Introduction

In a precedential decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on a malicious prosecution claim where the prosecution allegedly rests on a coerced confession and manufactured evidence. The case arises from the 1978 disappearance of five Newark teenagers and the 2008–2011 criminal investigation and prosecution of Lee Evans, who was ultimately acquitted.

The appellants, Detective Lou Carrega (Essex County Prosecutor’s Office) and Detective William Tietjen (New Jersey State Police), argued they were shielded by qualified immunity in Evans’s subsequent § 1983 malicious prosecution suit. The panel—accepting the plaintiff-friendly factual view required on interlocutory appeal—rejected that argument, reaffirming that it is always unconstitutional for police to coerce confessions or fabricate evidence and that such misconduct defeats qualified immunity even when probable cause might otherwise be arguable.

The decision also remands for reconsideration of the timeliness of Evans’s separate fabrication-of-evidence claim, signaling that injuries from the use of fabricated evidence accrue with the criminal proceeding and, in particular, its use at trial.

Summary of the Opinion

• The court affirms the district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity for Detectives Carrega and Tietjen on Evans’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.
• Key holding: Qualified immunity does not shield officers from malicious prosecution claims where the prosecution is allegedly built on manufactured evidence, including a coerced confession. It is always unconstitutional for police to coerce confessions and fabricate evidence to prosecute a suspect.
• Reasoning: A reasonable jury could find the officers recklessly omitted material facts—namely, that the confession was coerced—from the probable cause affidavit, tainting the arrest and prosecution. The right to be free from arrest and prosecution without probable cause, and from the use of fabricated evidence, was clearly established.
• Distinction: The panel distinguishes cases resolved on probable cause alone (e.g., pretrial dismissals) from cases where manufactured evidence reaches trial, implicating due process protections throughout the proceeding.
• Remand: The court remands for the district court to reconsider whether Evans’s independent fabrication-of-evidence claim is timely, noting it “makes little sense” for such an injury to accrue before trial when the harm is the use of fabricated evidence at trial.

Case Background

In 1978, five Newark teenagers disappeared; their remains were never found. For decades the case remained cold. In 2008, a renewed investigation focused on Lee Evans and his cousin, Philander Hampton. According to Evans, officers coerced Hampton into giving a false, recorded confession implicating Evans. Evans was arrested and prosecuted; Hampton pled guilty and testified at Evans’s 2011 trial. A jury acquitted Evans on all counts.

Evans then filed a civil rights action. Detectives Carrega and Tietjen moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity; the district court denied the motion as to malicious prosecution. On interlocutory appeal limited to legal issues, the Third Circuit accepted the district court’s factual framing—that Hampton’s confession may have been coerced and that the officers omitted that coercion from the probable cause affidavit—and affirmed the denial of qualified immunity.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

• Qualified immunity framework and appellate jurisdiction:
  • Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) – officials are shielded unless they violate clearly established rights.
  • Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984) – underscores the “reasonable notice” and “reasonable mistake” concepts that qualified immunity protects, but only for reasonable mistakes of law.
  • Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) – collateral order doctrine permits interlocutory appeal of qualified immunity denials on legal issues; Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) – no jurisdiction over factual disputes on such appeals.
• Probable cause and tainted affidavits (Franks-style omission analysis):
  • Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000) – “insert the omitted facts” test to assess materiality and whether probable cause survives.
  • Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1997) – omissions are actionable if made knowingly or with reckless disregard, and are material to probable cause.
  • Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 2016) – officers cannot ignore plainly exculpatory evidence.
  • Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690 (3d Cir. 2017) – reaffirming the centrality of probable cause to arrest; right to be free from arrest without probable cause is clearly established.
  • Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556 (2024) – the court continues to recognize the clearly established nature of the probable-cause requirement.
  • Pinkney v. Meadville, Pa., 95 F.4th 743 (3d Cir. 2024) – reaffirms the duty to scrutinize potentially tainted affidavits and emphasizes that “no reasonable officer would cover up a lack of probable cause by [fabricating evidence].”
• Fabricated evidence and due process:
  • Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2014) – due process forbids police from “fram[ing] suspects” or “cook[ing] up [their] own evidence”; a stand-alone § 1983 due process claim lies where fabricated evidence is used at trial and is reasonably likely to affect the outcome.
  • Black v. Montgomery County, 835 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2016) – Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment injuries can be intertwined where misconduct “infected the entirety of the criminal proceeding, from securing the indictment through trial.”
  • Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2017) – no malicious prosecution claim where undisputed probable cause existed and charges were dropped pretrial; distinguished here because Evans’s allegations center on fabricated evidence reaching trial.
  • Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010); Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2000); Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1995) – collectively underscore that arrest requires probable cause and that this right is clearly established.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel applied the familiar two-step qualified immunity test: (1) whether the facts, taken in the plaintiff’s favor, show a constitutional violation; and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time.

