No Property Interest in Zoning‑Violative Uses and No Fourth Amendment Seizure from Stop‑Work Orders:
A Comprehensive Commentary on Lamb v. Crofoot

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Kevin R. Lamb v. Scott Crofoot & Township of Jonesfield, No. 25‑1313 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025) (not recommended for publication). Although non‑precedential, the opinion provides a careful treatment of several recurring issues at the intersection of land‑use regulation, constitutional law, and standing doctrine:

• When landowners have a protected property interest (for Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process) in uses of land that violate zoning ordinances.
• How Michigan’s Right to Farm Act (RTFA) interacts with local zoning regulations, particularly for greenhouses.
• Whether zoning enforcement tools such as stop‑work orders and field inspections can amount to a Fourth Amendment “seizure” of property.
• The scope of pre‑enforcement standing to challenge municipal inspection ordinances under the Fourth Amendment.
• The need to dismiss claims without prejudice where the federal court lacks jurisdiction (standing) or declines supplemental jurisdiction.

The case arises from plaintiff Kevin Lamb’s effort to build a vegetable greenhouse in the front yard of his Jonesfield Township home. After a complaint, township inspector Scott Crofoot entered Lamb’s property, issued a stop‑work order, and later mailed a formal notice of violation identifying several zoning infractions. Lamb dismantled the greenhouse, was later charged (and re‑charged) with felony assault related to the encounter, and then sued the inspector and township in federal court.

Lamb asserted federal civil‑rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment (procedural due process) and the Fourth Amendment, along with Michigan state‑law trespass claims and constitutional challenges to the township’s zoning inspection ordinance. The district court dismissed all federal claims with prejudice and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the trespass claim.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit:

• Affirmed the dismissal of Lamb’s § 1983 claims on the merits (no Fourteenth or Fourth Amendment violation).
• Affirmed the lack of standing for Lamb’s pre‑enforcement challenge to the inspection ordinance, but held the dismissal must be without prejudice.
• Held the state‑law trespass claim likewise must be dismissed without prejudice when a federal court declines supplemental jurisdiction.
• Remanded with instructions to correct the judgment accordingly.

Although formally unpublished, the opinion crystallizes several important principles:

1. A landowner has no property interest (for procedural due process) in using his land in a way that violates a valid zoning ordinance, and the Michigan RTFA does not convert such a use into a protected entitlement.
2. Stopping unlawful construction and posting a stop‑work order on a structure is not a Fourth Amendment “seizure” of land or of the structure, absent meaningful interference with possession.
3. Subjective “chill” from fear of warrantless administrative inspections does not, without more, create standing for a Fourth Amendment pre‑enforcement challenge.
4. Dismissing claims for lack of jurisdiction or declining supplemental jurisdiction requires dismissal without prejudice, not with prejudice.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

Lamb began building a vegetable greenhouse in the front yard of his home at a corner lot in Jonesfield Township. After a complaint, zoning inspector Crofoot:

1. Visited the property, walked onto the land (a concededly permissible “knock and talk” at first), and told Lamb’s adult daughter and her boyfriend that work must stop.
2. Encountered Lamb, who demanded that Crofoot leave and send any concerns in writing.
3. Dropped his business card on the ground, went back to his car, and then drove partially onto Lamb’s yard to write and attempt to post a stop‑work order on the greenhouse (which fell to the ground).
4. Called the police, later told an officer (on body camera) that Lamb had “chest‑butted” him (which Lamb denies), and four days later mailed a formal “Notice of Violation and Order.”

The notice alleged multiple zoning violations, including that the greenhouse sat within the street’s right‑of‑way (which Lamb disputes). Lamb dismantled the greenhouse. He was then arrested and charged with felony assault. The prosecutor dismissed the charges but re‑issued them after Lamb filed this civil suit.

B. Procedural History

Lamb sued in federal court, bringing:

• Two § 1983 claims (against both Crofoot and the Township) alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment (procedural due process) and Fourth Amendment.
• A state‑law trespass claim against both defendants.
• Facial and as‑applied challenges to the Township’s zoning inspection ordinance, § 901(1)(D), as violative of the Fourth Amendment.

