“No Request, Minimal Possessory Interest”: Reasonable Extended Seizure of Cellphones Pending Warrant and No Rule 32 Violation Where Victim Letters Are Cumulative of the PSR

Case: United States v. Everette Jhamal Thibou (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (unpublished)
Posture: Conditional guilty plea; appeal of suppression rulings (Fourth and Fifth Amendments) and sentencing procedure (Rule 32 / due process).
Holding: Affirmed.

1. Introduction

Everette Jhamal Thibou pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud arising from an international elder-fraud scheme. The appeal, however, turned largely on events from a March 7, 2022 Tennessee traffic stop: a trooper clocked a Chevrolet Malibu at 100 mph, smelled marijuana, observed furtive movement by the passenger (Thibou), extended the stop, searched the car, and seized cash and three cellphones. Thibou also challenged post-stop statements as taken in violation of Miranda, and claimed a sentencing due process violation when the district court described victim impact letters that were not disclosed pre-sentencing.

The Sixth Circuit addressed three clusters of issues: (1) Fourth Amendment validity of the stop, its duration, the automobile search, and the seizure (and continued retention) of cellphones; (2) Fifth Amendment/Miranda invocation and waiver; and (3) Rule 32(i)(1)(B) and due process constraints on reliance at sentencing on undisclosed information.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Traffic stop: Probable cause supported the stop notwithstanding initial uncertainty about which car was speeding; the district court’s credibility findings were owed deference.
Extension of the stop: Reasonable suspicion justified prolonging the encounter based on marijuana odor, observed movement, irregular and inconsistent travel stories, felony histories, and “drug corridor” context.
Vehicle search: Probable cause supported the automobile-exception search.
Seizures: Probable cause supported seizure of $76,000 (in a backpack), $6,000 (on Thibou), and three cellphones; Thibou also failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the cash and did not meaningfully establish one in the phones.
Duration of phone retention: The continued seizure pending a warrant was reasonable under a balancing test, emphasizing Thibou’s failure to request return and law enforcement’s interest in preserving digital evidence; the 16-day period between FBI learning of the phones and obtaining a federal warrant was deemed diligent and reasonable.
Miranda: The district court permissibly credited the trooper’s testimony that Thibou agreed to answer questions; no clear error in finding no unambiguous invocation of silence.
Sentencing: No reversible Rule 32/due process violation because the victim-impact information described by the court was cumulative of the PSR; any error was harmless given lack of prejudice and the court’s statement it would impose the same sentence.

Unpublished but instructive: Although “NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision consolidates the Sixth Circuit’s current approach to (i) marijuana odor and automobile probable cause, (ii) cellphone seizure reasonableness pending warrants under United States v. Sykes, and (iii) Rule 32’s treatment of undisclosed sentencing material when the PSR already covers the substance.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shape the Decision)

1) Standards of review and “affirm on any ground”

United States v. Taylor, 121 F.4th 590 (6th Cir. 2024): supplies the appellate lens—clear error for facts, de novo for law, viewing evidence “most favorable to the government.”
United States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963 (6th Cir. 2019): supports affirmance if the result is justifiable “for any reason,” reinforcing a deferential posture toward the district court’s ultimate suppression rulings.
United States v. Lott, 954 F.3d 919 (6th Cir. 2020): frames Fourth Amendment analysis chronologically (stop → prolongation → search → seizure).

2) Probable cause for the stop; objective reasonableness; reasonable mistakes

United States v. Jackson, 682 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2012): a traffic stop is a “seizure.”
United States v. Watson, 142 F.4th 872 (6th Cir. 2025): the stop is reasonable with probable cause a traffic violation occurred.
Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018) and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983): emphasize probable cause as a low bar—a “probability or substantial chance,” not certainty.
United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)): confirms subjective intent is irrelevant if objective probable cause exists.
Beaven v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 622 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2010) and Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564 (1985): anchor deference to the district court’s credibility findings and “plausibility” determinations.
United States v. Stevenson, 43 F.4th 641 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014)): validates that reasonable mistakes can still support probable cause—important to rebut Thibou’s claim that initial uncertainty about the speeding vehicle invalidated the stop.

