No Qualified Immunity Without Discretionary Authority: Eleventh Circuit Fortifies First-Amendment Protection in School-Board Forums

Commentary on Arthur Huggins v. School District of Manatee County, 89 F.4th ___ (11th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

Arthur Huggins, a Bradenton (Florida) community member and outspoken critic of the Manatee County School Board’s handling of a historically Black charter school, was expelled from a November 2019 school-board meeting moments before he was scheduled to speak. Superintendent Cynthia Saunders ordered his removal; the School District’s Chief of Security (Paul Damico) and a City of Bradenton police officer (Adam Wollard) executed it.

Huggins sued the Board, the City, and the individual actors, asserting (among other theories) that expulsion violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech and Petition Clauses and constituted retaliatory action for his earlier advocacy. The district court dismissed all federal claims, holding that each individual defendant enjoyed qualified immunity and that Huggins had failed to plead municipal liability under Monell. The Eleventh Circuit—speaking through Judge Rosenbaum—partly reversed, holding that Superintendent Saunders could not invoke qualified immunity because she failed to show that ordering Huggins’s removal fell within her discretionary authority, and because Huggins plausibly pled viewpoint discrimination and retaliation. The panel affirmed dismissal as to the other defendants and the municipalities and sustained denial of further leave to amend.

The decision creates an important precedent: a government official bears the burden of showing both halves of the “discretionary-authority” test before qualified immunity attaches, and failure to do so precludes the defense—even at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Additionally, the Court clarifies pleading standards for viewpoint discrimination, retaliation, and municipal liability in the context of limited public fora such as school-board comment periods.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Reversed dismissal of Counts 9, 11, and 16 (speech restriction and retaliation) as to Superintendent Saunders. She is not entitled to qualified immunity, and the complaint sufficiently alleges First-Amendment violations.
• Affirmed dismissal (with prejudice) of the same counts as to Chief Damico, Officer Wollard (individual capacity), Communications Director Barber, the School Board of Manatee County, and the City of Bradenton.
• Affirmed dismissal of Count 12 (retaliation based on video dissemination) against Barber.
• Vacated the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims (because federal claims will now proceed) and remanded for further proceedings.
• Affirmed the denial of leave to amend a second time, finding futility and potential prejudice.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The panel’s opinion is rich with precedent; the most influential authorities include:

• Spencer v. Benison, 5 F.4th 1222 (11th Cir. 2021) – Defines the two-step “discretionary-authority” inquiry that an official must satisfy to invoke qualified immunity. Huggins extends this by emphasizing the burden’s weight at the pleading stage.
• Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) – Restates the two-prong “right violated / clearly established” test for qualified immunity once discretionary authority is shown.
• McDonough v. Garcia, 116 F.4th 1319 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc) – Re-articulates forum analysis and the necessity of viewpoint neutrality and reasonableness in limited public fora.
• Cornelius v. NAACP LDF, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) – Explains viewpoint discrimination in non-public and limited public fora; relied upon to show that a purportedly content-neutral rule cannot survive if motivated by viewpoint suppression.
• Ridley v. MBTA, 390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004) – Cited for heightened suspicion when government suppresses speech critical of itself.
• Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) & Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473 (11th Cir. 2016) – Provide the “ordinary firmness” standard for adverse acts in retaliation cases.
• Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) – Governs municipal liability; the Court used it to affirm dismissal against the Board and City.
• Florida Statutes §§ 1001.40, 1001.48, 1001.51, 1001.372 – Determine the distribution of authority within a Florida school district; crucial to the discretionary-authority analysis.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Qualified-Immunity Burden
   The panel reiterates that a defendant must prove both that the challenged act (i) was undertaken while performing job-related duties and (ii) fell within the scope of delegated authority. Superintendent Saunders proved neither. Although she plainly attended the meeting as superintendent, removal power lay statutorily with the presiding officer (the Board chair). Because Huggins alleged that Saunders acted unilaterally and contrary to the written decorum policy, she failed at step one. Without discretionary authority, the court never reached the “clearly-established right” inquiry for her.
2. Pleading Viewpoint Discrimination
   Accepting the complaint’s allegations, the Court found it plausible that Saunders knew both Huggins’s intended topic (funding for Lincoln Memorial Academy) and his critical stance, given prior sign-up, media coverage, and her presence at earlier meetings. Her unexplained deviation from procedure, coupled with post-event apologies, allowed a reasonable inference of viewpoint-based motivation. Even assuming a limited public forum, such discrimination is per se unconstitutional.
3. Pleading Retaliation
   The Court applied the DeMartini tripartite test. Huggins’s advocacy was protected speech; forced removal would deter an ordinary person; and temporal proximity, the Superintendent’s pattern of irritation, absence of neutral rationale, and her apology established plausible causation.
4. Individual Defendants Protected
   Damico and Wollard (security chief and police officer) acted on orders, had no alleged knowledge of Huggins’s viewpoint, and thus lacked the subjective nexus necessary for a speech-based violation. Barber, who produced and shared a video arguably casting Huggins in a threatening light, was performing quintessential communications duties and violated no clearly established prohibition.
5. Municipal Liability
   The School Board and City of Bradenton could not be held liable because Huggins alleged only isolated incidents without demonstrating a persistent, well-settled custom, formal policy, or ratification. The Board’s rarity of similar expulsions, immediate apologies, and lack of contemporaneous review undercut any Monell theory.
6. Denial of Further Amendment
   Because the proposed second amended complaint would not cure the deficiencies (it mainly reassigned counts and deleted parties), and would force a new round of motions, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding amendment futile and prejudicial.

