The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the sentence. It held that:

1. Because Camacho did not object below, his due process claim is reviewed only for plain error.
2. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s sentencing‑package doctrine (as articulated in United States v. Fowler), the focus for vindictiveness purposes is whether the total aggregate sentence increased on resentencing, not whether the Guidelines offense level or the sentence on any individual count increased.
3. Since Camacho’s aggregate sentence remained 535 months, there was no presumption of vindictiveness.
4. In the absence of that presumption, Camacho bore the burden to show actual vindictiveness, which he failed to do, especially given the district court’s record‑based explanation (gruesome conduct requiring sufficient punishment and deterrence).
5. Because there was no error, Camacho could not satisfy the first prong of the plain error test; his due process challenge therefore failed.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)

Pearce is the foundational case on vindictive sentencing. There, the Supreme Court held that due process is offended when a trial judge imposes a harsher sentence upon reconviction as a punishment for the defendant’s decision to appeal or collaterally attack a conviction. The Court announced two key propositions:

• The sentencing authority may not penalize a defendant for successfully exercising a statutory or constitutional right.
• When a harsher sentence is imposed after a new trial, it must be supported by objective information concerning identifiable conduct occurring after the original sentencing.

Although later cases narrowed Pearce, the core due process rule—that a defendant cannot be punished for appealing—remains central. The Camacho panel expressly grounds its due process framework in this line of authority, quoting Pearce’s admonition that vindictiveness “must play no part” in the new sentence.

2. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)

In Blackledge, the Court extended the vindictiveness concept beyond sentencing to charging decisions. After a defendant exercised his right to a trial de novo, the prosecutor obtained a more serious felony indictment based on the same conduct. The Court held that such practices risk a chilling effect on defendants’ willingness to pursue their rights, and therefore create an unacceptable danger of vindictiveness.

The Camacho opinion cites Blackledge mainly to situate the case within the broader doctrine: both Pearce and Blackledge represent situations where post‑exercise government action carries a high risk of retaliation, justifying a presumption of vindictiveness.

3. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982)

Goodwin significantly narrowed automatic vindictiveness presumptions. The Court emphasized that such presumptions are appropriate only when there is a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness”; otherwise, the defendant must prove actual retaliatory motive. The Court warned against over‑expanding the presumption, as many legitimate prosecutorial or judicial decisions may be made after a defendant exercises legal rights.

The Eleventh Circuit in Camacho relies on Goodwin’s core insight: not all adverse changes after a defendant asserts a right are suspect; only when circumstances objectively suggest a realistic danger of retaliation does the presumption arise.

4. Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989)

Smith clarifies and limits Pearce:

• The presumption of vindictiveness applies only where there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the harsher sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness.
• Where no such reasonable likelihood exists, the defendant must shoulder the burden of proving actual vindictiveness.

Smith also explained that a difference in the information available to the sentencing court can justify a different sentence without any inference of retaliation. In Camacho, the court quotes Smith directly to emphasize that the presumption is not automatic: its availability depends on an objective assessment of the risk of vindictive motivation.

5. United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010 (11th Cir. 2014)

Fowler is the Eleventh Circuit’s key precedent applying vindictiveness principles to multi‑count resentencings. Fowler initially received a sentence of life plus ten years. After he successfully challenged one underlying count, the district court resentenced him to life on the surviving count alone.

The defendant argued that the resentencing was vindictive because the sentence on the remaining count itself had effectively “jumped” from 10 years to life. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that argument, articulating what has come to be known as the “sentencing‑package doctrine” in this context:

• A multi‑count sentence is a “package of sanctions”, crafted as an integrated whole.
• If one component of that package (a conviction or count) is vacated, the district court is entitled to “repackage” the sentence on resentencing, consistent with the Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
• For vindictiveness purposes, the key question is whether the defendant’s total aggregate punishment increased on resentencing, not whether the sentence on any individual count increased.

In Fowler’s case, because the aggregate sentence dropped from life plus ten years to life, there was no increase in total punishment and thus no presumption of vindictiveness.

Camacho’s case is, in many ways, Fowler’s twin: the aggregate sentence did not increase, even though the Guidelines calculations shifted. The panel relies heavily on Fowler and applies its aggregate‑punishment framework directly: as long as the overall term (535 months) does not grow, there is no Pearce‑type presumption of vindictiveness—even if the Guidelines calculation becomes more severe.