The district court:

• Held Lamb had no protected property interest in building a greenhouse in violation of zoning, defeating his procedural due process claim.
• Found that Crofoot’s entry and posting of the stop‑work order did not amount to a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, defeating that claim.
• Dismissed the Monell claim against the Township because no underlying constitutional violation was found.
• Rejected the as‑applied challenge to § 901(1)(D) on the merits and held Lamb lacked standing to pursue a facial challenge.
• Declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state‑law trespass claim.
• Dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, accepting well‑pleaded allegations as true. Gerboc v. ContextLogic, Inc., 867 F.3d 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2017).

C. Holdings

1. No procedural due process violation (Fourteenth Amendment).
   Lamb had no cognizable property interest in building a greenhouse contrary to a valid zoning ordinance. The Michigan RTFA does not preempt zoning rules about greenhouse location and does not create such a property interest.
2. No Fourth Amendment seizure.
   The posting of a stop‑work order and the interference with Lamb’s use of his land did not constitute a Fourth Amendment “seizure” of land or the partially constructed greenhouse. Lamb retained full possession and control.
3. No Monell liability.
   Without any underlying constitutional violation, the Township cannot be liable under Monell.
4. Lack of standing for pre‑enforcement challenge to § 901(1)(D).
   Lamb’s alleged fear of warrantless inspections and asserted “chill” in rebuilding a greenhouse do not establish an actual or imminent injury, causation, or redressability. He thus lacks Article III standing to bring either facial or as‑applied Fourth Amendment challenges to the inspection ordinance.
5. Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction must be without prejudice.
   Because Lamb lacked standing to challenge § 901(1)(D), the district court lacked jurisdiction and thus erred in dismissing that claim with prejudice. The proper disposition is dismissal without prejudice.
6. Declined supplemental jurisdiction requires dismissal without prejudice of state claims.
   Having declined supplemental jurisdiction over the trespass claim, the court had to dismiss it without prejudice so Lamb could pursue it in state court.
7. Video evidence properly excluded at Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
   The district court correctly refused to consider the body‑camera video at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage because it did not “blatantly contradict” the complaint.

The appellate court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to modify the judgment so that:

• The § 1983 claims remain dismissed with prejudice (on the merits).
• The challenges to § 901(1)(D) are dismissed without prejudice (for want of standing).
• The state‑law trespass claims are dismissed without prejudice (following declination of supplemental jurisdiction).

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Due Process and Property Interests in Zoning‑Violative Uses

1. The legal framework: what counts as “property” for due process?

To prevail on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must show:

1. A protected life, liberty, or property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment;
2. A deprivation of that interest; and
3. An absence of constitutionally sufficient process before the deprivation.

This three‑part test is standard in the Sixth Circuit. See Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 716 (6th Cir. 1999). The first two steps—whether the plaintiff has a protected interest and whether it was deprived—are threshold requirements. Without a protected property interest, there is nothing for due process to protect.

Under Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), a property interest exists only where the plaintiff has a “legitimate claim of entitlement,” not merely “a unilateral expectation.” Such entitlements usually arise from state law — including statutes, regulations, municipal ordinances, or “traditional” property law principles. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.

2. Application: no entitlement to build in violation of zoning

Lamb did not claim that the Township physically confiscated his tangible property. Instead, he argued that he had a property interest in using his land to build a greenhouse and that the stop‑work order deprived him of that interest without adequate process.

The Sixth Circuit rejected that premise at its core:

• The Jonesfield Township zoning ordinance prohibits “accessory buildings” in front yards. Zoning Ordinance § 306(1)(a).
• “Accessory buildings” expressly include greenhouses. § 202(4).
• “Front yard” is defined as a yard “extending across the full width of the lot.” § 202(192)(b).
• Lamb’s greenhouse was an accessory building in the front yard and therefore clearly violated the ordinance.

Because state and local law define the scope of a property interest, a use that is flatly prohibited by a valid zoning ordinance cannot form the basis of a “legitimate claim of entitlement.” The court emphasized that while state law cannot abrogate traditional core property interests (e.g., fee ownership itself), it can and does lawfully limit specific uses of property through zoning. See White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., 606 F.3d 842, 853 (6th Cir. 2010).

Thus, because the ordinance forbade a front‑yard greenhouse, Lamb had no protected property interest in that use. Without a protected interest, his procedural due process claim necessarily failed at step one, and the court did not need to examine what “process” was due.

3. The Michigan Right to Farm Act (RTFA) argument

Lamb attempted to salvage his claimed property interest by arguing that Michigan’s Right to Farm Act (RTFA), Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 286.471–.474, preempted the Township’s zoning restriction as it applied to greenhouses. The RTFA preempts local ordinances “to the extent that [they] would prohibit conduct protected by the” Act. Charter Twp. of Shelby v. Papesh, 704 N.W.2d 92, 103 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); see also Township of Fraser v. Haney, 2025 Mich. App. LEXIS 6358, *7 (July 9, 2025) (cited by the panel).