3) Prolonging the stop: reasonable suspicion and Rodriguez constraints

United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2005): no continued detention absent reasonable suspicion of other crimes.
Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)): the mission ends when traffic tasks reasonably should be completed; extension requires independent reasonable suspicion.
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) and United States v. McCallister, 39 F.4th 368 (6th Cir. 2022): define reasonable suspicion as more than a hunch, less than preponderance.
United States v. Williams, 68 F.4th 304 (6th Cir. 2023): confines reasonable-suspicion assessment to what was apparent by the time of the initial stop and events occurring during the stop.

4) Marijuana odor, furtive movement, drug-corridor travel, and probable cause

United States v. Brooks, 987 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2021): central to the panel’s reasoning—marijuana odor (sometimes alone) can supply probable cause to search a vehicle; furtive stuffing-like movements strengthen the inference.
United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617 (6th Cir. 2015): passenger “fumbling” supports reasonable suspicion for safety-related actions and limited searches; used as an analog for interpreting movement as suspicious.
United States v. Smith, 601 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2010): inconsistent/implausible travel stories plus drug-corridor context can justify extending a stop; cited to validate reliance on contradictory narratives between driver and passenger.
United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Bohanon, 420 F. App'x 576 (6th Cir. 2011): reject a meaningful raw-vs-burnt marijuana distinction for probable cause purposes.
United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754 (6th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Dyer, 580 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2009): reinforce that inconsistent travel plans and criminal history are relevant (though not dispositive) in probable cause analysis.

5) Automobile exception scope and timing of probable cause

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991): once probable cause exists, officers may search any part of the car and containers that could conceal the object of the search.
United States v. Peake-Wright, 126 F.4th 432 (6th Cir. 2025): probable cause is assessed based on objective facts known at the time of the search/seizure—used repeatedly to shut down hindsight arguments (e.g., “the phones didn’t actually contain drug evidence”).

6) “Standing,” expectation of privacy, and disclaimers of ownership

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998): clarifies that “standing” is effectively part of substantive Fourth Amendment analysis (reasonable expectation of privacy).
United States v. Mathis, 738 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2013): assigns defendant the burden to show an actual subjective expectation of privacy and that it is objectively reasonable.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978): invoked by Thibou late; the panel rejects using it to create privacy rights after disclaiming ownership.
United States v. Rogers, 97 F.4th 1038 (6th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1982): disclaimers of ownership/authority undermine a reasonable expectation of privacy and the ability to challenge the search/seizure.
Stewart v. IHT Ins. Agency Grp., LLC, 990 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Allen, 93 F.4th 350 (6th Cir. 2024): arguments first raised in a reply brief are forfeited—used to limit Thibou’s late-emerging privacy claim in the backpack.

7) Seizing property to obtain warrants; extended seizures of phones

United States v. Sykes, 65 F.4th 867 (6th Cir. 2023): the decision’s anchor for extended cellphone-seizure reasonableness—probable cause allows seizure to secure a warrant; balancing considers possessory interests, intrusion, duration, and diligence; failure to request return reduces the possessory interest.
United States v. Respress, 9 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 1993): establishes permissibility of seizing items on probable cause while seeking a warrant and supplies balancing factors (also referenced through Sykes).
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984): officers must obtain a warrant within a reasonable time after a lawful seizure.
United States v. Saddler, 498 F. App'x 524 (6th Cir. 2012): supports upholding extended seizures where the suspect’s possessory interest is weak.
United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985): observation that not seeking return of property weakens a claim of Fourth Amendment harm from delay.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984): defines seizure as “meaningful interference” with possessory interests, framing the intrusion analysis.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014): recognized as making cellphones special for privacy; the panel nonetheless distinguishes possessory-interest weakness from privacy-interest strength.
United States v. Pratt, 915 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2019): distinguished (via Sykes)—unreasonable delay there tied to law enforcement indecision and a demonstrated possessory interest.

8) Multiple phones as indicia of trafficking (with a limiting caution)

United States v. Gilbert, 952 F.3d 759 (6th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Taylor, 471 F. App'x 499 (6th Cir. 2012): cited for the proposition that multiple phones may be “tools” of drug trafficking.
United States v. Fletcher, 978 F.3d 1009 (6th Cir. 2020): used to cabin the inference—multiple phones are not, by themselves, evidence of criminal activity.

