No Private Right to Enforce County Zoning Against the State via Declaratory Judgment: South Dakota Supreme Court Re-centers Justiciability on a “Claim of Right”

Introduction

In Jensen, Hoffman v. Department of Corrections, 2025 S.D. 35, the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a challenge by neighboring landowners and a local nonprofit to the State’s decision to site a new men’s prison on two state-owned parcels in rural Lincoln County. The case arose after the Department of Corrections (DOC), acting under House Bill 1017 (2023), selected agricultural land for the facility. Plaintiffs—private neighbors and NOPE-Lincoln County, Inc.—sought declaratory and injunctive relief, principally asking the courts to declare that the State must comply with the county’s 2009 Revised Zoning Ordinance and therefore submit to local processes such as a conditional use permit or rezoning.

The State moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including standing, sovereign immunity, and preemption. The circuit court found standing for two plaintiffs but dismissed on immunity and (alternatively) on preemption. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed—but on a different basis. The Court held the controversy was not justiciable because the private plaintiffs lacked a “claim of right” to enforce county zoning against the State through a declaratory judgment action. The Court therefore did not reach sovereign immunity or preemption.

The decision establishes a clear rule: the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not itself confer a private enforcement right. Private parties must identify a substantive source—statutory, constitutional, or common law—that grants them authority to compel the State to comply with local zoning. Because no such source exists in South Dakota’s zoning statutes, and because the legislature assigned zoning enforcement to county officials (with a limited mandamus backstop), the plaintiffs’ suit was nonjusticiable.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court reframed the dispositive question as one of justiciability under the Declaratory Judgments Act, not merely traditional Article III-style standing. Relying on Danforth v. City of Yankton’s four-part justiciability test for declaratory relief, the Court focused on whether plaintiffs had a “claim of right” to the declaration they sought.
The Court held that private plaintiffs lacked any substantive right—statutory, constitutional, or common law—to enforce Lincoln County’s zoning ordinance against the State. The Declaratory Judgments Act is procedural and does not create new rights.
South Dakota’s zoning statutes place enforcement with county commissions (SDCL 11-2-25). Private individuals are not authorized to enforce county zoning; the legislature provided only a limited mandamus remedy for taxpayers to compel county officials to perform duties (SDCL 11-2-35).
Because plaintiffs had no enforceable claim of right, the controversy was nonjusticiable. The Court affirmed dismissal on that ground and expressly declined to reach sovereign immunity and preemption.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

The Court’s analysis integrates longstanding South Dakota and persuasive out-of-state authority to realign the threshold inquiry in declaratory judgment cases.