6. Other Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court Authorities

The opinion also relies on a series of Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court decisions on standards of review and plain error:

• United States v. Bowers, 811 F.3d 412 (11th Cir. 2016) – constitutional sentencing challenges are ordinarily reviewed de novo.
• United States v. Raad, 406 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2005) – unpreserved sentencing errors are reviewed for plain error.
• United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003 (11th Cir. 2007) – an issue is preserved only if the objection clearly alerts the court and the opposing party to the specific grounds later raised on appeal.
• United States v. Hall, 314 F.3d 565 (11th Cir. 2002) – lays out the four‑prong plain‑error test.
• United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2005) – “plain” error must be clear or obvious at the time of appellate consideration.
• Rosales‑Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018) – defines the “substantial rights” prong as requiring a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome would have been different.
• United States v. Boone, 97 F.4th 1331 (11th Cir. 2024) – discussed briefly in a footnote for its treatment of the invited error doctrine: if a defendant affirmatively agrees to a calculation or ruling, appellate review may be precluded entirely.

These authorities collectively frame how strictly Camacho’s unpreserved constitutional claim must be evaluated on appeal.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standard of Review: Plain Error for Unpreserved Due Process Claims

Although constitutional challenges to a sentence are normally reviewed de novo, the panel emphasizes that:

• Failure to object in the district court triggers plain‑error review, even for constitutional arguments.
• At resentencing, defense counsel affirmatively stated there were no objections to the PSR and that the Guidelines were “correct.” Camacho also did not object to the sentence or its factual predicate.
• Thus, his due process/vindictiveness claim is raised for the first time on appeal and is evaluated under the exacting plain‑error standard.

Under that standard, Camacho needed to show:

1. There was error,
2. The error was plain (clear or obvious),
3. The error affected his substantial rights (a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for the error), and
4. The error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The panel resolves the case at step one: there was no error because the sentence was not vindictive under governing law.

2. Substantive Due Process: Vindictiveness and Presumptions

The court then turns to the core substantive question under Pearce, Blackledge, Goodwin, and Smith: when is a court required to presume that a harsher outcome following a successful appeal or collateral attack is vindictive?

The governing framework, as stated by the Supreme Court and reiterated by the panel, is:

• Due process forbids punishment **because** a defendant exercised a legal right.
• A presumption of vindictiveness applies only when there is a “reasonable likelihood” that a harsher penalty reflects retaliatory motive.
• Where no such reasonable likelihood appears, the burden remains on the defendant to prove actual vindictiveness.

The question, then, is whether increasing the offense level and Guidelines range—but not the aggregate sentence—creates such a “reasonable likelihood.” To answer that, the panel turns to Fowler and the sentencing‑package doctrine.

3. The Sentencing‑Package Doctrine and Aggregate Punishment

The heart of the opinion is its application of Fowler’s sentencing‑package framework:

• A defendant convicted on multiple counts receives a single, integrated sentence—a “package of sanctions”—reflecting the court’s holistic application of the Guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors.
• If a conviction on one count is later vacated, the package is “unpacked,” and the district court is permitted (and often expected) to “repackage” the sentence structure at resentencing.
• For vindictiveness purposes, the relevant comparison under Pearce is not count‑by‑count or guideline‑by‑guideline, but rather the overall aggregate punishment before and after resentencing.

Key doctrinal point reaffirmed in Camacho:
“Whether a defendant’s sentence has become ‘more severe’ for purposes of invoking the Pearce rule should depend on whether his total punishment has increased upon resentencing, not whether his punishment on a single surviving count of conviction has increased.” (Fowler, as quoted in the opinion, emphasis in original.)

The panel straightforwardly applies that rule here: since Camacho’s aggregate term remained 535 months, his total punishment did not increase. Therefore, there is no “more severe” sentence in the Pearce/Fowler sense, and no presumption of vindictiveness arises.

4. Application to Camacho’s Resentencing

Camacho’s core argument was that his sentence became, in his words, “increased” and “more severe” because:

• His total offense level rose from 35 to 38,
• His Guidelines range thus became higher, and
• The resentencing court revisited enhancements, adding certain firearm‑brandishing adjustments.

The panel’s reply is blunt: the increase in offense level and Guidelines range is not dispositive. The only thing that matters, for purposes of the Pearce presumption, is the aggregate term of imprisonment:

• Before vacatur and resentencing: 535 months.
• After vacatur and resentencing: 535 months.

Therefore:

• No increase in total punishment → no “more severe” sentence under Fowler.
• No “more severe” sentence → no Pearce/Smith presumption of vindictiveness.

