No Public‑Interest Exception to Mootness:
Grassroots Leadership and the Constitutional Limits of Judicial Power in Texas

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Texas Department of Family and Protective Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., No. 23‑0192 (Tex. May 30, 2025), is a landmark opinion on Texas justiciability doctrine and the constitutional limits of judicial power. Although the underlying controversy concerns state licensing of federal immigration family-detention facilities in Dilley and Karnes, the Court deliberately avoids the merits and instead reshapes Texas mootness law.

The central holding is categorical: there is no “public‑interest exception” to mootness in Texas. Texas courts, including courts of appeals, lack constitutional authority to decide moot cases simply because they raise questions of broad public importance. Mootness, the Court confirms, is not a flexible prudential doctrine but a constitutional limit derived from the Texas Constitution’s text, structure, and history.

This commentary explains the case background, summarizes the Court’s holdings, analyzes the precedents and reasoning, and explores the decision’s future impact—especially for public‑interest litigation and appellate practice in Texas.

II. Background of the Case

A. Federal Flores consent decree and Texas family detention

The litigation arises from the intersection of federal immigration detention and Texas child-care regulation. A 1997 federal class-action consent decree in Flores v. Reno (later enforced in Flores v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 3d 864 (C.D. Cal. 2015)) requires that immigrant minors generally be held only in “licensed” facilities. In 2014, the federal government began detaining mothers and children who had entered the United States illegally at two Texas facilities:

Dilley, operated by Corrections Corporation of America (now CoreCivic); and
Karnes, operated by The GEO Group, Inc.

When federal plaintiffs argued that these secure family detention centers lacked state licenses, the California federal court agreed that this violated the Flores settlement. To preserve federal family detention at Dilley and Karnes, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) responded in 2016 by promulgating a new rule recognizing “family residential centers” as a subset of “general residential operations,” and providing licensing requirements for them. See 26 Tex. Admin. Code § 748.7.

These “family residential center” rules allowed:

adults and children to share a bedroom (to keep mothers and children together overnight); and
more than four occupants per bedroom in certain circumstances (to keep siblings together).

B. The lawsuit: Grassroots Leadership and detained mothers

Grassroots Leadership, Inc., a nonprofit civil-rights organization, filed suit in September 2015 challenging DFPS’s authority under Texas law to adopt the new licensing rule. The suit was later amended to add:

several detained mothers and their minor children (through next friends), and
a children’s day-care operator.

The plaintiffs alleged:

that DFPS’s rule unlawfully reclassified Dilley and Karnes as licensed child-care facilities;
that under the new rule, unrelated adults and children were allowed to share bedrooms, allegedly leading to a sexual assault on one plaintiff’s child; and
that the rule increased safety risks and lengthened detention periods.

They sought:

a declaration under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that DFPS lacked authority to adopt the rule and that the rule was invalid; and
a permanent injunction preventing DFPS from issuing licenses under the rule.

The theory was strategic and indirect: if the state rule and resulting licenses were invalid, the Flores decree would prevent the federal government from holding children at Dilley and Karnes for more than very brief periods.

C. Procedural history

1. Trial court

DFPS, CoreCivic, and GEO Group intervened or defended and filed pleas to the jurisdiction, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The district court:

denied the jurisdictional pleas in relevant part, and
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the APA claim, declaring the DFPS rule invalid and enjoining DFPS from granting licenses.

2. First trip to the court of appeals and Texas Supreme Court on standing

The Third Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the detainee mothers’ injuries were not “fairly traceable” to the DFPS rule. It interpreted the rule as not allowing children to share bedrooms with unrelated adults and discounted any claim that the rule increased detention length.

In 2022, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed that standing holding in Grassroots Leadership, Inc. v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, 646 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. 2022). The Court:

rejected the court of appeals’ reading of the rule and held that it does permit bedroom-sharing between unrelated adults and children, and
held that at least some detainee mothers had adequately alleged concrete, traceable injuries.

The case was remanded for the court of appeals to address remaining jurisdictional issues (including mootness) and, if appropriate, the merits.

