No Recantation, No Brady: Delaware Supreme Court Holds That a Victim’s “Drop the Charges” Affidavit Is Not a Recantation and Reaffirms That DNA Is Not Required to Sustain a Rape Conviction

Introduction

In Garcia-Vincente v. State (Del. Oct. 17, 2025), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed convictions for second-degree rape, stalking, third-degree assault, and multiple counts of non-compliance with bond after conducting an independent review under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), Delaware’s analogue to the Anders/Penson procedure for no-merit appeals. The appellant, Enrique Garcia‑Vincente, challenged his convictions on four principal grounds:

that the complainant (M.B.S.) had recanted her allegation of rape;
that the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose the alleged recantation;
that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for second-degree rape and non-compliance with bond; and
that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by filing a Rule 26(c) motion to withdraw rather than advancing those claims.

The Court rejected each argument, concluding that the “recantation” was nothing more than an affidavit expressing a desire not to proceed, that there was no Brady suppression because defense counsel possessed and transmitted the affidavit to the prosecution, that the victim’s testimony alone sufficed to sustain the rape conviction even in the absence of attributable DNA, and that the record supported the jury’s nuanced verdicts on bond non-compliance based on the defendant’s knowledge over time. The Court further held that appellate counsel properly proceeded under Rule 26(c) after a conscientious review.

Summary of the Opinion

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed all judgments of conviction and sentence (eleven years of unsuspended Level V incarceration, with the remainder of over 200 years suspended). Applying Rule 26(c), the Court:

Found no recantation: an October 5, 2023 affidavit reflected only the victim’s wish not to continue the case; it did not withdraw or contradict her prior statements, and she reaffirmed at trial that the rape occurred.
Found no Brady violation: there was no suppression because defense counsel had the affidavit and forwarded it to the State; the conclusory claim that a service provider (La Esperanza) prompted accusations lacked evidentiary support.
Upheld sufficiency for second-degree rape under 11 Del. C. § 772(a)(1): the complainant’s testimony established nonconsensual intercourse; DNA attributable to the defendant was not required, consistent with Farmer v. State.
Upheld sufficiency for non-compliance with bond under 11 Del. C. § 2109(c): the record supported that the defendant knowingly violated a no-contact order through numerous recorded calls and letters after he was re-advised of bond conditions on July 17, 2023; the jury’s split verdicts tracked that timeline.
Rejected the ineffective assistance claim: counsel’s filing of a Rule 26(c) motion and non-merit brief, standing alone, is not ineffective assistance (Loper v. State).

Concluding the appeal was wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue, the Court affirmed and declared counsel’s motion to withdraw moot.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

Rule 26(c), Penson v. Ohio, and Leacock v. State: The Court reiterated that under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 26(c), it must ensure counsel has conscientiously reviewed the record and independently assess whether any arguably appealable issues exist (citing Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927–28 (Del. 1996)).
Brady v. Maryland and Risper v. State: The State’s constitutional duty is to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence within its possession that is material to guilt or punishment (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Risper v. State, 250 A.3d 76, 90 (Del. 2021)).
Sufficiency Standard and Farmer v. State: The Court applied de novo review of sufficiency claims to determine whether any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt viewing the evidence most favorably to the State (citing Farmer v. State, 844 A.2d 297, 300 (Del. 2004)). Farmer also supplies the key substantive proposition: a victim’s testimony alone can sustain a conviction for sexual offenses if it establishes the elements.
Statutes: Second-degree rape under 11 Del. C. § 772(a)(1) (intentional sexual intercourse without consent); and non-compliance with bond under 11 Del. C. § 2109(c) (knowing violation of a bond condition).
Rule 26(c) and Ineffective Assistance: Filing a Rule 26(c) motion and non-merit brief does not, without more, constitute ineffective assistance (citing Loper v. State, 234 A.3d 159, 2020 WL 2843516, at *3 (Del. June 1, 2020) (TABLE)).

