No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy for Trespassers in Tents on Posted Public Land: United States v. Parkerson (5th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In United States v. Parkerson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence discovered when an officer lifted the unzipped flap of a tent pitched beneath a San Antonio overpass. The tent’s occupant, defendant-appellant Caleb Parkerson, was sleeping on land owned by the Texas Department of Transportation, which was posted with multiple “No Trespassing” signs. Upon lifting the flap, the officer observed a firearm in plain view and identified Parkerson, who had outstanding warrants. Parkerson, a convicted felon, was later indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The central question on appeal was whether a person trespassing on posted public property has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent used as a residence, such that the Fourth Amendment would be implicated by the officer’s conduct. The panel, in an unpublished opinion authored by Judge Haynes, held that a trespasser has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the place of trespass and therefore cannot invoke the Fourth Amendment to suppress evidence discovered there. The court expressly affirmed on that ground, without reaching alternative theories (such as “plain view”) or other exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo whether Parkerson’s asserted privacy expectation was one “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” The court assumed for the sake of argument that Parkerson subjectively expected privacy in his tent, but held that such an expectation was not objectively reasonable because:

He was trespassing on clearly posted state property and had been warned to leave;
Supreme Court precedent indicates that “wrongful” presence defeats Fourth Amendment claims; and
Property concepts (e.g., the legality of one’s presence and rights to be on land) remain relevant to judging the legitimacy of privacy expectations under the Fourth Amendment.

Drawing on Rakas v. Illinois and related authorities, the panel concluded that a trespasser’s expectation of privacy is not one society recognizes as reasonable. Because the threshold requirement of an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy was not met, the court held that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated and affirmed the denial of suppression.

The panel underscored that its holding turns on trespass, not the mere fact that the land was public. It acknowledged that individuals can have reasonable privacy expectations in public spaces when their presence is lawful (citing Katz and Bond). But those cases are inapplicable where the individual’s presence is wrongful. The court also noted that the tent’s ownership and the fact that a flap obscured the interior did not alter the analysis where the occupant’s presence on the land was unlawful.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Drove the Outcome

The opinion is anchored in the Supreme Court’s modern Fourth Amendment framework and draws heavily on the “wrongful presence” principle that traces back to Jones v. United States (1960) and was reaffirmed in Rakas v. Illinois (1978):

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Rakas reframed Fourth Amendment “standing” as a merits question of whether the defendant’s own rights were violated, rejecting “automatic standing” and emphasizing that one must show a legitimate expectation of privacy. Crucially, Rakas reiterated Jones’s inverse rule: “wrongful” presence at the place searched does not allow one to object to the search (439 U.S. at 141 n.9). Rakas’s footnote 12 gave the classic example that a burglar’s expectation of privacy is not one society recognizes as reasonable. Parkerson’s trespass squarely implicated this line of reasoning.
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled in part by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). While Jones’s “automatic standing” rule was later overruled, its articulation that a person wrongfully on premises cannot invoke the privacy of those premises remains good law and is expressly relied upon in Rakas and by the Fifth Circuit here.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998). Carter emphasized that a reasonable expectation of privacy must be grounded in sources outside the Fourth Amendment—such as property concepts or societal understandings. That lens makes the legal status of the person’s presence highly relevant. A trespasser typically lacks both property rights and societal recognition of legitimate presence.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Katz established that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places; the inquiry centers on reasonable expectations of privacy rather than rigid property formalism. Yet, as Rakas and Carter instruct, property principles remain meaningful indicators of whether society recognizes an expectation as legitimate. The Fifth Circuit deploys that combined approach: Katz supplies the privacy test, while property law helps determine the test’s objective prong.
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). Bond illustrates that a person lawfully on public property (there, a bus) can still have a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal effects (a bag) against certain physical manipulations by others. The panel cites Bond only to distinguish it: unlike Mr. Bond, Parkerson was not lawfully present.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Kyllo reaffirms the two-part Katz test, including its objective reasonableness prong. The panel cites Kyllo to underscore that no Fourth Amendment “search” occurs unless society recognizes the asserted expectation of privacy as reasonable. Here, because the expectation fails at the objective stage, the analysis ends.
Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986). These cases—on squatting or trespass on public land—converge on a consistent rule: a trespasser lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy at the place of trespass. The Fifth Circuit arrays this authority to show that its holding aligns with the broader federal consensus.
United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011). Vega recognized Rakas’s burglar example and the associated principle: the wrongfulness of presence strips an expectation of its legitimacy. That acknowledgement in Fifth Circuit precedent provides intra-circuit support for today’s outcome.