3. Remand to the Third Court of Appeals: mootness and the “public-interest exception”

On remand, the Third Court of Appeals found that:

each plaintiff mother had been released from Dilley or Karnes;
average detention lasted only about 11 days, far too short to litigate a case fully; and
there was no record evidence explaining the conditions of the plaintiffs’ release or the likelihood of re-detention.

It held the case was “moot by definition,” because the plaintiffs were no longer detained and the relief sought (invalidation of the rule and licenses) would not change their circumstances. It also rejected the “capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review” exception because there was no evidence that these same mothers were reasonably likely to be detained again at Dilley or Karnes.

However, the court invoked a “public-interest exception” to mootness, based on its 1993 decision in University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298, 304 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, no writ). Under that doctrine, the court asserted authority to reach the merits if:

the case involved a question of “considerable public importance,” and
the question was capable of repetition but likely to evade review—even as to other members of the public, not necessarily the same parties.

Deeming DFPS’s rule “a matter of great public importance,” the court of appeals proceeded to the merits and again invalidated the rule under the APA.

4. Second Texas Supreme Court review

DFPS, the Commissioner, Texas Health and Human Services, the HHSC Commissioner, CoreCivic, and GEO Group petitioned for review. They did not ask the Court to ignore mootness; rather, they argued that:

the case was moot;
the “public-interest exception” was unconstitutional; and
the merits ruling was wrong in any event.

Grassroots and the mothers defended the judgment, arguing, in layers:

the case was not moot because plaintiffs could be re-detained;
even if facially moot, it fit within the “capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review” exception; and
even if neither of those arguments prevailed, the court of appeals properly applied the public-interest exception, which this Court should affirm.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Evan A. Young, writing for the Court (with the Chief Justice and one justice not participating), holds:

The plaintiffs’ claims are moot. Their releases from detention ended the concrete injury at issue—detention with children in the allegedly unlawfully licensed facilities. Any prospect of re-detention under the same circumstances is too speculative to sustain a live controversy.
The “capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review” exception does not apply. Although the short duration of detention satisfies the “evading review” prong, there is no non-speculative “reasonable expectation” that these same mothers will again suffer the same injury (detention in a family residential center with children for a Flores‑violating duration).
There is no constitutionally permissible “public-interest exception” to mootness in Texas. The Texas Constitution’s “judicial power,” “cases” requirement, separation-of-powers clause, legal-advice provision, and open-courts clause collectively prohibit Texas courts from issuing advisory opinions. A “public-interest exception” would be a true exception that authorizes advisory opinions and thus exceeds judicial power.
So-called “exceptions” to mootness (collateral consequences, capable-of-repetition, voluntary cessation, etc.) are not exceptions to constitutional requirements. Rather, they identify circumstances in which a controversy remains live despite appearing moot at first glance.
Disposition. The Court:
- reverses the Third Court of Appeals’ assertion of jurisdiction;
- vacates the court of appeals’ merits judgment and the trial court’s declaratory and injunctive orders; and
- renders judgment dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Court disapproves prior court-of-appeals decisions that recognized or applied a public-interest exception. It lists and disapproves, at least as to jurisdictional holdings, cases including Buchanan, Securtec, Nueces County v. Whitley Trucks, LaFleur, In re Guerra, and later cases that cited or acknowledged that exception.

The result is that DFPS’s family residential center rule remains in force—not because the Supreme Court upheld it on the merits, but because no justiciable case remained through which a court could lawfully adjudicate its validity.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Constitutional foundations of justiciability in Texas

The opinion undertakes an unusually comprehensive examination of the Texas Constitution as a source of justiciability requirements. It identifies five provisions as the textual and structural basis for doctrines like standing, mootness, and ripeness:

Article V, § 1 – The “judicial power” clause
Article V, § 3(a) – The “cases” requirement
Article II, § 1 – The separation-of-powers clause
Article IV, § 22 – The legal-advice provision (Attorney General opinions)
Article I, § 13 – The open-courts clause

1. “Judicial power” (Art. V, § 1; § 3(a))

Article V vests “[t]he judicial power of this State” in one Supreme Court and other courts. In a recent decision (Webster v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478 (Tex. 2024)), the Court explained that “judicial power” has:

a jurisdictional dimension – power to “adjudicate cases or liquidate law”; and
an administrative dimension – e.g., regulation of the practice of law.