Once the presumption is off the table, Camacho is left to prove actual vindictiveness. The panel finds that he does not even come close:

• The district court’s stated rationale for the above‑Guidelines sentence was the extreme brutality of the offenses, including torture with a blowtorch.
• The court explained that an above‑Guidelines term of 535 months was needed to provide “sufficient punishment and deterrence.”
• These were non‑vindictive, on‑the‑record justifications that are wholly independent of any exercise of appellate or post‑conviction rights.

Without any affirmative evidence that the district court sought to retaliate against Camacho for challenging his conviction, the court finds no error, much less plain error. Accordingly, the sentence is affirmed.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Clarification: Guidelines Severity Alone Does Not Trigger Pearce Presumption

The most notable doctrinal reinforcement in Camacho is the explicit rejection of the notion that a higher Guidelines offense level or a higher Guidelines range at resentencing, standing alone, can give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness.

In other words, the case stands for the proposition that:

An increased Sentencing Guidelines calculation on resentencing, without an increase in the defendant’s total term of imprisonment, does not, in the Eleventh Circuit, create a presumption of vindictive sentencing under North Carolina v. Pearce.

This is a significant clarification for federal sentencing practice: it underscores the dominance of the aggregate‑sentence comparison in vindictiveness analysis, and de‑emphasizes the exact movement of Guidelines components when the total term is stable or lower.

2. Practical Consequences for District Courts

For sentencing judges, Camacho reinforces that:

• After vacatur of one or more counts, the court may recalculate the Guidelines and restructure the sentence package, including adding enhancements that now become applicable in light of the changed posture.
• So long as the total sentence is not increased in retaliation for the defendant’s successful challenge, and particularly so long as the total sentence does not increase at all, the risk of a Pearce presumption is minimal.
• The court should nevertheless create a clear record by tying the sentence to the § 3553(a) factors and the facts of the offense (as the district court did here by referencing the blowtorch torture), which helps defeat any claim of actual vindictiveness.

3. Practical Consequences for Defense Counsel

Camacho includes two important practical lessons for defense attorneys:

1. Preserve objections at resentencing.
   Camacho’s vindictiveness arguments were forced into the narrow channel of plain‑error review. Moreover, the government argued (and the panel noted) that defense counsel may even have invited error by affirmatively stating that the Guidelines calculations were correct. In future cases, defense counsel who believe that resentencing adjustments inflict a practical penalty for a successful appeal should:
   • Object on the record to any allegedly retaliatory recalculations or enhancements, and
   • Avoid blanket statements that all Guidelines computations are correct if they intend to challenge them later.
2. Focus on aggregate exposure, not just per‑count or Guideline shifts.
   Because the Eleventh Circuit’s vindictiveness presumption hinges on total punishment, counsel should:
   • Compare the pre‑ and post‑resentencing aggregate terms.
   • Be prepared to show either an increase in total imprisonment or some other tangible increase in punishment (e.g., supervised release conditions) before arguing that Pearce applies.

4. Relationship to the Advisory Guidelines System

The case also illustrates an important reality of the post‑Booker world: even where the Guidelines range increases, the decisive question is the actual sentence imposed. The Guidelines are advisory; district courts may vary upward or downward as long as they justify the variance under § 3553(a).

Here, the district court again imposed an above‑Guidelines sentence, both before and after vacatur. That continuity, coupled with the court’s articulated reasons, made it especially difficult for Camacho to argue that the resentencing process itself penalized him for his successful challenge.

5. Precedential Status and Persuasive Weight

The opinion is labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” which under Eleventh Circuit practice means it is unpublished and not binding precedent. However:

• Unpublished opinions may still be cited as persuasive authority, particularly on closely related facts.
• Camacho explicitly applies and reinforces a published and binding decision—Fowler—and thus provides a concrete example of how Fowler operates when the Guidelines range changes but the aggregate sentence remains fixed.

Future litigants in the Eleventh Circuit can therefore reasonably rely on Camacho as a persuasive illustration of the court’s approach to vindictiveness claims in the resentencing context.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Plain Error Review

When a defendant fails to object to an issue in the district court, the appellate court usually reviews that issue only for plain error. This is a highly deferential standard.

To win under plain‑error review, a defendant must show:

• Error – the district court did something wrong.
• Plain – the error is clear or obvious under current law.
• Affected substantial rights – there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different without the error.
• Serious effect on the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings – the mistake is so serious that the appellate court should correct it even though it was not raised below.

In Camacho, the court never gets past step one because it finds no error at all in the resentencing.