Danforth v. City of Yankton, 71 S.D. 406, 25 N.W.2d 50 (1946). Danforth provides the four requirements for declaratory relief, including that a plaintiff must assert a “claim of right.” The Court emphasized that this requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, traditional standing inquiries. Plaintiffs must do more than show injury; they must have a legally protectible right to the relief sought.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kinsman, 2009 S.D. 53, 768 N.W.2d 540; Agar Sch. Dist. v. McGee, 527 N.W.2d 282 (S.D. 1995) (Wuest, J., concurring/dissenting); Lick v. Dahl, 285 N.W.2d 594 (S.D. 1979). These cases underscore that the Declaratory Judgments Act does not create substantive rights and cannot be used to circumvent legislative procedures or limitations. The Court analogized to tax refund cases where declaratory relief cannot stand in for statutorily prescribed remedies.
Hostler v. Davison Cnty. Drainage Comm’n, 2022 S.D. 24, 974 N.W.2d 415. The Court invoked Hostler to illustrate the mismatch between declaratory relief and a request to compel government compliance absent a direct claim under a statute or ordinance. As in Hostler, plaintiffs here were not seeking construction of an instrument affecting their rights; they were seeking enforcement against the government.
In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling re SDCL 62-1-1(6), 2016 S.D. 21, 877 N.W.2d 340; Highmark Fed. Credit Union v. Hunter, 2012 S.D. 37, 814 N.W.2d 413. These decisions reflect that “statutory standing”—the legislature’s creation of a private right to sue—can supply the requisite legal interest. The absence of such an enactment here was decisive.
Cuka v. Sch. Bd. of Bon Homme Sch. Dist., 264 N.W.2d 924 (S.D. 1978); Crowley v. Trezona, 408 N.W.2d 332 (S.D. 1987); Sweetman Constr. Co. v. State, 293 N.W.2d 457 (S.D. 1980). These cases exemplify South Dakota’s practice of asking whether a statute authorizes a particular plaintiff to sue—the essence of statutory standing.
Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453 (S.D. 1977). Plaintiffs relied on Johnson’s “balancing of interests” test, developed for conflicts between local governmental entities (there, a city landfill within a county). The Court declined to reach or extend Johnson because plaintiffs failed the threshold justiciability inquiry; no private right permits them to invoke that municipal balancing test against the State.
Broad Reach Power, LLC v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regul., 520 P.3d 301 (Mont. 2022). Cited for the premise that courts may (and should) raise justiciability sua sponte because nonjusticiable matters are beyond judicial power.
Persuasive authorities on the nature of declaratory relief: Cherrie v. Virginia Health Servs., Inc., 787 S.E.2d 855 (Va. 2016); Lowell v. Hayes, 117 P.3d 745 (Alaska 2005); Sommer v. Misty Valley, LLC, 511 P.3d 833 (Idaho 2021); Beahringer v. Page, 789 N.E.2d 1216 (Ill. 2003); Wilson v. Kelley, 617 A.2d 433 (Conn. 1992); Am. Linen Supply of N.M., Inc. v. City of Las Cruces, 385 P.2d 359 (N.M. 1963); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983); Hodgdon v. Campbell, 411 A.2d 667 (Me. 1980). Collectively, these decisions reinforce a uniform principle: declaratory judgments vindicate existing rights; they do not create new ones.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three key moves.

Re-centering on justiciability’s “claim of right” requirement. While the circuit court and parties focused on injury-based standing (e.g., property value diminution), the Supreme Court emphasized that declaratory relief also requires a plaintiff to have a legally protectible claim to the declaration sought. This derives from Danforth’s first and third requirements for declaratory judgment actions.
Declaratory judgments are procedural; they do not confer private enforcement authority. Plaintiffs’ filings suggested the Declaratory Judgments Act itself supplied the mechanism to enforce county zoning against the State. The Court rejected that premise. Declaratory relief cannot be used to manufacture a private right to compel governmental compliance where the legislature has not provided one. South Dakota’s zoning chapter does not authorize private enforcement and instead assigns enforcement to county commissioners (SDCL 11-2-25) with a narrow taxpayer mandamus remedy to compel county officials to perform legal duties (SDCL 11-2-35).
No statutory, constitutional, or common-law right of action exists here. Plaintiffs identified no statute authorizing private enforcement of county zoning against the State, no constitutional entitlement, and no common-law cause of action to compel such compliance. Their “necessity” argument—that the county believed itself unable or was unwilling to sue the State—could not substitute for a legislatively conferred right. The Court noted the appropriate, legislatively crafted alternative: mandamus to compel county officials to enforce the zoning ordinance, if a clear duty exists.

Because plaintiffs lacked a claim of right, the action was nonjusticiable. The Court thus had no occasion to decide whether sovereign immunity barred the suit, whether HB 1017 preempted local zoning, or whether the Johnson “balancing of interests” test might ever apply in a State-versus-county context. The Court also observed that plaintiffs were not actually seeking construction of HB 1017 or the county ordinance—another mismatch with SDCL 21-24-3’s paradigm for declaratory relief.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

The decision is significant in several respects, both doctrinal and practical.

