No Reasonable Expectation of Finality in a Sentence Under Appeal: Clarifying Double Jeopardy and Due Process in Resentencing

Introduction

United States v. John Jackson (3d Cir. Mar. 21, 2025) involves Carolyn and John Jackson’s challenge to their resentencing after this Court vacated their original prison terms for serious child‐abuse convictions. Over the course of three appeals—and three separate sentencing proceedings—the Third Circuit repeatedly found sentencing errors. On the third remand, the case was reassigned to a new judge. The Jacksons argued that their resentencing (a) violated their Sixth and Fifth Amendment rights by allowing the judge to find sentencing facts by a preponderance of the evidence, (b) violated double jeopardy and due process because they had completed the originally imposed sentences while the appeal was pending, (c) violated the law-of-the-case doctrine, and (d) produced procedurally and substantively unreasonable sentences. The Third Circuit affirmed the new sentences, holding among other things that a defendant whose sentence remains under appeal—completed or not—has no reasonable expectation of finality that would trigger double jeopardy or due process constraints.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The Third Circuit reaffirmed that judicial fact‐finding to calculate Sentencing Guidelines (so long as it does not increase a statutory maximum or mandatory minimum) does not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments (Apprendi & Alleyne principles).

2. It held that when a defendant’s sentence is on appeal, the defendant has no reasonable expectation of finality—even if the defendant has completed serving that sentence—so resentencing after vacatur does not violate double jeopardy or due process.

3. The Court clarified that once an original sentence is vacated, the resentencing judge is free de novo of any law‐of‐the‐case constraints (other than those issues expressly decided as binding precedents).

4. Procedural‐reasonableness challenges to the Guidelines calculation were rejected as harmless error, and the sentences—though substantial—were deemed substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Apprendi v. New Jersey (530 U.S. 466, 2000): Facts that increase statutory maximums or mandatory minima must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the Court distinguished Guidelines fact‐finding from “statutory maximum” enhancements.
Alleyne v. United States (570 U.S. 99, 2013): Extended Apprendi to mandatory minimums; again, still inapplicable to Guidelines ranges below statutory maxima.
DiFrancesco v. United States (449 U.S. 117, 1980): Held no double jeopardy when a sentence is vacated on appeal and a new sentence imposed, because no “reasonable expectation of finality” exists until appeal is concluded or the time for appeal expires.
Busic v. United States (639 F.2d 940, 3d Cir. 1981): Dictum rejecting any Double Jeopardy prohibition on lawful resentencing to correct an illegal or erroneous sentence.
Pepper v. United States (562 U.S. 476, 2011): On resentencing after vacatur, the court may consider post‐sentencing rehabilitative conduct and must treat defendant as if never sentenced.
United States v. Raia (993 F.3d 185, 3d Cir. 2021): Harmless‐error standard for Guidelines miscalculations at sentencing; requires “high probability” that the same sentence would have been imposed under correct calculation.

2. Legal Reasoning

A. Apprendi/Alleyne Analysis: The Court held that the sentencing judge's determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Jacksons’ conduct constituted “aggravated assault” (and therefore raised their Sentencing Guidelines range) did not implicate the Sixth Amendment because no statutory maximum was increased and no mandatory minimum was triggered. Apprendi‐type protections apply only to facts that increase the prescribed statutory maximum or mandatory minimum, not to Guidelines enhancements that remain below the statutory ceiling.

B. Double Jeopardy and Due Process: Relying on DiFrancesco, the Court explained that a defendant whose sentence is subject to direct appeal “has no expectation of finality in his sentence until the appeal is concluded or the time for appeal has expired.” Completion of service does not change that rule. The Court rejected any new, per se rule awarding finality once a sentence is served, observing that adopting such a rule would reward defendants with an “unjustified windfall” whenever their appeal vacates a sentence. Due‐process protections likewise do not require a different result; the resentencing did not involve unfair delay or other fundamental‐fairness defects.

C. Law of the Case: Once sentencing orders are vacated, the resentencing court “starts with a clean slate.” There is no law‐of‐the‐case constraint on sentencing issues other than precedents binding outside the vacated orders themselves.

D. Harmless Error & Reasonableness: The Jacksons challenged Guidelines calculations (groupings, analogies, weapon enhancements) without lodging objections below. The Court applied plain‐error review and found any miscalculation harmless because the judge provided a valid alternative sentence—explicitly adopting defense’s lower Guidelines range as hypothetical and then explaining her § 3553(a) reasons for the chosen term.

3. Impact

Reaffirms that enhancing a Guidelines sentence based on judge-found facts (below statutory ceilings) remains constitutional under Apprendi/Alleyne.
Establishes definitively that the “expectation of finality” for Fifth Amendment double jeopardy considerations does not arise simply because a sentenced defendant has completed service while the appeal remains pending.
Clarifies that once sentencing orders are vacated on appeal, the resentencing court may reconsider all sentencing determinations de novo, unbound by the prior district court’s findings.
Emphasizes that harmless-error and plain-error review govern unpreserved sentencing objections, reinforcing the importance of timely objections at sentencing hearings.
Guides district courts on crafting alternative sentences to insulate verdicts from subsequent harmless-error challenges: specifically, by announcing a hypothetical Guidelines range and then applying § 3553(a) factors.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Apprendi Rule: The constitutional principle that any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the statutory maximum penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Sentencing Guidelines: A framework promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission to advise courts on appropriate sentencing ranges. Judges may find certain facts by a preponderance of the evidence to calculate the Guidelines range, provided the sentence remains below the statutory maximum.
Double Jeopardy “Expectation of Finality”: Before a direct‐appeal process concludes (or the time to appeal runs), any sentence imposed is not final; thus resentencing after vacatur does not “put the defendant in jeopardy” again in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Harmless Error in Sentencing: An error in calculating a Guidelines range is harmless if there is a high probability that the judge would have imposed the same sentence under the correct calculation. Stating, “I would impose the same sentence even under the correct range,” and providing an alternative analysis satisfies this test.

Conclusion

United States v. Jackson confirms and clarifies crucial sentencing doctrines: (1) judicial factfinding below statutory maximums remains constitutional; (2) a defendant’s completion of a sentence under appeal does not grant a “final” sentence protected by double jeopardy or due process; (3) vacatur wipes the slate clean for de novo resentencing; and (4) district judges can safeguard against harmless‐error reversal by announcing alternative Guidelines calculations and dovetailing them with a thorough § 3553(a) analysis. These principles will guide federal sentencing practice, ensuring that resentencing disputes remain focused on the correct legal standards rather than on formalistic finality arguments.