Legal Reasoning: Why the Court Reached This Result

The court applied the familiar two-part Katz test: a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs only if (1) the individual manifests a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable. The panel assumed Parkerson satisfied the first prong—he likely viewed his closed or partially closed tent as private. But the court held he failed the second prong because:

His presence on the land was wrongful. The property was owned by TxDOT and posted with multiple “No Trespassing” signs. Parkerson had been warned to leave. That status under property law significantly undermines societal recognition of any privacy claim.
Supreme Court guidance indicates that “wrongful” presence defeats Fourth Amendment claims. Rakas’s admonition (via Jones) that a burglar’s expectation is not legitimate translates to trespassing scenarios, particularly where the trespass is known to the occupant.
The fact that the tent may be considered a residence by its occupant does not overcome the requirement of objective reasonableness. Even homes receive protection only when the claimant’s expectation is one society accepts as legitimate; when the underlying occupation is wrongful, the objective prong fails.
The panel emphasized the narrowness of its premise: the dispositive fact is trespass, not merely that the land is public. Individuals lawfully present on public land can have legitimate expectations of privacy in particular circumstances (as in Katz and Bond). But those cases are inapplicable when presence itself is unlawful.

A notable feature of the opinion is its reliance on property concepts to resolve the Katz inquiry. While Katz de-emphasizes property in favor of privacy, subsequent cases (Rakas, Carter) reaffirm that property status and societal norms remain central to the objective reasonableness analysis. Here, the court reasoned that a trespasser, who “could be ousted by authorities at any time” (Ruckman), lacks both property-based underpinnings and societal legitimacy for his asserted privacy claim.

Scope, Limits, and Practical Implications

Though unpublished and therefore nonprecedential under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, Parkerson adds persuasive circuit-level clarity on a recurring, sensitive question: do individuals living in tents on posted property have Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless peeks into their tents? The panel’s answer is no—if the individual is a trespasser, the objective reasonableness prong of Katz fails, and the Fourth Amendment is not implicated.

Important limits and implications include:

The holding is anchored in trespass. If a person uses a tent in a place where they are lawfully permitted to be (e.g., a permitted campsite or a sanctioned encampment), a different outcome is possible, and many courts have recognized privacy expectations in tents used as dwellings when the occupant is lawfully present.
The decision does not turn on the tent’s ownership. The panel expressly notes that the tent’s ownership status does not salvage a privacy claim when the tent is situated on land where the occupant has no right to be.
The opinion does not rely on, or decide, alternative doctrines such as “plain view” (which would require a lawful vantage point) or special-needs/community-caretaking rationales. It resolves the case at the threshold: no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, therefore no “search,” therefore no Fourth Amendment problem.
Operationally, law enforcement in the Fifth Circuit has persuasive support for inspecting tents on clearly posted property during encampment notifications or cleanups when occupants are trespassing. Conversely, where presence is lawful, officers should not assume the same authority without a warrant or a recognized exception.

Unresolved Questions and Doctrinal Tensions

The opinion frames a “search” exclusively through the Katz reasonable-expectation lens (citing Smith v. Maryland). Since United States v. Jones (2012), however, the Supreme Court has recognized a separate, property-based path to defining a search: a physical intrusion on a constitutionally enumerated area—“persons, houses, papers, and effects”—for the purpose of obtaining information. The Parkerson panel did not discuss Jones’s property-trespass test.

That omission surfaces two open questions:

Tent as “effect.” A tent is plausibly an “effect.” Lifting a tent flap to view the interior might be characterized as a physical intrusion onto the defendant’s personal effect to obtain information—prima facie a “search” under Jones. The panel’s reasoning suggests that the tent’s placement on land where the defendant lacked the right to be defeats Fourth Amendment protection; yet Jones’s property-trespass test focuses on the government’s physical invasion of the defendant’s own effect. Future litigants may test whether Jones changes the analysis when the government manipulates a trespasser’s personal property, even if the property sits on land where the person has no right to be.
Interplay with Bond. In Bond, the Court treated the squeezing of a bus passenger’s bag as a search (pre-Jones) because the passenger reasonably expected that others would not manipulate his bag in an exploratory manner. Parkerson distinguishes Bond on lawfulness of presence, but does not explicitly address whether physical manipulation of an effect could itself be a search independent of Katz. This is a potential avenue for doctrinal development in future cases.

