No Public-Trial Violation from Sequestration of a Potential Witness: People v. Smith (Ill. 2025)

Introduction

In People v. Smith, 2025 IL 130067, the Supreme Court of Illinois resolved multiple trial-management and evidentiary disputes arising from a 2012 homicide at the Press Box bar in Harvey, Illinois. The central question on appeal was whether the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial (and its state analogue) was violated when the trial court excluded his mother from the courtroom during portions of trial because she was a potential witness. The appellate court had reversed on that ground and ordered a new trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that sequestration of a potential witness—even the defendant’s mother—does not implicate the public-trial right where the courtroom remains open to the public.

The Court went on to resolve four additional issues the appellate court had addressed for guidance: (1) the admissibility of identifications from a second lineup in which the defendant wore his own red-and-white shirt; (2) a discovery violation stemming from a gunshot residue expert’s trial testimony that tacitly diverged from her report; (3) the trial court’s decision to send a photograph to the jury during deliberations; and (4) two challenged prosecutorial remarks in closing argument. Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and remanded to the appellate court to consider any unresolved issues raised in the briefs that the appellate court had not addressed.

Summary of the Opinion

• No public-trial violation: Excluding the defendant’s mother from the courtroom as a potential witness did not close the courtroom and therefore did not trigger the Waller v. Georgia closure analysis or constitute structural error (¶¶ 31-33).
• Lineup identifications admissible: The second lineup was not impermissibly suggestive merely because the defendant wore his own red-and-white shirt that witnesses had described; there was no police “spotlighting” (¶¶ 37-40).
• Discovery violation not reversible: The State elicited undisclosed opinion testimony from the gunshot residue expert about other laboratories’ standards, which conflicted with her report. This was a discovery violation but not prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial (¶¶ 41-47).
• Photograph to the jury: No abuse of discretion in sending to the jury a photograph admitted as the defendant’s personal property, especially given the defense’s earlier admissions about the photo’s provenance; invited error doctrine applied (¶¶ 49-53).
• Closing argument: One prosecutorial remark was improper but not prejudicial; a second remark was not clearly erroneous and, in any event, was forfeited for lack of a contemporaneous objection (¶¶ 56-61).
• Disposition: Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed; case remanded to the appellate court for consideration of any remaining, previously unaddressed issues (¶¶ 65-68).

Case Background

Matthew Smith was convicted of first-degree murder stemming from the shooting death of Kevin Guice in the early morning hours of August 11, 2012, after a disturbance at the Press Box bar. Four eyewitnesses linked Smith to the shooting; he was apprehended after fleeing a silver Buick in which a .357 revolver was found. A red-and-white shirt, which witnesses associated with the shooter, was recovered from the vehicle. Smith sought to suppress identifications from two lineups conducted that day, challenged the admission and later jury access to a photograph recovered with his property, objected to gunshot residue testimony, and claimed prosecutorial error in closing. He also claimed a violation of his public-trial right when his mother was excluded from the courtroom until the State rested, owing to her status as a potential witness (she had been present at the station during Smith’s juvenile interrogation).

Detailed Analysis

1) Public-Trial Right vs. Witness Sequestration

Precedents Cited

• Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984): Establishes the test for courtroom closures that implicate the Sixth Amendment public-trial right.
• People v. Radford, 2020 IL 123975: Partial closures still may not violate the public-trial right where the courtroom remains open to some members of the public, such as family or media (¶ 32).
• People v. Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d 84 (1990): Excluding certain members of the public (while leaving the courtroom open to media) during sensitive testimony did not violate the public-trial right (¶ 32).
• People v. Taylor, 244 Ill. App. 3d 460 (1993): Distinguishes a public-trial claim from the court’s authority to exclude potential witnesses; excluding defendant’s parents as possible witnesses did not implicate public-trial rights (¶ 32).
• People v. Chatman, 2022 IL App (4th) 210716: Notes the time-honored practice of excluding witnesses to prevent tailoring of testimony (¶ 31).

