No Prohibition for Procedural Missteps Under R.C. 2981.03: Subject-Matter Jurisdiction vs. Exercise of Jurisdiction in Post-Sentence Property-Return Orders

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of Ohio’s per curiam decision in State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-4542 (Oct. 2, 2025), affirming the Third District’s dismissal of a prohibition action brought by Derrick L. Martre against Judge Jeffrey L. Reed of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas. The case presents a focused question at the boundary of extraordinary-writ practice and criminal forfeiture procedure: may a writ of prohibition be used to invalidate a trial court’s order on a postsentence motion for return of property on the theory that the court failed to treat the motion as a suppression motion under R.C. 2981.03?

The Court’s answer is no. Anchored in long-settled principles distinguishing a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction from errors in the exercise of that jurisdiction, the Court reaffirms that prohibition is generally unavailable to correct alleged procedural errors—here, an asserted failure to apply R.C. 2981.03(A)(4)—where the common pleas court plainly had subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying felony case and where adequate ordinary remedies existed. The opinion also clarifies, in a footnote with practical consequences, that R.C. 2981.03(A)(4) applies only when an indictment seeks forfeiture of the property under R.C. Chapter 2981, a condition missing in Martre’s case.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Third District’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal of Martre’s prohibition complaint. Martre—who had pleaded no contest in 2018 to multiple felony offenses arising from incriminating content on his cellphone—filed a postsentence motion in 2021 for return of his cellphone and memory card, which Judge Reed granted to the extent the items were not contraband, illegal, or being held as evidence. After unsuccessfully appealing that order in 2021, Martre sought in 2024 a writ of prohibition compelling Judge Reed to vacate the property-return order and to treat the motion as a suppression motion under R.C. 2981.03, which he contended would require vacatur of his convictions.

The Supreme Court held:

Alleged noncompliance with R.C. 2981.03’s procedures does not implicate a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. At most, it is an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, which is not remediable by prohibition.
Even assuming arguendo that the statute applied and required suppression-motion treatment, prohibition would still be improper because Martre had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law, including the direct appeal he already pursued.
Additionally, the Court underscored that R.C. 2981.03(A)(4) is triggered only when an indictment seeks forfeiture of the property; Martre’s indictment did not, undermining his statutory premise.

Case Background and Procedural History

2017–2018: Martre was indicted on six felony counts related to sexual offenses involving a minor. Law enforcement seized his cellphone pursuant to a warrant; videos on the device supported the charges. He pleaded no contest, received a 12-year sentence, and was classified as a Tier II sex offender. The Third District affirmed. See State v. Martre, 2019-Ohio-2072 (3d Dist.).
2021: Martre filed a postsentence motion for return of property (cellphone and memory card), arguing the search warrant was void and that non-contraband, non-evidentiary property should be returned in a closed case. Judge Reed granted the motion to the extent the items were not contraband, illegal, or evidence, without addressing the warrant’s validity.
2021 Appeal: Martre argued on appeal that the court, by ordering return, had effectively granted a suppression motion under R.C. 2981.03 and should have vacated his convictions. The Third District rejected that claim and affirmed; the Supreme Court declined review in 2022.
2024 Prohibition Action: Martre sought a writ ordering Judge Reed to vacate the 2021 order and to treat the motion as a suppression motion under R.C. 2981.03(A)(4). The Third District dismissed, concluding no patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction and the existence of adequate legal remedies. Martre appealed to the Supreme Court.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State ex rel. Martre v. Cheney, 2023-Ohio-4594
The Court cites Cheney for the de novo standard governing appellate review of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal in extraordinary-writ cases, and for the three elements of prohibition: (1) exercise of judicial power; (2) unauthorized by law; and (3) lack of an adequate remedy at law, unless the respondent patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction. This framework shapes the Court’s threshold inquiry and the disposition.
State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, 2022-Ohio-2427, and State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein, 2018-Ohio-3155
These cases reiterate the core principle that when a trial court has general subject-matter jurisdiction, claimed errors are errors in the exercise of jurisdiction, not jurisdictional defects, and thus not cognizable in prohibition. Paschke applied this to alleged noncompliance with Civ.R. 53—directly analogous to the claimed noncompliance with R.C. 2981.03 in Martre’s case.
Smith v. Sheldon, 2019-Ohio-1677
Confirming that a common pleas court has subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases (citing R.C. 2931.03), this authority eliminates any doubt that the Allen County Common Pleas Court could adjudicate Martre’s motions arising in his felony case.
Pratts v. Hurley, 2004-Ohio-1980
Pratts is pivotal: a trial court’s failure to comply with a procedural statute (there, R.C. 2945.06) does not divest it of subject-matter jurisdiction; rather, it constitutes, at most, an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, correctable on appeal. The Court analogizes directly: even if R.C. 2981.03 applied and was not followed, the remedy is not prohibition.
State ex rel. Sands v. Culotta, 2021-Ohio-1137
Cited for the proposition that errors in the exercise of jurisdiction are subject to correction via ordinary appellate remedies, reinforcing the conclusion that prohibition is improper.
State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, 2024-Ohio-1624
In a prior writ proceeding by the same relator, the Supreme Court held that Martre had an adequate remedy because he appealed the 2021 property-return order. That holding effectively precludes the 2024 prohibition claim on the adequate-remedy element and supplies stare decisis continuity in this very dispute.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds on two independent and mutually reinforcing tracks.

