within the park’s boundaries. Second, the regulation’s mens rea element is “intentionally interfering”—it does not require the additional showing that a defendant knew the official’s legal authority or jurisdiction. The body-camera video showing Williams refusing to remove an obstructive cooler from the sidewalk, disregarding commands, and actively resisting arrest sufficed to prove intentional interference.

The court also referenced § 2.31(a)(5), which independently prohibits intentional or reckless obstruction of sidewalks in park areas. That provision supplied context for the ranger’s enforcement actions and supported that the ranger was engaged in official duties when Williams resisted. The combination of video evidence and testimony readily cleared the sufficiency bar under the deferential standard.

Impact and Implications

Urban national parks and mixed-ownership parcels: The opinion underscores that NPS regulations governing conduct—particularly interference with officials—apply within park boundaries “regardless of land ownership.” This has practical significance for urban parks dotted with private inholdings, driveways, and easements. Vendors and property occupants cannot rely on private ownership as a jurisdictional shield against park regulations when the land lies within the park perimeter.
Lower evidentiary threshold for § 5.3 prosecutions: By recognizing “solicitation” as encompassing attempts or efforts to sell, the decision reduces the government’s proof burden. Photographs and testimony showing displays, pitches, or other sales efforts—without a completed transaction—can support convictions. Vendors and performers operating near or within park lands need to heed permit requirements even if no sales are ultimately consummated.
Mens rea for interference is intentional conduct, not knowledge of authority: The court’s construction of § 2.32(a)(1) clarifies that the government need not prove a defendant knew the official’s authority or that the land was federally regulated. Purposeful refusal to comply with orders and active resistance is enough. This will shape defense strategies in future interference prosecutions and informs training for rangers on articulating and documenting commands and noncompliance.
Practical enforcement validation: Reliance on body-camera footage proved pivotal. Expect continued emphasis on video corroboration in park-enforcement cases, especially in crowded or mixed-ownership settings.
Precedential status: Though designated “Not for publication” and therefore nonbinding in the Eleventh Circuit, the opinion supplies persuasive guidance on the meaning of “solicitation” under § 5.3 and the scope and mens rea of § 2.32. It will likely be cited in district and magistrate courts confronting similar fact patterns in national parks.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Sufficiency of the evidence” review: On appeal, courts ask whether, viewing the evidence in the government’s favor, any reasonable factfinder could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not a re-try; credibility choices and reasonable inferences favor the verdict.
“Soliciting any business” (36 C.F.R. § 5.3): You can violate this rule by trying to sell goods or services in a park area without a permit—even if no sale occurs. Displaying merchandise and pitching to visitors can be enough.
“Intentionally interfering” (36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1)): This covers purposeful acts that hinder a ranger’s official duties, such as refusing lawful orders, obstructing pathways after being told to stop, or resisting arrest. The government does not need to prove you knew the ranger’s legal authority or the land’s ownership status.
“Regardless of land ownership” within park boundaries: Some park rules apply inside the mapped park area even on privately owned parcels. If you are inside the boundary, certain conduct rules still apply.
Bench trial before a magistrate judge; “second tier of appellate review”: When a magistrate judge conducts a bench trial, appeals go first to a district court and then to the court of appeals. The appellate courts apply the same sufficiency standard the district court used, without retrying the case.
“Not for publication” and “Non-Argument Calendar”: “Not for publication” generally means the decision is nonprecedential in the Eleventh Circuit (though it can be persuasive). “Non-Argument Calendar” indicates the case was decided without oral argument, typically on the briefs.

Practical Takeaways

For vendors and performers: Within park boundaries, do not engage in efforts to sell (display, pitch, or otherwise solicit) without a permit—even on private property inside the park. Expect enforcement.
For property owners within park boundaries: Private ownership does not categorically exempt conduct from park regulations. Coordinate with NPS on permissible uses and access points to avoid unintentional violations.
For law enforcement and rangers: Document boundaries, cite the “regardless of land ownership” provisions when necessary, and continue using body-worn cameras to capture commands, refusals, and resistance.
For defense counsel: Challenges premised on the absence of completed sales or on private land status will be uphill under this reasoning. Focus may shift to whether the area is actually within the park boundary, whether orders were lawful and clear, and whether the client’s conduct was truly “intentional.”

Conclusion

United States v. Williams provides clear guidance on two frequent flashpoints in urban national parks: commercial solicitation and interference with federal officials. First, the court held that “soliciting any business” under 36 C.F.R. § 5.3 is satisfied by attempts or efforts to sell, without proof of completed sales. Second, it confirmed that interference prohibitions under § 2.32 apply within park boundaries irrespective of land ownership, and that “intentional interference” does not require proof the defendant knew the ranger’s authority or the land’s federal status.

While unpublished and not binding, the decision is an instructive roadmap for future cases involving street vending and park regulation enforcement in mixed-ownership urban settings. It underscores the importance of boundary awareness, permitting compliance, and unambiguous adherence to ranger directives. The upshot is straightforward: within national park boundaries, attempts to conduct unpermitted business can support conviction, and deliberate resistance to ranger directives can constitute intentional interference—no sale and no private enclave required.