This case concerns the jurisdictional side: courts may exercise “judicial power” only to resolve actual, live disputes between adverse parties, culminating in enforceable judgments. Advisory opinions fall outside that conception.

The Court draws an analogy to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which similarly vests “the judicial Power” in the federal judiciary and has long been understood to exclude advisory opinions. The Texas Court quotes Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S.W.2d 641, 643–44 (Tex. 1933): advisory opinions “have generally been held not to be the exercise of judicial power.”

Crucially, the Court notes that the only reason it can answer certified questions from federal appellate courts—an archetypal form of advisory opinion—is that the People amended the Constitution to authorize this in Article V, § 3‑c. That narrow exception underscores that no other advisory opinions are permissible:

“Article V, § 3‑c is thus yet another constitutional provision illustrating the requirements of justiciability. If advisory opinions were already available, we would not have needed that provision….”

2. “Cases” as the form of judicial power (Art. V)

The Court highlights the Constitution’s repeated references to “cases” in defining court jurisdiction—e.g., Article V, § 3(a) (Supreme Court jurisdiction “extend[s] to all cases except in criminal law matters…”). As with the federal “cases” and “controversies” language, “cases” limit judicial power to adjudications that:

involve adversarial parties,
present concrete facts and issues, and
culminate in judgments that resolve the dispute.

Citing Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 164 (Tex. 2004), the Court reiterates that “[a] judicial decision reached without a case or controversy is an advisory opinion” and violates the separation of powers.

3. Separation of powers (Art. II, § 1)

Like the federal system, Texas has three distinct branches. But Texas makes this explicit: Article II, § 1 forbids any branch from exercising the powers “properly attached” to another. For courts, this clause both:

protects judicial independence (other branches cannot dictate outcomes in cases), and
limits judicial encroachment (courts may not exercise non‑judicial powers).

The Court quotes Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control Board, 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993): the separation-of-powers article “prohibit[s] courts from issuing advisory opinions because such is the function of the executive rather than the judicial department.”

This constitutional architecture grounds justiciability doctrines like mootness as jurisdictional mandates, not judge-made policy choices.

4. Legal advice provision (Art. IV, § 22)

Article IV, § 22 directs the Attorney General, an executive officer, to “give legal advice in writing to the Governor and other executive officers.” This is the constitutional point of reference for lawful advisory opinions in Texas: they are executive functions, not judicial.

The Court relies on Morrow’s observation that the Attorney General is the “only state officer expressly authorized to render such opinions,” and ties this to historic federal practice, where the U.S. Supreme Court refused President Washington’s request for advisory opinions, noting that Article II assigns advisory roles to executive officers, not courts.

5. Open-courts clause (Art. I, § 13)

Article I, § 13 guarantees that “[a]ll courts shall be open” and that injured persons “shall have remedy by due course of law.” The Court reads this as a two-sided provision:

It guarantees access for those “suffering an injury,” and
It implicitly limits courts to addressing actual injuries, not hypothetical or generalized grievances.

Quoting Texas Association of Business and later cases, the Court reaffirms that open courts “contemplates access…only for those litigants suffering an injury” (emphasis added). Injuries no longer being suffered—such as completed detentions with no reasonable prospect of recurrence—fall outside this guarantee.

6. Synthesis: Mootness as constitutional, not prudential

Drawing these strands together, the Court concludes:

Mootness is a manifestation of these constitutional limits; and
Texas courts have “no power” to decide moot cases, just as federal courts lack Article III power to decide non‑cases or controversies.

The Court expressly reiterates that “our lack of jurisdiction over moot cases is a mandate of the constitution, not a matter of convenience” (quoting ERCOT, Inc. v. Panda Power, 619 S.W.3d 628, 641 (Tex. 2021)).

B. Mootness and its so‑called “exceptions”

The opinion clarifies both the scope and the terminology of mootness doctrine.

1. Step one: facial mootness

A case is moot on its face when intervening events make it so that a judgment would have no practical effect on the parties’ rights or obligations. Examples include:

a plaintiff’s release from detention where only prospective relief is sought;
expiration of a statute of limitations for an underlying claim (Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra Group, LP, 575 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. 2019)); or
granting tenure to a professor challenging an evaluation that allegedly threatened tenure (Texas A&M-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. 2011)).

