No Public-Interest Exception to Mootness in Texas: Constitutional Limits on Judicial Power in Grassroots Leadership v. DFPS

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’ 2025 decision in Texas Department of Family and Protective Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., No. 23‑0192 (Tex. May 30, 2025), is a major structural decision about the constitutional limits on judicial power in Texas. While the underlying dispute concerned state licensing of federal immigration family detention facilities at Dilley and Karnes, the Court used the case to definitively answer a broader, recurring question: may Texas courts reach the merits of a moot case because the issue is “important to the public”?

The Court’s answer is categorical: no. There is no public‑interest exception to mootness in Texas, and any such doctrine is unconstitutional because it authorizes advisory opinions. Mootness – like standing and ripeness – is not just a prudential tool; it is a constitutional constraint rooted in several provisions of the Texas Constitution.

The case involved:

State agencies and officials: the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS), the Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC), and their commissioners.
Private prison contractors: Corrections Corporation of America (CoreCivic) and GEO Group, which operate the Dilley and Karnes “family residential centers.”
Respondents: Grassroots Leadership, a nonprofit, and several formerly detained mothers suing on their own behalf and as next friends of their children.

The plaintiffs challenged a DFPS rule that enabled Texas to license the Dilley and Karnes facilities as “family residential centers,” a step the federal government needed in order to keep detaining immigrant children there under the federal Flores consent decree. By the time the case returned to the court of appeals after an earlier Texas Supreme Court decision on standing, all of the individual plaintiffs had long since been released from detention. The court of appeals conceded the claims were moot, but invoked a “public‑interest exception” to decide the merits anyway and invalidated the rule.

The Texas Supreme Court reverses course in sweeping terms:

It holds the claims are moot and not saved by any recognized mootness doctrine.
It declares there is no constitutionally permissible public‑interest exception to mootness.
It vacates the lower courts’ rulings on the merits and renders judgment dismissing the case for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction.

In doing so, the Court provides one of its most extensive modern expositions of justiciability under the Texas Constitution and expressly disapproves a line of court‑of‑appeals decisions that had adopted the public‑interest exception.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Evan A. Young, writing for the Court, frames three core questions:

Are the plaintiffs’ challenges to the DFPS licensing rule moot because they are no longer detained at Dilley or Karnes?
If so, does any recognized mootness doctrine – especially the “capable of repetition yet evading review” doctrine – preserve justiciability?
If not, may Texas courts nonetheless decide the merits of a moot case under a “public‑interest exception”?

The Court answers:

Mootness: The case is moot on its face. None of the plaintiffs remains detained; any re‑detention (with children, at Dilley or Karnes, for long enough to implicate the Flores decree) is speculative.
Capable-of-repetition exception: The record shows no “reasonable expectation” that any named plaintiff will face the same challenged action again; mere statutory authority to re‑detain and isolated anecdotal experience are insufficient.
Public‑interest exception: The Texas Constitution does not permit courts to decide moot disputes, however important. The purported public‑interest exception is a true exception – it authorizes advisory opinions – and is therefore unconstitutional.

Doctrinally, the Court:

Reaffirms that mootness is a constitutional limitation on judicial power, not a matter of judicial convenience.
Explains that what are often labeled “exceptions” to mootness (collateral consequences, capable of repetition, voluntary cessation in some settings, and sometimes attorney’s fees) are not true exceptions at all, but ways of showing the case is not really moot because a live controversy persists.
Solidifies earlier language from Morath v. Lewis and Panda Power as binding precedent: Texas courts lack power to issue advisory opinions, except where the Constitution specifically authorizes them (federal certified questions).
Expressly disapproves a series of intermediate appellate decisions that had applied or endorsed a public‑interest exception to mootness.

On remedy, the Court:

Reverses the court of appeals’ jurisdictional ruling.
Vacates the court of appeals’ merits decision and the trial court’s orders and judgment.
Renders judgment dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

1. The Flores decree and Texas licensing

In 1997, a federal court in California approved a class‑action settlement (Flores) governing the treatment and detention of immigrant minors. Among other obligations, the federal government agreed not to house minors for more than brief periods in secure facilities that lacked valid state licenses.