3.3 Impact

This ruling’s implications ripple across multiple doctrinal and practical fronts:

• Discretionary Authority Prong Elevated – The decision underscores that the first prong of qualified immunity is not perfunctory. Officials must demonstrate the source of their power and its scope; courts will scrutinize statutory text, bylaws, and factual allegations. Expect more plaintiffs to contest discretionary authority and more defense briefs to document delegation in detail.
• Limited Public Forum Clarity – School boards and other governmental bodies hosting comment sessions must double-check decorum rules, ensure actual chair control, and provide warnings before removal. Unilateral executive actions may now face heightened exposure.
• Retaliation Pleading Guidance – The Court shows that circumstantial allegations—media quotes, meeting sign-up sheets, deviation from procedure, and apologies—can suffice at the 12(b)(6) stage. Practitioners will rely heavily on similar inference chains.
• Municipal Policies vs. Single Incidents – Affirming dismissal under Monell clarifies that immediate corrective statements (apologies, policy reviews) militate against finding ratification and hinder municipal liability. Local governments may pre-empt exposure through swift, public disavowals of rogue conduct.
• Strategic Litigation Posture – Plaintiffs should evaluate whether to sue rank-and-file officers where viewpoint knowledge is minimal; focus may shift to higher-level decision-makers. Defendants will gather evidence of ignorance of a speaker’s viewpoint to secure immunity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified Immunity – A judge-made doctrine shielding officials from personal liability unless (1) they acted within their delegated authority and (2) violated a clearly established right. If step one fails, the defense collapses immediately.
• Traditional / Designated / Limited / Non-Public Forum – Categories describing how much the government has opened property for speech. School-board comment periods are usually limited public fora: the government may impose reasonable, viewpoint-neutral rules but cannot discriminate against a speaker’s stance.
• Viewpoint Discrimination – A subset of content discrimination that singles out a particular perspective (e.g., criticizing the Board) for suppression. It is “an egregious form” of First-Amendment violation and rarely survives scrutiny.
• Retaliation (Free Speech/Petition Clause) – Punishing someone because of prior protected speech. Requires: protected activity, adverse action that would chill an ordinary speaker, and causation.
• Monell Liability – Municipalities are liable only for their own policies, customs, or ratifications—not vicariously for employees’ misdeeds. A single episode seldom suffices unless a policymaker made or approved it.
• Discretionary Authority – The specific power granted by law or policy to an official. Simply being “on duty” is not enough; the official must have lawful authority to perform the precise act in question.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Huggins v. School District of Manatee County recalibrates qualified-immunity analysis and strengthens First-Amendment safeguards in governmental meetings. By insisting that a defendant first demonstrate lawful authority to perform the challenged act, the Court prevents officials from sheltering ultra vires conduct behind the immunity veil. At the same time, the opinion delineates the evidentiary threshold for alleging viewpoint discrimination and retaliation, clarifies the limits of individual liability where knowledge is lacking, and reinforces stringent standards for municipal responsibility under Monell. School boards, city councils, and public-meeting administrators throughout the Circuit must heed the message: adherence to statutory procedure and viewpoint neutrality is not merely good governance—failure may expose top decision-makers to personal liability.