The Court acknowledges that mootness is “difficult to establish” and that the party urging mootness bears an initial burden. But once it is clear that the concrete injury has ceased and no further practical relief seems possible, the plaintiff must identify non-speculative reasons why the case is nonetheless live.

2. Step two: are any recognized “exceptions” applicable?

The Court recognizes two primary, generally applicable mootness “exceptions”:

Collateral consequences (e.g., enduring civil disabilities or reputational harms from criminal or mental-health adjudications); and
Capable of repetition, yet evading review (short-duration actions that are reasonably expected to recur as to the same complaining party).

It also acknowledges related doctrines:

Voluntary cessation of challenged conduct, which usually does not moot a case unless it is clear the conduct cannot reasonably recur;
Partial mootness, where some but not all claims or issues have become moot; and
Attorney’s-fee-driven “residual” controversies, where statutory fee entitlement can preserve a live stake in a case even after the underlying injunctive relief has become moot (e.g., Marshall v. Housing Authority of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. 2006)).

The key conceptual move is the Court’s insistence that these are not truly “exceptions” at all:

“[S]o-called ‘exceptions’ to the mootness doctrine are not really exceptions at all. They do not allow courts to disregard the boundaries of the judicial power and adjudicate cases that are actually moot. Rather, the exceptions elucidate when a case that seems moot actually remains live….”

They therefore do not authorize advisory opinions; they simply recognize that some disputes remain live even though the initial injury has ceased or changed form.

3. Rejection of “public-interest exception” as a real exception

By contrast, the “public-interest exception” explicitly authorizes courts to:

admit that a case is moot, yet
nevertheless decide the merits because the issue is important, likely to recur, and (as to some segment of the public) likely to evade review.

That is, it embraces advisory opinions as such. The Court finds that qualitatively different from doctrines like collateral consequences or capable-of-repetition, which protect ongoing concrete interests of the parties before the court.

For that reason, the Court rejects the suggestion (made by some other state courts and by at least one Kansas decision, which it cites) that the existence of judicially created mootness “exceptions” proves mootness to be prudential, not constitutional. In Texas, these doctrines operate within a non‑waivable constitutional floor of live controversy.

C. Application to Grassroots Leadership’s challenge

1. Facial mootness: release from detention

The plaintiffs’ operative injury, as the Court defines it, was:

being detained with minor children at Dilley or Karnes,
in facilities licensed under the challenged DFPS rule, and
for periods that would violate the Flores decree absent a valid license.

It is undisputed that:

none of the plaintiff mothers remained detained;
average detention lasted roughly 11 days; and
one mother’s documented detention lasted only eight days after she was added as a plaintiff.

The short-term detentions ended years ago. That ended the live, concrete injury. The question became whether further injury to these plaintiffs is sufficiently likely and non‑speculative that judicial relief (invalidation of the DFPS rule) would still have a “practical effect” on them.

2. Plaintiffs’ arguments against mootness

Grassroots advanced two main arguments to avoid mootness even at the facial level:

Federal re-detention authority. Citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b), it argued that the U.S. Attorney General could revoke parole and re-detain any of the mothers “at any time,” including at Dilley or Karnes.
Expert testimony on ICE practices. Grassroots’s immigration expert, Erica Schommer, testified that:
- ICE has broad discretion to re-detain released immigrants;
- in 2015, about 16,000 people were detained at Dilley; and
- she knew of “over twenty” families who had been re-detained in Dilley or Karnes, often for reasons such as violating parole conditions, committing crimes, or receiving adverse immigration decisions.

Grassroots argued that these circumstances preserved a live stake in the litigation: re-detention was possible, the detention periods were short, and absent judicial intervention the challenged rule could again facilitate prolonged family detention.

3. The Court’s response: possibility vs. reasonable likelihood

The Court acknowledges that mootness is not established simply because the immediate injury has ceased. But it insists on a “reasonable likelihood” or “reasonable expectation” standard, consistent with prior Texas and U.S. Supreme Court cases. Mere “physical or theoretical possibility” is not enough.