In 2014, the federal government began using two Texas facilities – Dilley and Karnes – as family detention centers for mothers and children who had entered the United States illegally. When class counsel in Flores moved to enforce the decree, the federal district court held that detaining mothers and children in unlicensed secure facilities breached the settlement.

In response, DFPS in 2015 (on an emergency basis) and again in 2016 promulgated a rule, 26 Tex. Admin. Code § 748.7, creating a licensing category for “family residential centers” as a subset of “general residential operations” under the Human Resources Code. The rule largely imported existing standards but allowed:

Adults (the detained mothers) to share bedrooms with their children, and
More than four occupants in a bedroom to keep sibling groups together.

2. The lawsuit and initial appellate history

Grassroots Leadership, a nonprofit opposed to private prisons and immigrant detention, sued DFPS in 2015 to challenge the rule. It later added:

Several detained mothers and their minor children, and
A child‑care provider (whose claims later dropped out).

The plaintiffs alleged that:

The rule exceeded DFPS’s statutory authority under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
The licensing regime allowed unsafe practices, including unrelated adults and children sharing rooms, allegedly leading to a sexual assault.
If the rule – and thus the licenses – were invalid, the Flores decree would bar continued detention of children at Dilley and Karnes.

DFPS, CoreCivic, and GEO Group challenged standing via pleas to the jurisdiction. The trial court denied those pleas and granted summary judgment to Grassroots, declaring the rule invalid and enjoining DFPS from licensing the facilities.

The court of appeals initially reversed, holding the mothers lacked standing because their alleged injuries were not traceable to the rule. In 2022, however, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed that ruling in Grassroots Leadership, Inc. v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, 646 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. 2022), holding that the rule did permit children to share bedrooms with unrelated adults and that this injury was fairly traceable to DFPS’s action. The case was remanded.

3. Mootness on remand and the “public-interest exception”

On remand, the Third Court of Appeals (Austin) determined:

All of the plaintiff mothers and their children had long been released from detention at Dilley and Karnes.
The average length of stay was approximately eleven days – too short to litigate a case to completion.
There was no evidence in the record describing the conditions of release or supporting a non‑speculative likelihood of re‑detention of any named plaintiff at the same facilities.

The court held that the claims were “moot by definition” and that the “capable of repetition yet evading review” doctrine did not apply because there was only a “mere physical or theoretical possibility” of re‑detention.

Nevertheless, the court invoked an Austin‑court precedent, University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, no writ), which had announced a “public‑interest exception” to mootness for issues of considerable public importance capable of repetition as to other members of the public. Relying on that exception, the court reached the merits and held the DFPS rule invalid under the APA.

B. The Constitutional Foundations of Justiciability in Texas

Justice Young devotes the heart of the opinion to explaining why mootness is constitutionally compelled in Texas, not merely a discretionary prudential doctrine. The Court grounds mootness in five separate constitutional provisions:

1. Article V, § 1 – “The judicial power”

Article V vests “[t]he judicial power of this State” in the courts. The opinion distinguishes two components:

Jurisdictional power: the authority “to adjudicate cases or liquidate law” by rendering binding judgments that resolve actual disputes.
Administrative power: internal authority such as regulating the practice of law (discussed more fully in Webster v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline).

For present purposes, “judicial power” means:

“the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for a decision.” (Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Tex. 1933))

By contrast, advisory opinions are “generally” not an exercise of judicial power. This is an old and consistent theme in Texas law: courts are not legal advisors; they are adjudicators of actual disputes.

2. Article V, § 3(a) – “Cases”

Mirroring Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the Texas Constitution limits the Supreme Court’s authority to “cases”:

“[The Supreme Court’s] jurisdiction shall extend to all cases except in criminal law matters and as otherwise provided in this Constitution or by law.”

Other courts’ powers are similarly defined in terms of “cases.” A “case” in this sense presupposes:

Genuinely adverse parties,
A concrete dispute, and
An enforceable judgment that resolves that dispute.