Legal Reasoning

The Court draws a bright doctrinal line between courtroom closures (which are subject to the Waller framework and can trigger structural error) and witness sequestration (a routine trial management tool). The Court found that the courtroom was never closed; other family members, spectators, and the media were present throughout (¶ 31). The mother’s exclusion flowed from her status as a potential witness, which the defense had effectively conceded (¶ 33). Because this was sequestration, not closure, the Sixth Amendment’s public-trial right was not implicated and Waller did not apply.

Impact

• Clarification for trial courts: Judges may exclude potential witnesses—including close relatives—from the courtroom without triggering public-trial analysis, so long as the courtroom remains open.
• Structural error limited: Defendants cannot recharacterize proper sequestration as a courtroom closure to obtain automatic reversal.
• Record-building: While not required here, best practice is to make a clear record that the courtroom remains open and to revisit witness status so family members may attend once they are no longer potential witnesses (as the court did here when it permitted the mother to enter after the defense elected not to call her).

2) Lineup Suggestiveness and Wearing One’s Own Clothing

Precedents Cited

• People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118 (1992): Wearing one’s own clothing that resembles what witnesses described the offender wearing is not suggestive absent police “spotlighting.” The touchstone is “the strength of suggestion made to the witness” (¶¶ 39-40).
• People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117 (1996): Differences in hairstyle among lineup participants do not render a lineup unduly suggestive (¶ 38).
• People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381 (1995): Age differences among fillers alone do not make a lineup unduly suggestive (¶ 38).
• People v. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d 322 (1988): Participants need not be physically identical (¶ 38).
• People v. Kavanaugh, 85 Ill. App. 3d 783 (1980): Differences in age/size/appearance go to weight, not necessarily admissibility (¶ 38).
• People v. Faber, 2012 IL App (1st) 093273; People v. Gabriel, 398 Ill. App. 3d 332 (2010): Wearing one’s own clothes is not suggestive absent police conduct spotlighting the suspect (¶ 40).

Legal Reasoning

The second lineup was not unduly suggestive. The fillers’ age and hairstyle differences were not so pronounced as to “spotlight” the defendant (the mohawk was “not very pronounced,” and the trial and appellate courts agreed fillers were not “grossly dissimilar”) (¶ 38). Crucially, the red-and-white shirt the defendant wore in the second lineup was his own, and he admitted he wore it at the Press Box (¶¶ 39-40). There was no evidence of police design to highlight the defendant. Under Johnson, absent police activity that signals whom to pick, wearing one’s own distinctive clothing does not taint the lineup.

Impact

• Reaffirmed standard: Illinois courts will continue to assess suggestiveness primarily through the lens of police conduct. Clothing parity among fillers is not necessary when the suspect appears in his own clothes without police orchestration.
• Practice pointer for law enforcement: Document that a suspect wears his own clothing and that no direction was given about attire; avoid any “spotlighting” behaviors (telling witnesses the suspect is present, highlighting clothing, or otherwise singling out one participant).
• Defense strategy: To suppress, defendants must show police conduct created suggestion leading to a substantial likelihood of misidentification; mere differences among fillers typically go to weight.

3) Expert Discovery Violations and Prejudice Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 412(a)(iv): The State must disclose expert reports and test results.
• People v. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d 97 (2009): Reversal for discovery violations requires prejudice; the State cannot elicit an undisclosed expert interpretation that contradicts the report (¶¶ 45-46).
• People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36 (1999): Discovery rules protect against surprise, unfairness, and inadequate preparation; reversal requires prejudice (¶ 41).
• People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68 (1993): Continuance may be relevant to whether prejudice can be cured; here the Court recognized a continuance would have been futile (¶ 47).

Legal Reasoning

The ISP expert testified that under ISP standards, three tri-component particles are required for a “positive” gunshot residue finding; the defendant’s right hand had one particle, which under ISP protocols did not indicate discharge (¶¶ 43-44). The State then elicited undisclosed testimony that some outside laboratories consider a single tri-component particle sufficient to deem a sample positive—implicitly suggesting the defendant might be “positive” elsewhere (¶ 44). That implicit interpretive pivot contradicted the report’s conclusion and was undisclosed, surprising the defense and impairing cross-examination or the opportunity to call a counter-expert (¶ 44).