Applied here:

The plaintiffs did not claim to be challenging their federal immigration status or detention authority generally. They sought only state-law relief invalidating the DFPS rule and resulting licenses.
To make that state-law challenge non-moot for these plaintiffs, they needed to show a reasonable likelihood that:
- they would be re-detained,
- at Dilley or Karnes,
- with a minor child,
- for a period exceeding Flores limits so that licensing status would matter.
Neither the bare federal statutory authority to re-detain, nor Schommer’s very general testimony about ICE discretion and rare re-detentions, comes close to establishing such a likelihood for any named plaintiff.

The Court underscores that:

we cannot presume that plaintiffs will violate parole conditions or commit crimes (two main reasons Schommer identified for re-detention); and
nothing in the record links any particular plaintiff to a heightened risk of adverse immigration outcomes that would likely lead to re-detention at those specific facilities.

Thus, although re-detention is conceivable, it remains “speculative, hypothetical, or contingent,” which under Texas law is insufficient to keep a case alive. The Court invokes the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), and its own prior holdings (e.g., Yarbrough, Glassdoor) as paradigmatic instances where possible but unlikely future harms did not preclude a finding of mootness.

4. Capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review

The Court then examines whether, despite mootness, the case fits within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine. This requires:

Short duration. The challenged action must be too short to be fully litigated before it ceases. The 11-day average detention easily meets this requirement.
Reasonable expectation of recurrence as to the same complaining party. The same plaintiffs must face a reasonable likelihood of suffering the same injury again.

The Court agrees that the detentions “evade review” because of their brevity, but finds the second requirement unsatisfied for the same reasons the case is facially moot:

There is no evidence of a reasonable expectation that these specific mothers will be detained again under the same conditions.
Grassroots’s evidence shows only rare, isolated instances of re-detention, typically due to parole violations, crimes, or adverse immigration decisions unrelated to the DFPS rule.

Therefore the exception does not apply. The Court emphasizes that this doctrine is not satisfied by a generalized likelihood that someone in the public will face similar treatment; it demands recurrence as to “the same complaining party.”

5. Dismissal without prejudice and the possibility of refiling

The Court notes that dismissal for mootness is without prejudice and does not foreclose future litigation if:

any of these plaintiffs are in fact re-detained under the same conditions, or
new plaintiffs with live injuries bring a fresh challenge.

It cites Waco ISD v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2000), where a ripeness dismissal left plaintiffs free to refile once claims ripened. The same logic applies to mootness: courts cannot reach the merits in a nonjusticiable posture, but that constraint does not bar future suits when a genuine injury arises.

D. Formal rejection of the “public-interest exception”

1. The court of appeals’ use of Buchanan

The Third Court of Appeals relied on its 1993 decision in UIL v. Buchanan, which had fashioned a “public-interest exception” to mootness. That exception allowed appellate courts to decide moot disputes that:

raise issues of “considerable public importance”; and
are capable of repetition but evade review as to “other members of the public,” even if not as to the same parties.

The Supreme Court criticizes the court of appeals both for:

failing to engage with the constitutional basis for justiciability at all; and
failing to recognize that later Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Panda Power, Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. 2020)) had undermined its Buchanan precedent.

2. Morath’s warning becomes an explicit holding

In Morath v. Lewis, a school-finance case, the Court had already written:

“We do not have power to decide moot cases, whether they ‘involve a matter of public concern’ or not…. If courts were empowered to ignore the usual limits on their jurisdiction, such as mootness, when matters of public concern are at stake, then we would no longer have a judiciary with limited power to decide genuine cases and controversies.”

In Grassroots Leadership, the Court expressly adopts this passage as a holding and uses it to shut the door on a public-interest exception:

courts cannot trade constitutional limitations for perceived public good; and
judicial self-restraint is especially critical in high-profile, politically charged cases, where the risk of intrusion into legislative or executive prerogatives is greatest.