But what the RTFA protects is nuisance immunity, not a free‑standing right to build wherever one wishes:

• The statute provides that a “farm or farm operation shall not be found to be a public or private nuisance” if it complies with “generally accepted agricultural and management practices” (GAAMPs). Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 286.473(1), 286.474(6).
• As the Michigan Supreme Court held in Papadelis v. City of Troy, 733 N.W.2d 397 (Mich. 2007), this nuisance protection does not displace zoning rules on the location of farm structures where GAAMPs do not address that issue.
• Papadelis specifically noted that “no provisions of the RTFA or any published [GAAMPs] address the . . . location of buildings used for greenhouse[s].” 733 N.W.2d at 398.

The Sixth Circuit followed Papadelis and noted that, as of the opinion’s timeframe, GAAMPs still did not regulate greenhouse locations. Because the RTFA addresses nuisance liability and not zoning siting criteria for greenhouses, it did not preempt the Township’s ordinance. Consequently:

• The zoning restriction remained valid.
• Lamb had no entitlement under state law to build a greenhouse in his front yard.
• Thus, he could not transform an illegal land use into a constitutional property interest by invoking the RTFA.

This portion of the opinion is significant for Michigan land‑use disputes: it reinforces that the RTFA is not a general override of local zoning, particularly where state agricultural standards do not speak to siting.

B. Fourth Amendment: No “Seizure” from Stop‑Work Orders and Zoning Enforcement

1. The theory pressed by Lamb

On appeal, Lamb did not argue that Crofoot’s actions constituted a search. He explicitly conceded that the initial entry was a permissible “knock and talk”—a well‑recognized doctrine allowing officers or inspectors to approach a home’s front door area without a warrant. See Smith v. City of Wyoming, 821 F.3d 697, 713 (6th Cir. 2016).

Instead, Lamb’s Fourth Amendment theory was that, after he told Crofoot to leave:

• Crofoot drove back onto his property without a warrant,
• attempted to post the stop‑work order on the greenhouse, and
• thereby effected a “seizure” of his property by interfering with his “free use” of it.

He relied on the notion that the stop‑work order disrupted his possessory rights in the greenhouse and land by forbidding continued construction.

2. Seizure doctrine: meaningful interference with possessory interests

The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures” of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. For property:

• A seizure occurs “when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
• That generally requires “taking possession” of the property. F.P. Dev., LLC v. Charter Twp. of Canton, 16 F.4th 198, 208 (6th Cir. 2021), quoting Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 312 (2021).
• Absent a warrant or an applicable exception, such seizures are usually unreasonable. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983).

3. Land is not an “effect”; no seizure of land

The panel first considered whether Lamb was effectively alleging a seizure of his land, based on being told he could not continue his project on the front yard. That theory fails for a categorical textual reason:

• The Fourth Amendment explicitly lists “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” It does not list “land”.
• In F.P. Development, the Sixth Circuit held that land is not an “effect” for Fourth Amendment purposes. 16 F.4th at 208.
• The court relied on Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 n.7 (1984): “The Framers would have understood the term ‘effects’ to be limited to personal, rather than real, property.”

Accordingly, under binding circuit precedent, the Fourth Amendment does not protect real property (land) from “seizure” in the constitutional sense. The opinion notes that such governmental action may implicate Takings Clause concerns under the Fifth Amendment, but Lamb did not assert a takings claim.

4. No seizure of the greenhouse or materials

Could the partially constructed greenhouse itself, or its component materials, be considered seized? The court held no, because:

• Crofoot never took possession of the greenhouse or its materials.
• The structure remained on Lamb’s property until Lamb chose to dismantle it himself.
• Lamb retained possession of all building materials after dismantling.

The stop‑work order thus informed Lamb of a zoning violation but did not itself “meaningfully interfere” with his possessory interests. It restricted how he could lawfully use the property, but did not confiscate or physically control it.

This analysis parallels F.P. Development. There, a township posted a stop‑work order regarding tree removal. The plaintiff argued the ordinance authorized an unreasonable seizure of trees. The court held:

• Standing trees were real property and not protected “effects.”
• Once felled, the removed trees remained fully in the plaintiff’s possession: no seizure occurred. 16 F.4th at 208.