2. Presumption of Vindictiveness vs. Actual Vindictiveness

Presumption of vindictiveness is a legal shortcut: in certain situations, courts will assume that a harsher outcome after a successful appeal is retaliatory, unless the government or the court can provide objective, non‑retaliatory reasons.

Actual vindictiveness requires proof that the judge or prosecutor was in fact retaliating against the defendant for exercising a legal right.

In many situations (including Camacho’s), the presumption does not apply because there is no “reasonable likelihood” of vindictiveness. The defendant must then produce evidence—often from the record—that the decisionmaker was improperly motivated.

3. Sentencing‑Package Doctrine

Under this doctrine, when a defendant is convicted on multiple counts, the district court conceptualizes the resulting sentence as a single package that reflects an integrated view of:

• The total harmfulness of the conduct,
• The applicable Sentencing Guidelines, and
• The statutory sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

If one count is later vacated, the court can “open” the package and “repack” it, re‑allocating the total punishment across the remaining counts, so long as the new sentence is lawful and reasonable.

For Pearce purposes, this means the question is whether the overall package became harsher—not whether any individual component did.

4. Offense Level and Guidelines Range

Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines:

• Every federal offense starts with a base offense level.
• Specific offense characteristics and adjustments (e.g., use of a firearm, role in the offense, obstruction of justice) increase or decrease that level.
• The final total offense level, combined with the defendant’s criminal history category, yields an advisory Guidelines sentencing range (e.g., 188–235 months).

In Camacho’s resentencing, the PSR added firearm‑brandishing enhancements, which increased his total offense level from 35 to 38, thereby increasing his Guidelines range. Nevertheless, the court chose an above‑Guidelines sentence of 535 months—just as it had earlier— and that continuity undercut his claim of vindictive motive.

5. Firearm Brandishing Enhancements

The Guidelines often provide enhanced offense levels if a firearm is:

• Possessed,
• Used, or
• Brandished (displayed or referred to in a way that would intimidate a victim).

These enhancements reflect the increased danger and coercive power that firearms add to an offense. In Camacho’s case, such enhancements were applied at resentencing, contributing to the higher offense level.

6. Upward Variance

An upward variance occurs when a judge imposes a sentence that is above the Guidelines range after considering the statutory § 3553(a) factors. Variances are permitted as long as they are explained and reasonable.

The district court in Camacho expressly imposed an above‑Guidelines sentence to reflect:

• The extreme cruelty of the conduct (including torture with a blowtorch), and
• The need to provide adequate punishment and deterrence.

These articulated reasons undercut any inference of vindictiveness.

7. Invited Error Doctrine

Under the invited error doctrine, a party who induced or expressly agreed to a ruling in the district court generally cannot later complain of that ruling on appeal. The doctrine bars review entirely, unlike plain‑error review.

In a footnote, the government suggested that Camacho might have invited any error by affirmatively stating that the Guidelines were correctly calculated. The panel did not decide the issue because it found no error in any event.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Camacho reinforces a clear and pragmatic rule in the Eleventh Circuit’s vindictive‑sentencing jurisprudence: the Due Process Clause’s presumption of vindictiveness focuses on the defendant’s total aggregate punishment, not the intricacies of the Guidelines calculation.

Even though Camacho’s total offense level and Guidelines range increased on resentencing after one count was vacated, his aggregate sentence remained 535 months. Under the sentencing‑package doctrine, this meant his sentence was not “more severe” in the sense relevant to Pearce and Fowler, and thus no presumption of vindictiveness arose. In the absence of that presumption, and given the district court’s non‑vindictive explanation for an above‑Guidelines sentence, Camacho failed to demonstrate any error, let alone plain error.

The opinion offers important guidance:

• District courts may freely recalculate Guidelines and reconfigure multi‑count sentences after vacatur, provided the resentencing is grounded in legitimate sentencing considerations, not retaliation.
• Defendants must carefully preserve objections and focus on aggregate punishment when raising vindictiveness claims.
• In the Eleventh Circuit, an increased Guidelines range without an increased total term of imprisonment will not, by itself, support a presumption that the resentencing court acted vindictively.

In the broader legal context, Camacho is a careful, if unpublished, application of existing Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent. It underscores that due process protections against vindictiveness remain robust, but are tightly cabined to situations where there is a genuine, objectively reasonable likelihood that a defendant is being punished for exercising his rights—not simply where the mechanics of Guidelines calculations have become more severe while the overall sentence has stayed the same.