3. Disapproving court-of-appeals decisions

The Court goes further and explicitly “disapprove[s]” the jurisdictional holdings (or acknowledgement of the doctrine’s availability) in at least a dozen court-of-appeals decisions, including:

UIL v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (Austin 1993);
Securtec, Inc. v. County of Gregg, 106 S.W.3d 803 (Texarkana 2003);
Nueces County v. Whitley Trucks, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 124 (Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1993);
In re Guerra, 235 S.W.3d 392 (Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2007);
Texas DPS v. LaFleur, 32 S.W.3d 911 (Texarkana 2000);
and later decisions such as City of Georgetown v. Putnam, NextEra Energy, Inc. v. PUC, and others that cited or assumed the doctrine’s validity.

While the Court does not disturb any substantive merits holdings in those cases, it disapproves them “to the extent” they relied on or endorsed the public-interest exception to sustain jurisdiction.

4. Other states’ approaches rejected

Grassroots pointed to other states that recognize a similar public-interest exception. The Court responds:

States with explicit constitutional provisions authorizing advisory opinions (e.g., Massachusetts) are in a different situation;
Some state courts have traditions of giving advisory opinions to political branches; and
Texas’s Constitution, by contrast, does not contain such a provision and instead follows the federal model of limiting courts to cases and controversies, even though its textual architecture is independently crafted and adds unique constraints.

The Court draws particular support from DeFunis, where the U.S. Supreme Court declined to adopt Washington State’s public-interest exception under Article III. Similarly, Texas courts may not import other states’ advisory-opinion practices absent a constitutional amendment.

E. Important precedents cited and how they shaped the decision

The opinion’s doctrinal depth comes partly from its engagement with numerous prior cases. Key precedents include:

1. Morrow v. Corbin (1933) and United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney (1965)

Both cases are foundational for Texas’s bar on advisory opinions.

Morrow explained that advisory opinions are not an exercise of “judicial power,” noting that the Constitution assigns such advisory roles to the Attorney General (Art. IV, § 22).
Delaney held that even a declaratory judgment sought solely to answer a legal question for use in a federal case would be an impermissible advisory opinion because the Texas court could not itself bind the parties in the underlying federal litigation. This rigor led the People to adopt Art. V, § 3‑c, authorizing certified questions from federal appellate courts.

These cases underpin the Court’s insistence that courts cannot create jurisdictional “exceptions” that functionally authorize advisory opinions.

2. Justiciability line: Texas Ass’n of Business, Heckman, Brown v. Todd

The Court situates the opinion within its longer-standing reliance on federal justiciability standards as “instructive” under the Texas Constitution:

Texas Ass’n of Business v. Texas Air Control Board, 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) – held that standing in Texas is both constitutional (open courts, separation of powers) and prudential. It underscored that courts cannot issue advisory opinions.
Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) – clarified standing, class-action mootness, and the need for a live controversy at all stages, noting that even one live issue between class and defendants can preserve justiciability.
Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. 2001) – applied federal standing concepts, emphasizing the role of separation of powers and open courts in limiting Texas courts to cases of actual injury.

These precedents support the Court’s portrayal of mootness as part of a unified, constitutionally anchored justiciability framework.

3. Mootness and collateral consequences: Carrillo, In re J.J.R.S., In re A.R.C.

Drawing on criminal and juvenile cases, the Court shows that collateral consequences—such as sex-offender registration requirements or future limitations—can keep a case live even after direct penalties end. Examples include:

Carrillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. 1972) – collateral consequences of a conviction prevented mootness;
In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2021) – any ruling on a moot issue is an advisory opinion courts lack jurisdiction to issue;
In re A.R.C., 685 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. 2024) – involuntary commitment orders have collateral consequences under federal and state law.

These cases demonstrate that Texas courts take mootness seriously but recognize genuine, continuing injuries beyond the immediate sanction.

4. Voluntary cessation and capable-of-repetition: Matthews, In re Continental Freighters, Williams v. Lara

The Court invokes:

Matthews v. Kountze ISD, 484 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. 2016) – voluntary cessation does not moot a case absent clear proof that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably recur;
In re Continental Freighters, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. 2022) – withdrawal of discovery requests in response to a mandamus petition did not moot the case because plaintiffs remained free to renew their requests; and
Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2001) – articulated the classic two‑prong capable‑of‑repetition test under Texas law.

The Court uses these cases to draw the line between genuinely live controversies that appear moot and truly moot disputes where any recurrence is too speculative.