By analogy, Lamb’s greenhouse—partially built and later dismantled—remained within his physical dominion at all times. No “seizure” took place.

5. Distinguishing Soldal v. Cook County

Lamb leaned on Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992), where sheriff’s deputies oversaw the forcible removal of a mobile home from its lot, ripping it from its foundations and towing it away. The Supreme Court held that was a Fourth Amendment seizure: the government helped take away the home, dispossessing the owner.

The Sixth Circuit distinguished Soldal on the key factual axis: possession.

• In Soldal, the government physically dispossessed the owner of his mobile home.
• In Lamb’s case, the government left the greenhouse where it was. There was no taking or towing away; Lamb himself dismantled the structure.

Accordingly, Soldal supports the principle that government‑enabled dispossession constitutes a seizure, but it does not extend to regulatory stop‑work orders where the owner remains in full possession.

6. Search vs. seizure: an important doctrinal separation

A notable procedural nuance: the Township’s briefing answered only a search theory, arguing the entry was an administrative inspection and that Lamb had no expectation of privacy. Lamb, however, argued only a seizure theory on appeal.

The panel correctly emphasized that searches and seizures are analytically distinct. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. Although defendants arguably forfeited a direct response to the seizure argument, the court decided the issue anyway “in the interest of judicial economy,” reasoning that:

• The seizure argument failed as a matter of law at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage.
• Even if preserved for later, it would be rejected at summary judgment on the same grounds.
• The district court had already rejected the seizure theory on reasoning similar to that adopted by the panel.

This aspect underscores that plaintiffs must clearly identify whether their Fourth Amendment theory sounds in search, seizure, or both, and courts will analyze each component independently.

C. Municipal Liability Under Monell

Lamb sued Jonesfield Township alongside Crofoot, alleging the inspector’s conduct reflected a municipal policy or custom. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipality is liable under § 1983 only when:

• The plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated; and
• The violation was caused by a municipal policy, custom, or practice that amounts to official policy.

Because the panel held that no underlying constitutional violation occurred:

• No procedural due process violation (no protected property interest);
• No Fourth Amendment seizure;

the Monell claim failed at the threshold. The Town’s alleged policies, even if proven, could not give rise to § 1983 liability absent a predicate breach of federal rights.

D. Standing for Pre‑Enforcement Fourth Amendment Challenges

1. The ordinance challenged: § 901(1)(D)

Lamb also sought injunctive and declaratory relief against § 901(1)(D) of the Jonesfield Zoning Ordinance, which authorizes zoning officials “to make inspections of any building or parcel as necessary to enforce this Ordinance.”

His claim: because this provision does not expressly require a warrant or specify an administrative review mechanism, it allegedly authorizes unconstitutional warrantless searches. He brought both:

• a facial challenge (invalid in all or most applications), and
• an as‑applied challenge (invalid as applied to him),

premised on his fear that Crofoot would reinpect his property without a warrant. Lamb pointed to a letter from Crofoot stating he would reinspect around November 28, 2023.

2. Article III standing requirements

To have standing in federal court, a plaintiff must satisfy the familiar Lujan triad:

1. Injury‑in‑fact — a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent injury;
2. Traceability — the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and
3. Redressability — the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). These requirements apply equally to facial and as‑applied challenges. See Miller v. City of Wickliffe, 852 F.3d 497, 502 (6th Cir. 2017).

3. No “actual” injury in this pre‑enforcement context

In a pre‑enforcement challenge, the Supreme Court has recognized that plaintiffs may sometimes proceed without having violated the law yet, but only where the injury is ongoing or imminent. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014).

The Sixth Circuit noted:

• Only ongoing harms count as “actual” injuries in this pre‑enforcement setting. Clark v. Stone, 998 F.3d 287, 294 (6th Cir. 2021).
• Purely past harms (e.g., a previous inspection) that have ceased do not suffice. See Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).

Lamb’s complaint did not allege any ongoing injury from § 901(1)(D). He waited until his opening brief to assert an intention to rebuild the greenhouse, and until his reply brief to claim that fear of warrantless inspection had “chilled” him from doing so. Under Sixth Circuit pleading rules, the court was required to “focus only on the allegations in the pleadings.” Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass’n, 958 F.3d 470, 483 (6th Cir. 2020). Allegations raised for the first time in briefs cannot cure defects in the complaint.

