No Prevailing-Party Fees for Preliminary Injunctions That Become Moot: Sixth Circuit Implements Lackey v. Stinnie in Maryville Baptist Church v. Beshear

Case: Maryville Baptist Church v. Andy Beshear (No. 24-5737)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Panel: Chief Judge Sutton; Judges McKeague and Nalbandian
Date: March 25, 2025
Disposition: Affirmed (denial of attorney’s fees)

Introduction

This appeal arises from a high-profile clash between pandemic-era executive orders and religious exercise rights. In spring 2020, Maryville Baptist Church and its pastor challenged Kentucky Governor Andy Beshear’s COVID-19 restrictions that prohibited “mass gatherings,” including faith-based services, while exempting a number of secular venues and activities. The Church quickly secured preliminary injunctive relief permitting both outdoor and indoor worship. But subsequent executive and legislative actions mooted the case before a final judgment on the merits.

The only question presented on appeal was whether the Church—which obtained a preliminary injunction but no final judgment before mootness—qualifies as a “prevailing party” entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Sixth Circuit’s answer derives directly from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lackey v. Stinnie, 145 S. Ct. 659 (2025), which imposes a bright-line rule that preliminary injunctions mooted before final adjudication do not confer prevailing-party status. Applying that rule, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of fees.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the panel, Chief Judge Sutton held that, in light of Lackey v. Stinnie, a plaintiff who wins a preliminary injunction but whose case becomes moot before any merits judgment does not “prevail” for purposes of § 1988. The opinion emphasizes that the Supreme Court now requires “enduring judicial relief on the merits” that “conclusively resolves a claim” and “materially alters the legal relationship between the parties.” Preliminary injunctions typically represent “temporary success at an intermediary stage,” and when a case later goes moot due to external events, any ongoing benefit flows from those events—not from an enduring, merits-based court order. Because Maryville’s litigation ended in mootness after preliminary relief, it cannot obtain § 1988 fees.

The court also acknowledged that the Sixth Circuit had previously recognized “occasional exceptions” permitting fee awards following certain preliminary injunctions. But the opinion concludes that those exceptions cannot be reconciled with Lackey’s bright-line rule and thus must yield to the Supreme Court’s directive in the “hierarchical system of precedent.”

Detailed Analysis

Factual and Procedural Background

• March 2020: Governor Beshear issues orders prohibiting “mass gatherings,” including religious services, and closing non–life-sustaining businesses. Religious organizations could provide certain social services but otherwise were subject to closure; numerous secular activities and businesses were exempted.
• April 12, 2020 (Easter): Maryville holds services with congregants inside and in cars; Kentucky State Police notify attendees of violations.
• Appellate and District Court Relief: The Sixth Circuit initially stayed enforcement as to outdoor worship; shortly thereafter, the district court entered a preliminary injunction protecting indoor and outdoor worship.
• Subsequent Events: The Governor allowed worship services to reopen the day after the preliminary injunction; in 2021 the Kentucky General Assembly curtailed the Governor’s emergency powers (see Cameron v. Beshear, 628 S.W.3d 61 (Ky. 2021)); the federal case was dismissed as moot in October 2021.
• Fee Petition: The district court denied § 1988 fees, finding no prevailing-party status; the Church appealed.

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

The opinion situates the fee dispute within a well-developed body of Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit law on “prevailing party” status.

1) Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)

Buckhannon sets the modern baseline for fee shifting. It rejects the “catalyst theory,” under which a plaintiff could recover fees if the lawsuit prompted a defendant to voluntarily change conduct. Instead, Buckhannon requires a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,” such as a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree. The Maryville opinion invokes Buckhannon to remind that fee eligibility turns on relief with judicial imprimatur that materially and formally alters the parties’ legal relationship.

2) McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2010) and Progeny

Before Lackey, the Sixth Circuit “usually” denied fees when a plaintiff obtained only preliminary relief. But it acknowledged “occasional exceptions” where a preliminary injunction effectively resolved the merits and had enduring effect. Representative cases include:

• Roberts v. Neace, 65 F.4th 280 (6th Cir. 2023): Restated the “ordinary” rule that a preliminary injunction alone does not suffice, while recognizing narrow, merits-driven exceptions.
• Tennessee State Conference of the NAACP v. Hargett, 53 F.4th 406 (6th Cir. 2022); Miller v. Caudill, 936 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2019); Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region v. Dewine, 931 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2019): Instances where fees followed preliminary relief that was materially merits-based and durably altered the parties’ legal relationship.

Maryville acknowledges this line but holds it cannot survive Lackey’s categorical rule as to cases mooted before final judgment.

3) Lackey v. Stinnie, 145 S. Ct. 659 (2025)

Lackey provides the controlling rule. There, plaintiffs secured a preliminary injunction against a Virginia driver’s license suspension law, but the legislature later repealed the statute, mooting the case before final judgment. The Supreme Court held that such plaintiffs are not prevailing parties under § 1988. To “prevail,” a litigant must obtain enduring relief that “conclusively resolves a claim” on the merits and materially alters the parties’ legal relationship. Preliminary injunctions, by contrast, are “temporary” and “intermediary”; if the case becomes moot without a final merits ruling, any ongoing benefit is attributable to post-litigation events, not a conclusive judicial determination.

4) Hawver v. United States, 808 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2015)

Cited to underscore the hierarchical nature of precedent: where Supreme Court precedent conflicts with prior circuit decisions, the latter must give way. Maryville uses Hawver to confirm that Lackey abrogates Sixth Circuit “occasional exception” cases to the extent they suggested fees could follow a preliminary injunction when the case ends in mootness pre-judgment.