5. ERCOT and Panda Power

Recent high-profile decisions, especially ERCOT, Inc. v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2021) (“Panda Power”), play a prominent role. There, the Court declined to answer significant questions about the Electric Reliability Council of Texas’s sovereign-immunity status because the underlying case had become moot. Panda Power stresses:

courts cannot issue advisory opinions even in “important” energy and regulatory cases; and
mootness is a constitutional, not discretionary, bar.

The Grassroots Leadership opinion leans on Panda Power to underscore that even intense judicial and public desire for clarity cannot justify deciding moot cases.

V. Complex Doctrines Simplified

Several technical concepts drive the opinion’s reasoning. For clarity, here are simplified explanations.

1. Justiciability

“Justiciability” is a gatekeeping idea. It asks: is this a dispute that courts are allowed to decide? Core justiciability doctrines include:

Standing – Does the plaintiff have a concrete, personal stake in the outcome?
Ripeness – Is the dispute developed enough, or is it too early/speculative?
Mootness – Has the dispute ceased to exist or lost practical significance?

If any of these fail, the case is nonjusticiable and must be dismissed, even if the underlying policy issues are important.

2. Mootness

A case is “moot” when:

the underlying issue that gave rise to the lawsuit has been resolved or has ceased; and
there is no longer any meaningful relief a court can grant that would affect the parties’ rights or obligations.

In this case, the injury was detention under certain conditions. Once all plaintiffs were released and could not show a non-speculative likelihood of being detained again under the same conditions, there was no live case.

3. Advisory opinion

An “advisory opinion” is when a court answers a legal question in the abstract, without resolving a live dispute between parties. For example:

“Is DFPS’s family residential center rule valid?” asked in general is advisory.
“Is DFPS’s rule valid, as applied to these plaintiffs who are currently detained under it, and will invalidation change their legal position?” is a justiciable question.

Under the Texas Constitution, courts (unlike the Attorney General) cannot give abstract legal advice. They must resolve concrete cases.

4. Collateral consequences

Sometimes a legal judgment has effects that outlast the direct punishment or sanction. These are “collateral consequences”:

a criminal conviction that limits voting or firearm rights;
a juvenile adjudication that must be disclosed in future court proceedings; or
a mental-health commitment that affects future civil rights.

Even if the original sentence is over, these continuing legal consequences mean the case is not moot.

5. Capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review

This doctrine applies where:

the harm is so short‑lived that no lawsuit could be fully litigated before it ends (e.g., election disputes, short-term detentions, some pregnancy-related issues); and
there is a reasonable expectation that the same plaintiff will be subjected to the same harm again.

It is not enough that others might someday be harmed. The same person must be reasonably likely to face the same situation again.

6. Voluntary cessation

When a defendant voluntarily stops the challenged conduct after being sued (e.g., repeals a law, stops enforcing a policy), courts are suspicious. The defendant might resume the conduct after the case is dismissed. So:

voluntary cessation usually does not moot a case; but
if it is “absolutely clear” the conduct cannot reasonably recur (for example, due to legislative repeal with no prospect of revival), the case becomes moot.

7. Public-interest exception (now rejected)

Under the now-rejected doctrine, courts could:

acknowledge a case was technically moot;
but still decide it because the issue was important and likely to come up again for other people.

The Supreme Court now holds that Texas courts cannot do this: importance to the public does not expand judicial power beyond the Constitution’s limits.

VI. Impact and Future Directions

A. Immediate effect on the Grassroots litigation and family-detention rule

For this specific lawsuit:

The trial court’s declaratory judgment invalidating DFPS’s rule and its injunction are vacated.
The court of appeals’ merits decision striking down the rule is also vacated.
DFPS’s “family residential center” licensing rule remains in effect unless and until it is successfully challenged in a new, justiciable case or changed by the agency or legislature.

The Supreme Court expresses no view on the APA merits—whether DFPS properly had statutory authority to adopt the rule.

B. Constraints on public-interest litigation strategies

This decision significantly alters the landscape for public-interest and impact litigation in Texas, particularly where:

the underlying harm is inherently short-lived (e.g., short detentions, election disputes, temporary school or prison policies); and
the plaintiffs are individuals whose circumstances change before appellate review concludes.