If a court issues a decision without a live case or controversy, that decision is an advisory opinion and violates the constitutional structure.

3. Article II, § 1 – Separation of powers

Texas, unlike the federal Constitution, has an explicit separation-of-powers clause:

“The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments… and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.”

The Court emphasizes that:

Separation of powers limits judicial jurisdiction – courts cannot exercise powers that belong to the legislative or executive branches.
Issuing advisory opinions is an executive function (providing guidance, policy advice), not a judicial one.
Justiciability doctrines (standing, mootness, ripeness) are rooted in this separation of powers: they keep courts within their proper sphere.

4. Article IV, § 22 – The Attorney General’s “legal advice” function

Article IV, § 22 directs the Attorney General to:

“give legal advice in writing to the Governor and other executive officers, when requested by them.”

The Court reads this as strong textual confirmation that advisory opinions belong to the executive branch, not the judiciary. In Morrow, the Court had already reasoned that because the Attorney General is the only officer expressly authorized to give such advice, courts lack that authority absent an explicit constitutional grant.

One such express grant is Article V, § 3‑c, adopted in 1985, which permits the Texas Supreme Court to answer certain certified questions of law from federal appellate courts. The opinion stresses:

Certified‑question jurisdiction is itself an exception created by constitutional amendment.
If advisory opinions were already permissible, that amendment would have been unnecessary.
Its specificity underscores that no other advisory opinions are allowed.

5. Article I, § 13 – The Open Courts provision

The Open Courts clause provides:

“All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him… shall have remedy by due course of law.”

The Court reads this as guaranteeing access only to litigants who have suffered an actual injury; it does not create a forum for abstract disputes or policy debates. Thus, Open Courts not only protects access but also helps define the boundaries of justiciable issues.

6. Synthesis: Justiciability as a constitutional minimum

Bringing these provisions together, the Court concludes:

Texas courts are limited to exercising judicial power in actual “cases.”
The separation-of-powers clause and Attorney General provision confirm that advisory opinions are outside the judicial function.
The Open Courts clause ties judicial remedies to real injuries.
Therefore, doctrines like standing, ripeness, and mootness reflect constitutional limits on when a case can be heard.

Critically, the Court underscores:

The legislature or judiciary may impose additional prudential limits (e.g., heightened standing requirements), but
They may not relax the constitutional baseline by allowing courts to decide cases without a live controversy, whatever the reason.

C. The Court’s Treatment of Mootness and Its “Exceptions”

1. The two-step mootness inquiry

The Court describes mootness analysis as having two main steps:

Is the case facially moot?
Has the live controversy ended so that a court’s ruling can no longer affect the parties’ rights or interests in a practical way?
If so, does a recognized doctrine show the controversy is still live?
For example, via collateral consequences or the capable‑of‑repetition exception.

The Court stresses a key conceptual point: these “exceptions” are not exceptions to the Constitution. They do not authorize courts to decide non‑live disputes. They operate as interpretive tools to recognize when a case that looks moot still involves a real, ongoing controversy.

2. Facial mootness in this case

Grassroots sought prospective relief – a declaration that DFPS’s rule is invalid and an injunction against future licensing under that rule. But by the time the case reached the court of appeals on remand:

None of the named plaintiffs was detained at Dilley or Karnes.
There was no concrete evidence that any plaintiff was likely to return to detention at those facilities with minor children for longer than the Flores decree permits.

The Court frames the key question:

Is there still a “real and substantial controversy involving genuine conflict of tangible interests” – not just a theoretical dispute – that a judgment would affect in a practical way?

The Court answers “no” for three reasons:

The core injury – being detained in an allegedly unlawfully licensed facility – has ceased.
Any future injury depends on a chain of contingencies: the federal government re‑detains one of these plaintiffs, at Dilley or Karnes, with minor children, for a period long enough to implicate the decree.
This chain is speculative, not a “reasonable likelihood.”

By Texas standards, that makes the case moot on its face.