9) Miranda invocation/waiver and clarifying questions

United States v. Calvetti, 836 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2016): suppression review standards for Miranda issues.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010): unambiguous invocation required; absent invocation, an uncoerced statement can constitute waiver.
Simpson v. Jackson, 615 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2010), rev'd on other grounds, Sheets v. Simpson, 565 U.S. 1232 (2012): if invocation is ambiguous, officers may ask clarifying questions.
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994): supports clarifying questions as protective of suspects’ rights.

10) Sentencing disclosure: Rule 32, due process, cumulative information, harmlessness

United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1999): due process requires notice and opportunity to be heard at sentencing; Rule 32 implements those protections.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(B): requires disclosure/summarization of excluded information on which the court will rely and an opportunity to comment.
United States v. Hamad, 495 F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 2007): if the court relies on undisclosed evidence without sufficient detail to respond, it must not rely on it.
United States v. Patrick, 988 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1993): even “in passing” reliance on undisclosed material may violate Rule 32.
United States v. Meeker, 411 F.3d 736 (6th Cir. 2005): key to affirmance—undisclosed information that is cumulative of the record (including the PSR) undercuts notice/prejudice arguments; also referenced for the practical difficulty of “rebutting” victim emotional distress.
United States v. Robinson, 503 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2007) and United States v. Moten, No. 22-3320, 2023 WL 4364005 (6th Cir. July 6, 2023): Rule 32 disclosure duty is triggered for information not already contained in the PSR.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Fourth Amendment: from stop to search to seizure

The panel’s Fourth Amendment method is deliberately sequential (per United States v. Lott): it tests the justification for (i) initiating the stop, (ii) prolonging the stop, (iii) searching, and (iv) seizing specific items and retaining them.

Stop: The trooper’s radar reading plus headlight matching supported probable cause; credibility determinations about what the trooper perceived were essentially insulated absent clear error (Beaven, Anderson).
Prolongation: Marijuana odor and observed concealment-like movement provided at least reasonable suspicion; conflicting travel narratives and irregular itinerary increased suspicion. The panel insists the suspicion arises from what occurred “during the stop” (Rodriguez, Williams), not from later discoveries.
Search (automobile exception): Under Acevedo, once probable cause exists, containers in the vehicle may be searched; the “totality” included odor, movement, travel anomalies, inconsistent stories, and criminal history.
Seizure (cash and phones): The panel treats seizure as justified by probable cause that the items were evidence/instrumentalities (drug proceeds/communications tools), and separately underscores that Thibou weakened any Fourth Amendment claim to the cash by disclaiming ownership and never seeking its return (expectation-of-privacy analysis under Mathis, reinforced by Tolbert and Rogers).

2) Cellphone retention pending a warrant: balancing, not a stopwatch

A salient feature is the panel’s refusal to treat delay as dispositive in isolation. Instead, it applies United States v. Sykes and Respress to weigh possessory interests against government interests, while considering diligence.

Possessory interest minimized: Because Thibou never requested return of the phones, his possessory interest is characterized as “minimal” (Sykes, Johns).
Government interest elevated: The government’s interest in preserving digital evidence is treated as substantial (Sykes), and the “multiple phones” fact is allowed to contribute to probable cause in context (Gilbert), though not alone (Fletcher).
Diligence controls the reasonableness of time: The panel focuses on the 16 days between the FBI learning of the phones and obtaining a federal warrant, finding ongoing investigative steps sufficient. It declines to deem the longer overall period categorically unreasonable absent evidence of investigative lethargy or indecision of the kind highlighted in United States v. Pratt.

Importantly, the opinion acknowledges Riley v. California (cellphones’ unique privacy sensitivity), but channels that insight into the search-warrant requirement rather than expanding possessory-interest protection where the defendant behaves as if the phones are not worth reclaiming.