Applying Lovejoy, the Court held that this was a discovery violation. But on prejudice, the Court considered: (a) the strength of the evidence against the defendant (overwhelming) (¶ 47); (b) the strengthening effect of the undisclosed testimony (mitigated by the expert’s ultimate conclusion that the analysis indicated the defendant may not have fired) (¶ 47); and (c) the likelihood that prior notice would have enabled effective rebuttal (a continuance would have been futile because any expert would have to acknowledge ISP’s standard and the variation across labs) (¶ 47). No new trial was warranted.

Impact

• Disclosure breadth: The State must disclose not only an expert’s bottom-line conclusion but also material interpretive opinions it intends to elicit at trial, including comparisons to other laboratories’ standards.
• Foundation matters: The Court criticized the absence of foundation for claims about “other laboratories” (which labs, what standards, and the basis for the expert’s knowledge) (¶ 44). Trial courts should require a proper foundation before admitting such testimony.
• Prejudice lens: Even when discovery violations occur, Illinois courts will measure prejudice practically, considering the totality of the evidence and whether a continuance could realistically cure the surprise.

4) Sending the Photograph to the Jury During Deliberations

Precedents and Standards

• People v. Hollahan, 2020 IL 125091: A trial court’s response to a jury request to view evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion (¶ 48).
• People v. Carter, 208 Ill. 2d 309 (2003): Invited-error doctrine bars a party from inducing a course of action and later complaining about it on appeal (¶ 53).

Legal Reasoning

The photograph was admitted as part of the defendant’s personal property seized at arrest—an evidentiary foundation unchallenged at trial (¶ 49). Although trial testimony did not establish when or where the photograph was taken, defense counsel repeatedly admitted pretrial that the photograph was taken “in the club” on the night of the shooting and that the defendant wore the red-and-white shirt in the club (¶¶ 50, 52). At the exhibit conference, counsel pivoted and argued that the photo’s time/place were unknown; the Supreme Court applied invited error to preclude that change in position (¶ 53). Given the foundation and the defense’s admissions, sending the photo in response to the jury’s request was within the court’s discretion.

Impact

• Exhibit management: Once an item is admitted, courts have wide latitude to send it to the jury. Parties should anticipate that admitted exhibits may go to the jury absent a limiting agreement or ruling.
• Consistency of positions: Defense admissions at a motion in limine can have consequences; counsel should be cautious about concessions that later foreclose objections or underpin invited-error findings.

5) Prosecutorial Closing Argument

Precedents Cited

• People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92 (2007): Reversal for improper closing argument requires substantial prejudice and that the improper comments were a material factor in the conviction (¶ 56).
• People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112: Consider the argument as a whole; isolated misstatements can be cured by instructions and correct statements of law (¶¶ 56-58).
• People v. Mudd, 2022 IL 126830; People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66 (1989); People v. Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d 513 (2000): Isolated improper comments, mitigated by proper burden statements and instructions, generally are not reversible (¶¶ 57-59).
• People v. Williams, 2022 IL 126918: Preservation requires objection at trial and in a posttrial motion (¶ 60).
• People v. Coleman, 158 Ill. 2d 319 (1994): Permissible for the State to argue that to accept the defense’s version the jury would have to believe the State’s witnesses are lying; improper to argue that to acquit the defendant the jury must find State witnesses are lying (¶ 61).

Legal Reasoning

The first remark—“in order for you to find him not guilty, you have to find that … all four people lied”—was improper. But it was an isolated misstatement in lengthy arguments that repeatedly and correctly placed the burden on the State and was cured by comprehensive instructions (¶¶ 57-58). The second remark—“[t]he only way this is whodunit is if you … find the four people … liars”—was forfeited for lack of a contemporaneous objection and, in any event, was not clearly erroneous because it mirrors the argument approved in Coleman: to accept the defense theory the jury would have to disbelieve the State’s witnesses (¶ 61).

Impact

• Burden-of-proof guardrails: Prosecutors should avoid framing acquittal as requiring a finding that State witnesses lied. Safer formulations are those approved in Coleman.
• Preservation matters: Defense counsel must object contemporaneously and include the claim in a posttrial motion to preserve the issue; otherwise review is limited to plain error.
• Jury instructions as cure: Robust, accurate instructions and repeated correct statements of the burden can mitigate isolated misstatements.