Clarifies the threshold in declaratory judgment cases. Jensen firmly re-anchors South Dakota’s declaratory judgment jurisprudence to Danforth’s “claim of right” requirement. Practitioners should not assume that injury-based standing suffices for declaratory relief. Courts will ask: what substantive source authorizes this plaintiff to obtain this declaration?
Limits private enforcement of local zoning against the State. Private landowners and civic groups cannot sue the State directly to force its compliance with county zoning via declaratory or injunctive relief unless a statute grants them that right. The appropriate channel—if county officials decline to enforce—may be mandamus under SDCL 11-2-35 to compel the county to perform its statutory duties, assuming those duties are clear and ministerial.
Leaves sovereign immunity and preemption unresolved. The Court expressly did not decide whether the State is immune from local zoning enforcement or whether HB 1017 preempts county zoning. Those questions remain open for a procedurally proper case—for example, an action brought by a party with a legislatively conferred enforcement right or a mandamus proceeding to compel county action that squarely presents the conflict.
No extension of the Johnson “balancing of interests” test to State actions. While Johnson remains a tool for resolving intergovernmental zoning conflicts (e.g., city versus county), Jensen signals that such balancing will not be reached unless a proper plaintiff with a claim of right brings the case. The Court did not foreclose application of Johnson in a future State-versus-local dispute, but it made clear that private plaintiffs cannot be the ones to trigger that balancing absent statutory authorization.
Signals potential legislative pathways. If the legislature wants citizen enforcement of county zoning—or wants to specify the State’s relationship to local land-use controls—it can create explicit private rights of action, set procedures, or clarify preemption/immunity rules. Jensen puts the policy choice squarely back with the legislature.
Practical guidance for neighbors and community groups. Those wishing to challenge State siting decisions that may contravene county zoning should:
- Petition county officials to enforce their ordinances;
- If officials refuse or fail to act, consider mandamus under SDCL 11-2-35 to compel performance of clear duties;
- Monitor for any agency processes or statutory avenues that might confer participant or challenger status; and
- Engage the legislative process to shape statewide siting and preemption rules.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Declaratory judgment. A judicial tool that lets courts declare existing legal rights or statuses, often to resolve uncertainty. It is procedural only; it does not create new rights or remedies. To obtain declaratory relief, a plaintiff must show a justiciable controversy, including a legally protectible “claim of right” to the declaration sought.
Justiciability vs. standing. Standing (injury, causation, redressability) is one facet of justiciability. In declaratory judgment actions, South Dakota adds Danforth’s requirements—especially the need for a claim of right. Even if a plaintiff can show injury, the suit can still be nonjusticiable if the plaintiff lacks a substantive right to the declaration.
Statutory standing/private right of action. A legislature can authorize specific persons to sue to enforce a statute or ordinance. Without such authorization—or an applicable common-law or constitutional claim—private parties generally cannot compel government compliance.
Zoning enforcement structure. Under SDCL 11-2-25, county commissions are responsible for enforcing county zoning regulations. Private individuals are not designated enforcers. A limited remedy exists: any taxpayer may seek mandamus to compel officials to perform clear duties (SDCL 11-2-35).
Sovereign immunity and preemption. Sovereign immunity shields the State from certain suits. Preemption addresses conflicts between state and local law. Jensen does not decide either question; it rests entirely on justiciability.
“Balancing of interests” (Lincoln County v. Johnson). A judicial test used to resolve conflicts between local governmental entities’ land-use prerogatives by weighing competing governmental interests. Jensen does not extend this balancing to allow private plaintiffs to enforce zoning against the State.
Escheat. The process by which property reverts to the State in the absence of heirs or claimants, with proceeds often dedicated to public purposes (e.g., schools). Here, the parcels were acquired by the State via escheat in 1992 and later sold to DOC after appraisal.

Conclusion

Jensen, Hoffman v. Department of Corrections clarifies a fundamental threshold principle: private parties cannot use South Dakota’s Declaratory Judgments Act to enforce county zoning ordinances against the State absent a substantive right of action. The Act is not a font of enforcement power; it is a procedural mechanism to declare rights that exist elsewhere in law. Because the legislature vested county commissions with zoning enforcement and provided only a limited mandamus remedy for taxpayers to compel official action, the plaintiffs’ suit was nonjusticiable and properly dismissed.

The ruling does not resolve whether the State must comply with county zoning for a prison site, whether HB 1017 preempts local land use controls, or whether sovereign immunity would bar such claims. Those questions await a properly framed case with an authorized plaintiff. For now, Jensen restores a disciplined approach to justiciability in declaratory judgment actions and delineates the proper institutional roles: legislatures decide who may enforce, executive officials enforce, and courts adjudicate when a plaintiff comes with a bona fide claim of right.