3) Fifth Amendment: invocation must be unambiguous; clarifying questions are permitted

On the Miranda issue, the panel’s affirmance is largely institutional: the district court found the video audio largely inaudible but credited the trooper’s testimony that Thibou agreed to answer questions. Under clear-error review, that credibility finding effectively resolves whether there was an unambiguous invocation (Berghuis v. Thompkins). The opinion also frames the trooper’s “no? huh?” exchange as permissible clarification of an ambiguous response (Simpson v. Jackson; Davis v. United States), rather than impermissible continued interrogation after invocation.

4) Sentencing: Rule 32 focuses on new information, not new packaging

The sentencing dispute turns on whether the district court “relied” on undisclosed victim letters in a way that denied notice/opportunity to respond (Hayes; Rule 32(i)(1)(B); Hamad; Patrick). The panel’s resolution is pragmatic:

Cumulativeness defeats the claim: Because the PSR already documented the victims’ losses and emotional harms, the letters’ substance was not “new” (Meeker; Robinson; Moten).
Prejudice is absent: The court emphasized that even if there were error, it was harmless: the defendant did not show what he would have said in response, and the district court stated it would impose the same sentence regardless.

C. Impact

1) Reinforcement of marijuana-odor doctrine (in illegality jurisdictions)

The opinion consolidates a familiar Sixth Circuit pathway: marijuana odor—especially paired with observed concealment-like movements—remains a powerful driver of reasonable suspicion and probable cause (Brooks). In jurisdictions where marijuana remains illegal, litigants should expect odor-based probable cause arguments to continue to succeed unless credibility or factual foundations collapse.

2) A clearer “possessory-interest” lever in cellphone seizure-delay litigation

The most practically significant contribution is its emphasis on the defendant’s conduct—particularly failure to request return—as a factor that reduces the Fourth Amendment “possessory interest” side of the Sykes balance. In future cases, defendants challenging delayed warrants for seized phones will likely face pointed questioning about:

whether they asked for the phone back,
whether they asserted ownership/need, and
what concrete deprivation the seizure caused.

Conversely, investigators will cite the case to argue that so long as they can show continuing investigative diligence and a legitimate digital-evidence preservation rationale, delays are less vulnerable—particularly where the defendant never sought return.

3) Sentencing practice: disclosure disputes may hinge on PSR completeness

For Rule 32 litigation, the opinion underscores a recurring theme: if the PSR already contains the factual substance of letters or other materials, a defendant’s claim that undisclosed documents deprived him of notice is weakened. Practically, it raises the stakes of PSR review and objections, because the PSR becomes the benchmark for what is “already known.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable cause: A commonsense probability that evidence of a crime will be found—not certainty (Illinois v. Gates; Wesby).
Reasonable suspicion: A lower threshold than probable cause—specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity may be occurring (Sokolow).
Automobile exception: If officers have probable cause a car contains evidence, they may search the car and containers that could hide the evidence without a warrant (California v. Acevedo).
Expectation of privacy / “standing”: A defendant can complain about a search/seizure only if it invaded his own legitimate privacy interest; disclaiming ownership can defeat that claim (Mathis; Tolbert).
Search vs. seizure (cellphones): Police generally need a warrant to search phone contents (Riley), but may seize a phone on probable cause while diligently seeking a warrant (Sykes; Respress).
Miranda invocation: The right to silence must be invoked unambiguously; ambiguous responses permit clarifying questions (Berghuis; Davis; Simpson).
Rule 32(i)(1)(B): If the court relies on information not in the PSR, it must disclose/summarize it and allow comment; if the same information is already in the PSR, the notice concern is reduced (Meeker; Robinson).
Harmless error: Even if a procedural mistake occurred, reversal is not required if the defendant was not prejudiced (as framed through the opinion’s reliance on Meeker and the district court’s stated alternative basis).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Thibou affirms a broad set of trial-court determinations—probable cause for a stop and automobile search anchored in marijuana odor and suspicious travel facts; admissibility of post-Miranda statements where the district court credits an implied agreement to talk; and sentencing procedures where undisclosed victim letters are cumulative of the PSR. Its most durable takeaway is its application of United States v. Sykes: when a defendant never asks for a seized cellphone’s return, the diminished possessory interest materially strengthens the government’s position that extended retention pending a warrant is reasonable, provided investigators can show diligence and legitimate evidence-preservation needs.