Key implications:

No reliance on “public importance” to bypass mootness. Litigants cannot argue that courts should decide moot cases because the issues matter broadly or to other affected persons. If a plaintiff’s claim is moot and no recognized exception applies, the entire case must be dismissed.
Greater emphasis on class actions and structural challenges. Because the Court hints that class actions raise distinct justiciability questions, public-interest litigants may:
- prefer class-certification strategies that ensure at least one class representative continues to suffer injury; and
- structure claims so that injunctive and declaratory relief attach to ongoing, systemic practices rather than to a single, completed episode.
Need for better evidence on capable-of-repetition. Where plaintiffs anticipate relying on the capable-of-repetition doctrine, they will need:
- plaintiff-specific evidence of a realistic likelihood of recurrence,
- not just general policies or statutory discretion affecting a broad population.
Importance of timing and appellate strategy. Because mootness is assessed at every stage, lawyers must:
- build records showing ongoing injury or concrete likelihood of recurrence;
- consider expedited procedures in inherently short-lived contexts; and
- avoid overreliance on prospective-only relief for plaintiffs with transient statuses (e.g., detainees, students, seasonal workers).

C. Institutional implications for Texas courts

The opinion reinforces a judicial philosophy of institutional modesty:

Court power is confined to live disputes; courts may not reach out to decide important questions whenever they believe their input would be helpful.
Constitutional limits apply with special force in high-profile, politically charged cases, to avoid encroachment on legislative and executive functions.
Courts of appeals are explicitly warned not to follow older precedents that have been “disturbed by higher authority.” Horizontal stare decisis cannot override the Texas Supreme Court’s more recent justiciability jurisprudence.

D. Clarification of Texas–federal analogies and differences

Although the opinion draws heavily on federal Article III case law, it emphasizes that:

the Texas Constitution stands on its own, grounded in its own historical and textual commitments; but
where the text and structure parallel the federal Constitution, federal justiciability doctrine is highly persuasive and often aligned with Texas’s constitutional minimum.

Given that Texas adds an open-courts clause and an explicit separation-of-powers provision, the Court suggests that:

if anything, Texas’s justiciability limits may be more restrictive than Article III’s, not less; and
Texas courts cannot be more permissive (e.g., by adopting advisory-opinion practices) without constitutional amendment.

E. Future litigation over advisory functions

By tying advisory opinions explicitly to the Attorney General’s constitutional role (Art. IV, § 22) and to Art. V, § 3‑c’s limited certified-question mechanism, the Court signals that:

any expansion of judicial advisory functions—whether by statute, court rule, or lower-court innovation—will be suspect;
legislative attempts to require courts to issue opinions divorced from resolving concrete disputes would likely be struck down; and
if Texans desire courts to issue advisory opinions on matters of great public concern, they must amend the Constitution explicitly, as they did for certified questions from federal appellate courts.

VII. Conclusion

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc. is a pivotal reaffirmation—and clarification—of the constitutional boundaries of judicial power in Texas.

Substantively, the Court leaves unresolved the legality of DFPS’s licensing of family residential centers used for immigration detention. Procedurally and institutionally, however, it delivers a clear message:

Mootness is a constitutional constraint, not a flexible policy tool.
There is no public-interest exception to mootness in Texas. Courts may not decide cases that have ceased to present live controversies, no matter how important the issues or how likely the issues are to recur for others.
Justiciability “exceptions” are not true exceptions. Collateral consequences, capable-of-repetition, voluntary cessation, and related doctrines simply describe situations in which a controversy remains live despite appearances; they do not license advisory opinions.

For public-interest litigants, the decision underscores the necessity of careful plaintiff selection, class-action strategy, evidentiary support for recurrence, and attention to timing. For the judiciary, it reaffirms a limited, case‑focused role, aligned with both the Texas and federal constitutional traditions.

In sum, the opinion cements a core principle of Texas constitutional law: courts exist to decide live cases between parties with real stakes—not to announce abstract rules of law, however pressing the policy questions might be. Any departure from that model must come, if at all, from the People themselves through constitutional amendment, not from judicial innovation.

No Public‑Interest Exception to Mootness: Grassroots Leadership and the Constitutional Limits of Judicial Power in Texas