5) Cameron v. Beshear, 628 S.W.3d 61 (Ky. 2021)

Not a fee-shifting case, Cameron explains the state legislative action limiting the Governor’s emergency powers. Its significance here is factual: along with executive changes to the orders, it contributed to mootness, which foreclosed any pathway to a merits judgment in the Church’s federal case.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in three steps:

1. The relevant statutory text—§ 1988(b)—permits fees to a “prevailing party.” Buckhannon and Lackey define this term to require a judicially sanctioned, conclusive, merits-based determination that materially alters the parties’ legal relationship in an enduring way.
2. Preliminary injunctions, by their nature, are interlocutory and tentative. They reflect a likelihood-of-success assessment, not a final merits decision. Even if they temporarily protect the plaintiff’s interests, they do not “conclusively resolve” claims. And where a case becomes moot before final judgment—due to legislative repeals or policy changes—the judiciary’s preliminary orders do not supply the enduring, merits-based change required for fee eligibility.
3. To the extent Sixth Circuit precedent previously allowed “occasional exceptions” for fees after preliminary relief, those cases cannot be reconciled with Lackey’s bright-line rule. Under the Supreme Court’s hierarchical authority, those exceptions are no longer available where the suit ends in mootness prior to final judgment. Applying Lackey to Maryville’s facts, the Church’s “transient victory” via preliminary injunction does not make it a prevailing party; any ongoing freedom to worship came from the Governor’s revised orders and the Kentucky General Assembly’s legislation, not from a final court decree.

Impact and Implications

The opinion has significant consequences for civil rights litigation strategy and fee-shifting practice under § 1988.

• Uniform Rule in the Sixth Circuit: The court eliminates its prior “occasional exceptions” doctrine for cases that end in mootness before final adjudication. Litigants can no longer argue that materially merits-driven preliminary injunctions justify fees if the case moots pre-judgment.
• Incentives and Litigation Strategy: Plaintiffs seeking fees must now secure enduring, merits-based judicial relief. Practical pathways include:
  • Prosecuting the case to a final merits judgment (e.g., permanent injunction or declaratory judgment).
  • Obtaining a court-ordered consent decree or stipulated judgment with judicial imprimatur.
  • Preserving live claims that can prevent mootness—for example, claims for nominal damages, which may sustain a case even when prospective relief becomes unnecessary.
• Effects on Emergency Litigation: While preliminary injunctions remain vital to guard against imminent harm, they no longer carry fee entitlement if the case moots before judgment. This may reduce fee recovery in fast-moving, policy-driven disputes where government defendants change course mid-stream.
• Reduced Satellite Litigation over Fees: Lackey’s bright-line rule decreases case-by-case wrangling about whether a preliminary injunction was “merits-like” or “enduring,” promoting predictability and efficiency in fee determinations.
• Alignment with Buckhannon: The decision reinforces Buckhannon’s insistence on judicially sanctioned, durable relief—further cabining catalyst-style arguments that voluntary policy changes triggered by litigation should yield fees.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Prevailing Party: To be a “prevailing party,” a plaintiff must obtain court-ordered, durable relief that conclusively resolves a claim on the merits and changes the legal relationship with the defendant. Examples typically include a final judgment or a court-approved consent decree. Merely influencing a defendant to change behavior, or obtaining temporary relief that evaporates before judgment, is not enough.
• Preliminary Injunction: A temporary order designed to maintain the status quo and prevent irreparable harm while litigation proceeds. It relies on a predictive, not definitive, assessment of the merits (likelihood of success). It is not a final adjudication.
• Mootness: A case becomes moot when there is no longer a live controversy for the court to resolve, often because circumstances change (e.g., law repeal, policy revision). Federal courts must dismiss moot cases because Article III jurisdiction requires an actual, ongoing dispute.
• Enduring Judicial Relief: Relief that persists because of a court’s definitive ruling on the merits—such as a permanent injunction, declaratory judgment, or consent decree—not merely because the defendant voluntarily changed course.
• Judicial Imprimatur: A formal, binding court action altering the parties’ legal relationship (e.g., entering judgment), as opposed to a defendant’s unilateral policy change or a non-binding settlement.

Conclusion

Maryville Baptist Church v. Beshear cements in the Sixth Circuit the Supreme Court’s bright-line rule from Lackey v. Stinnie: a plaintiff who secures a preliminary injunction but whose case becomes moot before a final merits decision is not a “prevailing party” under § 1988. The court’s opinion both harmonizes circuit precedent with Lackey and clarifies that prior “occasional exceptions” for fees after preliminary relief are no longer viable when suits end in mootness pre-judgment.

The decision meaningfully reshapes incentives in civil rights litigation. Plaintiffs seeking fee recovery must aim for enduring, merits-based judicial relief—through final judgments or consent decrees—rather than relying on the provisional success of preliminary injunctions in cases susceptible to mootness. By aligning fee awards with conclusive judicial outcomes, the opinion promotes predictability and preserves the boundary Buckhannon and Lackey draw between temporary, interim victories and true prevailing-party success.

Key Takeaways

• Bright-line rule: Preliminary injunctions that become moot before a final judgment do not confer prevailing-party status under § 1988.
• Sixth Circuit “occasional exceptions” to this rule are abrogated to the extent they conflict with Lackey.
• Enduring, merits-based relief with judicial imprimatur (final judgment, consent decree) remains the touchstone for fee eligibility.
• Strategic litigation choices—such as seeking final declaratory relief or ensuring claims survive mootness—may be necessary to preserve the possibility of fee awards.