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) The “Recantation” Claim

The linchpin of Garcia‑Vincente’s appeal—that the complainant recanted—collapsed under the record. The affidavits (one English, one Spanish), dated October 5, 2023 and sent by a person named Daniel Garcia, conveyed that the victim did not want the case to proceed because she shared a child with the defendant. The Supreme Court treated this as an “affidavit of non-prosecution,” not a repudiation of the substance of her accusation. Critically, at the October 2024 trial, the victim testified that the rape occurred and explained earlier requests to drop charges as a product of the defendant’s urging. On these facts, the Court found no recantation.

b) No Brady Violation

A Brady claim requires suppression by the State of favorable evidence that is material to guilt or punishment. The record showed the opposite of suppression: the defendant’s own brother emailed the affidavits to defense counsel, who in turn sent them to the prosecutor on November 3, 2023. Because defense counsel possessed and disclosed the documents, the State did not “suppress” them within the meaning of Brady. The Court also rejected as unsupported a conclusory allegation that service-provider staff encouraged the victim to accuse the defendant.

c) Sufficiency of the Evidence—Second-Degree Rape

The Court applied the deferential sufficiency standard, emphasizing that a rational juror could credit the victim’s testimony that the defendant held her down and had vaginal intercourse after she told him she did not want sex. Accompanying forensic evidence included bruising to the neck, chest, clavicle, shin, thigh, buttock, and injuries to the posterior fourchette, cervix, and hymenal ring, as well as the presence of male DNA (albeit insufficient to attribute to the defendant). The Court rejected the argument that a DNA match was necessary, invoking Farmer’s rule that a victim’s testimony alone can establish the elements of sexual offenses.

d) Sufficiency of the Evidence—Non-Compliance with Bond

Under § 2109(c), the State had to prove the defendant knowingly violated a bond condition—in this case, a no-contact order prohibiting any contact with the victim. The evidence included:

Bond conditions first imposed on June 29, 2023, with a Spanish interpreter present;
Reimposition of the same conditions at the July 17, 2023 arraignment/bail review hearing;
Extensive prison call records and recordings, plus letters, showing repeated contact between July 3 and November 10, 2023; and
The defendant’s own testimony that he initially did not understand the restriction, but learned of it.

The jury’s split verdicts reflected careful parsing of the “knowledge” element: acquittals on early counts (July 3–15, 2023) aligned with his professed initial confusion; convictions beginning July 18, 2023 followed the arraignment/bail review hearing at which the no-contact order was reiterated. The Supreme Court held that a rational juror could find knowledge and violation for the post‑July 17 period.

e) Ineffective Assistance Claim in a Rule 26(c) Appeal

The Court rejected the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for filing a Rule 26(c) motion and non-merit brief. Rule 26(c) expressly authorizes such a filing when, after a conscientious review, counsel finds no meritorious issues. Citing Loper, the Court reaffirmed that the mere act of filing a 26(c) motion is not deficient performance. Moreover, because each substantive claim lacked merit, the ineffective assistance theory failed on prejudice and performance alike.

3) Impact and Significance

Clarification on “recantation” vs. “reluctance”: The Court draws a clear line between a true recantation (a substantive withdrawal or contradiction of prior allegations) and a victim’s expression of a desire to drop charges. The latter is not a recantation and, without more, does not undercut sufficiency or materiality.
Brady’s suppression element reinforced: When the defense already possesses the document and even transmits it to the State, there is no suppression. Practitioners should be cautious in labeling as “Brady” evidence that is already in defense hands or plainly known to the defense.
Victim testimony suffices without DNA: The reaffirmation of Farmer is consequential for sexual assault prosecutions: DNA is not a prerequisite to conviction where the complainant’s testimony covers each element and the jury credits it, particularly when corroborated by injuries.
Knowledge in bond violations can be temporal and fact-sensitive: The jury’s verdicts illustrate that knowledge may evolve; early contacts might be acquitted if confusion is credible, but later contacts—especially after explicit re-advisement—will likely sustain guilt. Recorded jail communications remain potent evidence.
Rule 26(c) practice affirmed: The decision endorses conscientious 26(c) practice. Appellate counsel who performs a thorough review and files a non-merit brief does not thereby render ineffective assistance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 26(c) (Delaware’s no-merit appeal procedure): Similar to the federal Anders/Penson framework, Rule 26(c) allows defense counsel to move to withdraw if, after careful review, counsel finds no non-frivolous issues. The Supreme Court then independently reviews the record to ensure the appeal truly lacks arguable issues.
Brady obligations: The prosecution must disclose favorable evidence that is material. Three parts: (1) the evidence is favorable (exculpatory or impeaching), (2) it was suppressed by the State (not disclosed), and (3) prejudice (a reasonable probability of a different outcome had it been disclosed). If the defense already has the evidence, there is no suppression.
“Recantation” vs. “affidavit of non-prosecution”: A recantation is when a witness withdraws or contradicts their prior substantive allegation. An affidavit stating “I don’t want to continue” or “I want charges dropped” does not negate the original accusation and is not, by itself, exculpatory.
Sufficiency of the evidence: On appeal, courts do not reweigh credibility. The question is whether any rational juror, viewing the evidence in the State’s favor, could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Victim testimony in sexual assault cases: Under Delaware law, a victim’s testimony alone can be enough to convict if it establishes every element. Forensic or DNA evidence can corroborate but is not mandatory.
Non-compliance with bond (11 Del. C. § 2109(c)): The State must prove the defendant knowingly violated a bond condition (here, a no-contact order). Proof often includes court records of the condition, interpreter use, signed commitments, and recorded communications.
Level V incarceration: In Delaware’s sentencing structure, Level V is incarceration in a correctional facility. Sentences may include a period of unsuspended Level V time followed by suspended terms with decreasing levels of supervision.