4. “Chill,” causation, and redressability problems

Even setting aside the pleading defect, the court explained why Lamb’s subjective chill theory would still fail:

• Causation: Lamb dismantled the greenhouse because it violated zoning, not because of § 901(1)(D). Any reluctance to rebuild is thus attributable to the substantive zoning prohibition, not the inspection power. The challenged provision is not the but‑for cause of his inaction.
• Redressability: Even if § 901(1)(D) were enjoined, the underlying zoning ban on front‑yard greenhouses would remain in place. A favorable ruling would not authorize Lamb to rebuild, so it would not redress the asserted chill.
• Self‑inflicted injury: The Supreme Court has rejected standing theories based on “self‑inflicted injuries” arising from speculative fears of unlawful conduct. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 418 (2013).
• Fourth Amendment context: The panel emphasized that mere subjective “chill” is not recognized as injury‑in‑fact in Fourth Amendment cases, as opposed to certain First Amendment doctrines that sometimes treat chill differently.

5. No “imminent” injury: speculative chain of events

To establish imminence, there must be at least a “substantial risk” that the harm will occur. Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 158 (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5). Lamb’s future‑injury theory required a highly attenuated chain of possibilities:

1. He would rebuild the greenhouse.
2. Crofoot or another official would choose to reinspect the property.
3. The reinspection would qualify as a “search” (e.g., entering onto curtilage rather than visually observing from public ways).
4. The search would occur without a warrant and without any valid administrative search regime or pre‑compliance review.

The court viewed this chain as speculative at multiple steps:

• Lamb provided no concrete, pleaded plans to rebuild beyond a generalized desire.
• Any future “inspection” might be a simple visual inspection from a public road, which is not a search. See Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1184–85 (6th Cir. 1987).
• Even if a search occurred, Jonesfield might comply with the Fourth Amendment by using a valid administrative search regime or obtaining a warrant. See Benjamin v. Stemple, 915 F.3d 1066, 1069 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 420 (2015)).

6. The role of pre‑compliance review and the Jonesfield appeals process

Under Patel, an administrative search regime generally must provide property owners with an opportunity for “precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker”. 576 U.S. at 420. The Sixth Circuit suggested that Jonesfield’s zoning scheme may satisfy this requirement:

• The ordinances allow “any aggrieved person” to appeal any “decision or action” of the Zoning Administrator to the Zoning Board of Appeals (§ 903(2)(A)).
• The Township’s “Zoning Ordinance Actions Table” (§ 909) indicates the Zoning Administrator’s decisions (including, plausibly, a threatened inspection) are appealable.
• An appeal would trigger a public hearing, supplying the kind of pre‑compliance review Patel contemplates.

The court did not definitively decide the Fourth‑Amendment validity of Jonesfield’s administrative inspection regime, but this analysis further underscored that Lamb’s prediction of a future unlawful search was speculative.

7. Presumption of official regularity and lack of a pattern of violations

Lamb’s speculation that Crofoot would re‑inspect without a warrant also ran counter to the presumption that public officials will act lawfully. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974); Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 165.

Notably:

• Crofoot’s prior conduct had been found constitutional (no search or seizure).
• Lamb could not point to any pattern of repeated Fourth Amendment violations by Township inspectors under § 901(1)(D).

Thus, there was no “substantial risk” of a future unconstitutional inspection even if Lamb were to rebuild.

8. Result: no standing, dismissal must be without prejudice

Because Lamb failed to establish either an actual or imminent injury traceable to § 901(1)(D) and redressable by an order invalidating it:

• He lacked Article III standing to bring either facial or as‑applied challenges.
• The district court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction over those claims.
• Under Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 809 (6th Cir. 2019), a court that lacks jurisdiction cannot dispose of claims on the merits or with prejudice.

The appellate court therefore directed that Lamb’s challenges to § 901(1)(D) be dismissed without prejudice, leaving him free to refile if he can allege and prove standing in the future (for example, after a concrete enforcement episode that satisfies Lujan).

E. Supplemental Jurisdiction and State‑Law Trespass Claims

The district court explicitly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Lamb’s state‑law trespass claim after disposing of the federal claims.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), federal courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims once they have dismissed all claims over which they have original jurisdiction. When they do so, the proper consequence is to dismiss the state claims without prejudice, thus allowing plaintiffs to pursue them in state court. See, e.g., Vandiver v. Hardin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 935 (6th Cir. 1991).