1. Constitutional violation:
   • Material omission in probable cause affidavit. The court reiterated the duty to “dissect a potentially tainted affidavit of probable cause” and “insert the facts recklessly omitted” (Wilson). If a jury credits Hampton’s recantation, the affidavit omitted that Hampton repeatedly denied involvement and told officers the story was a lie. Those are “the kind of thing a judge would wish to know.” The omissions could be found reckless and material, particularly because prosecutors later testified that, without Hampton’s confession, probable cause “surely” would not have existed.
   • Use of fabricated evidence throughout the prosecution. The opinion stresses that due process protects a defendant throughout the criminal proceeding, “through and after trial,” from the use of fabricated evidence (Halsey). Evans’s prosecution went to trial; the allegedly coerced confession was used there, squarely implicating Fourteenth Amendment protections in addition to the Fourth Amendment seizure concerns.
2. Clearly established right:
   • The right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly established long before 2008–2011 (Orsatti, Berg, Kelly, Andrews). Equally clear—well before this investigation—is that police may not fabricate evidence or coerce confessions to secure charges or convictions (Halsey).
   • “Reasonable mistake” does not apply to fabrication. The court rejects the notion that officers could have reasonably, but mistakenly, believed probable cause existed while fabricating or coercing evidence. “[N]o reasonable officer would have covered up a lack of probable cause by [fabricating evidence]” (Pinkney). Thus, the very nature of the alleged misconduct forecloses qualified immunity.

The court also forcefully rejects defendants’ framing that any independent probable cause would cleanse later misconduct. To accept that argument would imply police may “use whatever means they choose” once they have arguable probable cause—“including coercing confessions and manufacturing evidence”—which the panel deems “absurd” and flatly unconstitutional. The due process violation persists irrespective of the legality of the initial arrest and is actionable even where the defendant is acquitted (Black; Halsey).

C. Why the Officers’ Jurisdictional Arguments Failed on Interlocutory Appeal

On an interlocutory appeal from a qualified immunity denial, the court has jurisdiction over purely legal issues (Mitchell), not over factual disputes (Johnson). Here, the panel accepted the district court’s view of the facts—coercion and fabrication are assumed for purposes of appeal—and concluded, as a matter of law, that such conduct violates clearly established rights and defeats qualified immunity on a malicious prosecution claim.

D. The Remand on Fabrication-of-Evidence Accrual

Evans also pled a stand-alone § 1983 fabrication-of-evidence claim. In 2016, the district court deemed aspects of that claim untimely, reasoning that injuries were apparent by the end of grand jury proceedings. The Third Circuit directs the district court to reconsider. Two points drive this remand:

• Use-at-trial injury: The panel notes it makes “little sense” for an injury based on the use of fabricated evidence at trial to have accrued before trial began, underscoring due process protections “through and after trial.”
• Recantation timing: Hampton did not recant until 2017 (years after the 2016 timeliness ruling and four years after the complaint). That timing “may impact when Evans was on notice of the allegedly coerced nature of the confession.”

While not definitively resolving accrual, the panel’s guidance signals that fabrication claims tied to trial use should not be time-barred by pretrial milestones alone.

Impact and Implications

• Reinforced prohibition on manufactured evidence:

  The opinion cements, in precedential terms, that coercing confessions or fabricating inculpatory narratives is never a “reasonable mistake” within the qualified immunity framework. Officers cannot launder such misconduct through a prosecutor’s charging decision, especially where critical exculpatory facts (e.g., coercion) are withheld from prosecutors and the court.