3. Burden of proof and the role of speculation

Grassroots argued that mootness is “difficult to establish” and that DFPS, as the party asserting mootness, failed to show it is “impossible” for the Court to grant effectual relief. They pointed to:

A federal statute allowing the Attorney General to revoke parole and re‑detain aliens at any time, and
Expert testimony that ICE has broad discretion to re‑detain former detainees and that some families had been re‑detained.

The Texas Supreme Court accepts that:

Mootness is not lightly found;
The party invoking mootness initially must show the case appears moot (which DFPS did by showing all plaintiffs were released).

But the Court sharply limits reliance on bare possibility or speculation:

“Impossible” is not a metaphysical test. The question is whether a judgment would have a practical effect, not whether one can imagine some distant scenario where it might matter.
Mere statutory authority to re‑detain is comparable to the future possibility that some judgment might influence some later case – too remote to sustain jurisdiction.
The expert’s testimony undermined, rather than supported, a finding of likelihood: among roughly 16,000 detainees in 2015, she could identify “over twenty” redetentions, often for reasons (parole violation, criminal activity) that cannot be presumed.

Thus, even if some re‑detentions happen, the chance that these plaintiffs will face this injury again is too speculative to keep the case live.

4. Capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review

Grassroots next invoked the “capable of repetition yet evading review” doctrine, which in Texas requires:

The challenged action is inherently too short to be fully litigated before it ceases.
There is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.

The Court accepts the first prong: eleven‑day detentions are too short to litigate. But the second prong fails for essentially the same reasons that facial mootness applies:

There is no evidence, beyond general statutory authority and thin anecdotes, that any named plaintiff is reasonably likely to be re‑detained under the same conditions.
A “mere physical or theoretical possibility” is not enough.

The Court distinguishes this context from situations where the same individual predictably faces a recurrent short‑term harm (e.g., election‑law disputes involving repeat candidates, recurring but time‑limited government practices directed at the same person). Here, the risk to the named plaintiffs is too attenuated.

5. Collateral consequences, voluntary cessation, attorney’s fees

Although not central to the disposition, the Court clarifies other mootness doctrines:

Collateral consequences: Keeps a case live when a judgment (e.g., a conviction or commitment order) continues to impose concrete legal disabilities even after the immediate sanction ends. It does not apply where the supposed “benefit” is just a better legal precedent for future, hypothetical litigation.
Voluntary cessation: Usually does not moot a case if the defendant stops the challenged conduct while retaining the power to resume it. But it can moot a case where it is absolutely clear the conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur (e.g., DeFunis).
Attorney’s fees and costs: Sometimes a statutory entitlement to fees can keep a dispute live even if the main injunctive or declaratory relief is moot, but only when there is still a cognizable, live stake in the fee determination.

In all of these, the decisive question remains: is there still a live controversy that affects the parties, not just the law?

D. Rejection of the Public-Interest Exception

1. What is the “public-interest exception”?

Several Texas courts of appeals – especially the Austin and Corpus Christi–Edinburg courts – had recognized a doctrine allowing appellate courts to decide moot cases if:

The issue presented is of “considerable public importance,” and
The issue is capable of repetition with respect to other members of the public but tends to evade review.

This “exception” extended the capable-of-repetition doctrine beyond the requirement that the same complaining party be exposed again, focusing instead on future disputes between other parties. It is especially attractive in high‑stakes public‑law cases (e.g., school eligibility rules, local‑government disputes, administrative law, election law).

2. Why the Court finds it unconstitutional

The Supreme Court characterizes this doctrine as fundamentally different from traditional mootness doctrines:

Collateral consequences and capable of repetition identify situations where the controversy is still live as to the parties.
The public‑interest exception, by contrast, openly authorizes courts to decide merits after acknowledging the case is moot as to the parties.

In the Court’s words:

“The ‘public‑interest exception,’ by contrast, would be a true exception—one that would allow courts to openly render advisory opinions despite the constitutional ban on doing so.”

That, the Court holds, is irreconcilable with:

The textual grant of “judicial power” and “cases” (Art. V),
The explicit separation‑of‑powers limitation (Art. II),
The Attorney General’s advisory‑opinion function (Art. IV § 22), and
The Open Courts provision’s injury‑requirement (Art. I § 13).