Case Background and Key Facts

The parties lived together with their child; the victim described prior physical abuse and, on April 14, 2023, a rape involving restraint and non-consensual vaginal intercourse.
Forensic nurse examiner documented extensive bruising and genital injuries; swabs revealed male DNA but insufficient for attribution.
After the victim sought a restraining order with assistance from La Esperanza, police were contacted; the victim later sought to “drop charges,” stating confusion and emotional distress, with the defendant urging her to do so.
The defendant was arrested June 29, 2023; no-contact conditions were imposed with an interpreter; the same conditions were reiterated at a July 17, 2023 arraignment/bail review hearing.
From jail, the defendant repeatedly contacted the victim (calls and letters). The jury acquitted on early non-compliance counts but convicted on fifty-three counts after July 17, 2023, reflecting knowledge post-re-advisement.
The jury convicted of second-degree rape as a lesser-included offense of first-degree rape; it also convicted on stalking and April 14 assault but acquitted on December 2022 assault and certain early bond violations.

Practical Takeaways for Practitioners

Do not equate reluctance with recantation: When a complainant expresses a wish to “drop charges,” assess whether the statement contradicts the substantive allegation. If not, it is unlikely to be deemed exculpatory or material under Brady.
Document language-access safeguards: Where knowledge of bond conditions is contested, interpreter use and the defendant’s acknowledgments at hearings are critical; juries may differentiate early confusion from later knowing violations.
Jail communications are powerful evidence: Expect recorded calls and letters to bolster stalking and bond-violation counts and potentially to support consciousness-of-guilt or witness-influence theories.
DNA is not indispensable: In sexual assault prosecutions, thorough victim testimony—particularly with medical corroboration—can sustain convictions even without a DNA match.
Rule 26(c) filings remain viable and protected: When properly executed, a 26(c) motion with a non-merit brief is consistent with effective appellate advocacy and professional obligations.

Conclusion

Garcia‑Vincente reinforces several settled but significant principles of Delaware criminal law and appellate practice. First, an affidavit stating a victim’s desire to discontinue prosecution is not a recantation and, when already in defense possession, cannot ground a Brady claim. Second, a rape conviction need not rest on a DNA match where the complainant’s testimony, credited by the jury and supported by medical findings, establishes the offense. Third, the “knowledge” element in bond violations is time-sensitive and can be proved via court proceedings, interpreter-facilitated advisements, and recorded communications; juries may legitimately calibrate verdicts to that timeline. Finally, the decision affirms the integrity of Delaware’s Rule 26(c) process: conscientious no-merit filings neither shortchange defendants nor constitute ineffective assistance.

Taken together, the ruling provides clear guidance to prosecutors, defenders, and trial courts on the treatment of purported recantations, the contours of Brady, the sufficiency of testimonial evidence in sexual assault cases, and the evidentiary showing required for bond-violation prosecutions, all within the robust framework of independent appellate review under Rule 26(c).

This commentary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.