Professional Responsibility Note

In a footnote, the Court cautioned counsel about citation accuracy and reminded practitioners of their obligations under Rules of Professional Conduct 3.1 and 3.3. This serves as a broader admonition about the integrity of appellate briefing and the importance of accurate authority (n.1).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Public-trial right vs. sequestration: The Sixth Amendment ensures the courtroom is open to the public. Sequestration is a separate, routine practice that keeps potential witnesses out until they testify to prevent tailoring. Sequestration does not “close” the courtroom.
• Structural error: A rare class of errors that require automatic reversal (e.g., a closed trial). Sequestration of a witness is not structural error.
• Waller test: A stringent standard governing courtroom closures (necessity, narrow tailoring, consideration of alternatives, and adequate findings). It applies only if there is a closure, not routine witness exclusion.
• Suggestive lineup: A lineup is unlawfully suggestive if police conduct “spotlights” the suspect, creating a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Wearing one’s own distinctive clothing, without police design, is generally acceptable.
• Gunshot residue (GSR) tri-component particle: Under ISP protocols, a “positive” finding requires three tri-component particles. Variations exist across labs; undisclosed testimony about such variability can be a discovery violation if it goes beyond the disclosed report.
• Invited error: A litigant cannot complain on appeal about a ruling they induced or a position they previously advanced.
• Plain error: A narrow exception allowing review of unpreserved errors when the evidence is closely balanced or the error is so serious that it undermines the fairness of the trial. The first step is establishing a clear or obvious error.

Broader Significance and Practical Takeaways

• Public-trial doctrine clarified: Smith draws a clear distinction between true closures and witness sequestration. Courts and litigants should assess public-trial claims by first asking whether the courtroom was, in fact, closed to the public.
• Trial management: Judges may exclude potential witnesses—including close family—without invoking Waller. Still, it is prudent to:
  • State on the record that the courtroom remains open;
  • Explain that exclusion is for sequestration purposes;
  • Revisit witness status during trial to allow reentry once witness status ends.
• Identification procedures: Law enforcement can conduct lineups without equalizing clothing when suspects wear their own clothes, provided there is no “spotlighting.” Defense challenges should target police conduct rather than filler differences alone.
• Expert disclosures: Prosecutors must ensure expert testimony tracks disclosed reports. If trial testimony may include comparative standards or interpretive gloss not in the report, supplement discovery in advance and lay proper foundation.
• Exhibits and admissions: Early concessions about exhibits (e.g., when/where a photo was taken) can limit later objections and may invite error. Counsel should calibrate admissions to avoid foreclosing legitimate evidentiary arguments.
• Closing arguments: Prosecutors should avoid language suggesting jurors must find State witnesses “lied” to acquit. Defense counsel should object in real time to preserve claims.

Unresolved Matters on Remand

Although the Supreme Court resolved the principal issues addressed by the appellate court, it observed that the appellate court reviewed only two of several closing-argument comments challenged on appeal (¶ 62). The case is remanded to the appellate court to consider any remaining unresolved issues raised in the original appellate briefs (¶ 65). Practitioners should watch for the appellate court’s treatment of any such residual claims.

Conclusion

People v. Smith cements an important clarification: the sequestration of a potential witness—even a defendant’s mother—does not implicate the Sixth Amendment public-trial right where the courtroom remains open. It simultaneously reinforces longstanding identification law: wearing one’s own clothing that matches a witness description does not make a lineup unduly suggestive absent police “spotlighting.” On discovery, the Court signals rigor in requiring disclosure of expert opinions and interpretive testimony while applying a pragmatic prejudice analysis. The opinion also underscores the force of the invited-error doctrine and the value of precise, preserved objections to closing arguments.

As a whole, Smith offers a careful, trial-practical map: keep courtrooms open, sequester witnesses when appropriate, avoid suggestive lineup practices, disclose expert opinions fully, handle exhibits consistently with prior admissions, and keep closing arguments within proper bounds. The decision not only restores the verdict in this case but provides clear operational guidance for courts and counsel navigating these recurring trial issues.