No subject-matter jurisdiction defect; at most, an error in the exercise of jurisdiction
The Allen County Common Pleas Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over felonies (R.C. 2931.03). A postsentence motion for return of property arising out of such a case falls within that court’s general jurisdiction. Martre’s contention—that the court was required to treat his property-return motion as a suppression motion under R.C. 2981.03(A)(4)—implicates a claimed procedural misstep, not the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction. Under Pratts, Paschke, and Sponaugle, such claims cannot support prohibition; they are, at most, allegations that the trial court erred while exercising jurisdiction it plainly had.
Adequate remedy at law existed
Because there was no patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, Martre had to show the absence of an adequate legal remedy. He could not. He not only had the remedy of direct appeal, but he took it in 2021 and lost. Under Sands and the Court’s 2024 decision in Martre v. Reed, that is dispositive against prohibition.

Notably, the Court adds a clarifying observation about R.C. 2981.03(A)(4): it requires suppression-motion treatment only “if the motion is filed by a defendant after an indictment … seeking forfeiture of the property has been filed.” The Court points out that Martre omitted the italicized statutory condition in his briefing and that his indictment did not seek forfeiture under R.C. Chapter 2981. That observation undermines his statutory premise entirely. Still, the Court grounds its holding on the more fundamental jurisdictional and adequate-remedy principles, expressly stating that even if R.C. 2981.03 applied, prohibition is not the correct vehicle.

Impact

This decision substantially clarifies two practical points at the intersection of criminal procedure and extraordinary-writ practice in Ohio.

Boundary-policing for prohibition actions
Litigants cannot use prohibition to collaterally attack a trial court’s postsentence handling of property-return motions on the theory that the court misapplied R.C. 2981.03. When the common pleas court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal case, any failure to invoke R.C. 2981.03(A)(4) is a nonjurisdictional procedural error, reviewable, if at all, by appeal or other ordinary remedies.
Clarification of R.C. 2981.03(A)(4)’s trigger
The footnote offers a key statutory clarification: the “treat as a motion to suppress” directive applies only where the indictment seeks forfeiture of the property under R.C. Chapter 2981. Absent such an indictment, R.C. 2981.03(A)(4) does not mandate suppression-motion treatment. This narrows the circumstances in which postsentence property-return motions become vehicles for suppression analysis.

Downstream, expect courts of appeals to cite this decision when rejecting prohibition complaints aimed at converting garden-variety property-return disputes into retroactive suppression contests. For trial courts, the opinion provides assurance that routine orders on property disposition in closed cases do not expose them to jurisdictional writs. For defendants, it underscores the importance of timely direct appeals and correct statutory framing when challenging searches, seizures, or property dispositions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Writ of Prohibition: An extraordinary remedy used to prevent a lower court from exercising judicial power it does not have. It is not a tool to correct legal errors made in the course of valid jurisdiction.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction vs. Exercise of Jurisdiction: Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear a class of cases (e.g., felony cases in common pleas courts). Errors in applying statutes or rules within such cases are “exercise of jurisdiction” errors. Prohibition generally lies only when there is no subject-matter jurisdiction, not for mere procedural mistakes.
Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction: A narrow exception that allows prohibition without showing lack of an adequate remedy if it is obvious on the face of things that the lower court lacks jurisdiction. That was not the case here.
Adequate Remedy at Law: If a party can appeal or otherwise seek relief through standard procedures, prohibition is improper. Martre appealed the 2021 order, so he had an adequate remedy.
R.C. 2981.03(A)(4) (Forfeiture Statute): Allows a person to challenge a seizure. The “treat as a motion to suppress” directive applies only if the indictment seeks forfeiture of the property. Without a forfeiture count, that conversion requirement does not trigger.

Key Takeaways

A trial court’s handling of a postsentence motion for return of property—right or wrong—occurs within its subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal case; prohibition is not available to police alleged misapplications of R.C. 2981.03.
R.C. 2981.03(A)(4)’s “motion to suppress” treatment applies only when the indictment seeks forfeiture of the property under R.C. Chapter 2981.
Even assuming a procedural statute required different handling, errors of application are correctable by appeal, not by extraordinary writ.
The Supreme Court’s prior ruling in State ex rel. Martre v. Reed (2024) forecloses relitigation via writ where the relator already pursued an appeal of the property-return order.

Conclusion

State ex rel. Martre v. Reed reaffirms a bedrock jurisdictional principle: prohibition is not a backdoor appeal to remedy alleged procedural missteps in a court that plainly has subject-matter jurisdiction. By anchoring its holding in Pratts, Paschke, and related authority, the Court keeps the writ within its narrow channel and signals that disputes over the treatment of property-return motions—including arguments about R.C. 2981.03(A)(4)—must be raised through ordinary appellate pathways. The opinion also helpfully clarifies that the suppression-motion conversion in R.C. 2981.03(A)(4) is contingent on an indictment seeking forfeiture, a limitation that will guide litigants and trial courts alike. In short, the case tightens the boundary between jurisdictional defects and correctable trial error, promoting finality and channeling challenges into the ordinary course of law.