Because the district court’s judgment dismissed the trespass claim with prejudice, the Sixth Circuit reversed in part and ordered that the trespass claim be dismissed without prejudice. Lamb remains free to litigate his trespass allegations in Michigan state court.

F. Use of Video Evidence at the Motion‑to‑Dismiss Stage

Finally, Lamb argued that the district court erred by refusing to consider body‑camera footage of Crofoot’s conversation with police, claiming it undermined Crofoot’s justification for the initial entry and stop‑work order.

The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s approach:

• At Rule 12(b)(6) stage, courts generally may not consider materials outside the pleadings (like videos) unless they are integral to the complaint or their contents are undisputed.
• Even then, such evidence may override allegations only if it “blatantly contradicts” the complaint. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th 362, 364 (6th Cir. 2022).
• Here, Lamb claimed that the body‑camera footage actually supported his version of events, not that it contradicted his own allegations.

Thus:

• The district court properly declined to consider the video at the pleading stage.
• In any event, the district court had accepted as true Lamb’s allegations that Crofoot lied about being assaulted and that the greenhouse was not in a right‑of‑way. The video would not have changed the analysis on the due process or Fourth Amendment issues.

IV. Precedents and Prior Authorities: How They Shaped the Outcome

The opinion is heavily grounded in, and consistent with, existing U.S. Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit case law. Key influences include:

A. Property Interests and Zoning

• Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972): Defined property interests as “legitimate claims of entitlement” grounded in state law, not unilateral expectations.
• Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., 143 S. Ct. 1369 (2023): Emphasized that states may not abolish traditional property interests to avoid federal constitutional protections; referenced to clarify that while core ownership interests are protected, specific use‑rights may be limited by zoning.
• White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., 606 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2010): Acknowledged zoning’s role in defining and constraining land‑use expectations.
• Papadelis v. City of Troy, 733 N.W.2d 397 (Mich. 2007): Held that the RTFA’s GAAMP‑based nuisance immunity does not override zoning criteria for the location of greenhouses where GAAMPs do not regulate siting.
• Charter Twp. of Shelby v. Papesh, 704 N.W.2d 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005): Articulated RTFA preemption “to the extent” local zoning prohibits conduct the RTFA protects.

These precedents support the court’s conclusion that Lamb lacked a protected property interest in a zoning‑prohibited greenhouse and that RTFA did not supply such an interest.

B. Fourth Amendment Seizures and Real Property

• United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984): Defined seizure of property as “meaningful interference” with possessory interests.
• Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021): Clarified seizure of persons and highlighted the requirement of control or submission; cited by the panel (via F.P. Dev.) to analogize seizures of property.
• Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984): Noted that “effects” refers to personal, not real, property.
• F.P. Dev., LLC v. Charter Twp. of Canton, 16 F.4th 198 (6th Cir. 2021): Held that land is not an “effect,” reinforced that stop‑work orders and retained possession of trees do not amount to seizures.
• Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56 (1992): Found a seizure where officials participated in physically towing away a mobile home and dispossessing the owner.

These cases frame the court’s holding that:

• Land is outside the Fourth Amendment’s seizure text.
• Regulatory prohibition of certain uses, absent dispossession or physical control, is not a seizure of chattels.

C. Standing and Pre‑Enforcement Review

• Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992): Injury‑in‑fact, traceability, redressability as constitutional minima.
• TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021): Reinforced concreteness and particularization requirements for injury.
• City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983): Past injury does not automatically establish standing for forward‑looking injunction; need a realistic threat of future harm.
• Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014): Articulated the “substantial risk” standard for future injuries and the parameters for pre‑enforcement standing in the First Amendment context.
• Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013): Rejected speculative chains of future events and self‑inflicted harms as bases for standing.
• Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass’n, 958 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2020): Confirmed that new allegations in briefing cannot cure deficiencies in the complaint.
• Vonderhaar v. Village of Evendale, 906 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2018): Clarified that “past, present, or future” injury can suffice for certain as‑applied challenges, though here the problem was lack of future injury and causation.

These authorities directly support the holding that Lamb’s feared future inspection was too speculative and insufficiently tied to § 901(1)(D), so he lacked standing.

D. Administrative Searches and Pre‑Compliance Review

• City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015): Held that administrative inspection schemes must allow for “precompliance review” before a neutral decisionmaker in most contexts.
• Benjamin v. Stemple, 915 F.3d 1066 (6th Cir. 2019): Applied Patel to municipal inspection schemes.
• Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180 (6th Cir. 1987): Observed that inspection from public vantage points (e.g., a road) does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.