None of this undermines the panel’s holding; rather, it identifies boundaries and questions that may arise in fact patterns where officers physically intrude upon personal effects that are situated on land where the owner is trespassing. The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished disposition does not resolve those issues.

Likely Impact on Future Cases and Enforcement Practices

Parkerson is likely to have several practical and doctrinal effects within the Fifth Circuit and beyond:

Encampment enforcement. Agencies conducting posted-area encampment cleanups may rely on Parkerson to support warrantless visual inspections (e.g., lifting an unzipped flap) of tents whose occupants are trespassing, at least where signage and prior warnings support the “wrongful presence” finding.
Litigation focus on status and notice. Defense challenges will likely target the “trespasser” status—arguing lack of adequate posting, ineffective notice, implied permission, or lawful presence under municipal policies. The existence and clarity of “No Trespassing” signs and evidence of prior warnings will become critical in suppression litigation.
Distinguishing lawful camping. Where occupants have permission to camp (public campgrounds, sanctioned encampments, private land with consent), counsel will invoke cases recognizing privacy in tents-as-dwellings and highlight that Parkerson expressly turns on trespass, not on the mere use of a tent or the public character of the land.
Separate constitutional doctrines. While Parkerson is a Fourth Amendment case, governmental seizures and disposals of property in encampment contexts can also trigger due process constraints; municipalities should ensure compliance with notice-and-storage requirements separate from search-and-seizure rules. Parkerson does not address those issues.
Persuasive, not binding. Because the opinion is unpublished, it does not create binding circuit precedent. Nonetheless, its reasoning—rooted in Supreme Court guidance and consistent with other circuits—will likely be cited as persuasive authority in district courts within the Fifth Circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable expectation of privacy: A two-part test from Katz. First, did the person actually expect privacy (subjective)? Second, is that expectation one society recognizes as reasonable (objective)? If the second prong fails, there is no “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Wrongful presence/trespass: Being somewhere you have no right to be under property law (e.g., posted government land) is a powerful factor—often dispositive—against the objective reasonableness of any asserted privacy expectation. Rakas uses the burglar example to illustrate the point.
“Standing” in Fourth Amendment law: After Rakas, “standing” is shorthand for whether the defendant’s own Fourth Amendment rights were violated; it is not a separate jurisdictional requirement. The inquiry focuses on the defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy.
Property concepts in Fourth Amendment analysis: Although Katz shifted focus from property to privacy, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that property rights and societal norms remain central to determining whether an expectation is legitimate. Since Jones (2012), a physical intrusion on a person’s “effects” for information-gathering can also be a search, even apart from Katz.
Plain view doctrine: If officers are lawfully in a position to see evidence, and its incriminating nature is immediately apparent, they may seize it without a warrant. Parkerson does not rely on plain view because the court disposed of the case at the antecedent step—concluding there was no “search” to begin with.
Public land versus trespass: Being in a public place does not negate Fourth Amendment privacy (Katz, Bond). The decisive issue here is trespass—wrongful presence defeats the legitimacy of the claimed privacy interest.
Unpublished opinions: Under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, unpublished opinions are not precedent except in limited circumstances. They may be cited for persuasive value pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1.

Conclusion

United States v. Parkerson reinforces a clear—and for trespass cases, outcome-determinative—principle: a person trespassing on posted property has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the place of trespass, even if they use a tent as a residence and even if the tent obscures the interior. That conclusion flows from Rakas’s “wrongful presence” rule, is supported by multiple circuits, and is consistent with the Supreme Court’s instruction that property law and societal norms inform the objective reasonableness of asserted privacy expectations.

The decision’s practical message is straightforward. Where law enforcement can establish trespass—especially with clear signage and prior warnings—warrantless visual inspections of tents at encampments are unlikely to implicate the Fourth Amendment within the Fifth Circuit. Conversely, where presence is lawful, tents-as-dwellings may well be protected by the Fourth Amendment, and officers should proceed with a warrant or a recognized exception.

Although unpublished and thus nonbinding, Parkerson is a significant and timely application of settled Fourth Amendment principles to the realities of encampment policing. It clarifies that the constitutional inquiry turns not on the form of shelter but on the legality of presence—a distinction future cases will continue to test, including in scenarios that raise the Jones property-trespass test when officers physically manipulate personal effects.