The Court also re‑affirms and elevates earlier language from Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. 2020), which had said:

“We do not have power to decide moot cases, whether they ‘involve a matter of public concern’ or not.”
…
“[I]f courts were empowered to ignore the usual limits on their jurisdiction, such as mootness, when matters of public concern are at stake, then we would no longer have a judiciary with limited power to decide genuine cases and controversies.”

The Court now adopts that as a formal holding: there can be no exception to the requirement of a live controversy at every stage of litigation.

3. Disapproval of earlier court-of-appeals decisions

The Court expressly disapproves the jurisdictional discussion in several cases that had applied or endorsed a public‑interest exception, including:

University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, no writ)
Nueces County v. Whitley Trucks, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1993), dismissed sub nom. FDIC v. Nueces County, 886 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1994)
Securtec, Inc. v. County of Gregg, 106 S.W.3d 803 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied)
In re Guerra, 235 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2007, pet. denied)
Texas Department of Public Safety v. LaFleur, 32 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.)
And several others that had at least acknowledged the availability of a public‑interest exception.

Those decisions are effectively abrogated on the jurisdictional point: they can no longer support the exercise of jurisdiction over moot disputes in any Texas court.

4. Other states and advisory opinions

Grassroots argued that many other state courts permit some form of public‑interest review of moot cases, and some state constitutions explicitly authorize advisory opinions (e.g., Massachusetts). The Court responds:

Each state is free to structure its judicial power differently.
Some states’ constitutions affirmatively require their high courts to answer advisory questions from the legislature or executive; Texas’ does not.
Texas’ constitutional text and history align more with the federal “case or controversy” model than with advisory‑opinion systems.

In short, the practices of other states cannot override Texas’ constitutional limits; if Texans want their courts to issue advisory opinions in defined circumstances, they must say so in the Constitution (as they did once, for certified questions).

E. Application to Grassroots Leadership v. DFPS

1. From standing to mootness

An important nuance is that in 2022 the Court held these same plaintiffs had standing when the case was filed. They alleged concrete injuries fairly traceable to DFPS’s rule.

This decision does not retreat from that holding. Instead, it reminds that standing and mootness are time‑sensitive:

Standing asks whether there was a live controversy at the outset of litigation.
Mootness asks whether there is still a live controversy at each stage, including on appeal.

A case can start with standing and later become moot, as happened here when all plaintiffs were released.

2. Why the plaintiffs’ release mooted the case

The Court treats the plaintiffs’ release as ending the existing injury. The question becomes whether any non‑speculative, concrete interest remains:

Not just that the federal government could re‑detain them (it could re‑detain many people),
But that there is a realistic prospect that any named plaintiff will again be detained at Dilley or Karnes, with minor children, for long enough to implicate the Flores decree.

The record does not support that chain of likelihood. The expert testimony suggests that re‑detention does occur, but rarely and for reasons that cannot be assumed (and are often within the control of the individual). Thus any future injury is “speculative, hypothetical, or contingent,” which Texas law rejects as a basis for exercising judicial power.

3. Rejection of the capable-of-repetition argument

Grassroots re‑packages essentially the same factual assertions under the capable‑of‑repetition doctrine. The Court holds:

Short duration (11‑day detentions) satisfies prong one.
But prong two – reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action – is not met.
The evidence shows nothing more than a bare, generalized possibility of re‑detention, which is insufficient.

4. Remedy: Vacatur and dismissal

Because the case was moot and no recognized doctrine preserved a live controversy, the Court holds that:

The court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to address the merits.
The trial court likewise lacked jurisdiction when it rendered summary judgment.

The Supreme Court therefore:

Reverses the court of appeals’ jurisdictional holding.
Vacates the court of appeals’ merits judgment and the trial court’s orders and judgment.
Renders judgment dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction.

“Without prejudice” is important: if a plaintiff later suffers a similar injury under the same rule, a new suit can be filed with a fresh, live controversy.