These decisions informed the panel’s reasoning that Jonesfield’s appeal process may provide pre‑compliance review and that purely visual reinspection from a public road might not implicate the Fourth Amendment at all.

E. Jurisdiction and Dismissal Without Prejudice

• Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 2019): A court lacking jurisdiction cannot decide the merits; dismissal must be without prejudice.
• Vandiver v. Hardin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991): Declining supplemental jurisdiction over state‑law claims requires dismissal without prejudice.

These cases undergird the portion of the opinion reversing the district court’s with‑prejudice dismissals of the ordinance challenge and trespass claim.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Procedural Due Process & Property Interests

• What is it? The Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide fair procedures (notice, hearing) before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
• But first: You must actually have a recognized property interest under state law — not merely a hope or desire.
• Here: Because local zoning made front‑yard greenhouses illegal, Lamb had no legal entitlement to that use. Without such an entitlement, due process protections do not attach.

2. Michigan Right to Farm Act (RTFA)

• Purpose: To protect legitimate farming operations from being sued as nuisances when they comply with state‑approved farming practices (GAAMPs).
• What it does not do: It does not generally overwrite zoning rules about where farm structures may be located, unless GAAMPs specifically regulate that siting and conflict with the zoning.
• In this case: Because GAAMPs do not regulate greenhouse siting, the RTFA does not create a right to build a front‑yard greenhouse in contradiction of zoning.

3. Fourth Amendment “Seizure” of Property

• Seizure happens when government meaningfully interferes with your right to possess something—most commonly by physically taking it or blocking your access.
• Land vs. effects: The Fourth Amendment protects “effects” (personal property like cars, computers, etc.), but, under current precedent, not land as an “effect.” Land‑use restrictions are instead usually evaluated under the Takings Clause or substantive due process.
• Here: The government never took the greenhouse or its materials; it simply ordered Lamb to stop building under a valid zoning rule. He kept full physical control of everything on his land. Thus, no “seizure.”

4. “Search” vs. “Seizure”

• Search: Concerns the government looking into places or things where you have a reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., inside a home).
• Seizure: Concerns the government taking or controlling your person or property.
• Why it matters: Different facts and case law govern each. Here, Lamb only pursued a seizure theory on appeal.

5. Qualified Immunity (in the background)

• What is it? A doctrine shielding government officials from personal liability unless they violate clearly established constitutional rights.
• Two steps:
  1. Did the officer violate a constitutional right?
  2. Was that right clearly established at the time?
• Here: The court never reached step two, because it found no constitutional violation in the first place.

6. Monell Municipal Liability

• Municipalities (like townships) are not vicariously liable for employees’ actions simply because they employ them.
• They are liable only when a constitutional violation arises from an official policy or custom.
• Without any constitutional violation by the inspector, the township cannot be liable under Monell.

7. Standing & Pre‑Enforcement Challenges

• Standing is about whether you have enough of a stake in a controversy to bring a federal lawsuit.
• Pre‑enforcement challenge means you’re challenging a law or ordinance before it’s enforced against you again, based on a credible threat of enforcement.
• You must show:
  • Injury‑in‑fact (actual or imminent),
  • Caused by the law you’re challenging, and
  • Fixable by the court (redressability).
• Here: Lamb’s fear of future inspections was too speculative and more directly caused by the zoning ban than the inspection ordinance. Thus, no standing.

8. Dismissal With vs. Without Prejudice

• With prejudice: The case is finally decided on the merits. You cannot refile the same claim.
• Without prejudice: The case is dismissed procedurally (e.g., for lack of jurisdiction) and you may refile if you can cure the problem.
• Rule: If the court lacks jurisdiction (no standing) or declines supplemental jurisdiction, the dismissal must be without prejudice.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Land‑Use Regulation, RTFA, and Due Process Claims

For landowners and municipalities in Michigan and the Sixth Circuit:

• The opinion reinforces that violating clear zoning rules deprives a landowner of any reasonable expectation—or “entitlement”—to continue the illegal use. Consequently, procedural due process theories based on such uses will frequently fail at the property‑interest step.
• It confirms that the Michigan RTFA is, as the Michigan Supreme Court has held, principally a nuisance‑defense statute, not a broad land‑use entitlement statute. Farmers and quasi‑agricultural landowners cannot rely on RTFA alone to skirt zoning location requirements, especially for structures like greenhouses that GAAMPs do not site‑regulate.
• Municipalities can rely on this reasoning to defend zoning enforcement actions against due process claims where the use is plainly prohibited on the face of the ordinance.