• Malicious prosecution after acquittal remains viable:

  The decision underscores that acquittal does not immunize prior constitutional violations. A prosecution corrupted by fabricated evidence can ground damages liability even without a conviction, particularly where the misconduct “infected the entirety of the criminal proceeding, from securing the indictment through trial” (Black).

• Probable cause is not a safe harbor for later fabrication:

  Even if officers believe probable cause exists, they may not embellish or coerce evidence to strengthen or sustain a case. The court expressly rejects the theory that independent probable cause insulates subsequent due process violations during prosecution.

• Affidavit integrity and disclosure obligations:

  Wilson/Sherwood’s omission doctrine is front and center. Officers must include material exculpatory facts in affidavits and charging presentations. Omitting coercion or denials is a reckless, material omission that can vitiate probable cause and support malice.

• Accrual of fabrication claims:

  By indicating that use-at-trial injuries accrue with the trial, the opinion will likely influence timeliness analyses in fabrication-of-evidence suits. Courts may look beyond indictment dates to when the fabricated evidence was used in court and when a plaintiff could reasonably discover the fabrication (e.g., post hoc recantations).

• Practical guidance for law enforcement:
  • Document and disclose all denials, inconsistencies, and the circumstances of any confession (including polygraph use and custodial conditions).
  • Avoid coaching or scripting witness statements; ensure independent, voluntary narratives.
  • Do not characterize or rely on polygraph “failures” as substantive proof; and never use them as leverage to elicit inculpatory statements.
  • Maintain candor with prosecutors; omissions can expose officers to personal liability despite prosecutorial charging decisions.
• Litigation posture and appellate practice:

  Defendants seeking interlocutory appeal of qualified immunity denials must tailor arguments to legal issues; factual disputes—like whether a confession was coerced—are off-limits on appeal. Plaintiffs should develop a robust record of omissions and materiality under Wilson to defeat qualified immunity at summary judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified immunity:

  A defense that protects officials from damages unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right. No protection exists for conduct that a reasonable officer would know is unlawful. Fabricating evidence or coercing confessions is never a reasonable mistake.

• Malicious prosecution (§ 1983):

  A claim that officers initiated or continued a criminal proceeding without probable cause, with malice, and that the proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor, causing a deprivation of liberty. Material misstatements or omissions in a probable cause affidavit can supply both lack of probable cause and malice.

• Probable cause and the “insert-omitted-facts” test (Wilson/Sherwood):

  Courts evaluate whether omitted facts were material by hypothetically inserting them into the affidavit to see if probable cause would still exist. If not, the omissions are material and can invalidate the warrant and defeat qualified immunity.

• Fabricated evidence and due process (Halsey):

  The Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids the government from using fabricated evidence to charge or convict. This protection extends through trial. Injury can occur when fabricated evidence is used to initiate or sustain prosecution, even if the defendant is ultimately acquitted.

• Interlocutory appeal limits (Mitchell; Johnson):

  Appellate courts may review legal questions about qualified immunity before trial but cannot resolve factual disputes at that stage. Thus, on appeal courts assume the plaintiff’s version of the facts when deciding the legal question.

• Fourth vs. Fourteenth Amendment timeline:

  Early in a case (arrest and pretrial detention), the Fourth Amendment governs seizures and probable cause. As the case progresses to trial, due process (Fourteenth Amendment) governs the fairness of the proceeding, including a ban on using fabricated evidence.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in Evans v. City of Newark is a robust reaffirmation that qualified immunity does not shield officers who manufacture evidence to build or sustain a prosecution. It draws a clear line: coercing confessions and fabricating evidence is categorically unconstitutional and cannot be excused as a “reasonable mistake,” regardless of whether initial probable cause might otherwise be arguable. The opinion integrates Fourth Amendment seizure principles with Fourteenth Amendment due process protections, emphasizing that misconduct infecting the prosecution through trial is actionable—even after an acquittal.

Equally important, the court’s remand on accrual signals sensitivity to the reality that the injury from fabricated evidence often crystallizes at or after trial, especially where the fabrication is uncovered only later (as with a recantation). Going forward, Evans will guide courts and litigants on both the merits and the timing of § 1983 claims involving coerced confessions and manufactured evidence, and it provides concrete operational guidance to law enforcement: disclose material facts, avoid coercion, and never “cook up” evidence.