F. Key Precedents and Their Influence

The opinion is notable for the breadth of precedent it canvasses. A few highlights:

1. Texas precedents

Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1933)
Established that advisory opinions are not an exercise of judicial power and rejected statutory attempts to confer such power.
United Services Life Insurance Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965)
Held that even declaratory judgment actions designed to answer questions for federal courts could not be used to render advisory opinions; prompted the 1985 constitutional amendment (Art. V, § 3‑c) to allow certified questions.
Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control Board, 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993)
Grounded standing and justiciability in the separation-of-powers and open‑courts provisions.
Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012)
Elaborated Texas standing doctrine, linking it to federal patterns and emphasizing that justiciability must exist at every stage.
ERCOT, Inc. v. Panda Power, 619 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2021)
Stressed that lack of jurisdiction over moot cases “is a mandate of the constitution, not a matter of convenience” and highlighted the prohibition on advisory opinions.
Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. 2020)
Contained the key language (now elevated to a holding) rejecting any power to decide moot cases, even when they involve matters of public concern.
Coalson v. City Council of Victoria, 610 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. 1980)
Articulated the principle that Texas courts do not decide cases based on speculative, hypothetical, or contingent facts.

2. Federal precedents

DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974)
Law school admissions case dismissed as moot after the plaintiff was about to graduate; illustrates that speculative future harms (e.g., not graduating) are insufficient to defeat mootness.
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016)
Emphasized that a plaintiff must retain a “concrete interest, however small” in the outcome; used as a touchstone for the requirement of a personal stake.
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982)
Articulated the “reasonable expectation” requirement for the capable-of-repetition doctrine and rejected a “mere physical or theoretical possibility” standard.
United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932 (2011)
Clarified that the potential use of a decision as precedent in other litigation is too “possible and indirect” a benefit to defeat mootness.

The Texas Supreme Court explicitly adopts the federal approach on these points where the Texas and federal constitutional structures are parallel, while emphasizing that Texas has even more textual hooks (separation of powers, open courts) reinforcing similar limitations.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Justiciability

Justiciability is a legal gatekeeping concept. It asks: “Is this the sort of dispute a court is allowed to decide?”

Key components:

Standing – Did the plaintiff suffer a real, personal injury caused by the defendant that a court can likely remedy?
Ripeness – Is the dispute developed enough, or is it too early/speculative to decide?
Mootness – Has the dispute ended so that a court’s decision would no longer affect the parties?

If any of these fails, a Texas court must dismiss the case for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction.

2. Mootness

A case is moot when there is no longer a real, live conflict between the parties that a court decision can meaningfully resolve. Even if the legal question remains interesting or important, the case is moot if the parties are no longer affected in a concrete way.

Example: A student sues for admission to a state university and, during litigation, graduates from a different school and no longer seeks admission. Unless there are collateral consequences, the case is likely moot.

3. Advisory opinions

An advisory opinion is a legal answer to a hypothetical or abstract question, not tied to resolving a live dispute between adverse parties.

In Texas:

The Attorney General may issue advisory opinions to state officials (Art. IV, § 22).
Civil courts cannot issue advisory opinions, except in the narrow realm of certified questions authorized by Art. V, § 3‑c.

This is why the Court is so insistent that moot cases cannot be decided on the merits: doing so would be issuing an advisory opinion.

4. Capable of repetition yet evading review

This doctrine is designed for problems that:

Don’t last long enough to fully litigate (e.g., pregnancy, certain election disputes), and
Are likely to happen again to the same person or entity.

It is not enough that the issue may affect other people in the future; the same plaintiff must face a realistic chance of recurrence.

5. Collateral consequences

Even if a sentence or sanction ends, a case is not moot if the judgment continues to impose legal disabilities (e.g., loss of voting rights, sex‑offender registration). Those continuing burdens give the plaintiff an ongoing stake in the outcome.

6. Voluntary cessation

If a defendant stops the challenged behavior during litigation (e.g., repeals a policy, withdraws a challenged action), courts ask: Is it absolutely clear the behavior won’t recur?

If the defendant could easily restart the conduct after the case is dismissed, courts usually treat the case as still live and refuse to dismiss on mootness grounds.

V. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. Immediate Impact on the Parties and the DFPS Rule

For the parties in this case:

The plaintiffs do not obtain a binding ruling that DFPS’s family‑residential‑center rule is invalid.
DFPS’s rule remains in effect, at least as of this litigation, because the trial‑court and appellate judgments invalidating it have been vacated.
Grassroots and similarly situated organizations must find new plaintiffs with live injuries if they wish to re‑challenge the rule.

For the federal government and immigration detention policy:

The decision leaves unresolved, under Texas law, whether the DFPS rule is intra vires and valid.
The Flores decree still conditions certain federal detention of minors on state licensing; this decision neither expands nor contracts federal obligations, but leaves the status of the Texas rule open to future, properly justiciable challenges.

B. Litigation Strategy in Short-Lived Controversies

The elimination of the public‑interest exception will significantly affect how lawyers structure cases involving short‑lived harms such as:

Detention episodes.
Election procedures (e.g., ballot access disputes, signature challenges).
School or athletic eligibility decisions.
Temporary administrative actions.

Going forward, Texas litigants cannot rely on an “importance” override if their clients’ injuries end before appeal. Instead, they will need to:

Use class actions where appropriate, so that even if some named plaintiffs’ claims become moot, the class claims can remain live.
Document collateral consequences and ongoing legal disabilities to fit within that doctrine.
Develop evidence of recurrence specific to the same plaintiff to invoke the capable‑of‑repetition doctrine.
Seek expedited proceedings or temporary relief to maximize the chance of merits resolution before the injury expires.

C. Consequences for Public-Interest and Impact Litigation

This decision meaningfully tightens the space for public‑interest litigants in Texas:

Courts of appeals may no longer save public‑law cases from mootness just because issues are “of great public importance.”
Public‑interest groups must ensure that their cases remain anchored in ongoing, concrete injuries to named clients throughout the appellate process.
Many high‑visibility disputes that previously might have been resolved on the merits despite mootness may now end with dismissals without prejudice.

At the same time, the Court underscores that the political branches remain open to address such issues:

The legislature can amend statutes and abolish or revise rules prospectively.
The executive branch can change policies and practices administratively.

The constitutional role of courts is narrower: to resolve actual, live controversies, not to issue systemic rulings once the controversy has dissipated.

D. Institutional Role of Texas Courts Going Forward

This opinion is as much about judicial self‑restraint as it is about mootness. It signals:

A strong commitment to textual and structural constitutional interpretation.
A view of the judiciary as a limited, reactive branch that may not “aggrandize” its power by deciding questions outside a live case.
A willingness to overrule or disapprove lower court precedents that deviate from those constitutional limits.

One can expect this framework to influence:

Future disputes over state‑court standing (especially “public rights” and broad taxpayer standing theories).
Efforts to invite courts to resolve high‑salience policy questions where individual injuries have ended or never crystallized.
The treatment of “prudential” justiciability doctrines; the Court may favor clear constitutional minima over flexible, judge‑made exceptions.

VI. Conclusion

Grassroots Leadership v. DFPS is a landmark in Texas justiciability jurisprudence. Beyond immigration detention and the specific DFPS licensing rule, the case crystallizes a fundamental principle: Texas courts cannot decide moot cases, no matter how important the underlying issue may seem.

Key takeaways:

Mootness is rooted in multiple provisions of the Texas Constitution and is not optional.
The “public‑interest exception” to mootness is invalid under the Texas Constitution and may no longer be invoked by any Texas court.
Recognized mootness doctrines – collateral consequences, capable of repetition, voluntary cessation, fee claims in some contexts – are not true exceptions; they simply identify when a controversy remains live.
Advisory opinions are reserved to the Attorney General (and, narrowly, certified questions), and the judiciary must resist the temptation to provide legal advice outside the bounds of actual cases.

For litigants and courts alike, this opinion refocuses Texas civil adjudication on its constitutional core: deciding real disputes between real parties with real stakes, and nothing more. Where injuries end and no concrete stake remains, courts must step back, even when public interest in the underlying issues remains intense. The remedy for such concerns lies with the political branches or with new litigation brought by parties who again face a live controversy.