B. Fourth Amendment Limits on Stop‑Work Orders

The opinion further solidifies a line of Sixth Circuit jurisprudence (notably F.P. Development) holding that:

• Stop‑work orders and related regulatory directives, standing alone, are generally not Fourth Amendment seizures unless they entail physical dispossession or control over chattels.
• Disputes about whether zoning or regulatory orders are unfair or overly burdensome are more appropriately framed as:
  • Takings Clause claims (for regulatory takings), or
  • Substantive due process claims (arbitrary and capricious regulation),
  rather than Fourth Amendment seizure challenges.

For local governments, this clarifies that routine zoning enforcement—entering curtilage for brief administrative purposes and posting notices, without confiscating property—generally does not implicate Fourth Amendment seizure doctrine.

C. Narrowing Pre‑Enforcement Standing in Fourth Amendment Contexts

On standing, the opinion sends a clear message:

• Allegations of a mere subjective chill from possible future administrative inspections, without concrete future plans and a realistic threat of unconstitutional enforcement, will not suffice for Article III standing.
• Plaintiffs must carefully plead:
  • Specific, concrete intended conduct (e.g., precise redevelopment plans),
  • A credible, non‑speculative threat of enforcement (e.g., pattern of prior enforcement, stated intention to inspect, lack of lawful alternatives), and
  • A clear chain from the challenged ordinance to the feared injury.
• Fourth Amendment pre‑enforcement challenges are especially constrained, as courts are reluctant to project future unlawful searches absent a concrete practice.

D. Administrative Search Regimes and Local Appeals Processes

The court’s discussion of pre‑compliance review hints at a practical blueprint for municipalities:

• Include clear provisions allowing individuals to appeal inspection decisions or threatened inspections to a neutral board (e.g., Zoning Board of Appeals) before the inspection occurs or is enforced.
• Document and communicate these appeal rights clearly in any inspection notices.

Such regimes, if properly designed, are more likely to withstand facial Fourth Amendment challenges under Patel.

E. Procedural Precision: Jurisdiction vs. Merits

Finally, the opinion underscores an important procedural discipline:

• When a court decides it lacks jurisdiction (through lack of standing), it must not dismiss with prejudice or purport to adjudicate the merits.
• Similarly, once a federal court declines supplemental jurisdiction over state‑law claims, it must leave those claims for state courts to address, via dismissal without prejudice.

This clarification is especially relevant for district courts and appellate counsel, ensuring judgments accurately reflect whether claims are being rejected on jurisdictional or substantive grounds.

VII. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Lamb v. Crofoot, though unpublished, delivers a structured reaffirmation of core doctrines in property, constitutional, and standing law as applied to routine zoning enforcement:

• A landowner has no Fourteenth Amendment property interest in using land in a way expressly forbidden by a valid zoning ordinance, and the Michigan Right to Farm Act does not transform such uses into protected entitlements when GAAMPs are silent on siting.
• A zoning inspector’s issuance of a stop‑work order—even after a contentious interaction on private property—does not constitute a Fourth Amendment “seizure” absent a meaningful interference with possession of tangible property.
• Pre‑enforcement challenges to administrative inspection authority demand rigorous proof of actual or imminent injury, causation, and redressability; mere subjective chill is insufficient in the Fourth Amendment context.
• Jurisdictional dismissals (for lack of standing) and declinations of supplemental jurisdiction must result in dismissals without prejudice, preserving plaintiffs’ opportunity to pursue claims if they can later satisfy jurisdictional prerequisites or in appropriate state fora.

In practical terms, the decision offers guidance for:

• Landowners seeking to challenge zoning enforcement, highlighting the critical importance of conforming uses to local ordinances and the limited scope of RTFA preemption and Fourth Amendment seizure protections.
• Municipalities, confirming that properly structured zoning ordinances and administrative inspection regimes, paired with appeal mechanisms, can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
• Courts and litigators, reinforcing clear distinctions between merits and jurisdictional dismissals, and between search‑based and seizure‑based Fourth Amendment theories.

Taken together, Lamb v. Crofoot functions as a concise but potent primer on how federal courts will scrutinize land‑use enforcement actions under the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments, and how standing doctrine cabins pre‑enforcement challenges to municipal inspection authority.